ORDER 1. The instant intra-Court appeal u/S 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 assails the final order dated 6.10.2020 [Reported in 2020 II MPWN 100] passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. No.14864/2020, while excercising jurisdiction under Article 226 r/w 227 of the Constitution of India, dismissing the petition in question by imposing cost of Rs.20,000/- against the three petitioners therein and while doing so, the following observation was made in respect of conduct of the counsel representing the said three petitioners :- “Although the conduct of Shri G.S. Sharma, Advocate falls within the parameters of Contempt of Court, but instead of initiating proceedings for Contempt of Court, this Court thinks it appropriate to issue a warning to Shri G.S. Sharma, Advocate, that he should not induldge in such dreadful tactics.” Pertinently, Shri G.S. Sharma, Advocate is the appellant herein. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of appellant restricts the challenge herein to the aforesaid remark made by learned Single Judge against the counsel for petitioners, who is appellant herein. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant herein has raised the sole ground of denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant herein to be heard by learned Single Judge before making the aforesaid observations which according to the learned counsel for the appellant visit the appellant with adverse civil consequences. It is submitted that when the impugned order was passed, appellant (counsel for petitioners therein) was not present and learned Single Judge finding appellant to be not present even in the second round made the aforesaid impugned observation which casts consequences of adverse nature upon the professional status of the appellant and may be deleterious to the furtherance of his professional prospects in the future. It is, thus, submitted by relying upon decisions Bijendra Singh Parihar v. State of M.P. & Another 2017 (2) MPLJ 615 (Para 7), Shyam Narayan Tripathi v. State of M.P., 2001 (I) MPWN 181 = 2001(1) MPWN 181 = 2001 (2) MPLJ 234 (Para 9), The Secretary Department of Horticulture, Chandigarh v. Raghuraj, 2008 AIR SCW 7630 (Para 34), that the said impugned observation be set-aside. 3. After hearing learned senior counsel for the appellant on admission, this Court as regards the imposition of cost is of the view that the intention of learned Single Judge while imposing cost of Rs. 3. After hearing learned senior counsel for the appellant on admission, this Court as regards the imposition of cost is of the view that the intention of learned Single Judge while imposing cost of Rs. 20,000/- was to fasten the said burden of said cost upon three petitioners and not the cousnel for the petitioners i.e. appellant herein. Thus, this Court need not go into the aspect of challenge to imposition of cost since the petitioners are not before this Court in this appeal. 4. As regards the observation made by learned Single Judge against appellant, it is seen from the impugned order that the writ Court was of the view that despite the appellant herein, who was the counsel in earlier round of litigation which had resulted into dismissal not only of the petition but and of the writ appeal, knowing very well about the issue having been concluded by the Single Bench and as well as the Division Bench, filed the petition in question seeking the same relief on the same grounds and same set of facts. The writ Court further found that the appellant being counsel for the petitioners in the earlier round and as well as this round did not disclose about the earlier round of litigation & it's fate and drafted the petition in a manner giving an impression that the dispute has not attained finality by making a prayer of deciding the representation of the petitioners in terms of some earlier orders passed in the case of allegedly similarly situated persons. 5. By noticing the aforesaid, the writ Court came to the conclusion that the counsel despite having knowledge of the earlier round of litigation, intentionally supressed this fact thereby adversely reflecting upon the professional integrity. The act of appellant counsel was found to be highly codemnable and falling within the bounds of contempt of Court. However, the writ Court instead of drawing contempt proceedings against the appellant, merely issued a censor/warning against the appellant to dissaude from indulging in such dreadful tactics. 6. On the aspect of affording of reasonable opportunity of being heard before any strictures are passed against a person, the apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern For Governance Trust and Others [ (2007) 3 SCC 587 ], has held as under : 39. 6. On the aspect of affording of reasonable opportunity of being heard before any strictures are passed against a person, the apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern For Governance Trust and Others [ (2007) 3 SCC 587 ], has held as under : 39. The party-in-person has also pointed out certain findings in the judgment of the High Court. We do not propose to go into the merits of the other contentions which are the subject-matter of Special Leave Petition No.336 of 2006. In our opinion, when an authority takes a decision which may have civil consequences and affects the rights of a person, the principles of natural justice would at once come into play. Reputation of an individual is an important part of ones life. It is observed in DF Marion v. Minnie Davis 1955 American LR 171 and reads as follows :- "The right to enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is of an ancient origin, and is necessary to human society. A good reputation is an element of personal security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." 