ORDERS 1. The appellant before this Court has filed this present appeal under order XLIII Rule 1(r) read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 being aggrieved by order dated 31.8.2020 by which the application preferred by the appellant / plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been rejected. 2. The facts of the case reveal that the appellant before this Court, who is the plaintiff before the trial Court, has filed a civil suit stating that she is the title holder and is in possession of the suit land bearing Survey No.3667 area 0.0418 hectare, Ujjain. The appellant has also stated in the civil suit that she has purchased the suit property from one Sanstha vide registered sale deed dated 15.7.2004 and the Sanstha has purchased the suit property on 12.5.2004 from the predecessor in title namely Hakimuddin, Amitubai and Khatijabai. 3. The plaintiff has also stated in the plaint that the land was mutated in the name of plaintiff and Bhu Adhikar Pustika and Rin Pustika were issued by the Government. Earlier the names of Ibrahim and Mohammed Hussain, the predecessor in title were mutated in the record of the year 1970-71 to 1972-73 and one Mohammed Hussain relinquished his share. The land was later on mutated in the name of predecessor in title and it was sold to the plaintiff in the year 2004. 4. It was further stated that on 31.7.2020 plaintiff received a notice from Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue), Ujjain seeking consent of the plaintiff for laying of pipe line and in the notice it was stated that the disputed land was a Karkhana and the plaintiff without seeking the permission of the Competent Authority has started running the marriage garden. 5. The plaintiff has further stated that she came to know from the news paper that some order has been passed by the Sub Divisional Officer on 14.8.2020 and in those circumstances, the plaintiff has filed a suit for declaration of title and for grant of permanent injunction. Alongwith the suit, an application was also preferred under Order XXXIX rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the same has been dismissed. Alongwith the suit, an application was also preferred under Order XXXIX rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the same has been dismissed. The trial Court after hearing the State of Madhya Pradesh has dismissed the application preferred under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 against which the present appeal has been filed. 6. Shri Assudani learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the matter has vehemently argued before this Court that the appellant is still in possession of the land on the basis of registered sale deed dated 15.7.2004 and therefore, the impugned order dated 31.8.2020 could not have been passed by the trial Court in the manner and method it has been done. 7. Another ground raised in the present appeal is that the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff is still in existence and until and unless the sale deed dated 15.7.2004 is set aside, the State Government cannot claim the title over the land in question. It has been further argued that even if it is assumed that the land was given for industrial purpose then also the provisions of section 181 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 empowers the Collector to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. 8. Another ground has been taken by learned counsel stating that the State Government was required to file a civil suit or to initiate proceedings under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Lok Parisar (Bedakhali) Adhiniyam, 1974 and by no stretch of imagination the impugned order could have been passed by the Court below merely because the State Government was in possession of the the suit property as stated before the trial Court. 9. Shri Assudani has argued before this Court that as per the provisions of section 115 of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 in case there is an incorrect entry, no order could have been passed by the Sub Divisional Officer after five years without seeking sanction of the Collector and in the present case, the sanction was granted on 13.8.2020 and on the same date the order was passed by the Sub Divisional Officer. Learned trial Court has failed to consider the aforesaid aspect of the case, hence, injunction be granted and appeal be allowed. 10. Learned trial Court has failed to consider the aforesaid aspect of the case, hence, injunction be granted and appeal be allowed. 10. It has also been contended before this Court that a Panchnama was brought before the trial Court on 23.8.2020 and it was only a paper Panchnama produced by the State Government and could not have been relied upon by the trial Court keeping in view the judgment delivered in this Court in the case of Gaurav Agroplast v. State of M. P. (Writ Petition No. 603/2000, decided on 6.9.2000. It has also been argued that lessor cannot take possession of the property extra judicially and has to take possession only in a manner recognized by law. 11. It has also been argued that for taking possession under section 248 or under section 181 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 there is a prescribed procedure and merely because the State Government took possession of the land, it can never be said that plaintiff was not entitled for grant of injunction. 12. On the other hand, Shri Pushyamitra Bhargava, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent / State has vehemently argued before this Court that the application preferred under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has rightly been rejected by the trial Court. 