JUDGMENT : 1. As a consequence to a disciplinary action, the petitioner (appellant herein) was subjected to a punishment in the following terms:- "Reduction to a lower stage in his time scale of pay by -01-stage for a period of -03- months without cumulative effect' And Further, the period of suspension of Mr. Chandra Shekhar Srivastava will be treated as period not spent on duty. Hence, no difference of salary will be payable to him except subsistence allowance, which he has already received." 2. Aggrieved by the same, he preferred a petition for writ with a ground, inter alia, that second part of punishment relating to period of suspension is bad being without jurisdiction. Learned Single Bench dismissed the petition for writ relying upon clause (2) of Regulation 48 of the Baroda Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank (Officers and Employees) Service Regulations, 2010 that reads as under:- "48. Treatment of suspension period and allied matters- (1) The Competent Authority may, while imposing penalty, direct whether the other or employee shall be paid the difference between the subsistence allowance and the emoluments which he would have received but for such suspension or the period he was under suspension and that, if the Competent Authority decides otherwise, no order shall be passed which shall have effect of compelling the officer or employee to refund such subsistence allowance. (2) The period during which an officer or employee is under suspension shall, if he is not removed or dismissed from the service, be treated as period spent on duty or otherwise as the Competent Authority may direct." 3. A challenge is given to the judgment impugned with submission that learned single Bench failed to appreciate and interpret provisions of Regulation 48 in correct perspective and that ultimately resulted into miscarriage of justice. It is submitted that clause (2) of Regulation 48 pertains to two different eventualities which are:- (i) When the employee is under suspension but is not subjected to the penalty of removal or dismissal from service, and (ii) When the petitioner or employee is under suspension and is subjected to a penalty otherwise to first eventuality, meaning thereby, he has been either removed or dismissed from service. 4. 4. Learned single Bench, as per the appellant, failed to appreciate these two different eventualities by treating only one circumstance of not imposing the penalty of removal or dismissal and this interpretation leads to an absurdity, asmuch as even in a case of subjecting an employee by a minor punishment, the competent authority may treat the period of suspension as break in service, which is having effect of removal from service. 5. It is asserted that, in the case in hand, the disciplinary authority though subjected the appellant to a minor punishment being the appellant would not be treated in service during the period of suspension but the direction given under Regulation 48(2) imposes an additional major punishment. 6. While defending the judgment impugned on behalf of respondent-bank it is stated that clause (2) of Regulation 48 is quite specific and that extends a broad power for the competent authority to deal with the issues relating to period of suspension in the event of imposing a punishment that is not removal or dismissal. 7. Under the provision aforesaid, absolute discretion is available with the competent authority either to treat the period of suspension as part of service or to take a view otherwise. Such discretion is not at all dependent to nature of the punishment imposed. 8. Heard learned counsels. 9. Precisely, the issue that needs consideration in this appeal is the intent of clause (2) of Regulation 48 of the Regulations of 2010. 10. Before touching merits of the case, it would be appropriate to state that every word and/or phrase in a statute carries a specific meaning. While interpreting such statute workability of it must be ensured. No interpretation of a statute is required to be made that reduces its functionality or that leads to absurdity. 11. In light of this general principle, we have examined the intent of Regulation 48 of the Regulations of 2010. 12. As already stated, learned single Bench while dismissing the petition for writ held that Regulation 48 (2) itself provides for competent authority to consider and pass appropriate orders treating the period of suspension as either one which has been spent on duty or otherwise and the competent authority as per clause (2) of Regulation 48 is well within its jurisdiction to treat the period of suspension spent on duty or not. 13. 13. In light of the view taken by learned single Bench power under Regulation 48(2) of Regulations of 2010 can be invoked only where no penalty of dismissal or removal is imposed. In other words the competent authority must not invoke this power if a penalty of removal or dismissal is inflicted. 14. In our considered opinion, learned single Bench while concluding as above, failed to understand very purpose of the Regulation concerned. 15. It is well settled that suspension is an interim disciplinary action, if not otherwise provided as punishment. Such interim disciplinary action is required to be taken by the authority empowered in various eventualities including to have a fair inquiry by preventing the delinquent to be with any official power that may impress or tamper with the evidence against him and further to ensure general confidence in services. The interim action taken, during the course of disciplinary proceedings, is supposed to be settled by the competent authority on conclusion of the inquiry. In an inquiry, the delinquent Officer/employee may be held guilty of the alleged charges or may be acquitted from the same. On being held guilty, the delinquent Officer/employee may be subjected to a major punishment or a minor punishment. The penalty of dismissal and removal are major punishments and while imposing such penalties the competent authority is required to take a definite decision as to whether suspension of the employee is to be treated as a part of service or otherwise. The competent authority while doing so examines justification of placing the incumbent under suspension. 16. In normal course, while imposing a minor punishment most of the employers do treat the period of suspension as the period spent on duty and it is quite obvious as the eventuality otherwise would amount to break in service depriving the Officer/employee from continuity of service. 17. Looking to this aspect, clause (2) of Regulation 48 is introduced in the Regulations of 2010. Its first part clearly indicates that if an employee is not subjected to any punishment that is having effect from termination in service either by way of removal or dismissal, his period of suspension shall be treated as the period spent on duty. This provision in unambiguous terms mandates that the period of suspension is always to be treated as the period spent on duty. This provision in unambiguous terms mandates that the period of suspension is always to be treated as the period spent on duty. The other part having the phrase "or otherwise", as a matter of fact pertains to the eventuality when employee is subjected to punishment of removal or dismissal, meaning thereby, if the employee has suffered a penalty of removal or dismissal the competent authority may pass appropriate directions. The interpretation otherwise would make the clause (2) non-functional for the Officers or employees, who have suffered the punishment of dismissal or removal and at the same time would also lead to absurdity to the extent that an employee subjected to minor punishment may suffer with a penalty of break in service which is having an essence of termination. 18. In view of whatever stated above, in our opinion, learned single Bench committed a gross error while interpreting the intent of clause (2) of Regulation 48. Hence, this appeal deserves acceptance. Accordingly, the same is allowed. The judgment impugned dated 10th February, 2020 passed by learned single Bench is set aside. The petition for writ is allowed. The order dated 16th March, 2018 passed by the competent authority/ General Manager, Baroda Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank is quashed to the extent that relates to treating the period of suspension of the appellant as not a period spent on duty and further disentitling him from the payment of any difference of salary except the subsistence allowance already paid. The period aforesaid be treated as the period spent by the appellant on duty.