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2020 DIGILAW 121 (GUJ)

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Jivanlal Chhaganlal Vaghela

2020-01-22

A.J.SHASTRI, VIKRAM NATH

body2020
ORDER : A.J. SHASTRI, J. 1. Present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment and order, dated 19.8.2019, passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.7682 of 2017. 2. The facts, in brief, are that the respondent herein – original petitioner was appointed to the post of “Kadia” in the year 1982 and was made permanent w.e.f. 1.5.1984. On account of unauthorized absence, the respondent was served with a show-cause notice on 25.6.1991. Not having a satisfactory explanation, a departmental inquiry was conducted and the respondent was dismissed from service w.e.f. 9.12.1995. Aggrieved by the dismissal, the respondent approached the Labour Court by initiating reference proceedings which were Reference (LCA) No.513 of 1996. During the pendency of the reference, the matter was put up before the Lok Adalat on 3.3.2007. 2.1 In view of the process of the Lok Adalat, the negotiations ended with the appellant agreeing to reinstate the respondent’s service to his original post and a continuity of service, however, without back wages. It was also agreed to by both sides that the respondent would be meted with a punishment of stoppage of 3 increments with future effect. It appears that since the service was continued, the matter was resolved between the parties and an office order was issued on 30.4.2007. Since then, the respondent – original petitioner continued to work with the appellant-organization. Having attained the age of superannuation, the respondent retired from service on 30.11.2016 and the appellant issued an order of retirement. It appears that at the fag end of service, a memo was issued on 24.11.2016, wherein the appellant treated a period of 6066 days as unauthorized absence and break in service as contemplated under Section 2-A of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. The respondent herein requested the appellant for pension, gratuity, leave enchashment and other retirement benefits. However, on 6.2.2017, a letter was issued resulting in a further legal notice through an advocate to the appellant by the respondent on 13.2.2017. It appears that the action of not considering the service tenure to the extent mentioned above, lead to a grievance. The respondent herein requested the appellant for pension, gratuity, leave enchashment and other retirement benefits. However, on 6.2.2017, a letter was issued resulting in a further legal notice through an advocate to the appellant by the respondent on 13.2.2017. It appears that the action of not considering the service tenure to the extent mentioned above, lead to a grievance. Though the respondent is entitled to benefits of periodical increments as per the recommendations of 5th, 6th and 7th Pay Commissions and certain other benefits having not been made available, the respondent – original petitioner approached the Court by way of the aforesaid writ petition. His premise is that having accepted the continuity of service, he ought not to have been deprived of such benefits. Resultantly, the aforementioned petition was brought before the learned Single Judge to seek the following reliefs : “To pay the pension, arrears of pension, amount of gratuity, amount of leave encashment, the benefits of higher grade pay scale, arrears of salary arising out of the recommendations of 6th and 7th Pay Commission etc. to the present petitioner along with 12% interest p.a. (ii) To direct the present respondents not to recover any amount whatsoever from the retiral benefits of the present petitioner in pursuance to the communication dated 06.02.2017.” 2.2 The record indicates that this petition came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge on 19.8.2019. The learned Single Judge having heard the parties at length, allowed the petition, by observing that the respondent herein is entitled to the benefits. The operative part of the order impugned is reproduced hereinafter : “6. In light of the above discussion and reasons, the petition succeeds. The stand of the respondents in denying the retirement benefits to the petitioner is held to be illegal. The respondents are directed to pay to the petitioner the retirement benefits such as pension, arrears of pension, gratuity, leave encashment, higher grade pay-scale, salary arrears etc., arising out of 6th and 7th Pay Commission pay-scales. 6.1 The benefits shall be paid to the petitioner within ten weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. 6.2 It is clarified that if the amounts are not paid within the aforesaid stipulated time, it shall carry interest at the rate of 6% from the date of presentation of the petition, that is from 11.04.2017. 6.1 The benefits shall be paid to the petitioner within ten weeks from the date of receipt of the present order. 6.2 It is clarified that if the amounts are not paid within the aforesaid stipulated time, it shall carry interest at the rate of 6% from the date of presentation of the petition, that is from 11.04.2017. 6.3 Furthermore, the respondents are directed not to recover any amount from the retiral benefits payable to the petitioner pursuant to communication dated 06.02.2017. 7. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Direct service is permitted.” 2.3 It is this order passed by the learned Single Judge, that is the subject matter of the present Letters Patent Appeal before us, wherein we have heard the learned counsel, Shri H.S. Munshaw. 3. Shri H.S. Munshaw, learned counsel, has contended that a serious error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in not considering the sizable amount of days when the respondent has not worked. Further, the said non-working days were rightly treated by the appellant as a break in service. It is further observed that the said period was certainly a part of his unauthorized absence, for which he was departmentally dealt with. It is only a good gesture by the appellant that a lenient view was taken but, that would not permit the respondent to claim the benefits from that period. The learned counsel has further contended that the payment of gratuity ordered after considering the total length of service, is on a different yardstick and having not worked actually for that period, no benefits were made available to the respondent. As a result of this, the appellant has rightly treated the said period as break in service. Learned counsel has further submitted that if this is allowed then, the same would create a precedent. Hence, a request is made to set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and having seen the material on record, ex-face it appears that the settlement was made before the Lok Adalat which attained finality and observed that the respondent’s reinstatement was with continuity of service. The settlement-cum-award came to be passed before the Labour Court. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and having seen the material on record, ex-face it appears that the settlement was made before the Lok Adalat which attained finality and observed that the respondent’s reinstatement was with continuity of service. The settlement-cum-award came to be passed before the Labour Court. Since the continuity of service has already been granted, the said period has to be counted for the purpose of calculating retirement benefits and that aspect has been categorically observed by the learned Single Judge. While passing the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has also considered and applied the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Rafik, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 334 . Para-18 of the said judgment specifically categorizes a situation where recovery from the employee would be impermissible, which included the category of retired employees, as well. The appellant’s stand denying retiral benefits which are otherwise amenable to the respondent, has also rightly been considered by the learned Single Judge. Hence, we see no infirmity in this regard. Otherwise, the reinstatement with continuity of service would be indirectly adversely affected, which we are not inclined. 5. Apart from this, we have also noticed from the relevant papers placed before us that the penalty of 3 increment with permanent effect has also been exhausted. Further, this entire period, which has otherwise been treated as a continuity of service, has already been considered for payment of gratuity. When that is the case, it is not proper on the part of appellant to deprive the said benefit claimed by the respondent. 6. A bare reading of the impugned action reflected from the communication dated 24.11.2016 (page-26) indicated that if the period of 6066 days is to be treated as unauthorized absence then, there is no sanctity to the recalling of punishment and substitution of the same by stoppage of 3 increments with future effect, which was finalized between the parties in the form of settlement-cum-award. At the fag end of service, the appellant is rightly not permitted by the learned Single Judge to take such a stand depriving the respondent from legitimate dues. 7. After careful consideration of the overall material on record and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge, we are in complete agreement with the view taken. At the fag end of service, the appellant is rightly not permitted by the learned Single Judge to take such a stand depriving the respondent from legitimate dues. 7. After careful consideration of the overall material on record and the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge, we are in complete agreement with the view taken. This view is taken in a peculiar background of circumstance by the learned Single Judge and we are not inclined to disturb it. Further, keeping in view the peripheral limits of the scope of appeal as enlisted in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company, reported in (2016) 3 SCC 340 , we are not inclined to entertain the present Letters Patent Appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. 8. Since the main appeal is dismissed, connected Civil Application also stands dismissed hereby.