JUDGMENT : This appeal has been preferred by the “Holy Pentecostal Mission”, Thiruvananthapuram and by its Pastor as appellants 1 and 2 against the judgment passed by the Sub Judge, Nedumangad in A.S.No.29/2015, as per which, the appeal preferred by the 1st respondent herein was allowed setting aside the decree obtained by the appellants and remanding the matter for fresh consideration to the trial court under Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC for short). 2. The appellants contend that the judgment impugned is untenable and egregiously contrary to the provisions of law and in particular Order XXXXI Rule 27 of the CPC, because the only reason stated in ordering remand, is that the 1st respondent herein, who is the 1st defendant in the Suit, had produced certain documents as additional evidence at the appellate stage, which were not produced or marked in evidence before the Trial Court. 3. The appellants, therefore, pray that the impugned judgment be set aside and the Appellate Court be directed to consider the appeal preferred by the 1st respondent herein on its merits rather than remanding the Suit to the Trial Court as has been done. 4. The suit in question, namely O.S.No.867/2010, was filed by the appellants seeking declaration of title over plaint schedule properties and for a consequential permanent prohibitory injunction against the respondents, who are the defendants, asserting that they are the full owners in possession of the same. To the contrary, the assertions of the respondents are that the plaint schedule properties were sold by late Chinnamma, who is the mother of the 1st defendant, in her capacity as the Secretary of the 1st plaintiff -Pentecostal Mission; and therefore, that they are in legitimate and valid ownership and possession of the properties in question. It transpires that the 1st defendant had also filed a counter claim seeking a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the 2nd plaintiff from obstructing her ownership and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties. 5. The suit was taken to trial by the trial court raising seven issues as under:- “1. Whether the suit is maintainable because of the provisions contained in Travancore Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable (Societies) Registration Act and S.92 of CPC? 2. Whether the 2d plaintiff has got any locus standi to represent first plaintiff? 3. Whether the 1plaintiff has got title and possession over the plaint schedule property? 4. Whether the suit is maintainable because of the provisions contained in Travancore Cochin Literary Scientific and Charitable (Societies) Registration Act and S.92 of CPC? 2. Whether the 2d plaintiff has got any locus standi to represent first plaintiff? 3. Whether the 1plaintiff has got title and possession over the plaint schedule property? 4. Whether Sale deed No.2352/1991, Sale Deed No.1338/2010, 859/2004, Release deed No.243/2009 of SRO, Kanvakulangara are valid documents? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get any declaration as claimed? 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get any injunction as claimed? 7. Reliefs and cost.” 6. Before the Trial Court, the 2nd appellant/2nd plaintiff testified as PW1 along with PW2; while documents were marked as Exts.A1 to A35 and X1 to X3 on the side of the plaintiffs and Ext.B1 from the side of the defendants. The Court, in addition to this, marked Exts.C1 to C1(b) as court exhibits. On an assessment of the evidence and the documents available, the Trial Court decreed the suit finding that the documents, based on which title was being claimed by the 1st defendant, namely Exts.A25 and A26, were not validly executed by her mother late Chinnamma; and consequently declaring the title and possession over the plaint schedule property in favour of the 1st plaintiff -Holy Pentecostal Mission, thus permanently restraining the defendants by a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from causing any obstruction to the peaceful conduct of worship by the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property. 7. The 1st defendant filed A.S.No.29/2015 before the Sub Court, Nedumangad; and also filed I.A.No.550/2018 under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, producing certain documents and seeking to have the same accepted as additional evidence. She also took a contention that even though her counter claim had been validly registered by the court below, it had not framed an issue on the same, consequently that her claim had not been considered by it in any manner. 8. She also took a contention that even though her counter claim had been validly registered by the court below, it had not framed an issue on the same, consequently that her claim had not been considered by it in any manner. 8. The records reveal that even though the aforementioned I.A was not specifically ordered by the court below, it proceeded to allow it for the reasons stated in the impugned judgment and resultantly remanded the suit to the Trial Court invoking the provisions of Section 107 of the CPC, directing the said court to try and dispose of the suit afresh, after considering the evidentiary value of the additional documents and also after framing necessary issues with respect to the counter claim. It is this judgment which has been impugned by the appellants before this Court. 9. I have heard Sri.R.Gopan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants; Sri.R.Lakshmi Narayan, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent and Sri.R.T.Pradeep appearing on behalf of other respondents. 