JUDGMENT : V.C. Dixit, J. 1. This first appeal has been filed by defendant appellant under Section 19 of Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred as Act, 1984) against the judgment and decree dated 25.3.2017 passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Hapur in Case No. 487 of 2011 (Vikas Singh Vs. Smt. Neelam Devi) filed under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred as Act, 1955), by which the divorce suit filed by plaintiff respondent was decreed. 2. The divorce petition was filed by respondent husband with the allegation that his marriage was solemnized with the defendant appellant on 20.6.2002 in accordance with Hindu rituals without dowry at village Nayazpur Khaiya, Pargana and Tehsile Garh Mukteshwer, Ghaziabad, the parental house of the defendant appellant. After marriage the plaintiff respondent brought defendant appellant to his house at Garh Road, Kuvesher Chaupla, Pargana and Tehsile Hapur, Ghaziabad. He performed his obligations of being a husband and led a happy married life and fulfilled all genuine demand of his wife according to his status. Their daughter namely Km. Lavi was born on 1.1.2004. It is alleged that after two years of marriage the relationship of the parties strained and defendant started creating trouble asking to live separately with the family. It is further alleged that the defendant wife was not ready to do household chores and had starting quarreling with the plaintiff husband. It is further alleged that she started frequently visiting her parental house without plaintiff's permission. Apart from this she regularly talked on telephone to some unknown person and on being queried she used to quarrel. On 27.3.2010 when plaintiff was out of his house, the defendant was talking on telephone to some unknown person and on reaching home the plaintiff inquired with whom she was talking to, the defendant annoyingly threatened to murder him. On the very same day her father and brother came to the plaintiff's house to beat him and his mother. The father and brother took the defendant wife and Km. Lavi to her maternal home and while leaving removed Rs. 60,000/-and 20 tola' gold from plaintiff's house. It is further submitted that the wife had not performed her matrimonial obligations for last 6 years. The father and brother took the defendant wife and Km. Lavi to her maternal home and while leaving removed Rs. 60,000/-and 20 tola' gold from plaintiff's house. It is further submitted that the wife had not performed her matrimonial obligations for last 6 years. It is further alleged that the wife had lodged a false case which was registered as Case Crime 23 of 2010 in Mahila Thana, Meerut which was subsequently withdrawn on the intervention of respected people and relatives. Parties agreed to pursue divorce by mutual consent. Divorce petition was filed under Section 13 B of Act, 1955 on 9.4.2010 which was registered as Case No. 176 of 2010 but the same was subsequently withdrawn on 16.8.2011 on the application filed by the defendant appellant. When the defendant appellant refused to live together, under compelling circumstances the present divorce petition was filed seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty. 3. The defendant appellant on being notice had contested the divorce petition by filing written statement denying the allegations of the divorce petition. It was stated that her father had spent Rs.15 lakhs and had provided all house hold articles at the time of marriage but the family of husband were not happy with the dowry furthermore they demanded a car and Rs. 2 lakhs cash. This illegal demand of dowry was not fulfilled by her father and as such the family members of husband had started abusing and harassing the appellant defendant. It is further alleged that the husband had an illicit relation with a married woman of the locality and was leading an adulterous life. When the illegal demand of dowry was not fulfilled she was beaten by the husband and his family members and was thrown out of the house along with her daughter Km. Lavi on 27.3.2010. She lodged a first information report in Mahila Thana which was registered as Case Crime No. 23 of 2010 under Sections 498A, 323 I.P.C and 3/4 Dowry Act. A meeting was held at the residence of brother in law (Jija) of the plaintiff husband at Hapur on 4.4.2010 in absence of defendant and the plaintiff husband had refused to keep the defendant as his wife. He asked for the divorce and was ready to pay Rs.8 lakhs to the defendant as permanent alimony and Rs.12 lakhs for maintenance of Km. Lavi. He asked for the divorce and was ready to pay Rs.8 lakhs to the defendant as permanent alimony and Rs.12 lakhs for maintenance of Km. Lavi. On the pressure of father and other family members the criminal case was withdrawn by her. A divorce petition was filed under Section 13B of Act, 1955 on 9.4.2010 which was registered as Case No. 176 of 2010, but even after filing of divorce petition earlier filed with mutual consent the plaintiff respondent neither paid agreed amount to the defendant appellant nor deposited the amount in the name of Km. Lavi and as such divorce petition earlier filed with mutual consent was withdrawn subsequently on her application on 16.8.2011. It is also pleaded that she never deserted the plaintiff respondent but the plaintiff respondent himself had deserted her for such a long period without any sufficient reason and is not ready to keep her as his wife. The allegations alleged in the plaint regarding cruelty was specifically denied and it was stated that she was always ready and is still ready to live with the plaintiff respondent and prayed that the divorce suit filed by plaintiff respondent is liable to be dismissed. 4. On the pleadings of the parties following 2 issues were framed by the learned Family Court: 1. Whether on the grounds mentioned in the plaint, the marriage dated 20.06.2002 is liable to be dissolved ? 2. Relief ? 