ORDER : Irshad Ali, J. 1. Heard Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for respondent No. 1 and Sri Umesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for respondent No. 2. 2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, who is a tenant of shop No. 17 in a commercial complex in "Nanak Market". Previous to the construction of the aforesaid complex, one Khursheed Ahmad - father of the petitioner was tenant of the old shop, from which he was carrying on the business of selling milk in the name and style of "Doodh Bhandar". 3. The respondent No. 2 filed SCC Suit No. 2 of 1998 against the petitioner with the allegation that he had constructed the aforesaid commercial complex and the petitioner is in possession as a tenant of shop No. 17 on 2nd floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- excluding water tax, house tax and electricity charges. 4. The tenancy had commenced w.e.f. 01.09.1993 and a sum of Rs. 5000/- was deposited as security by the petitioner. It was also pleaded that tenancy was created through oral agreement for a period of 5 years which came to an end on 01.03.1998 but neither the petitioner had vacated the shop nor paid the rent, as a result whereof, a notice of demand and terminating the tenancy dated 04.06.1998 was sent to the petitioner which was returned through refusal. Despite notice of demand and terminating the tenancy, neither the rent was paid nor the shop was vacated. 5. The suit was contested by the petitioner by filing his written statement. It was further pleaded that the father of the petitioner was tenant since long on the southern-eastern portion on a monthly rent of Rs. 75/-. Since respondent No. 2 had his house on southern-western side and he was intending to construct a market for which he had got vacated the shops from other tenants but the shop in occupation of the petitioner and Awadh Aushadhalaya were not vacated. A request was made by respondent No. 2 with the father of the petitioner, who was on cordial relations and the dispute was resolved, whereby the respondent No. 2 agreed that he will provide a newly constructed shop on the southern side on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. A request was made by respondent No. 2 with the father of the petitioner, who was on cordial relations and the dispute was resolved, whereby the respondent No. 2 agreed that he will provide a newly constructed shop on the southern side on a monthly rent of Rs. 100/-. It was also pleaded that a sum of Rs. 7500/- as per the demand raised by respondent No. 2 was paid which had to be adjusted towards the rent. The respondent No. 2 used to take milk from the petitioner and the price of the milk was adjusted towards the payment of rent and a sum of Rs. 7500/- is still outstanding against respondent No. 2. The petitioner had also claimed adjustment of the rent deposited under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 6. The parties have led their oral and documentary evidence in support of their case. The trial court, namely, Judge Small Causes, dismissed the suit vide judgment dated 17.11.2000 holding that father of the petitioner was tenant prior to the construction of the complex which is governed by the Act. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 17.11.2000, passed by the Judge Small Causes Court, the respondent No. 2 filed a revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act. 8. The 8th Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Pratapgarh on a re-appraisal of the evidence, after substituting its own findings allowed the revision. 9. The aforesaid judgment was challenged by the petitioner by filing writ petition No. 23 (R.C.) of 2003, which was allowed vide judgment dated 06.11.2006 and the case was remanded to the District Judge to decide the revision. 10. This court, while remanding the matter after recording a specific observation that the findings on the question of rate of rent, the applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and entitlement of the petitioner to the benefit under Section 20 (4) were not illegal, thereby quashed the judgment. 11. On remand of the case by this court, the respondent No. 1 again on a re-appraisal of the evidence on record, affirmed the earlier findings holding that the rate of rent is Rs. 500/- and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are in-applicable. The respondent No. 1 has, thus, endorsed the earlier findings, which were already set-aside. 12. It has been contended by Sri Mohd. 500/- and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are in-applicable. The respondent No. 1 has, thus, endorsed the earlier findings, which were already set-aside. 12. It has been contended by Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner that it is now well settled proposition of law that on remand of the case by the higher court (this court), the lower court (District Judge) was bound by the terms of the order of remand and cannot traverse beyond the same, as has been propounded by the Apex Court in the case of Jasraj Inder Singh vs. Hemraj Multan Chand reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1011 and respondent No. 1 has, thus, erred in law in not complying the order of remand passed by this court earlier. 13. It has further been contented by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that it is well settled in law that in exercise of powers under Section 25 of Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, the revisional court, while deciding the revision has got a limited scope and could not substitute its own findings after reassessing/re-evaluating the oral and documentary evidence on record and only recourse open to it if it comes to the conclusion that the judgment rendered by the trial court is not in accordance with law, it could remand the matter to the trial court to decide the suit afresh in the light of the observations made therein. 