JUDGMENT : Dr. S.N. Pathak, J. In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, case was taken up through Video Conferencing and heard at length on various dates, lastly on 24.08.2020 and Judgment was reserved and the same is being pronounced today. Concerned lawyers have no objection with regard to the proceeding which has been held through Video Conferencing and there is no complaint in respect to audio and video clarity and quality and after hearing at length, the matter is being disposed of finally. PRAYER OF THE PETITIONER - MANAGEMENT 2. Petitioner-Management has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the Notification of Reference dated 21.06.2007, whereby and whereunder the appropriate government has referred the dispute with respect to the discharge of concerned workman from the service for adjudication before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur and to hold and declare that the dispute is hopelessly stale and not maintainable and valid in law. CASE OF THE PETITIONER – MANAGEMENT 3. Factual matrix of the case is that on 11.12.2003, a dispute was raised by one A.K. Sharma (concerned workman) who was working as a Khalasi in the Bar Forge Shop of the petitioner-Management, with respect to his discharge from the service of the company on 25.01.1996. The said dispute was referred for conciliation. The petitioner-Management appeared before the Conciliation Officer and a reply was filed stating therein that the said dispute was stale and thus not maintainable. The concerned workman was dismissed from the service on 25.01.1996 after conducting fair and proper domestic enquiry for a serious act of misconduct, misappropriation of company’s materials, property and abating by producing forged documents etc. The concerned workman fully participated in the enquiry proceedings and after following principles of natural justice, the workman was held guilty of eleven charges and was dismissed from the Company’s service vide order dated 25.01.1996. Against the said order of discharge dated 25.01.1996, the concerned workman raised the dispute on 11.12.2003 i.e. after more than eight years. The said dispute was referred by the appropriate government for adjudication vide Notification of Reference dated 21.06.2007 on the following terms: “Whether the dismissal of the workman Sri A.K. Sharma, Ex. P. No. – 100218 by the management of M/s. Tisco Ltd. (Now Tata Steel Ltd.), Jamshedpur is justified? The said dispute was referred by the appropriate government for adjudication vide Notification of Reference dated 21.06.2007 on the following terms: “Whether the dismissal of the workman Sri A.K. Sharma, Ex. P. No. – 100218 by the management of M/s. Tisco Ltd. (Now Tata Steel Ltd.), Jamshedpur is justified? If not, then what relief he is entitled to?” Pursuant to the said reference, Reference Case No. 7/2007 has been registered in the labour Court, Jamshedpur in which notices has been issued to the petitioner-Management for appearing and filing written statement, which is under challenge. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER-MANAGEMENT 4. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Manish Mishra and Mr. Piyush Chitresh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-Management argues that the concerned workman was found guilty of as many as eleven charges. The concerned workman fully participated in the enquiry proceedings and after following principles of natural justice, he was dismissed from the service. No industrial dispute existed and the reference itself is bad in the eyes of law. The said reference dated 21.06.2007 under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is not maintainable and hence the same is fit to be quashed. Learned Sr. Counsel further submits that the dispute having been raised after more than eight years from the date of discharge, does not survive and is hopelessly stale and thus the same is not maintainable. The notification making reference or the order of reference is illegal, arbitrary and suffers from non-application of mind. Learned Sr, Counsel argues that the dispute is not in existence and as such the same cannot be adjudicated. Learned Sr. Counsel further argues that after more than eight years of the date of discharge from the service, no industrial dispute survives which has been held in a catena of decisions. Learned Sr. Counsel relies upon the Judgment reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 [ Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another] and submits that right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. The Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity ‘delay defeats equities’. To buttress his arguments, learned Sr. Counsel has heavily placed reliance on the decision of a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 and submits that a dispute which is stale cannot be the subject matter of reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned Sr. Counsel has further relied upon the following Judgments: (i) Reserve Bank of India Vs. Gopinath Sharma and Another reported in (2006) 6 SCC 221 ; (ii) Brahmanand Tiwari Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur reported in 2007 (2) JCR 5 : 2007 (2) LLJ 935 . ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT - WORKMAN 5. Mr. Rahul Gupta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-workman argues that the workman joined service of TISCO Ltd. on and from 01.01.1974 and was made permanent on 01.01.1979. There was no complaint from any quarter and he worked with unflinching loyalty, devotion, honesty and sincerity. However, one P.R. Das, the then Divisional Manager of the petitioner-Management, acting on behalf of the company instituted various criminal cases against the concerned workman under various Sections of the Indian Penal Code and simultaneously, during the pendency of those criminal cases, he was also served with various Chargesheets. Thereafter, one Ranjan Singh was appointed as Enquiry Officer and H.L. Tilak, Manager Personnel was nominated as Management Representative to present case in the disciplinary proceeding. The said Enquiry Officer, without examining the relevant evidences and without considering similar allegations in the criminal case, at the behest of the Management, submitted table enquiry report in favour of the Management holding the workman guilty of all charges. Thereafter, without properly appreciating the facts involved in the case, the then Divisional Manager proposed to discharge the workman from the service and allowed him seven days’ time for making representation, if any. Thereafter, without properly appreciating the facts involved in the case, the then Divisional Manager proposed to discharge the workman from the service and allowed him seven days’ time for making representation, if any. The concerned workman submitted a written reply and explanation denying all the charges and praying therein to exonerate him from the charges as