5. Both the parties had led their evidence in support of their case. Plaintiff respondent himself had appeared as P.W.1 and also produced copy of divorce petition filed under section 13 B of Act, 1955 and order passed therein whereas defendant appellant herself had appeared as D.W. 1. 6. The learned Family Court had allowed the divorce petition vide judgment and decree dated 25.3.2017, which is impugned in the present appeal. 7. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the record as well as written submissions and case laws filed by respective parties. 8. The plaintiff-respondent had filed the divorce petition seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty alleging therein that the wife frequently visited her parental house without his permission and had put pressure to live separately with the family of plaintiff-respondent. Apart from this she regularly talked on telephone to some unknown person whereas the defendant appellant had denied these allegation. 8. The plaintiff-respondent had filed the divorce petition seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty alleging therein that the wife frequently visited her parental house without his permission and had put pressure to live separately with the family of plaintiff-respondent. Apart from this she regularly talked on telephone to some unknown person whereas the defendant appellant had denied these allegation. It was pleaded that on account of non-fulfilment of dowry, the husband and the family members had harassed the appellant. It was also alleged that the plaintiff respondent had an illicit relationship with a married women of the locality and was living an adulterous life. Learned family court had disbelieved the allegations of adultery alleged by both the husband and the wife against each other but the divorce petition was allowed by the judgment and decree dated 25.3.2017 on the ground that behaviour of wife is not like an ideal lady as she used to live at her parental house and make allegations against her husband without any basis which amounting to cruelty. 9. The decree of divorce has been challenged in the present appeal by the defendant appellant on the ground that the learned family court has not recorded any finding regarding persistent or repeated cruelty on the part of appellant as required by Section 13-(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The learned court below had wrongly shifted the burden to prove the ground of cruelty on the appellant-defendant rather it was to be proved by plaintiff-respondent. The counsel for the appellant-wife relied upon the para-6 of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey reported in AIR 2002 SC 591 , which is quoted herein below: 6. Treating the petitioner with cruelty is a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act but in relation to matrimonial matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers the living of the petitioner with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Cruelty for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. "Cruelty", therefore, postulates a treatment of the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished from the ordinary wear and tear of family life. It cannot be decided on the basis of the sensitivity of the petitioner and has to be adjudged on the basis of the course of conduct which would, in general, be dangerous for a spouse to live with the other. In the instant case both the trial court as well as the High Court have found on facts that the wife had failed to prove the allegations of cruelty attributed to the respondent. Concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts cannot be disturbed by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Otherwise also the averments made in the petition and the evidence led in support thereof clearly shows that the allegations, even if held to have been proved, would only show the sensitivity of the appellant with respect to the conduct of the respondent which cannot be termed more than ordinary wear and tear of the family life. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the court below had failed to consider that the wife wants to live with her husband and has erroneously ignored the specific averment in written statement as well as the oral statement of the wife in this regard before the court below. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that the impugned judgment was also passed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage eventhough it is not the statutory ground under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, infact husband himself had denied to keep the appellant with him. It has further been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that the impugned judgment was also passed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage eventhough it is not the statutory ground under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, infact husband himself had denied to keep the appellant with him. The reliance has been placed on para 7, 7A, 13 & 16 of Savitri Pandey's case (supra). 7. No decree of divorce could be granted on the ground of desertion in the absence of pleading and proof. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even in the absence of specific issue, the parties had led evidence and there was sufficient material for the Family Court to return a verdict of desertion having been proved. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel, we have opted to examine this aspect of the matter despite the fact that there was no specific issue framed or insisted to be framed. 