10. Sri.R.Gopan, learned counsel for the appellants, began his submissions relying on the judgment of this Court in Chirag Enterprises, Merchant and Commission Agents v. Star Traders, Merchants and Another [ 2012 (4) KHC 271 ] to assert that the First Appellate Court could not have ordered a remand of the suit to the Trial Court as a matter of course, but ought to have considered the additional documents produced by the defendant on its merits under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. He contended, rather vehemently, that, as is clear from the judgment impugned, the Trial Court did not consider the application filed by the 1st defendant in the manner as is statutorily required under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, but mechanically accepted the same, even without verifying whether the 1st defendant was entitled to produce it as per the sanction of Order 41 Rule 27(aa) of the CPC. As a corollary argument, Sri.Gopan submitted that, even assuming that the First Appellate Court could have allowed the documents to be produced, it ought not to have remanded the matter for fresh trial to the Court below , but should have considered such documents by examining witnesses, if so necessary. As a corollary argument, Sri.Gopan submitted that, even assuming that the First Appellate Court could have allowed the documents to be produced, it ought not to have remanded the matter for fresh trial to the Court below , but should have considered such documents by examining witnesses, if so necessary. As regards the counter claim of the appellants is concerned, Sri.Gopan submits that even though such a purported claim had been filed by the 1st defendant, it was not filed in the manner as is provided under Order 8 Rule 6A of the CPC and that in any event of the matter, the 1st defendant had remained ex-parte at the time of trial. He thus, reiteratingly contended that the First Appellate Court could not have remanded the matter on this issue, particularly because once the documents relied upon by the 1st defendant to prove her title over the plaint schedule property, namely Exts.A25 and A26, had already been found to be suspect by the Trial Court, it could only be inferred that the counter claim had been dismissed, conceding that said Court had not framed any issue on this nor has mentioned anything about it in the judgment. He thus, prays that this appeal be allowed and the First Appellate Court be directed to reconsider the appeal in terms of law. 11. Sri.R.Lakshmi Narayan, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, in reply to the afore contentions of Sri.R.Gopan, submitted that the First Appellate Court has only exercised its discretion, as is vested upon it under Section 107 of the CPC, to remand the matter to the Trial Court, especially, because the documents produced under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC would clearly show that the documents earlier relied upon by his client, namely Exts.A25 and A26, were validly and legally executed. He says that one among the documents produced by his client before the First Appellate Court is a resolution of the 1st appellant -Church, which authorised late Chinnamma to execute the afore said Exhibits A25 and A26; and therefore, that the First Appellate Court cannot be found fault with in having concluded they will have to be properly assessed, appreciated and evaluated by the Trial Court. He further contends that the impugned judgment does not prejudice the appellants in any manner, since all that has been ordered through the same is to have the suit retried, based on the documents now placed on record. He thus prays that this appeal be dismissed. 12. Sri.R.T.Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for respondents, submitted that as per the written statement filed by his clients, the 2nd plaintiff has no right either over the 1st plaintiff -Church or over its properties and that the 2nd plaintiff and the 1st defendant are rank trespassers of its properties; and further that the 2nd plaintiff has encroached into the plaint schedule property by manipulating the entries in the Minutes Book, thus illegally claiming to be the Secretary of the 1st plaintiff -Church. He says that it is the specific case of his clients that the 2nd plaintiff has no connection with the 1st plaintiff -Church and therefore, that the suit was liable to be dismissed. 13. I have examined the impugned judgment of the Lower Appellate Court and have closely evaluated the materials available. 14. As has already been indicated in the afore narrative, the Trial Court found that late Chinnamma had no authority in law to have executed the documents, namely Exts.A25 and A26, on the strength of which, the 1st defendant is claiming ownership over the plaint schedule property. It is on such basis that title of the 1st plaintiff -church over the plaint schedule property was declared and an injunction ordered against the 1st defendant. However, when the matter was taken in appeal by the 1st defendant, she appears to have produced certain documents, along with an application preferred under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC; and the Appellate Court transpires to have accepted the said documents without any forensic evaluation and in a rather mechanical fashion. It is this which is the genesis of the controversy between the parties at this stage and being called upon by the appellants to be examined by this Court in terms of the provisions of the CPC. 15. It is this which is the genesis of the controversy between the parties at this stage and being called upon by the appellants to be examined by this Court in terms of the provisions of the CPC. 15. It is without doubt that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC enables production of additional evidence in an Appellate Court, but only if the party seeking to produce such evidence establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge and could not, even after such exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. Further, if the Appellate Court feels that an additional document is to be admitted or any witnesses are to be examined to enable pronouncement of judgment or for any other substantial cause, it is fully entitled to allow such document to be produced or witnesses to be examined. Within the afore frame work of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, the question is whether the First Appellate Court could have remanded the matter to the Trial Court even without assessing the worth of the additional documents sought to be produced by the 1st respondent and as to why it had not been produced before the Trial Court, as has been done in the impugned judgment. 