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2020 DIGILAW 127 (CAL)

Mira Rani Hazra v. State Of West Bengal

2020-02-04

RAJASEKHAR MANTHA

body2020
JUDGMENT Rajasekhar Mantha, J. - The brief facts relevant are that C.S./R.S. Plot No. 1 Mouza Madurdaha, at E.M. Bypass in Kolkata, comprised in 47.63 Acres of land. (R.S. Plot No.1) 2. A declaration was published under section 6 of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act of 1948 in respect of 265.20 Acres of Land that was numbered LD Case No.55 of 1954 55. An area of about 33.10 Acres out of the said aforesaid 265.20 Acres fell under C.S./R.S. Plot No. 1 of Mouza Madurdaha. The Land was meant for Refugee Rehabilitation Department of the State Government. 3. Possession was taken under the aforesaid LD Case of about 265.20 acres of land which included Land measuring about 33.10 Acres. In respect of the said 265 Acres of Land an award was declared of all plots excluding plots under R.S.No.1. Mouza Madurdaha. Despite the above an area of 9.29 acres of the said R.S.Plot No.1. Was taken over by the State as vested land and handed over to the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA). 4. In respect of the balance 14.53 Acres in R.S No.1, L.A. Case No.4/22 of 2000/2001 was commenced by the State. An award for the entire 14.53 Acres was declared. Award in respect of one half of the said land was paid to the recorded owners and the balance half was paid to the Collector as the recorded owner. Admittedly the Collector could not have been the recorded owner in respect of other half of the land as no award was declared in aforesaid LD case. 5. The petitioners lay claim in respect of the 9.29 Acres of land by deducing that out of the total area of plot no. 1 above 23.815 Acres of Land has been stated to have been vested in the State and the balance 23.815 is Retained land. Of the said 23.815 Acres of retained land about 14.53 Acres is stated to have been settled in favour of the KMDA pursuant to LA Case No.4 of 22. 6. The petitioners have argued that their lands have been taken away in part under the aforesaid LD Case No.54 of 1956/57 which has lapsed. 7. The property has changed hands from the state to private persons from time to time. No award has been passed in respect of the aforesaid Ld. 6. The petitioners have argued that their lands have been taken away in part under the aforesaid LD Case No.54 of 1956/57 which has lapsed. 7. The property has changed hands from the state to private persons from time to time. No award has been passed in respect of the aforesaid Ld. Court in respect of R.S No.1 Not compensation has been paid. 8. The state would contend before the Court that the original acquisition having been made under the provisions of the 1948 Act and quantum of compensation being specified under the said 1948 Act, there is no question of formal declaration of any compensation. Reliance is placed on the Proviso b) to Section 8 of the said Act. It is argued that the market value of the land should be that of the year 1955. 9. The parties are ad idem that an interpretation of scope and purport of Section 8 of the 1948 Act addressed the issues raised herein. 10. Mr. Bera appearing for the petitioners would argue that since no award has been published under the acquisition made by the State as per the 1948 Act for the purpose of Refugee Rehabilitations the Said acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The KMDA contended that they received the land in question from the State of West Bengal and have transferred the same to private parties who have further transferred the same. A large number of third party interest has been created in respect of the said land. The KMDA contents that they cannot be held liable for any compensation or any sum of money, the petitioner and the latter if at all may have a claim against the State. 11. The State admits that compensation is required to be paid but only in terms of Proviso b) of Sections 8 of the 1948 Act i.e. as per the valuation prevalent on the 31st of December 1946. 12. The petitioners' arguments are summarised as follows: a. Section 8 of the 1948 Act includes by reference provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 11 of the L.A. Act 1894 came to be amended in the year 1984 introducing Section 11A, which prescribes that if an award is not published under proceedings under the L.A. Act within 2 years of initiation thereof, such proceedings would lapse automatically. Section 11 of the L.A. Act 1894 came to be amended in the year 1984 introducing Section 11A, which prescribes that if an award is not published under proceedings under the L.A. Act within 2 years of initiation thereof, such proceedings would lapse automatically. b. The application of the provision of the Land acquisition Act in Section 8 of the 1948 Act is an inclusion by reference and not by incorporation and hence any subsequent amendment to the 1894 Act would apply to acquisition proceedings even under the 1948 Act. c. Since no award has been passed in the original acquisition proceedings of 1955 under the 1948 Act, by the amendment to Section 11 of the 1894 Act, the acquisition proceedings in LD case No. 55 of 1954-55 in respect of whole CS RS plot No. 1 must be deemed to have lapsed insofar as the petitioners' share of 9.3 acre is concerned. 13. Learned Advocate General, Shri Kishore Dutta representing the State by reference of the provisions of Section 8 of the 1948 Act would submit that the provisions of the L.A. Act have been incorporated into the 1948 Act for a limited purpose. The 1948 Act is a complete code, since it contemplates at Section 4 and 6 thereof of notification as well as declaration. The other provisions of the 1948 Act are still intact and operative and the amendment to Section 11 of the 1894 Act cannot be applied to proceedings under the 1948 Act hence the proceedings in LD case No. 55 of 1954-55 have not lapsed. 