7A. "Desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. After referring to host of authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati [ AIR 1957 SC 176 ] held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. After referring to host of authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati [ AIR 1957 SC 176 ] held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. It further held: "For the office of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a different between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce, under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce. Whether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi. The offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus ort it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons the marital home with the intention, express or implied, of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The law in England has prescribed a three years period and the Bombay Act prescribed a period of four years as a continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decide to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for divorce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end and if the deserted spouse unreasonably refuses to offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion, the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court." 13. In any proceedings under the Act whether defended or not the court would decline to grant relief to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner was taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purposes of the reliefs contemplated under Section 23(1) of the Act. No party can be permitted to carve out the ground for destroying the family which is the basic unit of the society. No party can be permitted to carve out the ground for destroying the family which is the basic unit of the society. The foundation of the family rests on the institution of a legal and valid marriage. Approach of the court should be to preserve the matrimonial home and be reluctant to dissolve the marriage on the asking of one of the parties. 16. This Court in Ms.Jorden Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra [ AIR 1985 SC 935 ] suggested for a complete reform of law of marriage and to make a uniform law applicable to all people irrespective of religion or caste. The Court observed: "It appears to be necessary to introduce irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mutual consent as grounds of divorce in all cases. .... There is no point or purpose to be served by the continuance of a marriage which has so completely and signally broken down. We suggest that the time has come for the intervention of legislature in these matters to provide for a uniform code of marriage and divorce and to provide by law for a way out of the unhappy situation in which couples like the present have found themselves.” Marriage between the parties cannot be dissolved only on the averments made by one of the parties that as the marriage between them has broken down, no useful purpose would be served to keep it alive. The legislature, in its wisdom, despite observation of this Court has not thought it proper to provide for dissolution of the marriage on such averments. There may be cases where, on facts, it is found that as the marriage has become dead on account of contributory acts of commission and omission of the parties, no useful purpose would be served by keeping such marriage alive. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying spouses. This Court in V. Bhagat v. Mrs.D.Bhagat [ AIR 1994 SC 710 ] held that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is not a ground by itself to dissolve it. 11. The sanctity of marriage cannot be left at the whims of one of the annoying spouses. This Court in V. Bhagat v. Mrs.D.Bhagat [ AIR 1994 SC 710 ] held that irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is not a ground by itself to dissolve it. 11. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant defendant that the court below had relied upon the averment of plaint that the petition for mutual divorce under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was filed, which proves readiness of wife to seek divorce but had failed to consider that the consent given by the defendant appellant had already been withdrawn before the stage of second motion. Reliance has also been placed on the paragraphs 7, 8 & 9 of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Hitesh Bhatnager vs. Deepa Bhatnagar reported in AIR 2011 Supreme Court 1637, which are reproduced herein below: “7. The appellant, appearing in-person, submits that at the time of filing of the petition, a settlement was reached between the parties, wherein it was agreed that he would pay her 3.5 lakhs, of which he states he has already paid 1.5 lakhs in three installments. He further states in his appeal, as well as before us, that he is willing to take care of the respondent's and their daughter's future interest, by making a substantial financial payment in order to amicably settle the matter. However, despite repeat efforts for a settlement, the respondent is not agreeable to a decree of divorce. She says that she wants to live with the appellant as his wife, especially for the future of their only child, Anamika. 8. The question whether consent once given can be withdrawn in a proceeding for divorce by mutual consent is no more res integra. This Court, in the case of Smt.Sureshta Devi vs. Om Prakash (1991) 2 SCC 25 : ( AIR 1992 SC 1904 ), has concluded this issue and the view expressed in the said decision as of now holds the field. 9. In the case of Sureshta Devi (supra), this Court took the view: “9. The 'living separately' for a period of one year should be immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is necessary that immediately preceding the presentation of petition, the parties must have been living separately. 