the same were not proved. However, only in order to favour the Management, the concerned workman was discharged from the service by the order of the then Divisional Manager dated 25.01.1996. Learned counsel argues that the enquiry was not fair and proper. The allegations under the departmental enquiry are same and identical as in the criminal cases. The concerned workman represented before the Management that in all criminal cases the Management has failed to produce any evidence and all the charges are false and fictitious. The concerned workman was honourably acquitted in all the criminal cases filed by the Management, the last date of acquittal in the last case was 30.01.2001. Learned counsel argues that the concerned workman waited for acquittal from all the criminal cases and thereafter, he raised an industrial dispute demanding quashing of discharge order dated 25.06.1996, passed for the same and similar charges in which he was honourably acquitted by the Courts of law. Learned counsel submits that the two proceedings for the same and similar charges is totally unfair and invalid and as such needs interference by this Court. Learned counsel further argues that so far delay is concerned, the concerned workman was waiting for the final outcome of the criminal cases in which he has been honourably acquitted by the Courts of law whereas for the same and similar charges, the Management has dismissed him from service. Learned counsel submits that the law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate government to exercise its power under Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act. The appropriate government can revive the matter at any point of time. The dispute raised by the concerned workman is not at all stale. It is only after honourable acquittal from all the criminal cases, the concerned workman filed application before His Excellency the then Governor of Bihar to make reference, which remained pending for consideration and after considering entire facts, reference has been made, which needs no interference. The dispute raised by the concerned workman is not at all stale. It is only after honourable acquittal from all the criminal cases, the concerned workman filed application before His Excellency the then Governor of Bihar to make reference, which remained pending for consideration and after considering entire facts, reference has been made, which needs no interference. The decision of the appropriate government cannot be substituted by any other authority and is not subject to judicial review. Learned counsel submits that the question of delay also does not come to the rescue of the petitioner-Management. If the Court/Tribunal feels that discharge from the service is per-se unsustainable, it can extend its arm to set it at naught rather than to ask another forum to first adjudicate on its validity. Referring to the decision in the case of Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 , learned counsel submits that it has been held that delay in raising the industrial dispute and referring the same to the Labour Court for adjudication does not debar the workman from claiming rightful relief from his employer. Learned counsel further submits that the appropriate Government had rightly exercised its power and referred the dispute to the Labour Court to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the parties, which was made within a reasonable time, considering the circumstances in which the concerned workman was placed, as there was a criminal case pending against him. Learned counsel further submits that it is reasonable to adjudicate the industrial dispute in spite of delay in raising and referring the matter, since there is no mention of any loss or unavailability of material evidence due to delay. Learned counsel further argues that when facts and evidence in departmental as well as in criminal proceedings are same and similar and concerned workman has been honourable acquitted from the criminal proceeding, the departmental proceeding is bad in the eyes of law and thus, the instant writ petition is fit to be dismissed and the reference before the Labour Court for adjudication is fully justified. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the following Judgments: (i) Sapan Kumar Pandit Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. Reported in (2001) 6 SCC 222 . (ii) Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 ; FINDINGS OF THE COURT 6. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the following Judgments: (i) Sapan Kumar Pandit Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. Reported in (2001) 6 SCC 222 . (ii) Raghubir Singh Vs. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 ; FINDINGS OF THE COURT 6. Be that as it may, having considered rival submission of the parties across the bar and after examination of documents brought on record, this Court is of the view that admittedly there was unreasonable delay which was unexplained. The dispute was raised after eight years of discharge and three years from the date of acquittal. So far as delay in seeking reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. In the instant case, the explanation given by the respondent-workman that as the departmental proceeding was pending, he could approach only after acquittal in the criminal case and as such there cannot be said to be unreasonable delay. Nothing has been placed on record to show that the industrial dispute was raised within a reasonable time or the workman was not responsible for the delayed decision. 7. The issue fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of UPSRTC v. Babu Ram reported in (2006) 5 SCC 433 and in paragraph-10 of the said Judgment, it has been held as under: “10. It is to be noted that the High Court has very cryptically disposed of the writ petition. The workman has not placed any material to show that he had raised dispute within a reasonable time, and/or that he was not responsible for delayed decision, if any, in the conciliation proceedings. It was for him to show that the dispute was raised within a reasonable time and that he was not responsible for any delay. The High Court, on a hypothetical basis has assumed that the dispute might have been raised promptly but delayed by the State Government and he cannot be penalised for delay in finalising the conciliation proceedings and the reference. But neither the Labour Court nor the High Court has even noted the factual position. The conclusion was based on surmises and conjectures.” 8. But neither the Labour Court nor the High Court has even noted the factual position. The conclusion was based on surmises and conjectures.” 