13. It has been stated that prior to enforcement of M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 as per the revenue records the land was the Government land and mentioned as the Takayami Karkhana in the year 1950. The land bearing Survey No. 3667/1 and 3667/2 was in the name of Ibrahim and Mohammed Hussain, who were the lease holder till 1968. It was a Government land and no person was having right to sell the Government land and therefore, the sale deed executed against the interest of the State Government is a nullity. 14. It has been further stated that Ibrahim and Mohammed Hussain nor their legal representatives were having any legal right to dispose of the suit land and the possession of the plaintiff was also illegal. 14. It has been further stated that Ibrahim and Mohammed Hussain nor their legal representatives were having any legal right to dispose of the suit land and the possession of the plaintiff was also illegal. It has been further contended that the Sub Divisional Officer has rightly passed the order dated 13.8.2020 by which the land was again mutated in favour of the State Government by deleting the plaintiff's name and by the order of Sub Divisional Officer, the State Government is again reflected as the owner of the land and thereafter, the land was given to Nagar Nigam, Ujjain on Supurdagi. At present, the State Government is in possession of the disputed land in and those circumstances the application for grant of injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 has rightly been dismissed. 15. Shri Pushyamitra Bhargava, learned Additional Advocate General for the State has argued before this Court that the Government land was sold first by sale deed dated 12.5.2004 to one Hakimuddin and Hakimuddin sold the land to his wife just after four months on 15/07/2004, who is Nilofar. 16. It has been further contended that in the year 1950 the entry regarding the land was mentioned as Karkhana. The entry continued up to 1968 and after 1968 erroneously without their being any order, the plaintiff's predecessor name was mentioned in the revenue record and plaintiff is not having the title over the disputed land. The Sub Divisional Officer while passing the order has followed the prescribed procedure and he has sought permission of the Collector and therefore, the application was rightly dismissed by the trial Court. 17. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. The matter is being disposed of with consent of the parties at motion hearing stage itself. 18. This Court has carefully gone through the order passed by the trial Court and as on date it is an undisputed fact that the land in question is under the possession of the State Government. The land in question is situated in the heart of the city of Ujjain. It is behind the “Mahakaleshwar Temple” and the land is being used for the purposes of parking of the vehicles and for other purposes. Documents have been brought on record to establish that the State Government is in possession of the land in question. 19. The land in question is situated in the heart of the city of Ujjain. It is behind the “Mahakaleshwar Temple” and the land is being used for the purposes of parking of the vehicles and for other purposes. Documents have been brought on record to establish that the State Government is in possession of the land in question. 19. Learned District Judge, Ujjain in paragraphs No.10 to 29 has held as under :- “10. First of all I take up prima-facie case. Plaintiff in para 2 of the plaint has mentioned that plaintiff has purchased the disputed land by the registered sale dated 15.7.2004 from Tirthkar Grah Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit Sanstha. After having purchased the land possession was also handed over to the plaintiff. The Tirthkar Grah Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit Sanstha has purchased the disputed land from owner Hakimuddin, Amtubai and Khatijabai by registered sale deed dated 12.5.2004 and obtained possession. The land was duly mutated in favour of plaintiff and Bhoo Adhikar Pustika and Rin Pustika was duly issued by the revenue authorities, therefore, plaintiff's title cannot be challenged by the defendants by virtue of section 115 of Evidence Act. 11. It is further pleaded in para 5 of the plaint that since Khasra Panchsala 1970-71 to 1972-73 the land was in the name of previous owner Ibrahim and Mohammad Hussain. Subsequently Mohammad Hussain relinquished his share in favour of LR's of Ibrahim Hakimuddin, Amtubai & Khatijabai. Mutation was done accordingly in year 1988- 89. In para 7 of the plaint it is clear that on 31.7.2020 a notice was issued by competent authority S.D.O., Ujjain to plaintiff that pipe line and duct is to be laid in the disputed land and since the plaintiff is title and possession holder of the disputed land therefore, permission was sought to acquire the disputed land. On 4.8.2020 a notice was issued to the plaintiff that disputed land is mentioned as Karkhana in the revenue record and without permission of any competent authority marriage garden is being run against the rule. This notice is being challenged in this suit. 12. It is true that Khasra Panchsala of 1970-71 to 1972-73 name of Ibrahim is mentioned as Bhumi swami of the disputed land. In year 1989 to 1993 the disputed land stands in the name of Mohsin Ali Hakimuddin. This notice is being challenged in this suit. 12. It is true that Khasra Panchsala of 1970-71 to 1972-73 name of Ibrahim is mentioned as Bhumi swami of the disputed land. In year 1989 to 1993 the disputed land stands in the name of Mohsin Ali Hakimuddin. In the reply of order 39 rule 1,2 C.P.C. application the state has taken the specific plea that disputed land was earlier government land mentioned in the revenue record as Karkhana, therefore, no person has any right to sell the government land. Any sale deed of the disputed land is void against the interest of State government. After giving full opportunity S.D.O. has passed the order that land should be again restored to original owner as government land. The state government has relied upon Khasra of year 1950 which mentioned the disputed land as Karkhana which means that it was government land. No proceeding of any revenue authority has been brought to the notice of the Court that when this land which was earlier mentioned in the year 1950 as karkhana became private land. In the absence of any revenue Court order it cannot be said that the plaintiff has become owner of the property by virtue of Khasra entry 1970-71. 