9. In the case of Sureshta Devi (supra), this Court took the view: “9. The 'living separately' for a period of one year should be immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is necessary that immediately preceding the presentation of petition, the parties must have been living separately. The expression 'living separately', connotes to our mind not living like husband and wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The parties may live under the same roof by force of circumstances, and yet they may not be living in different houses and yet they could live as husband and wife. What seems to be necessary is that they have no desire to perform marital obligations and with that mental attitude they have been living separately for a period of one year immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. The second requirement that they 'have not been able to live together' seems to indicate the concept of broken down marriage and it would not be possible to reconcile themselves. The third requirement is that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. 10. Under sub-section (2) the parties are required to make a joint motion not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition and not later than 18 months after the said date. This motion enable the court to proceed with the case in order to satisfy itself about the genuineness of the averments in the petition and also to find out whether the consent was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence. The court may make such inquiry as it thinks fit including the hearing or examination of the parties for the purpose of satisfying itself whether the averments in the petition are true. If the court is satisfied that the consent of parties was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence and they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved, it must pass a decree of divorce.” On the question of whether one of the parties may withdraw the consent at any time before the actual decree of divorce is passed, this Court held: “13. From the analysis of the section, it will be apparent that the filing of the petition with mutual consent does not authorize the court to make a decree for divorce. From the analysis of the section, it will be apparent that the filing of the petition with mutual consent does not authorize the court to make a decree for divorce. There is a period of waiting from 6 to 18 months. This interregnum was obviously intended to give time and opportunity to the parties to reflect on their move and seek advice from relations and friends. In this transitional period one of the parties may have a second thought and change the mind not to proceed with the petition. The spouse may not be a party to the joint motion under subsection (2). There is nothing in the section which prevents such course. The section does not provide that if there is a change of mind it should not be by one party alone, but by both. The High Courts of Bombay and Delhi have proceeded on the ground that the crucial time for giving mutual consent for divorce is the time of filing the petition and not the time when they subsequently move for divorce decree. This approach appears to be untenable. Tat the time of the petition by mutual consent, the parties are not unaware that their petition does not by itself snap marital ties. They know that they have to take a further step to snap marital ties. Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B is clear on this point. It provides that “on the motion of both the parties. …if the petition is not withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall … pass a decree of divorce ...”. What is significant in this provision is that there should also be mutual consent when they move the court with a request to pass a decree of divorce. Secondly, the court shall be satisfied about the bona fides and the consent of the parties. If there is no mutual consent at the time of enquiry, the court gets no jurisdiction to make a decree for divorce. If the view is otherwise, the court could make en enquiry and pass a divorce decree even at the instance of one of the parties and against the consent of the other. Such a decree cannot be regarded as decree by mutual consent. 12. If the view is otherwise, the court could make en enquiry and pass a divorce decree even at the instance of one of the parties and against the consent of the other. Such a decree cannot be regarded as decree by mutual consent. 12. Learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent had supported the impugned judgment of family court on the ground that the court below had recorded the finding to the effect that the wife does not have a conduct of an ideal lady and she has committed cruelty against the husband and had made false allegations of adultery against him but failed to prove by adducing any cogent evidence. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent that the wife had left the house of the husband without any sufficient reason and was residing at her parental house for last three years. There was no relationship of husband and wife between the parties. The learned counsel for the respondent had relied upon the following case laws: a. Kusum Lata vs. Kamta Prasad AIR 1965 All 280 , b. Narayan Ganesh Dastane vs. Sucheta Narayan Dastane AIR 1975 SC 1534 , and c. Manjeet Kaur vs. Avtar Singh 2001 Hindu Law Report 614. 13. The aforesaid judgments were also relied by the learned Family Court, while dealing with the terms 'cruelty'. 14. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt.Sarita Devi vs. Sri Ashok Kumar Singh reported in 2018 (3) AWC 2328 has considered very widely the term 'cruelty' after relying the several judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court. The relevant paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27 and 29 of the judgment are reproduced herein below: 18. The concept of cruelty has been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.13, 4th Edition Para 1269, as under: "The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. The concept of cruelty has been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.13, 4th Edition Para 1269, as under: "The general rule in all cases of cruelty is that the entire matrimonial relationship must be considered, and that rule is of special value when the cruelty consists not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches, complaints, accusations or taunts. In cases where no violence is averred, it is undesirable to consider judicial pronouncements with a view to creating certain categories of acts or conduct as having or lacking the nature or quality which renders them capable or incapable in all circumstances of amounting to cruelty; for it is the effect of the conduct rather than its nature which is of paramount importance in assessing a complaint of cruelty. Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact and previously decided cases have little, if any, value. The court should bear in mind the physical and mental condition of the parties as well as their social status, and should consider the impact of the personality and conduct of one spouse on the mind of the other, weighing all incidents and quarrels between the spouses from that point of view; further, the conduct alleged must be examined in the light of the complainant's capacity for endurance and the extent to which that capacity is known to the other spouse. Malevolent intention is not essential to cruelty but it is an important element where it exits." 19. In 24 American Jurisprudence 2d, the term "mental cruelty" has been defined as under: "Mental Cruelty as a course of unprovoked conduct toward one's spouse which causes embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish so as to render the spouse's life miserable and unendurable. The plaintiff must show a course of conduct on the part of the defendant which so endangers the physical or mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued cohabitation unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need not establish actual instances of physical abuse. " 20. The plaintiff must show a course of conduct on the part of the defendant which so endangers the physical or mental health of the plaintiff as to render continued cohabitation unsafe or improper, although the plaintiff need not establish actual instances of physical abuse. " 20. One of the earliest decision considering "mental cruelty" we find is, N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326 , wherein Court has said: "The enquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct charges as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. " 21. In Sirajmohmedkhan Janmohamadkhan v. Haizunnisa Yasinkhan and Anr. (1981) 4 SCC 250 Court said that a concept of legal cruelty changes according to the changes and advancement of social concept and standards of living. With the advancement of our social conceptions, this feature has obtained legislative recognition, that a second marriage is a sufficient ground for separate residence and maintenance. Moreover, to establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous ill-treatment, cessation of marital intercourse, studied neglect, indifference on the part of the husband, and an assertion on the part of the husband that the wife is unchaste are all factors which lead to mental or legal cruelty. 22. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) 1 SCC 105 , Court observed that word 'cruelty' has not been defined in Act, 1955 but legislature, making it a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(i)(a) of Act, 1955, has made it clear that conduct of party in treatment of other if amounts to cruelty actual, physical or mental or legal is a just reason for grant of divorce. Cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, it is a question of fact about degree. If it is mental, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment and then as to the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other, ultimately, is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, cruelty will be established if conduct itself is proved or admitted. The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. 23. In V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994) 1 SCC 337 considering the concept of "mental cruelty" in the context of Section 13(1)(i)(a) of Act, 1984, Court said that it can be defined as conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. It is not necessary to prove that mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of other party. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is thus has to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. 24. In Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi, (2001) 4 SCC 250 , Court observed that matrimonial matters relates to delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. 24. In Chetan Dass v. Kamla Devi, (2001) 4 SCC 250 , Court observed that matrimonial matters relates to delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. There is no scope of applying the concept of "irretrievably broken marriage" as a straitjacket formula for grant of relief of divorce but it has to be considered in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case concerned. 25. In Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Panadey, (2002) 2 SCC 73 , Court held that mental cruelty is the conduct of other spouse which causes mental suffering or fear to matrimonial life of other. Cruelty postulates a treatment of party to marriage with such conduct as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious to live with other party. Cruelty has to be distinguished from ordinary wear and tear of family life. 27. In Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778 Court held that complaints and reproaches, sometimes of ordinary nature, may not be termed as 'cruelty' but their continuance or persistence over a period of time may do so which would depends on the facts of each case and have to be considered carefully by the Court concerned. 