14. In reply, Mr. Bera, counsel for the petitioner would submit that the process of acquisition by reference to the L.A. Act, 1894 involved declaration under Section 6 adjudication of objections, declaration of award and deposit and payment of the compensation and subsequent taking of possession under Section 16 thereof. It is only thereafter that the land would vest absolutely in the State. In the instant case no proceedings for declaration of award are available, no compensation has admittedly been paid and possession has also admittedly taken in terms of Section 16. Since the aforesaid steps and stages are not available or prescribed under the 1948 Act the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are to be resorted to. Hence the said inclusion of the L.A. Act in Section 8 of the 1948 Act is by reference. 15. Since the aforesaid steps and stages are not available or prescribed under the 1948 Act the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are to be resorted to. Hence the said inclusion of the L.A. Act in Section 8 of the 1948 Act is by reference. 15. The 1948 Act is, therefore, not a complete code and hence the reference to the 1894 Act is only by reference and not by incorporation and hence the proceedings under LD case No. 55 of 1954-55 have not been concluded within 2 years, Section 11A is attracted and must be invoked to declare of the proceedings under the aforesaid LD case to have lapsed. 16. Mr. Bera relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. M. V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 . In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with the meaning of Public Servant under Section 2 of the PCRA which was stated to be as defined under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code that was incorporated into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The issue was whether subsequent amendment to Section 21 of the IPC would be attracted to the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was held that in respect of a legislation by incorporation the normal rule is the same survived notwithstanding the repeal amendment or is declared ineffective or erased from the statute book except in the cases when the subsequent and the previous act are supplemental to each other or where the two acts are pari materia or if in the absence of the provisions of the amendment of the previous Act to be incorporated in the subsequent Act, the subsequent Act would render unworkable or ineffective. At Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said Judgment are set out hereinbelow. It was held that while it is true that The Prevention of Corruption Act was not pari materia with the Indian Penal Code Section 3 of the PCRA was Pari Passu with the IPC and hence by reference to the object and purpose of the PCRA the defination of Corruption ought to be given the widest possible meaning. It was held that while it is true that The Prevention of Corruption Act was not pari materia with the Indian Penal Code Section 3 of the PCRA was Pari Passu with the IPC and hence by reference to the object and purpose of the PCRA the defination of Corruption ought to be given the widest possible meaning. It was held that notwithstanding the fact that the defination was borrowed and lifted word to word from the IPC the subsequent amendments to Section 21 of the IPC must be read into Section 3 of the PCRA. "14. There is yet another aspect of the matter which is spelt out from the decision of the Privy Council in the Hindusthan Cooperative Insurance Society's case (supra) which has been relied upon by the High Court itself. While reiterating the principle that after certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act can be made, their Lordships of the Privy Council made it clear that this principle would not apply where the subsequent Act is rendered unworkable or is not able to function effectually. In this connection their Lordships observed as follows: "It seems to be no less logical to hold that where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition." 15. On a consideration of these authorities, therefore, it seems that the following proposition emerges: "Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act." 17. Mr. Mr. Bera next relied upon in the case of Western Coalfields Limited Vs. Special Area Development Authority, Korba and Anr., (1982) 1 SCC 125 . In the said case the Supreme Court was considering with the question as to whether Section 69 d of M. P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nibesh Adhiniyan 1973 which included the provisions of taxation from the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act 1956 and the M.P. Minicipalities Act 1961. It was held that the 1973 Act included the provisions of the 1956 and 1961 Acts by reference and not by incorporation. 