13. My attention goes towards the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Durga v. Milkhiram 1969 Punjab LJ 105 it was held by S.C. that where earlier revenue entries were changed in the later revenue entries and the change effected without any mutation and there was no order revenue authorities showing that the change was made the presumption in favour of later entries in the revenue are found would stand rebutted by the fact the alteration in the latest revenue entries were made unauthorizedly there being no material to justify the title of parties. 14. In view of aforesaid reason since predecessor of plaintiff have no prima-facie title over the disputed land, therefore, any sale deed executed by them appears to be null and void because seller cannot transfer better title then what he himself has. The plaintiff has relied on affidavit of three persons one Smt. Nilofar, second Javed Khan and third Sameer Khan. Smt. Nilofar in her affidavit stated that possession is of the plaintiff which is proved by photographs Annexure 4,5 & 6. The plaintiff has relied on affidavit of three persons one Smt. Nilofar, second Javed Khan and third Sameer Khan. Smt. Nilofar in her affidavit stated that possession is of the plaintiff which is proved by photographs Annexure 4,5 & 6. She has further stated that revenue Court has not passed any order of ejectment against her as per section 38 of M.P.LR.C. Code. No proper proceeding was initiated to take the possession, therefore, the possession still rests with the plaintiff which is proved by the Pakka construction over the disputed land. A forged panchnama has been prepared by the defendants in order to frustrate the claim of the plaintiff. She further stated that possession has not been taken over from the plaintiff. Same effect is affidavit of Javed Khan and Sameer Khan. 15. Shri M.K. Jain learned counsel relied on number of judgments in his favour one judgment is State of U.P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh AIR 1989 Supreme Court 997 to this effect that "if the lease is canceled lessor can resume possession only in a manner known or recognised by law." Another judgment relied on by the plaintiff advocate is S.R. Ejaz v. Tamil Nadu Handloom Weavers Cooperative Society M.P.W.N. 2002 (II) Note 15 that "title cannot be taken over by force." Another judgment relied on by plaintiff advocate is Ram Bharose Soni v. State of M.P. 2002 (II) M.P.W.N. Note 22 to this effect that "property right of a citizen cannot be under taken even for public purpose without following law.". Another judgment relied on by plaintiff advocate is Ram Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu 2004 (II) M.P.W.N. Note 25 to this effect that "law respects the possession even if there is no title in support thereof no one can be allowed to take the law in its own hand and dispossess the person forcibly." The plaintiff advocate has relied on Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act 1976 of section 10 (5) which describes the procedure and manner in which the possession can be taken over. Number of judgments have been relied on of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulations Act which I do not want to repeat because when there is procedure prescribed in M.P.L.R.C. Code then no external aid can be taken from other Act, therefore, I do not want to mention these judgments in my order. 16. Number of judgments have been relied on of Urban Land Ceiling and Regulations Act which I do not want to repeat because when there is procedure prescribed in M.P.L.R.C. Code then no external aid can be taken from other Act, therefore, I do not want to mention these judgments in my order. 16. Plaintiff advocate Shri M.K. Jain has relied on section 38 of M.P.L.R.C. Code describing the procedure for taking over the possession. Another judgment relied on by Shri Jain advocate State of M.P. v. Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd. 1999 R N 328 to this effect that proceeding under section 248 does not decide the title of the land and party aggrieved may file civil suit. There is no dispute that title can be decided only by civil Court not by revenue Court. Another judgment relied on by plaintiff advocate is Babulal v. Bhurelal 2000 RN 111 High Court to this effect that continuous Khasra entry thereafter showing possession of plaintiff, plaintiff was rightly found in possession of the disputed land. Another judgment relied on by plaintiff is Avadh Narain v. Ravi Prakash Verma 1987 RN 304 to this effect that without following procedure prescribed under section 38 of M.P.L.R.C. Code ejectment proceeding cannot be started. 