14. It was further contended that initial burden of proof that the tenant is in arrears lies on the landlord which he had failed to discharge and the respondent No. 1 by wrongly shifting the burden of proof on the petitioner even without considering the entire oral and documentary evidence on record allowed the revision, thus, the judgment passed is vitiated in law. 15. In support of his submission, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment reported in 1981 ARC page 545 Laxmi Kishore & another Vs. Hari Prasad Shukla and Banaras Education Society J.H.S. & another Vs. 15. In support of his submission, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment reported in 1981 ARC page 545 Laxmi Kishore & another Vs. Hari Prasad Shukla and Banaras Education Society J.H.S. & another Vs. Dandi Swami Rameshwar Ashram; 2014 (32) L.C.D. 986 , wherein it has been propounded that the court, while deciding the revision under Section 25 of the Act has to satisfy itself that the trial court's decree or order is according to law, of course, but it has no jurisdiction to re-assess or re-appraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself. Relevant portion of the judgment is being quoted below: (A) Laxmi Kishore & another Vs. Hari Prasad Shukla (Supra):- "(20) But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has a power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot inter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact." (B) Banaras Education Society J.H.S. & another Vs. Dandi Swami Rameshwar Ashram (Supra):- "(5) The scope of interference of a Revisional Court under Section 25 Act, 1887 is whether the decree or order made by Small Cause Court was according to law or not. Undoubtedly it is a supervisory power and not appellate power. The Revisional Court can call for record to see whether decree is according to law and, if not, it can pass such order with respect thereto as it may thinks fit. Undoubtedly it is a supervisory power and not appellate power. The Revisional Court can call for record to see whether decree is according to law and, if not, it can pass such order with respect thereto as it may thinks fit. (8) Some of the instances where the Court can interfere under Section 25 are, (1) where the Court has no jurisdiction in the matter; (2) where a party had not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or that the burden of proof had been misplaced on wrong shoulders; (3) where the Court had based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted; (4) where there has not been a proper trial according to law; and (5) if on certain facts two views are possible, then a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 was not interfered. (14) The circumstances where Revisional Court to find out whether decision of Small Cause Court is in accordance with law may look into the facts without assessment have been explained in para 19 and 20 of judgment of Division Bench in Laxmi Kishore and another v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 and it says" "19. If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that findings. Same will be the case where the finding is based only on admissible evidence. In such case, the court will be justified in deciding the question of fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law, viz. validity of notice, is sufficient for its decision. 20. But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order, as the justice of the case requires; but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine as issue of fact for itself. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. If it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact." (15) The bar is in effect with respect to reassessment of evidence and substitute its conclusion of fact but not where relevant evidence has not been considered or finding is based on inadmissible evidence or finding is without any evidence etc. In Dr. D. Sankaranarayana v. Punjab National Bank, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675 the Apex Court reiterate that reassessment of evidence is not permissible to substitute its own inference but not where the decision is not in accordance with law. If the Revisional Court does not agree with finding, that by itself cannot be a ground since it is within the realm of assessment of evidence. This is what has been observed by Apex Court in Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and others, JT 1998(8) SC 157; Sri Raj Laxmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswami, JT 1998(4) SC 46; Sarla Ahuja v. United Insurance Company Ltd. JT 1998(7) SC 297; and Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu,: JT 1999(10) SC 51. (19) The scope of judicial review in there matter under Article 226/227 is very limited and narrow as discussed in detail by this Court in Jalil Ahmad v. 16th Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 2013(2) AWC 2168. There is nothing which may justify judicial review of orders impugned in this writ petition in the light of exposition of law, as discussed in the above judgment. 16. The revisional jurisdiction is supervisory power and not appellate power. Counsel for the respondent No. 2 - Sri Umesh Chandra Srivastava supported the findings recorded by the respondent No. 1 and contended that the judgment passed by the respondent No. 1 is in accordance with law and no interference is called for. 17. In support of his submissions, he relied upon certain case laws, which are as under:- 1984 (1) ARC, page 679 Jagdish Prasad Vs. 17. In support of his submissions, he relied upon certain case laws, which are as under:- 1984 (1) ARC, page 679 Jagdish Prasad Vs. Smt. Angoori Devi:- "(3) In the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radha Krishnan, (1964) 5 SCR 64 ; a Constitution Bench of this Court indicated the scope of interference in a certiorari proceeding by saying that a writ of certiorari is issued for correcting the errors of jurisdiction committed by the courts or tribunals in cases where they exceed their jurisdiction or fail to exercise it or exercise it illegally or improperly, i.e. where an order is passed without hearing the party sought to be natural justice. A caution was indicated by saying that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory one and in exercising it, the court is not entitled to act as a court of appeal. That necessarily means that the findings of fact arrived at by the inferior court or tribunal are binding. An error of law apparent on the face of the record could be corrected by a writ of certiorari but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. The rule in Yakoob's case (supra) when applied to the present facts would lead to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of the Additional District Judge. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the appellant's contention that the High Court wrongly interfere with the decision of the Additional District Judge that the landlord failed to establish sub-tenancy. The circumstances in which the son of the proprietor of Pavan Trading Company was in the shop have been clearly explained and we are inclined to agree that there is no material on the record to doubt the explanation placed by way of evidence in the proceeding." (B) 1982 (1) ARC, page 611, Prem Prakash Vs. The IInd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur & others:- "(16) Learned counsel for the tenant also submitted that it was not permissible for the revisional court to re-assess the evidence and to disturb the finding of fact recorded by the trial court on the question of the date of the construction of the building. The IInd Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur & others:- "(16) Learned counsel for the tenant also submitted that it was not permissible for the revisional court to re-assess the evidence and to disturb the finding of fact recorded by the trial court on the question of the date of the construction of the building. It was urged that the question whether the building was constructed before 1951 or after that date is a question of fact, the finding on which could not be disturbed in a revision or a mere reappraisal of the evidence. I cannot agree. The question involved touched the jurisdiction of the court. It was a jurisdictional question so to say. Upon a proper determination of this question depended a more fundamental issue, namely, whether the suit was governed by Act 3 of 1947 or by the general law. If the suit was governed by U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 it could not have been decreed except on the grounds mentioned in section thereof." (C) 1983 ARC, page 477, Smt. Nattho & others Vs. The District Judge, Bulandshahar and others:- "(5) It is now well settled that even in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is open to the revisional court to upset the finding of an inferior court on jurisdictional fact. See cases: Chaubey Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi; Roshan Lal v. Ishwar Das; Ram Singh v. Vth Addl. District Judge, Meerut and others; and Prem Prakash v. IInd Addl. District and Session Judge, Saharanpur and others at page 616." (D) 1980 ARC page 466, Ram Saroop Rai Vs. Smt. Lilawati:- (5) Shri J.P. Goel rightly reminds us that in the normal course the appeal must be dismissed as concluded by finding of fact. But we will probe the matter further to explore whether there is any substance in Shri A.K. Sen's argument of fundamental failure bearing on the legality of the conclusions. The anatomy of the Act is substantially the same as that of other similar legislations. The most important feature we have to notice is the exemption from application of the provisions of the Act for the period of ten years in respect of new construction. The anatomy of the Act is substantially the same as that of other similar legislations. The most important feature we have to notice is the exemption from application of the provisions of the Act for the period of ten years in respect of new construction. Section 2(2) is relevant in this context and runs as follows:- Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed. Explanation I-Fir the purpose of this sub-section: (a) The construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion there of is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of a building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time; Provided that there may different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants. (b) 'construction' includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished; (c) Where such substantial addition is made to an existing building, that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof, the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. This sub-section and its construction is decisive of the fate of the appeal. Nothing in the rent control legislation shall apply to a building "during a period of ten years from the date of which its construction is completed." The first thing that falls to be emphasised is that in regard to all buildings the Act applies save where this exemption operates. Nothing in the rent control legislation shall apply to a building "during a period of ten years from the date of which its construction is completed." The first thing that falls to be emphasised is that in regard to all buildings the Act applies save where this exemption operates. Therefore, the landlord, who seeks exemption must prove that exception. The burden is on him to make out that notwithstanding the rent control legislation his building is out of its ambit. It is not for the tenant to prove that the building has been constructed beyond a period of ten years, but it is for the landlady to make out that the construction has been completed within ten years of the suit. This is sensible not merely because the statute expressly states so and the setting necessarily implies so, but also because it is the landlady who knows best when the building was constructed and not the tenant thereof. Speaking generally, it is fair that the onus of establishing the date of construction of the building is squarely laid on the landlord, although in a small category of cases where the landlord is a purchaser from another, he will have to depend on his assignor to prove the fact. (8) Unfortunately, it is not possible for the purchaser-respondent or the tenant appellant to give direct testimony about the time of the construction or the nature of the construction vis-a-vis Explanation (b) or (c). the best testimony is the municipal records about the completion of the building and the verification by the municipal authorities as to whether a new construction has come into being or an old construction has been remodelled and, if so when exactly the completion took effect. The municipal assessment record produced in the Court merely states "increased assessment". It may suggest the existence of an assessment which has been increased or it may perhaps be argued that when the building was reconstructed a new assessment was made which was more than the previous assessment and, therefore, was described as increased assessment. The oral evidence in the case, apart from what we have set out, is inconsequential, being second-hand testimony. Even the recital in the rent deed that there was a new construction in 1965-66 is by the appellant and the respondent, neither of whom has any direct knowledge about the construction. The oral evidence in the case, apart from what we have set out, is inconsequential, being second-hand testimony. Even the recital in the rent deed that there was a new construction in 1965-66 is by the appellant and the respondent, neither of whom has any direct knowledge about the construction. Of course, an admission by the appellant is evidence against, him but an admission is not always conclusive especially in the light of the municipal records such as are available and the burden such