18. In the said decision (supra) at Paragraph 16, 17 and 18 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: 16. The principle, broadly, is that where a statute is incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the second (see Clarke v. Bradlaugh,1881 8 QB 63 D, 69 : 46 LT 49 : 30 WR 53 (CA)] ) . Likewise, logically, where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it (see Secretary of State for India-inCouncil v. Hindusthan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd., (1931) AIR PC 149 : 58 IA 259 : 132 IC 748] ). But these rules are not absolute and inflexible. In the case last cited, the Privy Council qualified its statement of the law by saying that the principle, that an amendment of the first law which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent incorporating Act cannot be deemed to be incorporated into the second Act, applies "if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition" (IA p. 267). Besides, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, (1962) AIR SC 316 : (1962) 3 SCR 786 : (1962) 1 SCJ 68 ] the decision of the Privy Council could not be extended too far so as to cover every case in which the provisions of another statute are adopted by absorption (see SCR p. 837). Finally, in State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589 : AIR 1975 SC 1835 : (1976) 1 SCR 6 ] this Court held, after an examination of the relevant decisions, that the broad principle that where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act, is subject to four exceptions, one of which is that the principle will not apply to cases "where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other". "17. Applying these principles, we are of the opinion that in the instant case, subsequent amendments made to the Municipal Corporation Act and the Municipalities Act will also apply to the power of taxation provided for in Section 69(d) of the Act of 1973. The Act of 1973 did not, by Section 69 (d), incorporate in its true signification any particular provision of the two earlier Acts. It provides that, for the purpose of taxation, the Special Area Development Authority shall have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council has under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 or the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961. The case therefore is not one of incorporation but of mere reference to the powers conferred by the earlier Acts. As observed in Nathella Sampathu Chetty [ AIR 1962 SC 316 : (1962) 3 SCR 786 : (1962) 1 SCJ 68 ] , there is a distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making them part of another, so much so that the repeal of the former leaves the latter wholly untouched. Section 69(d) of the Act of 1973 must accordingly be read to mean that Respondent 1 shall have all the powers of taxation which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council has for the time being, that is to say, at the time when Respondent 1 seeks to exercise those powers. 18. The Act of 1973 does not provide for any independent power of taxation or any machinery of its own for exercising the power of taxation. 18. The Act of 1973 does not provide for any independent power of taxation or any machinery of its own for exercising the power of taxation. It rests content by pointing its finger to the provisions contained in the two Municipal Acts. The three Acts are therefore supplemental, from which it must follow that amendments made to the earlier Acts after the enactment of Section 69 (d) shall have to be read into that section. Without recourse to such a construction, the power of taxation conferred by that section will become ineffectual. A reading of the reference to the two earlier Municipal Acts as a reference to those Acts as they stand at the time when the power of taxation is sought to be exercised by Respondent 1, will not, possibly, cause repugnancy between the two earlier Acts on one hand and the Act of 1973 on the other, nor indeed will it cause any confusion in the practical application of the earlier Acts, because the Act of 1973 does not contain any independent provision or machinery for exercising the power of taxation. The first contention of the Attorney-General must therefore fail." 16. It was thus found that the subsequent amendments to the previous M.P.Acts of 1956 and 1961, removing the power of Taxation conferred to local authorities are not attracted to the subsequent 1973 Adhiniyam (Act). Going by the Narsimhan decision (Supra) this should have been held as a case of Incorporation. 17. Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of Dr. Partap Singh and Anr. Vs. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation and Ors., (1985) 3 SCC 72 . In the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering as to whether the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 particularly Section 165, in Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1973, it was held that an officer issuing search warrant under the FERA Act 1973 was not obliged to record reasons as required under Section 165 of the Cr.P.C. and hence the inclusion of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. into the FERA Act of 1973 was only by reference and not by incorporation. It was so held as Section 37(2) of the FERA Act 1973 has used the expression insofar may be. Para 11 and 12 of the aforesaid judgment is set out hereinbelow. "11. It was so held as Section 37(2) of the FERA Act 1973 has used the expression insofar may be. Para 11 and 12 of the aforesaid judgment is set out hereinbelow. "11. It was however contended that when sub-section (2) of Section 37 is read in juxtaposition with sub-section (1), the legislative mandate clearly manifest itself that before issuing a search warrant in exercise of the power conferred by Section 37(1), it is obligatory upon the officer issuing the search warrant to record in writing the grounds of his belief and specifying in such writing, so far as possible, the thing for which search is to be made because Section 37(2) provides that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898(now 1973) relating to searches, shall, so far as may be, apply to searches under this section subject to the modification that sub-section (5) of Section 165 of the said Code shall have effect as if for the word "Magistrate", wherever it occurs, the words "Director of Enforcement or other