8. The reliance of the respondents upon the Judgment passed in the case of Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways (Supra) does not come to his rescue. Said case is distinguished on the ground that assurances were given in the said case to the concerned workman whereas in the instant case there was no such assurance given to the workman. In absence of any assurances given by the Management, case of Raghubir Singh (Supra) or the case of Sapan Kumar Pandit Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 222 are distinguished from the facts and circumstances of the present case. Further, in the case of Raghubir Singh (Supra), there was no proceeding and it was only after conviction, an assurance was given by the Management whereas in the instant case, there was no assurance given by the Management. The dispute has to be raised on preponderance of probabilities. Admittedly no straight jacket formula can be available for rejecting the case on the ground of stale claim. In the instant case, while reference was made, the State was aware that it is a stale claim and as such reference itself was bad in law. 9. The Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt. reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 is relevant wherein the Judgment passed in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty reported in (2000) 2 SCC 455 has also been discussed. Para-25 of the said Judgment reads as under wherein paragraphs-6 to 8 of the Judgment passed in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (Supra) has also been discussed: “25. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty [Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 283] the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed that power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review, though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: (SCC pp. It was specifically observed that power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review, though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: (SCC pp. 460-61, paras 6-8) “6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 371 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 264] this Court observed: (SCC p. 393, para 24) ‘24. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference.’” 10. It is further relevant to quote paragraphs 27 of the Judgment passed in the case of Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt. (Supra) which reads as under: “27. In Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways [Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 10 SCC 301 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 23], this Court scanned through most of the available case law on the subject and emphasised that the words “at any time” occurring in Section 10 of the Act would imply that law of limitation did not apply. On facts, the Court held that the State Government had rightly exercised its power and referred the dispute to the Labour Court within reasonable time considering the circumstances in which the appellant therein was placed. In fact, the Court accepted the explanation for delay given by the workman in raising the dispute. In that case, it was found that there was a criminal case pending against the workman and further the Management had assured him that he would be reinstated on his acquittal. It was also noticed that even despite delay, there was no loss or unavailability of evidence due to the said delay.” In paragraph-29 of the said Judgment, it has been held as under: “29. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to be discussed with some elaboration, which would include discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it.” 11. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity “delay defeats equities. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity are based on principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non-existent. 12. In paragraph-42.1, 42.2, 42.3 and 42.6 of the Judgment passed in the case of Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt. (Supra) it has been held as under: “42.1. 12. In paragraph-42.1, 42.2, 42.3 and 42.6 of the Judgment passed in the case of Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt. (Supra) it has been held as under: “42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that “any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended”. The words “industrial dispute exists” are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead”, then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.6. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an “existing dispute”. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted” 13. This Court may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. This Court is of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. This Court is of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the “appropriate Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words “at any time” used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry. 14. On the application of the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that the reference at such a belated stage without any justifiable explanation for delay, the appropriate Government had no jurisdiction or power to make reference of a non-existing dispute. 15. In view of discussions rendered hereinabove, the plea of the respondent-workman that he could approach only after acquittal in criminal case, is also not acceptable as merely acquittal in a criminal case does not give a right to the workman to be reinstated in service as both the departmental proceedings as well as criminal proceedings are based on different parameters. Said plea of the learned counsel for the respondent is not at all acceptable to this Court as it does not weigh in the eyes of law. 16. As a result of the aforesaid rules, guidelines, judicial pronouncements and discussions made hereinabove, it can comfortably be inferred that admittedly the reference at a belated stage is bad in law and fit to be quashed and set aside. 16. As a result of the aforesaid rules, guidelines, judicial pronouncements and discussions made hereinabove, it can comfortably be inferred that admittedly the reference at a belated stage is bad in law and fit to be quashed and set aside. Although there was no limitation prescribed under the Act for making reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the policy of industrial disputes clarifies that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is satisfactory explanations for the delay. Since no plausible reason has been given or explained or brought on record, this Court is fully satisfied that the reference itself was bad in law. 17. In view of facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove and for the reasons expressed above, it is held that the dispute is hopelessly stale and not maintainable and valid in law and as such, this writ petition stands allowed. The Notification of Reference dated 21.06.2007, whereby and whereunder the appropriate government has referred the dispute with respect to the discharge of concerned workman from the service for adjudication before the Labour Court, Jamshedpur is hereby quashed and set aside.