as has been laid by the statute. (E) 2009 (27) LCD, page 229, Smt. Hemlata Tripathi Vs. Smt. Prem Kumari & another:- (3) The facts arising out of the present revision are that the opposite parties filed a suit for arrears of rent, ejectment an damages against the applicant with the allegations that she has sublet the premises in dispute and has also committed default in payment of rent. A written statement was filed by the applicant denying the subletting and has submitted that the entire rent has been deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act. The Prescribed Authority after consideration of the pleadings of the parties has decreed the suit after holding that Act No. XIII of 1972 is not applicable. A revision was filed by the applicant and that too has been dismissed. Hence, the present revision. (4) I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have perused the record. A finding of fact has been recorded that as the Act No. XIII of 1972 is not applicable, as such, mere a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is sufficient to vacate the said premises. Therefore, if any rent has been deposited, no benefit can be given to the applicant. While allowing the application, the Court below itself has granted three month's time vide its order dated 17.9.2008. (5) In my opinion the finding recorded by the Court below is a finding of fact and needs no interference." (F) 1988 (2) ARC, page 309, Bhoopal Singh Vs. While allowing the application, the Court below itself has granted three month's time vide its order dated 17.9.2008. (5) In my opinion the finding recorded by the Court below is a finding of fact and needs no interference." (F) 1988 (2) ARC, page 309, Bhoopal Singh Vs. VIIth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and others:- (5) Learned Counsel for the respondent has contended that on assessment of the materials on record, municipal record, rent notes and oral testimony, the Courts below came to the conclusion that the provisions of Section 2(2) Explanation-I shall be applicable to this building and, therefore, the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is not applicable. Learned Counsel for the respondent further pointed out that the property was purchased by means of a sale-deed dated 21.7-1978 and in this sale-deed there was no mention of any shop. The disputed accommodation is a shop. HE has also pointed out that the Courts below have relied upon the Municipal assessment for the years 1967-1975 and this property under the sale-deed was assessed as an annual value of Rs. 261 and there was no shop mentioned Learned Counsel, therefore, pointed out that for the first time in the assessment for the year 1975-80, four shops and house were shown and, therefore, the Courts below were justified in holding that the shop in question for the first time was assessed in the assessment year 1975-80. (6) I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length and after going through the entire material on record and also after hearing the learned Counsel on the questions of law, I am of the opinion that this case deserves to the remanded to the lower revisional Court for fresh decision in the light of law laid down in 1980 ARC (SC), p. 466 (supra). Learned lower revisional Court has erred in holding that he cannot enter into the questions of fact. In the present case the question whether the provisions of Act No. XIII of 1972 were not applicable to the accommodation in question depends on the date when the building in question was completed and its first assessment. But there is no such findings. Thus, finding regarding date of construction is a jurisdictional fact and can be examined, under Section 25, under the revisional power. But there is no such findings. Thus, finding regarding date of construction is a jurisdictional fact and can be examined, under Section 25, under the revisional power. The Court below failed to exercise its jurisdiction by taking the view that it had no power to interfere with such findings in its revisional jurisdiction, under Section 25." 18. On the issue, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 further relied upon a judgment rendered in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj & others; 2008 (9) SCC page 1: "38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law. 19. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 relied upon aforesaid judgments to show that the findings recorded by the trial court on erroneous impression of legal position could be interfered with and the revisional court can re-assess and record its findings. The case of Smt. Nattho (Supra) relates to the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C., likewise, in the case of Ram Swaroop (Supra), the provisions of Section 2(2) of Act No. 13 of 1972 were considered as well as in Hemlata Tripathi and Bhoopal Singh (Supra), it was held that the finding regarding non - applicability of the Act are findings of fact. The judgment of the Apex Court in Shamshad Ahmad (Supra) case relates to the bonafide requirement of the landlord. 20. The judgment of the Apex Court in Shamshad Ahmad (Supra) case relates to the bonafide requirement of the landlord. 20. On a careful consideration of the entire facts and the evidence on record as well as the case laws, it is now evident that this court after setting aside the findings recorded by the respondent No. 1 vide judgment dated 06.11.2006 regarding the question of rate of rent and applicability of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the entitlement of the petitioner for the benefit under Section 20(4) of the Act, quashed the same and remanded the matter to the respondent No. 1 to decide the revision in accordance with the directions contained therein within two months. 21. The respondent No. 1 even without complying the order of remand passed by this court earlier, had again endorsed the same findings which in view of the law relied upon by counsel for the petitioner are beyond scope of the powers conferred on him under Section 25 of the Act. 22. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the writ petition is, thus, allowed. The judgment dated 11.01.2008 (Annexure-9) passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 5, Pratapgarh, allowing the revision filed by the opposite party No. 2 is set aside. The case is remanded to respondent No. 1 to decide the revision in the light of the directions and observations given by this court in earlier judgment dated 06.11.2006 within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order is served upon him. 23. There shall be no order as to costs.