officer exercising his power" is substituted. It was submitted that if the power to search premises is conferred on the officer therein mentioned, it is hedged in with a condition that in exercise of the power he is bound by the requirements of Section 165 of the Code. In other words, it was said that by sub-section (2) of Section 37, Section 165 of the Code is incorporated in pen and ink in Section 37. It was urged that the section should be re-read as Section 37(1) as it is and Section 165(1) of the Code be read as Section 37(2). Continuing along this line, it was submitted that read thus, the necessary intendment of the legislature becomes revealed in that such drastic power of search and seizure without notice to the person affected, can be exercised, if the officer has reason to believe which must have its foundation on some material or grounds which must be stated in the search warrant itself or in a record anterior to the issuance of the search warrant so that when questioned the contemporaneous record would be available to the court to examine the contention whether there was material for taking such a drastic action or that the action was taken for extraneous and irrelevant reasons. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in H.L. Sibal v. CIT, (1975) 101 ITR 112 (P&H HC)] . The Court was examining the expression "in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to believe" in Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court after referring to the decision of this Court in Commr. of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan Jhaver, (1968) AIR SC 59 : (1968) 1 SCR 148 : (1967) 66 ITR 664 held that "the obligation to record in writing, the grounds of the belief as enjoined by Section 165(1), if not complied with would vitiate the issuance of search warrant and the seizure of the articles". It was then submitted that if the search is illegal, anything seized during such an illegal search has to be returned as held by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. T.N. Kaul, (1976) AIR Calcutta 178 . 12. Section 37(2) provides that "the provisions of the Code relating to searches, shall so far as may be, apply to searches directed under Section 37(1)". Reading the two sub-sections together it merely means that the methodology prescribed for carrying out the search provided in Section 165 has to be generally followed. The expression "so far as may be" has always been construed to mean that those provisions may be generally followed to the extent possible. The submission that Section 165(1) has been incorporated by pen and ink in Section 37(2) has to be negatived in view of the positive language employed in the section that the provisions relating to searches 'shall so far as may be' apply to searches under Section 37(1). If Section 165(1) was to be incorporated by pen and ink as sub-section (2) of Section 37, the legislative draftsmanship will leave no room for doubt by providing that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to searches shall apply to the searches directed or ordered under Section 37(1) except that the power will be exercised by the Director of Enforcement or other officer exercising his power and he will be substituted in place of the Magistrate. The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 37 has not been cast in any such language. The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 37 has not been cast in any such language. It merely provides that the search may be carried out according to the method prescribed in Section 165(1). If the duty to record reasons which furnish grounds for entertaining a reasonable belief were to be recorded in advance, the same could have been incorporated in Section 37(1), otherwise a simple one-line section would have been sufficient that all searches as required for the purpose of this Act shall be carried out in the manner prescribed in Section 165 of the Code by the officer to be set out in the section. In order to give full meaning to the expression "so far as may be", sub-section (2) of Section 37 should be interpreted to mean that broadly the procedure relating to search as enacted in Section 165 shall be followed. But if a deviation becomes necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act in which Section 37(1) is incorporated, it would be permissible except that when challenged before a court of law, justification will have to be offered for the deviation. This view will give full play to the expression "so far as may be." 18. The petitioner next relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mariyappa and Ors. Vs. the State of Karnataka and Ors., (1998) 3 SCC 276 . In the said decision which is relevant in the instant case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering Section 5 of the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act of 1972 incorporated the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act of 1984 as amended by (Karnataka Amendment) Act of 1961. It was held that the inclusion of the 1894 Act as amended by the 1961 Karnataka Act that was brought within the scope of Section 5 of the Karnataka Act 1972 by reference and an exception to incorporation. It was held that the Karnataka Act 1972 is not a self-contained code. It was further held that the subsequent and previous Acts i.e. 1972 and the 1894 Act are pari materia and that they are supplemental to each other. 19. At Paragraph 14-15 and 19-22 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as follows: "14. It was held that the Karnataka Act 1972 is not a self-contained code. It was further held that the subsequent and previous Acts i.e. 1972 and the 1894 Act are pari materia and that they are supplemental to each other. 