29. In Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh (supra) Court said that though no uniform standard can be laid down but there are some instances which may constitute mental cruelty and the same are illustrated as under: "(i) On consideration of complete matrimonial life of the parties, acute mental pain, agony and suffering as would not make possible for the parties to live with each other could come within the broad parameters of mental cruelty. (ii) On comprehensive appraisal of the entire matrimonial life of the parties, it becomes abundantly clear that situation is such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with other party. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. (iii) Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty, frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable. (iv) Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. (v) A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render miserable life of the spouse. (vi) Sustained unjustifiable conduct and behavior of one spouse actually affecting physical and mental health of the other spouse. The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. (vii) Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure can also amount to mental cruelty. (viii) The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which causes unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset may not be a ground for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (ix) Mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. (x) The married life should be reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period, where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and behavior of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the other party any longer, may amount to mental cruelty. (xi) If a husband submits himself for an operation of sterilization without medical reasons and without the consent or knowledge of his wife and similarly if the wife undergoes vasectomy or abortion without medical reason or without the consent or knowledge of her husband, such an act of the spouse may lead to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xii) Unilateral decision of refusal to have intercourse for considerable period without there being any physical incapacity or valid reason may amount to mental cruelty. (xiii) Unilateral decision of either husband or wife after marriage not to have child from the marriage may amount to cruelty. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty." 15. In the case in hand, the husband had appeared himself as PW1 and stated the same story as alleged in the divorce petition but had not produced any other witness or evidence in support of his case. The family court itself had recorded the finding that the husband had not lodged the complaint against the wife and her family members regarding quarrel with him and his mother in the year 2010. Apart from this, the learned family court had also recorded the finding to the effect that the plaintiff husband had failed to prove that the wife was talking on telephone with some unknown person. The learned Family Court had relied upon the judgments in the case of Kusum Lata vs. Kanta Prasad reported in AIR 1965 All 280 , Narayan Ganesh Dastane vs. Smt.Sucheta Narayan Dastane reported in AIR 1970 Bombay 812, Manjeet Kaur vs. Avtar 2011 (1) HLR 614 and Hanumant Rao vs. Shamani AIR 1999 SC 1318 as regards cruelty but failed to discuss any evidence which could establish the allegations of cruelty made against the appellant. 16. The divorce petition was decreed by the learned Family Court on the ground that the behaviour of the wife was not of an ideal lady, she used to live at her parental house, quarrel with his family members as well as false allegations were leveled by her against the husband which is itself would amount to cruelty by the wife. 17. 17. We have gone through the judgment of the family court and found that the learned court below had failed to consider that the defendant appellant herself was harassed by the plaintiff respondent and his family members for dowry following which a First Information Report was lodged by the wife and from the perusal of evidence it is apparent that the wife was always willing and is still willing to live with the husband and she was neglected and deserted by her husband. It is a well settled law that no party can take benefit of his/her own wrong and since the husband is not ready to live with his wife, he cannot take benefit of his own wrong. Allegations regarding quarrel by family members of the wife was already disbelieved by the Family Court at page-9 of the judgment and apart from this, the allegations of adultery by both the parties against each other was also disbelieved by the court below but still passed the decree of divorce without any cogent evidence on record. The learned family court had also granted divorce on the ground that the wife had deserted her husband and used to live at her parental house, but failed to consider the evidence adduced by the wife regarding harassment for dowry and her willingness to live with the husband. 18. From the evidence available on record, we find that the appellant-wife is not living separately on account of her own free-will. The defendant appellant was always ready and is still ready to live with the plaintiff respondent but he refused to live with defendant-appellant. The defendant appellant has herself not deserted plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff respondent has failed to establish that the defendant-appellant had committed cruelty or deserted him without there being any sufficient reasons. 19. In view of aforesaid discussion, the appeal is liable to be allowed. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and judgment and decree dated 25.3.2017, passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Hapur is hereby set aide and divorce suit filed by plaintiff respondent stands dismissed. 20. However, there shall be no order as to costs.