JUDGMENT : Ravikumar, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 27.11.2019 in W.P.(C) No.29880 of 2019. The appellant who was the petitioner therein filed the said writ petition on being aggrieved by the decision of the second respondent whereby he was not permitted to participate in the re-sale of toddy shop in Group No.XII of Cherthala Excise Range, held on 4.11.2019. The reason therefore was that he had failed to fill the relevant column marked for entering the age and date of birth in Form I, appended to the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002 (for brevity 'the Rules'), in terms of Rule 5(4) of the Rules. Form No.I is an identity card to be brought by the intending purchaser for participating in the sale of toddy shop duly attested by a Revenue Officer not below the rank of a Village Officer of the area where he/she permanently resides. The party respondents and the official respondents filed separate counter affidavits in the writ petition resisting the claims and contentions of the appellant. The learned Single Judge considered the rival contentions and ultimately held that the rule making authority specified the form appended to the rules in a particular manner and essentially, it is so prescribed with a precise purpose. Thus, after taking into account the very purpose of prescription of such a form and also the requirement to produce documents in Form No.II, the learned Single Judge arrived at the conclusion that the appellant herein is not entitled to the reliefs sought for. Evidently, the learned Single Judge held that this Court could not substitute the wisdom of authority to hold that the authority should also accept defective applications in the matter of privilege of vending toddy. Holding so, the writ petition was dismissed. This appeal has been preferred in the said circumstances. 2. Heard Sri. N. Raghuraj, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Sri. M.K. Pradeepkumar, the learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent and also the learned Government Pleader. 3. As a matter of fact, the parties have reiterated their contentions raised before the writ court. The nub of the contentions of the appellant is that the learned Single Judge had erred in finding that non-filling of the relevant column showing the age and date of birth in Form No.I appended to the rules is a material defect. 3. As a matter of fact, the parties have reiterated their contentions raised before the writ court. The nub of the contentions of the appellant is that the learned Single Judge had erred in finding that non-filling of the relevant column showing the age and date of birth in Form No.I appended to the rules is a material defect. According to the appellant, it ought not have been treated as a material defect as the other materials on record were sufficient to establish that the appellant had crossed the age limit of 18 years and therefore, entitled to participate in the re-sale auction. The contention is that the provisions under Rule 5(3)(vi) of the Rules is only to ensure that the participant seeking grant of privilege of vending toddy is ineligible to participate in the re-sale owing to his being below the age of 18 years, in other words, to ensure that he is a person above 18 years. According to him, when that fact is established from the materials on record it was absolutely unnecessary to adopt a hair splitting approach to find out the age and date of birth in the aforesaid matter. 4. Per contra, the official and party respondents contended that the prescription of filling up of all columns in Form No.I which is appended to the Rules cannot be said to be a mere or empty formality and in fact, the prescription insisted is with a purpose, as held by the learned Single Judge. True that, a person who crossed the age of 18 would be permitted to enter the hall to participate in the resale to grant the privilege of vending toddy. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent would submit that besides satisfaction of prescribed prescription of minimum age, one should also satisfy the maximum age limit prescribed statutorily, to earn eligibility to participate in the grant of privilege of vending toddy, under fourth proviso to Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules. On our careful perusal of the provisions under Rule 5 of the 'Rules', we find that the provision carrying maximum age limit regarding the eligibility for the purchase of toddy shop appears only under the third proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) and no such provision is there as part of Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules. On our careful perusal of the provisions under Rule 5 of the 'Rules', we find that the provision carrying maximum age limit regarding the eligibility for the purchase of toddy shop appears only under the third proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) and no such provision is there as part of Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules. The same reads thus:- “Provided also that persons above 80 years of age as on the date of sale shall not be eligible for the purchase of toddy shop.” It is also relevant to note that there is, in fact, only one proviso to Rule 5(1)(a) of the Rules and it was inserted as per Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal (Amendment) Rules, 2010 published by G.O. (P) No.62/2010/TD dated 12.03.2010 as SRO No.256/2010. No material whatsoever was produced or available indicating insertion of any other proviso to Rule 5(1) (a) to the Rules. We will now refer to the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal (2nd Amendment) Rules, 2012 published by G.O.