19. At Paragraph 14-15 and 19-22 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as follows: "14. From the above, it will be seen that the Karnataka Act, 1972 contains only seven sections and that it does not contain any independent machinery or provisions for the purpose of inquiry, reference, award and apportionment and payment of compensation. 15. Section 5 of the Karnataka Act, 1972 refer to the application of the Central Act, 1894 as amended by the Karnataka Act, 1961. These amendments concern the following sections of the Central Act, 1894 - Section 1(2), Sections 3(aa), (d), (e), (ee), (f), proviso (iii) (g), (h); (1) 4(1-A), 4(2), (3), (4), 5-5A(1), (2), (6) (1-A), (2) - (Section 8 is omitted), 9(2), (3), (4), 10(1), addition of proviso to 11, 12 (1), (2), 12-A, 15-A, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26(2), 27(2), 28, 30-A, 34, 35(1-A), (1-B)(ii), 35(2), 37-A, 45, 46, 50, 54. We are not referring to the details of these amendments except to say that the Dy. Commissioner replaces the Collector, certain extra details are to be given in Sections 4, 6 notifications, the Section 4(1) notification has also to be served on the owner or occupier, report on Section 5-A inquiry is to be approved by the Government, the State Government may revise the Dy. Commissioner's orders, application for reference to court is to be made within 90 days of service of notice under Section 12(2) and the Dy. Commissioner is to make a reference to the civil court in 90 days failing which the affected party can directly move the civil court. In Section 24 certain other factors are introduced for determining market value. Sections 28 and 34 are amended fixing a rate of interest of 5% rather than 6%. There are a few other amendments which are not material in the present context. 19. As the case before us, as we shall presently show, falls within the "exceptions" to the rule of "incorporation", we shall refer to the relevant rulings in this behalf. 20. There are a few other amendments which are not material in the present context. 19. As the case before us, as we shall presently show, falls within the "exceptions" to the rule of "incorporation", we shall refer to the relevant rulings in this behalf. 20. The leading case in which the broad principles were laid down is the one in State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589] . On a consideration of the case-law, it was stated by Fazal Ali, J. as follows: (SCC p. 385, para 15) "Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act." (emphasis supplied) 21. In that case, the position was that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 adopted the definition of public servant from Section 21 of the Penal Code, 1860. The question was whether the subsequent amendments made in 1958 and 1964 to Section 21 of the Penal Code enlarging the definition of "public servant" could be read into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Though it was held that the 1947 Act dealt with a specific offence of "criminal misconduct, while the Penal Code dealt with 'bribery' and were not in pari materia still, it was held that having regard to the preamble and object of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Penal Code, there could be no doubt that the former Act was undoubtedly a statute supplemental to the latter. Hence it was held that the amendments of 1958 and 1964 in the IPC should be read into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, as the case fell within one of the exceptions to the principle of "incorporation". 22. Hence it was held that the amendments of 1958 and 1964 in the IPC should be read into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, as the case fell within one of the exceptions to the principle of "incorporation". 22. Similarly, in Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority, (1982) 1 SCC 125 Section 69(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (Act 23 of 1973) stated that the Special Area Development Authority under that Act would, for the purpose of taxation, have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council has under the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 or the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961, as the case may be. Chandrachud, C.J. gave two reasons as to why the subsequent amendments made in the 1956 and 1961 Acts could be read into the 1973 Act. One reason was that the Act of 1973 did not, in Section 69(d), incorporate any particular provision of the 1956 and 1961 Acts but said that for the "purposes of taxation" the Authority shall have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council would have under the 1956 and 1961 Acts respectively. It was not therefore a case where merely some provisions of one Act were bodily lifted into another. The other reason was that the 1973 Act did not provide for any independent power of taxation or any machinery of its own for the exercise of the power of taxation. Further, the three Acts were supplemental to each other." 