17. In the reply State Government has taken the plea in para 4 of the reply that on 23.8.2020 possession was taken over by the state government from the plaintiff. The suit was filed on 14.8.2020. The notice was served upon defendant on 19.8.2020. It appears that the possession has been taken over by the state government after filing of the suit which cannot be recognized because no person or any authority is allowed to change the state of affairs prevailing on the date of accrual of cause of action to the plaintiff or on the date of filing of the suit. 18. The defendant has filed Panchnama dated 23.8.2020 to prove that possession has been taken over by the defendant from the plaintiff. Since possession was taken over by defendant during the pendency of the case which cannot be recognized. 19. My attention goes towards the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh AIR 1993 SC 276 that prima-facie case is not to be confused with prima-facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Since possession was taken over by defendant during the pendency of the case which cannot be recognized. 19. My attention goes towards the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh AIR 1993 SC 276 that prima-facie case is not to be confused with prima-facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima-facie case is substantial question, raised, bona-fide which needs investigation and a decision on merits. 20. Another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court is Shanti Kumar v. Shankuntala AIR 2004 SC 115 "the Court will be loath to issue an order of interim injunction or to order an interim arrangement in consistent with the order of executive magistrate. But only a rule of caution civil Court has power to interim injunction order inconsistent order 145 Cr.P.C. 21. When prima-facie it appears that the plaintiff is not owner of the property then no injunction can be issued to protect unlawful possession. In this matter my attention goes towards the judgment of Hon'ble M.P. High Court Hiralal v. Devmurti AIR 2008 NOC 1150 M.P. "No injunction against true owner". Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sopan versus Assistant Charity Commissioner AIR 2004 SC 1801 to this effect that "no injunction against the true owner. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar v. MCD 1993 Supreme Court Cases 161 held that" no injunction can be issued n favour of trespasser on the basis of possession. Another judgment is Premji Ratansey Shah and others v. Union of India and others [ (1994) 5 SCC 547 ] wherein the Hon'ble apex Court has held as under: "5. It is equally settled law that injunction would not be issued against the true owner. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly rejected the relief of declaration and injunction in favour of the petitioners who have no interest in the property. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession as against the owner. Pretext of dispute of identity of the land should not be an excause to claim injunction against true owner." 22. Even assuming that they had any possession, their possession is wholly unlawful possession of a trespasser and an injunction cannot be issued in favour of a trespasser or a person who gained unlawful possession as against the owner. Pretext of dispute of identity of the land should not be an excause to claim injunction against true owner." 22. Another judgment is Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Puna Municipal Corporation [ 1995 (3) SCC 33 ] Wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is a settled law that no injunction could be granted against the true owner at the instance of persons in unlawful possession. 23. In view of aforesaid reason I arrived at the finding and it appears to me that plaintiff has no prima-facie title over the disputed land because there is no document on record filed by the plaintiff to prove that when and how government land became private land of the plaintiff's predecessor. 24. The conduct of the plaintiff is also to be seen at the time of deciding interlocutory application under Order 39 rule 1,2 C.P.C. Registered sale deed filed by the plaintiff appears to be suspicious because registered sale deed in favour of Nilofar dated 15 July 2004 was executed by Mohammad Kalim president of Tirthkar Grah Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit who sold the disputed land to Nilofar father's name Rashid Khan aged 30 year. Nilofar and Mohammad Kalim are husband and wife in the registered sale deed; deliberately the husband name of Nilofar was not mentioned but from the title of the plaint it is crystal clear that the name of husband of plaintiff is Mohammad Kalim. It means that husband has sold the disputed land to his wife which is itself a suspicious circumstances. 25. It is a settled law that plaintiff is entitled to temporary injunction only when prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss exists in his favour and plaintiff has to prove further that she has come up before the Court with clean hands. Primaacie case does not exist in favour of the plaintiff because she does not appear to be prima-facie owner of the property. In view of aforesaid reason that there is no document that when and how government land became private land. Primaacie case does not exist in favour of the plaintiff because she does not appear to be prima-facie owner of the property. In view of aforesaid reason that there is no document that when and how government land became private land. When prima-facie case and prima-facie title of the plaintiff is not found to be proved then possession on that basis becomes illegal and possession of the plaintiff is nothing more then that of trespasser. Possession of tress passer cannot be protected by Court of law which is also a Court of equity. Also plaintiff has not come up before clean hands because husband sold property to his wife and deliberately husband name was not mentioned in the sale deed. Since predecessor of plaintiff's were not owner of the property, therefore, they cannot transfer better title then what they themselves have. Since prima-facie case is not in favour of plaintiff, therefore, balance of convenience and irreparable loss is also not in her favour because state government is in better financial position to compensate the plaintiff, therefore, I come to this conclusion that prima-facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss does not exist in favour of plaintiff. 