(P) No.131/2012/TD dated 21.07.2012 as SRO No.522/2012. It reads thus:- “GOVERNMENT OF KERALA Taxes (G) Department NOTIFICATION G.O.(P) No.131/2012/TD Dated, Thiruvananthapuram, 21st July, 2012 S.R.O. No.522/2012 -In exercise of the powers conferred by sections 18A and 29 of the Abkari Act, 1 of 1077, the Government of Kerala hereby make the following rules further to amend the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002 issued under G.O.(P) No.24/2002/TD dated 30th March, 2002 and published as S.R.O. No.198/2002 in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.376 dated 30th March, 2002, namely:- RULES 1. Short title and commencement -(1) These rules may be called the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal (2nd Amendment) Rules, 2012. (2) They shall come into force at once. 2. Short title and commencement -(1) These rules may be called the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal (2nd Amendment) Rules, 2012. (2) They shall come into force at once. 2. Amendment of the Rules -In the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002, - (1) in rule 2, in clause (ba), in the opening sentence, the words “or Toddy Shop Workers and Toddy Tappers Co-operative Society” [shall be omitted;] (2) in rule 3, in the last proviso, the words “and the tree tax payable under the Tree Tax Rules” shall be added at the end; (3) in rule 5, in sub-rule (1)(a),- (a) in the opening sentence, for the figures and symbol “2010-11”, the figures and symbol “2011-12” shall be substituted; (b) in the second sentence for the figures and symbol “2010-11”, the figures and symbol “2011 12” shall be substituted; (c) in the first proviso, for the figures and symbol “2010-11”, the figures and symbol “2011-12” shall be substituted; (d) the last proviso, shall be omitted. By order of the Governor, A.AJITH KUMAR, Secretary to Government Explanatory Note (This does not form part of the notification, but is intended to indicate its general purport.) In the Abkari Policy announced for the year 2012-13, vide: G.O. (Ms) No.130/2012/TD dated 19th July, 2012, Government have decided to give preference for sale to those licensees who are running the Toddy shop during the year 2011-12. The Toddy shops will not be entrusted with the Toddy shop Workers and Toddy Tappers Cooperative Societies this year also. It is also decided to exempt the Workers Committee which are conducting Toddy Shops from remitting Tree Tax. In order to give statutory validity to the above decisions in the Abkari Policy, 2012-13, the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002 have to be amended suitably. The notification is intended to achieve the above object.” 6. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the said submission of the learned counsel for the 4th respondent regarding the maximum age limit in terms of the third proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) of the Rules is not correct and to bring home that point, he has referred to G.O.(P) No.131/2012/TD dated 21.07.2012 published as SRO No.522/2012 and submitted that the said proviso relied on by the counsel for the 4th respondent was omitted as per the said SRO. In short, the contention is that upper age limit of 80 years is not now a condition applicable to the grant of privilege of vending toddy. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent would submit that a perusal of G.O.(P) No.131/2012/TD dated 21.07.2012 published as SRO No.522/2012 would reveal that the proviso, which was omitted, is not the proviso pertaining to the maximum age limit prescribed. According to the learned counsel for the 4th respondent, in fact, what was omitted under the said SRO No.522/2012 is the proviso inserted by SRO No.568/2011 published in G.O.(P) No.126/2011/TD dated 07.09.2011 as it was the last proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) as on 21.07.2012. Thus, the position now reveals is that in troth, no amendment was seen brought into Rule 5(1)(b) of the Rules and even if it is taken that as per SRO No.522/2012 actually, last proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) was deleted then, the question is which was the last proviso as on the date of the said SRO No.522/2012 dated 21.07.2012, under Rule 5(1)(b) of the Rules. Evidently, the proviso inserted by G.O.(P) No.126/2011/TD dated 07.09.2011 as per SRO No.568/2011 to Rule 5(1)(b) is as follows:- “Provided also that in the sale of toddy shops preference shall be given to those persons who had conducted the toddy shops during the year 2006-07, namely, prior to the year in which the shops were earmarked for the Toddy Shop Workers and Toddy Tappers Co-operative Societies.” The first and second provisos to Rule 5(1)(b) of 'the Rules' were inserted as per G.O.(P) No.59/2007/TD dated 21.03.2007 with effect from 01.04.2007 and G.O.