20. The petitioners next relied upon in the case of Girnar Traders (3) Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2011) 3 SCC 1 . In the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering as to whether the provisions of Section 11- A of the L.A. Act of 1894 was applicable to attract in the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act 1966 i.e. Section 125-129. The 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that both the Town Planning Act of 1966 and the L.A. Act of 1984 were complete and self-content codes and the provisions of the 1894 Act incorporated in the 1966 Maharashtra Act were not by reference but by incorporation and hence the Section 11-A brought by amendment in the year 1984 was not applicable to the Maharashtra Act of 1966. It was, therefore, held that proceedings initiated under the Maharashtra Act 1966 would not lapse by reason of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act. At Paragraph 77, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has stated as follows: 48. The various provisions, which we have indicated above, clearly demonstrate a self-contained scheme under the MRTP Act. Section 116 of the MRTP Act is one other provision which refers to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and states that a Development Authority constituted under Section 113(2) of the MRTP Act is vested with the powers of a Planning Authority under Chapter VII of this Act for the purposes of acquisition either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act. 49. Reference to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act in some of the provisions of the MRTP Act could only imply that they have solely been made for the purpose of completing the process of acquisition. Most of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, with alteration in the language, have been specifically stated under the provisions of the MRTP Act itself. Sections 126 to 129 of the State Act clearly enunciate the intention of the framers that substantive provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are not applicable to the MRTP Act, which is a selfcontained code providing procedure regarding all matters contained therein, except to the extent that provisions of Sections 9 to 11 of the Land Acquisition Act be brought into it for the limited purpose of acquiring land. 50. Once the provisions of the MRTP Act are analysed in their correct perspective, a holistic view can be taken that it is a code in itself. It is a legislation which has the paramount purpose only of planning; and acquisition of land is merely incidental, that too for a very limited purpose. The object of the MRTP Act is to specify and provide for development plans at the macro as well as micro level. While providing for larger concepts of development as contemplated under the regional plan as well as reservations under the development plan, provision for development at the most minute level i.e. a small township as a part of region has also been provided. 51. The primary object of the State Act is planned development. While providing for larger concepts of development as contemplated under the regional plan as well as reservations under the development plan, provision for development at the most minute level i.e. a small township as a part of region has also been provided. 51. The primary object of the State Act is planned development. Acquisition of land takes place only where the land is reserved, designated or required for complete development in the view of the planning, development or appropriate authority. Complete mechanism as to how the development plans shall be prepared, notified and implemented as well as how the land is to be acquired, and how the rights and disputes inter se parties as well as between the Planning Authorities and the owners will be settled are provided under different provisions of this Act. In other words, it is explicitly clear that a complete mechanism of planning, implementation, adjudicatory process in that regard as well as the methodology adopted for acquiring lands, in its limited sense, inclusive of change in the use, for public purpose, for which the land is required have been specifically provided under the MRTP Act. The State Act is hardly dependent upon the Land Acquisition Act except to the limited extent of completing the process of determining compensation, other than the compensation determinable by the designated arbitrator or tribunal. 53. Under Section 83 of the MRTP Act, the lands can be vested in the authority concerned at different stages right from the commencement of preparation/approval of draft plan to the final plans and their execution under the provisions of the Act. Like Section 83 of the MRTP Act, Sections 116 and 128(3) of the State Act can be enforced by the Planning Authorities with an object to achieve planned development and as part of planning under the Act. 68. The schemes under the two Acts are distinct and different. The scheme under the State Act can be implemented with recourse to the provisions of the Central Act which have been specifically stated therein. At the same time where there are specific provisions under the State Act the corresponding provisions of the Central Act will not apply. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to the acquisition of land alone, for which there are no specific provisions under the State Act, would be applicable to the acquisition under the State Act. At the same time where there are specific provisions under the State Act the corresponding provisions of the Central Act will not apply. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to the acquisition of land alone, for which there are no specific provisions under the State Act, would be applicable to the acquisition under the State Act. This view was also taken by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in a very recent judgment in Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) 7 SCC 129 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 1] . 