JUDGMENT : Re: Civil Misc. Delay condonation Application No. 1 of 2020:- 1. Additional cause list has been revised. No one is present for the respondents. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant is present. 3. Perused the office report dated 9.10.2020, according to which, in respect of respondent nos. 1 to 5, 7 & 9 neither undelivered cover nor acknowledgement have returned after service and also no one has put in appearance and so far as respondent no.6 is concerned undelivered cover has returned with the remarks that she is dead. The respondent no.6 is also one of the claimants. Admittedly, the other claimants have received the notices. Notice in respect of other claimants is deemed to be sufficient in the light of the aforesaid office report and I proceed to hear the application. 4. The stamp reporter had reported delay of 3937 days in filing the present appeal. 5. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and perused the record. 6. Before proceeding further it would be appropriate to take note of paragraph of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is quoted as under:- "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases:-Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section." (Emphasis supplied) 7. For the purpose of disposal of the delay condonation application it would also be beneficial to take note of few judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court on this issue. 8. In Baljeet Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives And Others vs. State of U.P. And Others (2019) 15 SCC 33 in para 7 it was observed as under:- "7. The matter requires examination from another aspect viz. laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. 8. In Baljeet Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives And Others vs. State of U.P. And Others (2019) 15 SCC 33 in para 7 it was observed as under:- "7. The matter requires examination from another aspect viz. laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existing." (emphasis supplied) 9. In Mohd. Sahid And Others vs. Raziya Khanam (Dead) Through Legal Representatives And Others (2019) 11 SCC 384 , the rejection of delay condonation application for condoning the delay of 349 days in availing provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was upheld as reason given was not sufficient and satisfactory. 10. In Bhivchandra Shankar More vs. Balu Gangaram More And Others (2019) 6 SCC 387 in paras 15 and 16 it was observed as under:- "15. It is a fairly well settled law that "sufficient cause" should be given liberal construction so as to advance sustainable justice when there is no inaction, no negligence nor want of bonafide could be imputable to the appellant. After referring to various judgments, in B. Madhuri, this Court held as under:- "6. The expression "sufficient cause" used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay." 16. Observing that the rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, this Court held as under:- "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time."" (emphasis supplied) 11. A reference may also be made to the judgment/order of this Court dated 10.10.2017 passed in First Appeal From Order Defective No. 1490 of 2017 (Ashok Kumar Alias Ashok Kumar Vohra vs. Zonal Manager Zonal Office National Insurance Co. & 4 Others) whereby delay condonation application was rejected. The extract of pragraph 2 of the said judgment is quoted as under:- “2. This appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been filed with a delay of two years and 334 days. In the affidavit accompanying delay condonation application filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1963") only explanation given is that concerned counsel has not given information but nothing has been placed on record to substantiate this defence.” (emphasis supplied) 12. In the above appeal also ground taken was that the learned counsel has not given the information. The Hon'ble Division Bench noted the related law in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Ashok Kumar (supra) which are quoted as under:- “4. In the above appeal also ground taken was that the learned counsel has not given the information. The Hon'ble Division Bench noted the related law in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of Ashok Kumar (supra) which are quoted as under:- “4. The expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107 , the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 5. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court said: "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 6. The Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties. They virtually take away the remedy. They are meant with the objective that parties should not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over their rights. They must seek remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The statute relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time, newer causes would come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is founded on public policy. During efflux of time, newer causes would come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). It is for this reason that when an action becomes barred by time, the Court should be slow to ignore delay for the reason that once limitation expires, other party matures his rights on the subject with attainment of finality. Though it cannot be doubted that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suiter from putting forth his cause but simultaneously the party on the other hand is also entitled to sit and feel carefree after a particular length of time, getting relieved from persistent and continued litigation. 7. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. No person gains from deliberate delaying a matter by not resorting to take appropriate legal remedy within time but then the words "sufficient cause" show that delay, if any, occurred, should not be deliberate, negligent and due to casual approach of concerned litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and, for the reasons beyond his control, and, in any case should not lack bona fide. If the explanation does not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court should show due consideration to the suiter, but, when there is apparent casual approach on the part of suiter, the approach of Court is also bound to change. Lapse on the part of litigant in approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him. 9. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Lapse on the part of litigant in approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him. 9. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless want of bona fide of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 10. The Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This principle still holds good inasmuch as the aforesaid decision of Privy Council as repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and others, AIR 2005 SC 2191 . 11. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. In the former case consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard and the basic guiding factor is advancement of substantial justice. 12. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC 448 , in para 17 of the judgment, the Court said : "...The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and state claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights." 13. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. The court cannot enquire into belated and state claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights." 13. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157 , in para 18 of the judgment, the Court said as under: "What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/ or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest." ” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Since, the law is well settled that delay must be sufficiently explained and shall not be a dilatory tactic, I am not inclined to refer to other judgments and I proceed to consider the delay condonation application in the present appeal filed for condoning delay of 3937 days in filing the appeal on merits. 14. Since, the law is well settled that delay must be sufficiently explained and shall not be a dilatory tactic, I am not inclined to refer to other judgments and I proceed to consider the delay condonation application in the present appeal filed for condoning delay of 3937 days in filing the appeal on merits. 14. Paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application are quoted as under:- “7. That on 22.12.2008, Learned Tribunal has illegally and arbitrarily allowed the claim petition and awarded compensation of Rs. 3,25,000/-in favour of the claimants/ Respondent No.3 to 10 and given right to recovery to the Insurance Company to the amount of compensation from the Appellant. The aforesaid judgment passed by the Learned Tribunal was never communicated by counsel of the appellant to him therefore he is not aware about the judgment and the right to recovery given to the Insurance Company. 8. That in compliance of aforesaid award dated 22.12.2008, Respondent Insurance Company has deposited the awarded amount along with interest as Rs. 4,25,302/-before Learned Tribunal and thereafter, in the year 2015, after the lapse of more than 6 years of passing the judgment and award initiated recovery proceeding and filed R.M. 68/2015 (The Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Charanjeet Singh) against the Appellant for recovery of Rs. 4,25,302/-on which the notices were also issued to the Appellant by the Court below but the same has not been served upon the Appellant. A Photostat copy of the Application u/s 174 M.V. Act registered as R.M. 68/2015 (The Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Charanjeet Singh) is being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No.-3 to this affidavit. 9. That surprisingly, in the month of September 2019, Appellant received Recovery Warrant issued against him by the Court Below thereafter, he enquired the matter with his local counsel at Mathura only then he has came into knowledge about the passing of order dated 22.12.2008 and the recovery right given to the Insurance Company against him thereafter, without any further delay, he immediately on 19.09.2019 filed his Objection i.e. Paper No.9-Ga against the recovery proceeding in R.M. 68/2015 but the Learned Tribunal has illegally, arbitrarily and contrary to evidence and material available on record rejected the Objection i.e. Paper No. 9Ga filed by the Appellant on 04.11.2019. For kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court, a xerox copy of the objection dated 19.09.2019 i.e. Paper No. 9-Ga filed by the Appellant and true and certified copy of entire order sheet of the R.M. 68/2015 (The Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Charanjeet Singh) are being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No.- 4 & 5 to this affidavit respectively.” (emphasis supplied) 15. Placing reliance on paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application it was submitted that the award was passed on 22.12.2008 awarding compensation of Rs. 3,25,000/-in favour of the claimants and giving right of recovery to the Insurance Company to recover the amount of compensation from the appellant. The said judgment passed by the learned Tribunal was never communicated by counsel of the appellant to owner-appellant and, therefore, he was not aware about the judgment and right of recovery given to the Insurance Company. It is further submitted that recovery proceedings were initiated in the year 2015 and when the owner-appellant received information about the recovery proceedings, he immediately filed his objection i.e. Paper No. 9-Ga against the recovery proceedings in R.M. 68 of 2015 on 19.9.2019. In such view of the matter, it is submitted that there is no deliberate delay on the part of the appellant. 16. On perusal, first of all I find that the annexure no.3 to the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application at page 81 clearly indicates that in paragraph 3 of the affidavit it has been mentioned that the entire award amount of Rs. 4,25,302/-was deposited vide Cheque No. 5083, Bank of Baroda, Mathura dated 13.04.2009. At the top, the case number is shown as R.M. ....... of 2009 and is duly signed by the Divisional Manager. However, it prima facie, appears from the order-sheet of the recovery proceedings in the present case that the same was filed on 14.8.2015 for the reasons best known to the officers/ officials of the Insurance Company. Insofar as recovery proceedings are concerned, fact remains that the owner-appellant had contested the claim petition and in the written statement filed by him it was not pleaded that the Driver was holding valid license. A finding on the issue that the driver was not holding the valid license was recorded on the basis of the report submitted by the Insurance Company being paper no. A finding on the issue that the driver was not holding the valid license was recorded on the basis of the report submitted by the Insurance Company being paper no. 71-Ga/1-4 and thereafter, the judgment was passed giving right of recovery to the Insurance Company to recover the amount from the owner-appellant herein. A bald statement in this regard that the owner-appellant was never informed about the passing of the award by the counsel for a period of more than 10 years is not acceptable in the case. The appellant-herein is a transporter by profession/ business and the vehicle involved was a water tanker. 17. Even in the application paper no. 9-Ga filed in the recovery proceedings it has nowhere been alleged that the owner-appellant was never informed about the award passed by the Tribunal by his counsel and was not aware of the same till the receipt of the recovery certificate. 18. The contention that the owner-appellant was not aware of the award for about more than 10 years is not acceptable also in view of the provisions of Section 168 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which clearly provides that "(2) The claim Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award." 19. In such view of the matter, I am not inclined to condone the delay of more than 11 years in filing the present appeal. 20. Therefore, the delay condonation application has no merit and the explanation given in this regard is not sufficient. The same is, accordingly, rejected and consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. 21. The statutory amount deposited before this Court shall be remitted to the Tribunal concerned for adjustment that is to be recovered from the appellant herein. Re: First Appeal From Order Defective:- 1. Since the delay condonation application has been rejected by me by order of date, consequently, present appeal also stands dismissed.