(P) No.57/2008/TD dated 19.03.2008 with effect from 01.04.2008 respectively. Obviously, the proviso which prescribes the maximum age limit of 80 years as on the date of sale as an ineligibility to participate in the grant of privilege of vending toddy was inserted as the third proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) before the insertion of the aforementioned proviso as per SRO No.568/2011, on 07.09.2011. In such circumstances, even if it is taken that the last proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) was as per SRO No.522/2012, it cannot be the proviso pertaining to the prescription of 80 years as the said proviso prescribing outer limit of age was not the last proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) as on 21.07.2012. In such circumstances, even if it is taken that the last proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) was as per SRO No.522/2012, it cannot be the proviso pertaining to the prescription of 80 years as the said proviso prescribing outer limit of age was not the last proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) as on 21.07.2012. Hence, even if it is taken that it was the last proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) that was omitted as per SRO No.522/2012, the proviso prescribing the maximum age of 80 years should remain in the statute. Though we have considered the contention in the aforesaid manner also, we may hasten to add that there is absolutely no room for presumption as regards omission of any provision from a statute and it should be very specific. Since the SRO did not state anything regarding amendment to Rule 5(1)(b), the aforesaid proviso to Rule 5(1)(b) prescribing the maximum age limit of 80 years cannot be taken as omitted as per SRO No.522/2012. In the circumstances, the learned counsel appearing for the 4th respondent is correct and justified in contending that the statute provides the minimum and maximum age limit for grant of privilege of vending toddy and going by the statute, 18 and 80 respectively still remain as the minimum and maximum age limit as regards eligibility for the purchase of toddy shop. Thus, it is evident that for the purpose of determining the question whether a person who turn up for participating for the sale of privilege of vending toddy has crossed the age of 18 years or 80 years, the age as on the date of sale is relevant. The age as on the date of sale for the aforesaid purpose could not be reckoned without knowing the date of birth. Obviously, the learned counsel for the 4th respondent referred to the aforesaid provisions to highlight the relevance of filling up the relevant space for entering the date of birth by a prospective purchaser in the identity card. In other words, the case of the appellant that date of birth is relevant solely for the purpose of ascertaining whether the participant had crossed the age of 18 years, is not the correct position and the date of birth would assume relevance for the purpose of considering the question whether one had crossed the maximum age of 80 years as on the date of sale. In short, it is inevitable to record the date of birth of an applicant in the identity card accompanying the application so as to enable the authority concerned to consider the said issue. 7. We are also of the view that the contention that recording of the date of birth is irrelevant for the reason that age had no relevancy in the matter of sale of toddy shops except for the purpose of considering the question whether the participant had crossed the age of 18, cannot be accepted for another score as well. In certain circumstances, for the purpose of identification also, it may become relevant. Merely because a photograph of a person is affixed and it was got attested, is no reason to contend that the requirement to record the date of birth in the identity card appended to the application is unwarranted. In the case on hand, the materials on record would reveal that two photographs of the appellant were available on record. True that photocopies of the documents carrying photographs of the appellant alone are produced before this Court. On perusing them, we have nothing but to say that no prudent man can say that the said two photographs are that of the same person. We made such an observation on perusing Ext.P5 and Ext.R2(a). Whatever that be, when the legislature in its wisdom prescribed a minimum and maximum age limit as a condition of eligibility to participate for the privilege of vending toddy and in Form No.1 space is specifically provided to enter the date of birth, a person intending to participate in the sale of toddy shops is bound to fill it up. 8. In that view of the matter, we do not find any reason to disagree with the view of the learned Single Judge that the failure on the part of the appellant in recording his date of birth in the identity card in Form No.I appended to the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002 is a vital and fatal defect and in such circumstances, the application was rightly treated as a defective application. The upshot of the discussion is that the rejection of the application and thereby disallowing the appellant to participate in the sale of toddy shops in Group No.XII of Cherthala Excise Range held on 04.11.2019 on the ground of his failure to record his date of birth in Form No.I, does not amount to an illegality. Therefore, upholding of the said rejection of application of the appellant and the consequential dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge invite no interference. In the result, this appeal must fail and accordingly, it is dismissed.