16. As rightly pointed out by Sri.R.Gopan, learned counsel for the appellants, the normal course or procedure available for an Appellate Court is to decide an appeal on the basis of evidence available on record. The power of full remand under Section 107 read with Order 41 Rules 23 and 23A of the CPC is certainly available to the said Court but same is circumscribed by certain specified contingencies under which it could be invoked. In the case at hand, the sole reason given by the First Appellate Court in remanding the Suit to the Trial Court is that certain additional documents have been produced by the 1st defendant and that the counter claim raised by her had not been considered by the Trial Court. 17. In the case at hand, the sole reason given by the First Appellate Court in remanding the Suit to the Trial Court is that certain additional documents have been produced by the 1st defendant and that the counter claim raised by her had not been considered by the Trial Court. 17. I am afraid that the course adopted by the First Appellate Court cannot find the favour of this Court because, when additional documents are sought to be produced by the 1st defendant, the Appellate Court ought to have considered the same from the touch stone of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, before deciding to accept them on record. The provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC unmistakably is that normally, the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence but can be allowed to do so only in the specified exceptional circumstances mentioned therein. Therefore, when the 1st respondent sought permission to produce certain new documents before the First Appellate Court, asserting that she could not produce the same even in spite of due diligence before the Trial Court, it certainly ought to have considered the said application strictly within the confines of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, before taking a decision as to whether those documents are relevant or otherwise. 18. Unfortunately, in the case at hand, the Appellate Court appears to have mechanically concluded that these documents are relevant and that they are liable to be marked in evidence; and consequently remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration. This certainly is not the manner in which the First Appellate Court ought to have acted, particularly when the Trial Court had concluded that certain documents relied upon by the 1st respondent had not been properly proved. 19. That said, on the question of the counter claim, the mere fact that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court did not answer the same specifically would also not be a reason why the First Appellate Court could have remanded the Suit for fresh trial, because it is obvious from the judgment of the Trial Court that it had concluded against the validity of the documents relied upon by the 1st defendant and axiomatically, dismissal of the counter claim was only a formality. The mere fact that there is no formal record about the dismissal of the counter claim in the judgment of the Trial Court, in my view, therefore, could not have been a good reason why the Appellate Court should have remanded the matter. 20. In any event of the matter, as matters now stand, the 1st respondent appears to be relying upon the additional documents produced in substantiation of her claims over the property and therefore, her application for such purpose ought to have been first considered by the First Appellate Court as above, before ordering a remand as has been done presently. 21. In the afore circumstances and for the reasons above, I allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the Sub Court, Nedumangad in A.S.No.29/2015; with a consequential direction to the said court to reconsider the said appeal, after affording necessary opportunities to the parties and following due procedure and to thereafter issue an appropriate judgment in it, as expeditiously as is possible but not later than six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. I make it clear that the observations in the judgment are only intended for the purpose of arriving at a decision regarding the validity of the judgment impugned and that they may not be construed to be in any manner to trammel or bridle any of the contentions of the parties, particularly when the Appellate Court considers the application preferred by the 1st respondent under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. Needless to say, it may also not be construed by the Appellate Court that this judgment is intended to operate so as not to allow the said Court to order a remand, but only that such a course be adopted, if so necessary, after all the relevant aspects are considered and decided in terms of law. In the conspectus of the rather singular facts noticed herein, I deem it appropriate not to make any order as to costs and to direct the parties to suffer their respective costs in this appeal. It is so ordered.