40. This Court also in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Natkarni [ 1983 (1) SCC 124 ] has observed that right to reputation is a facet of right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. 41. It is thus amply clear that one is entitled to have and preserve one's reputation and one also has a right to protect it. In case any authority in discharge of its duties fastened upon it under the law, travels into the realm of personal reputation adversely affecting him, it must provide a chance to him to have his say in the matter. In such circumstances, right of an individual to have the safeguard of the principles of natural justice before being adversely commented upon is statutorily recognized and violation of the same will have to bear the scrutiny of judicial review. 7. In such circumstances, right of an individual to have the safeguard of the principles of natural justice before being adversely commented upon is statutorily recognized and violation of the same will have to bear the scrutiny of judicial review. 7. In case of Om Prakash Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan and others [ (2014) 5 SCC 417 ], the apex Court has held as under :- “Reputation is fundamentally a glorious amalgam and unification of virtues which makes a man feel proud of his ancestry and satisfies him to bequeath it as a part of inheritance on the posterity. It is a nobility in itself for which a conscientious man would never barter it with all the tea of China or for that matter all the pearls of the sea. The said virtue has both horizontal and vertical qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man is half-dead. It is an honour which deserves to be equally preserved by the down trodden and the privileged. The aroma of reputation is an excellence which cannot be allowed to be sullied with the passage of time. The memory of nobility no one would like to lose; none would conceive of it being atrophied. It is dear to life and on some occasions it is dearer than life. And that is why it has become an inseparable facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. No one would like to have his reputation dented. One would like to perceive it as an honour rather than popularity. When a Court deals with a matter that has something likely to affect a person’s reputation, the normative principles of law are to be cautiously and carefully adhered to. The advertence has to be sans emotion and sans populist perception, and absolutely in accord with the doctrine of audi alteram partem before anything adverse is said.” 8. The sum and substance of the above said verdicts of the apex Court elicit that before recording any stricuture which may adversely reflect upon the conduct, behaviour or reputation of a person/counsel, judicial/quasi judicial/administrative authority ought to afford reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person likely to be adversely affected by the stricuture. 9. The sum and substance of the above said verdicts of the apex Court elicit that before recording any stricuture which may adversely reflect upon the conduct, behaviour or reputation of a person/counsel, judicial/quasi judicial/administrative authority ought to afford reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person likely to be adversely affected by the stricuture. 9. In the instance case, learned Single Judge passed the impugned stricture against the appellant in his absence thereby denying him the reasonable opportunity to explain as to whether supression of material fact of the earlier round of litigation and it's fate was intentional or not. 10. At this juncture, this Court cannot presume as to whether the appellant counsel could have satisfactorily explained as to whether the supression was intentional or unintentional, but the question of such explaination would arise only, if the appellant would have been given an opportunity to explain, and protect his reputation which is an integral part of life. 11. In view of above discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant deserved reasonable opportunity of explaining orally or in writing about the supression being intentional or not. Consequently, present appeal stands partly allowed with the following directions : 1. The impugned observation i.e. “Although the coduct of Shri G.S. Sharma, Advocate ... should not indulge in such dreadful tactics” in the impugned order dated 6.10.2020, stands deleted. 2. The matter is remanded to the learned Single Judge for affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to appellant Shri G.S. Sharma, Advocate, and thereafter passing suitable order in accordance with law. 3. As regards the challenge to the other part of impugned order and of cost, the same are repelled.