26. The plaintiff has sought temporary injunction in her favour on the ground that she is owner and possession holder of the disputed land. When ownership is under cloud then possession cannot be protected on the ground that possession is settled. When plaintiff has sought relief on the ground that she is owner and possession holder of the property then relief of temporary injunction cannot be given on the ground that even if prima-facie title is not proved, possession needs to be protected. The plaintiff has to prove primafacie title as well as possession only then she can get relief of temporary injunction. The plaintiff has not sought the relief of temporary injunction on the basis of possession alone hence the judgments relied on by plaintiff advocate that settled possession needs to be protected does not apply to the facts of the case. 27. Before parting with the order I want to mention one thing that reason mentioned in deciding application under Order 39 rule 1,2 C.P.C. will not affect the merit of the case. I have given reason because reason is the heart beat of judicial order but it will not affect the merit of the case. 27. Before parting with the order I want to mention one thing that reason mentioned in deciding application under Order 39 rule 1,2 C.P.C. will not affect the merit of the case. I have given reason because reason is the heart beat of judicial order but it will not affect the merit of the case. It will be decided after evidence. 28. In view of aforesaid reason the application under Order 39 rule 1,2 C.P.C. is hereby rejected. 29. Copy of this order be sent to both advocates on whatsapp as well as hard copy certified by the Court be given to the parties concerned immediately.” The documents on record and the order passed by the learned Judge reveals that the plaintiff in paragraph No.2 of the plaint has mentioned that the land was purchased vide registered sale deed dated 15.7.2004 from Tirthkar Grah Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit. The registry was done by the Sanstha through Hakimuddin in favour of the plaintiff, who is the daughter of the person who has executed the sale deed and earlier a sale deed was executed on 12.5.2004 and the so called Tirthkar Grah Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit has purchased the land from Hakimuddin, Amitubai and Khatijabai. 20. Undisputed facts also reveal that in the plaint it was mentioned that as per the revenue entries of the year 1970-71 to 1972-73 the land was in the name of previous owner Ibrahim and Mohammed Hussain. Subsequently, Mohammed Hussain relinquished his share in favour of legal representatives of Ibrahim Hakimuddin, Amitubai and Khatijabai. Mutation was done in the year 1988-89. Paragraph No.7 of the plaint makes it very clear that on 31.7.2020 a notice was issued by the Competent Authority, Sub Divisional Officer, Ujjain to plaintiff stating that a pipe line and a duct is to be laid in the disputed land. 21. On 4.8.2020 a notice was issued to the plaintiff that disputed land is mentioned as “Karkhana” in the revenue record and without permission of the Competent Authority marriage garden is being run contrary to the statutory provisions of law. The aforesaid notice is certainly a subject matter of the civil suit. 21. On 4.8.2020 a notice was issued to the plaintiff that disputed land is mentioned as “Karkhana” in the revenue record and without permission of the Competent Authority marriage garden is being run contrary to the statutory provisions of law. The aforesaid notice is certainly a subject matter of the civil suit. The record produced by the State Government before the trial Court prima-facie reveals that the land was State Government's land recorded as Karkhana and no order of any revenue authority was brought to the notice of the trial Court to prove that land in question was the private land and in those circumstances prima-facie the trial Court has observed that based upon the documents it can never be said that plaintiff has become the owner of the property by virtue of the Khasra entries of the year 1970-71. 22. The trial Court has also taken into account the aspect regarding prima-facie case / prima-facie title and has arrived at a conclusion that plaintiff has failed to prove that when and how Government land became the private land of the plaintiff's predecessor. In respect of possession, the plaintiff was not able to establish his possession also. On the contrary, the State Government is in possession and therefore, as there was no prima-facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss, the trial Court has declined the application preferred under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 23. The apex Court in the case of Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v. S. L. Vaswani and another reported in (2010) 2 SCC 142 in paragraphs No.19 to 22 has held as under:- “19. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. 23. The apex Court in the case of Skyline Education Institute (India) Private Limited v. S. L. Vaswani and another reported in (2010) 2 SCC 142 in paragraphs No.19 to 22 has held as under:- “19. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. Before pronouncing upon the tenability or otherwise of the appellant's prayer for restraining the respondents from using the word `Skyline' for the Institute of Engineering and Technology established by them, we consider it necessary to observe that as the suit filed by the appellant is pending trial and issues raised by the parties are yet to be decided, the High Court rightly considered and decided the appellant's prayer for temporary injunction only on the basis of the undisputed facts and the material placed before the learned Single Judge and unless this Court comes to the conclusion that the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing to entertain the appellant's prayer for temporary injunction is vitiated by an error apparent or perversity and manifest injustice has been done to it, there will be no warrant for exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. 20. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd .1990 (Supp.) SCC 727, this Court was called upon to determine the scope of appellate Court's power to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Court of first instance in granting or refusing the prayer for temporary injunction. The facts of that case were that in the suit filed by it, respondent-Antox India (P) Ltd. had prayed for restraining the appellant from using registered trade mark `Cal-De-Ce'. The learned Single Judge of the High Court refused to entertain the respondent's prayer but on reconsideration of the matter the Division Bench passed an order of injunction. This Court reversed the order of the Division Bench and observed: (SCC p. 733, para 14) "14. ... In such appeals, the appellate Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate Court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial Court's exercise of discretion." 21. The proposition of law laid down in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. (1990 Supp 727) was reiterated in N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corporation (supra) in which this Court considered the correctness of an order of temporary injunction passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in a suit filed by the respondents to restrain defendants from manufacturing, selling, advertising or in any way using the trade mark `Whirlpool' or any other trade mark deceptively or confusingly similar to the trade mark `Whirlpool' in respect of their goods. The claim of the plaintiffs-respondents was based on prior user of the mark `Whirlpool'. After considering the rival pleadings and material placed before him, the learned Single Judge granted temporary injunction. The Division Bench confirmed that order and dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. This Court, declined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court and held: (N.R.Dongre case, SCC P.727, para 18) "18. Injunction is a relief in equity and is based on equitable principles. On the above concurrent findings, the weight of equity at this stage is in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. It has also to be borne in mind that a mark in the form of a word which is not a derivative of the product, points to the source of the product. The mark/name `WHIRLPOOL' is associated for long, much prior to the defendants' application in 1986 with the Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiff 1. It has also to be borne in mind that a mark in the form of a word which is not a derivative of the product, points to the source of the product. The mark/name `WHIRLPOOL' is associated for long, much prior to the defendants' application in 1986 with the Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiff 1. In view of the prior user of the mark by Plaintiff 1 and its trans-border reputation extending to India, the trade mark `WHIRLPOOL' gives an indication of the origin of the goods as emanating from or relating to the Whirlpool Corporation, Plaintiff 1. The High Court has recorded its satisfaction that use of the `WHIRLPOOL' mark by the defendants indicates prima facie an intention to pass off the defendants' washing machines as those of the plaintiffs or at least the likelihood of the buyers being confused or misled into that belief." A somewhat similar view was expressed in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals [ 2001 (5) SCC 73 ]. 22. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that once the Court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the Court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate Court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate Court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity.” In the aforesaid case, the apex Court was considering an issue of Trade Marks Act, 1999 and has observed that once the Court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of material placed before the Court and is supported by cogent reasons, appellate Court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter, it is possible for the appellate Court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima-facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity. In the present case, the trial Court based upon the documents produced by the plaintiff and defendants has arrived at a conclusion that the defendant State is in possession of the suit property. In the present case, the trial Court based upon the documents produced by the plaintiff and defendants has arrived at a conclusion that the defendant State is in possession of the suit property. The plaintiff has not been able to make out a prima-facie case for grant of injunction. This Court does not find any reason based upon the entire record to reverse the findings arrived at by the trial Court. 