69. For an Act to be a "self-contained code", it is required to be shown that it is a complete legislation for the purpose for which it is enacted. The provisions of the MRTP Act relate to preparation, submission and sanction of approval of different plans by the authorities concerned which are aimed at achieving the object of planned development in contradistinction to haphazard development. An owner/person interested in the land and who wishes to object to the plans at the appropriate stage a self-contained adjudicatory machinery has been spelt out in the MRTP Act. Even the remedy of appeal is available under the MRTP Act with a complete chapter being devoted to acquisition of land for the planned development. Providing adjudicatory mechanism is one of the most important facets of deciding whether a particular statute is a "complete code" in itself or not. 21. Xxx XXX XXX XXX 22. The Honble Supreme Court thereafter went on to hold that even under legislations by reference there may be two categories. It was held that while applying the two doctrines the Court must see whether the subsequent amendment to the former legislations would still have to see if the reading into the subsequent amendment would militate with the object of the subsequent legislation. 135. While applying any of the doctrines, the Court will have to take care that there is no distortion or destruction of the provisions of the principal statute. For examining this aspect, it really would not matter whether we apply the doctrine of incorporation or reference to the facts of the present case. It will have to be examined on the touchstone of effective and complete workability while protecting legislative intent. For examining this aspect, it really would not matter whether we apply the doctrine of incorporation or reference to the facts of the present case. It will have to be examined on the touchstone of effective and complete workability while protecting legislative intent. Primarily, we have to examine whether incorporating provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act into the provisions of the MRTP Act by reference would disturb the scheme of the MRTP Act and cause legal and practical impediments in the execution of this Act. "77. Now, we may, while referring to an example, show when a statute may not be treated as a self-contained code. In Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 276 , a Bench of this Court was concerned with the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (in short "the Karnataka Act") which was an Act of only seven sections and Section 5 of which provided that provisions of the Land Acquisition Act shall mutatis mutandis apply. The Court, in SCC para 37 of the judgment, stated that there being no detailed machinery whatsoever in the Karnataka Act, it cannot be treated as a self-contained code. This clearly shows that if complete machinery or mechanism is not provided under an Act to ensure effective execution of the functions assigned therein with due protection of the rights of the interested persons within the framework of law, it may not be possible for the court to hold that such a statute is a self-contained code." 23. The Learned Advocate General appearing for the State by reference to the provisions of Section 8 of the 1948 Act relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. Vs. S. Balasubramanian and Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 642 . In the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Paragraph 12 has stated as follows: "12. We may in this context point out that in law a distinction is drawn between a mere reference or citation of a statute into another and incorporation of a particular provision of a statute. Vs. S. Balasubramanian and Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 642 . In the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court at Paragraph 12 has stated as follows: "12. We may in this context point out that in law a distinction is drawn between a mere reference or citation of a statute into another and incorporation of a particular provision of a statute. While in the former case a modification, repeal or re-enactment of the statute that is referred will also have effect for the statute in which it is referred, but in the latter case any change in the incorporated statute by way of amendment or repeal has no repercussion on the incorporating statute. [See : Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, (1962) 3 SCR 786 : AIR 1962 SC 316 : (1962) 1 Cri LJ 364] (SCR at p. 831); G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 4th Edn., pp. 178-179.] The provisions of Rule 6 of the Special Rules, as they stood prior to the impugned amendment, applied the rule of reservation in the matter of appointments as contained in Rule 22 of the General Rules, to appointment to the post of Deputy Tahsildar in each district. The said Rule 6 only referred to the provisions contained in Rule 22 of the General Rules and it cannot be construed as incorporating by reference Rule 22 of the General Rules into the said Special Rule. This means that a subsequent amendment in Rule 22 of the General Rules would be applicable in the matter of appointment to the category of Deputy Tahsildar under the Special Rules and the amendments that were introduced in Rule 22 of the General Rules in 1967 and thereafter were applicable in the matter of such appointments. It was not necessary to make an amendment in Rule 6 of the Special Rules to incorporate the amendment that was introduced in Rule 22 of the General Rules in 1967. Moreover, the principle that where a subsequent enactment incorporates the provisions of a previous enactment, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent enactment and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous enactment is subject to certain exceptions. One such exception excluding the applicability of this principle is where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other. One such exception excluding the applicability of this principle is where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other. [See : State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 589 : (1976) 1 SCR 6 ] (SCR at p. 14)]" 24. What follows from the above discussions is that there is no straight jacket formula to determine as to whether subsequent amendment to a former Act when the said former Act has been included to apply to a latter Act would be automatically be incorporated in the said latter Act. Some of the principles that would help determine the above is the doctrine of Legislation by Incorporation Vs. the Doctrine of Legislation by Reference. While in the case of Legislation by Incorporation the repeal, extinguishment or amendment to the amendment of the former legislation would not have any effect or bearing on the subsequent legislation, in case of legislation by Reference the subsequent Act would attract the provisions of the amendment, repeal, substitution or extinguishment of the former legislation. The cases which are an exception to the rule of incorporation are (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other; (b) where the two Acts are in pari materia; (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act." e) where given the objects of the purpose of the subsequent legislation the amendment to the former would serve to further the said objects and purpose of the subsequent legislation. Narasimhan Case (Supra). f) Where the Subsequent legislation is not a complete code. Western Coalfields Case (Supra). g) Where the subsequent legislation does not have substantive provisions like Taxation as in the former Act Mariappa Case (Supra). 25. Let us now analyse the provisions of the West Bengal Land Development and Planning Act of 1948. i) Under Section 2a of the 1948 Act the definition of Land, Collector and Company have the same definition as in the 1894 Act. ii) Publication of Gazette Notification is prescribed under the Section 4 of 1948 Act as in Section 4 of 1894 Act. i) Under Section 2a of the 1948 Act the definition of Land, Collector and Company have the same definition as in the 1894 Act. ii) Publication of Gazette Notification is prescribed under the Section 4 of 1948 Act as in Section 4 of 1894 Act. iii) Invitation of Objections by collector is provided under Section 4A of the 1948 Act as in Section 5A of the 1894 Act. iv) Publication of Scheme for Development is under Section 5 of the 1948 Act as in Section 6 of the 1894 Act. v) Declaration of Scheme for Public Purpose is under Section 6 of the 1948 Act, vi) Special provisions for urgency/ fast track procedure are in Section 7 of the 1948 Act as under Section 17 of the 1894 Act. vii) Possession can be taken by the authorised officer under Section 8(1)(a) at any time after publication of declaration u/s 6. The provisions for taking possession are available under Section 16 of the 1894 Act. Vesting takes place immediately thereafter under both the Acts. 26. Hence it is seen that the 1948 Act is a complete Code and the facts of instant case bear a striking similarity with the Girnar Traders Case (Supra). The said decision of the Constitution Bench squarely applies in the instant case. The 1948 Act is Complete Code in itself. The reference to the provisions of the 1894 Act is only to fill in gaps in the 1948 Act. The two acts are not supplemental to each other and but may be Pari Materia. The objects and purpose of the said Act are special and made for a specific purpose. Section 11A introduced by amendment in the year 1984 is not necessary for the achievement of the objects and purposes of the 1948 Act. The State Legislature has not specifically or by implication incorporated the Section 11A of the 1894 Act into the 1948 Act. The repeal of the 1894 Act therefore would not have any effect or bearing on the 1948 Act which is still in force. Hence this Court is of the view that the acquisition proceedings under LD case No.55 of 1954-55 are not hit by the mischief of the Section 11A of the 1894 Act. 27. There is however one very important consideration. Hence this Court is of the view that the acquisition proceedings under LD case No.55 of 1954-55 are not hit by the mischief of the Section 11A of the 1894 Act. 27. There is however one very important consideration. The petitioners have relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs Aziman Bibi, (2016) 15 SCC 710 . In the said decision that was rendered in the specific context of the 1948 Act and the 1894 in a similar case of lapsing of proceedings under the 1948 Act by application of Section 11A of the 1894 Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Acquisition proceedings in the said case under the 1948 Act had lapsed by reason of application of Section 11A of the amended 1894 Act. It, however, appears that none of the judgements referred to hereinabove particularly the Constitution bench Decision in the case of Girnar Traders (Supra) have been placed or argued by the parties and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has thus not addressed the questions addressed herein. It is submitted by the State that an application for Review has been filed in the Aziman Bibi Case (Supra). It is also submitted by Ld. Advocate General that the disposal of the Review was not consented to by the State. 28. This Court is not concerned with the Review application or its disposal by consent. This Court is only notes that the Aziman Bibi decision (Supra) has not been upset by the Supreme Court till date and is binding on this Court. Hence, in view of the Aziman Bibi decision (Supra) it is held that the acquisition proceedings in LDP Case No. 55 of 1954 -55 have lapsed. 29. There shall be no order as to costs 30. Urgent Photostat Certified copy be given to the parties after compliance with the usual formalities.