24. The apex Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Star Bone Mill and Fertiliser Company reported in (2013) 9 SCC 319 in paragraphs No.17 to 25 has held as under:- “17. No person can claim a title better than he himself possess. In the instant case, unless it is shown that M/s. A. Allauddin & Sons had valid title, the respondent/plaintiff could not claim any relief whatsoever from Court. 18. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar & Ors. v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 901 , this Court held as under :- “12. A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under section 110 of the Evidence Act.” 19. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander & Ors. & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 1165 , dealing with the provisions of section 110 of the Evidence Act, this Court held as under:- “15. .........Possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one can deny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. When the facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.” 20. In Chief Conservator of Forests, Govt. of A.P. v. Collector & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1805 , this Court held that : “20. ........ Presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.” 21. The principle enshrined in section 110 of the Evidence Act, is based on public policy with the object of preventing persons from committing breach of peace by taking law into their own hands, however good their title over the land in question may be. The principle enshrined in section 110 of the Evidence Act, is based on public policy with the object of preventing persons from committing breach of peace by taking law into their own hands, however good their title over the land in question may be. It is for this purpose, that the provisions of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and sections 154 and 158 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, were enacted. All the aforesaid provisions have the same object. The said presumption is read under section 114 of the Evidence Act, and applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim “possession follows title” is applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of waste lands, or where nothing is known about possession one-way or another. Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in any party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it. It infact means, that if at any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vested in him. A person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/encroachment etc. Where the apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under section 110 of the Evidence Act. 22. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under section 110 of the Evidence Act. 22. The Courts below have failed to appreciate that mere acceptance of municipal tax or agricultural tax by a person, cannot stop the State from challenging ownership of the land, as there may not be estoppel against the statute. Nor can such a presumption arise in case of grant of loan by a bank upon it hypothecating the property. 23. The trial Court has recorded a finding to the effect that the name of one Raja Ram was shown as Pattadar in respect of the land in dispute and the respondent/plaintiff is in possession. Therefore, the burden of proof was shifted on the government to establish that the suit land belonged to it. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff could not furnish any explanation before us as to who was this Raja Ram, Pattadar and how respondent/plaintiff was concerned with it. Moreover, in absence of his impleadment by the respondent/plaintiff such a finding could not have been recorded. 24. The Courts below erred in holding, that revenue records confer title, for the reason that they merely show possession of a person. The Courts below further failed to appreciate that the sale deed dated 11.11.1959 was invalid and inoperative, as the documents on record established that the vendor was merely a lessee of the Government. 25. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are perverse and liable to be set aside. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the Courts below are hereby set aside. The suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff is dismissed.” In light of the aforesaid judgment, the trial Court was justified in not treating the revenue record as a title document. The State of Madhya Pradesh was certainly title holder of the property and no order was brought on record as to how the title was transferred in favour of the private individuals. Hence, the trial Court was justified in rejecting the application for grant of injunction. 25. In the considered opinion of this Court, no illegality or perversity has been noticed in the order passed by the trial Court. Hence, the trial Court was justified in rejecting the application for grant of injunction. 25. In the considered opinion of this Court, no illegality or perversity has been noticed in the order passed by the trial Court. The trial Court has passed the order after taking into account rival contention of the parties and this Court also does not find any reason to allow the appeal and reverse the order passed by the trial Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Resultantly, the appeal is devoid of merit and substance and is accordingly dismissed. It is made clear that the observations made in the order of trial Court and the observations made by this Court, while deciding the appeal, will not come in way of the parties, so far as the civil suit is concerned. The trial Court shall decide the civil suit without being influenced by the order passed by this Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties during the trial.