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2020 DIGILAW 1287 (KAR)

Ravi v. State Of Karnataka

2020-07-01

B.A.PATIL, M.G.UMA

body2020
JUDGMENT M.G.Uma, J. - The appellant/accused is before this Court aggrieved by the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 13.04.2017 on the file of learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bagalkote (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court') in S.C.No.73/2015, whereunder the appellant/accused was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.25,000/- and in default to pay fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. 2. We have heard the learned counsel Sri.K.S.Patil for the appellant/accused and learned Addl. SPP Sri.V. M. Banakar for the respondent-State and perused the materials on record. 3. The brief facts of the case as contended by the prosecution are that the accused is the brother of the deceased Shantavva and their father had landed properties at Jammanakati of Badami taluk standing in the name of Somanagouda-father of the accused and the deceased. The deceased had 1/4th share in the said properties. A suit for partition in that regard was filed and the same was decreed. She had even filed Final Decree Proceedings before the Civil Court. The accused was disgruntled by the move of the deceased for having claimed the share in the properties belonging to her father and on 21.04.2015 at about 9.30 am found the deceased Shantavva proceeding with her son Basappa on foot. At that time, the accused assaulted her with an axe on her neck and caused fatal injuries, as a result of which the deceased died on the spot. On seeing the gruesome act committed by the accused, Basappa-son of deceased, who had accompanied his mother, ran away from the scene of offence and informed this fact to his aunt Yallavva, who inturn lodged the first information as per Ex.P6, against the accused. The FIR was registered against the accused in Crime No.29/2015 of Keroor police station, for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and after investigation the charge sheet came to be filed against the accused for the above said offence. 4. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the matter, secured the presence of the accused and committed the matter to the Sessions Court for trial as required under Section 209 of Cr.P.C., after following the procedure contemplated under Section 208 of the Code. 4. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the matter, secured the presence of the accused and committed the matter to the Sessions Court for trial as required under Section 209 of Cr.P.C., after following the procedure contemplated under Section 208 of the Code. The trial Court after securing the presence of the accused, framed the charge against him for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. But accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. Thereafter the prosecution examined in all 26 witnesses, got marked 36 documents and identified 10 material objects, in order to prove its contention. 6. The accused has denied all the incriminating materials available on record in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and got examined 2 witnesses and got marked 4 documents in support of his defence. The trial Court after taking into consideration all these materials on record, came to the conclusion that the evidence of PW16 and 17, that is the first informant and the eye witness, is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and proceeded to convict him for the said offence and sentenced him as stated above. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court, the accused has preferred this appeal. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, it is only PW16 and 17 who are the material witnesses to the prosecution and all other witnesses except the official witnesses, have turned hostile. Admittedly PW16-the first informant, is not the eye witness. The sole eye witness to the incident according to the case of the prosecution, is PW17. If the version of PW17 as deposed before the trial Court is taken into consideration, his version is highly suspicious. There are material contradictions in the case made out by the prosecution. The prosecution tried to improve its own case from stage to stage. The presence of PW17 at the scene of offence cannot be believed even for a moment. The conduct of PW17-the son of the deceased, after seeing the accused assaulting and giving fatal blow to the deceased, is also suspicious. According to PW17, on seeing the accused assaulting the deceased, he never tried to intervene in the matter, nor tried to question the accused. The conduct of PW17-the son of the deceased, after seeing the accused assaulting and giving fatal blow to the deceased, is also suspicious. According to PW17, on seeing the accused assaulting the deceased, he never tried to intervene in the matter, nor tried to question the accused. He had not even raised hue and cry. On the other hand, he silently went away from the scene of the offence and informed the fact to the informant- PW16 who is his aunt. This conduct on the part of PW17 son of the deceased cannot be believed even for a moment. 9. He further submitted that, as per the first information-Ex.P6, the accused had come and assaulted the deceased on her neck with an axe and caused her death. Subsequently when PW16 and 17 deposed before the Court, they referred to a road traffic accident, wherein the deceased had come in the motorcycle bearing registration No.KA29/Y-4842 and dashed the same to the deceased and thereafter assaulted her with an axe, causing fatal injuries. This version of PW16 and 17 has not been found support from the medical evidence, as the deceased had not sustained any injuries, as a result of dashing of the motorcycle by the accused against her and she falling on the road. 10. He further submitted that there is absolutely no reason as to why all the material witnesses examined by the prosecution including PW18-Smt.Rangavva who is the sister of the deceased, have not supported the case of the prosecution. He submitted that the trial Court had not taken into consideration Ex.D4 the clinching document produced by the accused and admitted by PW17, wherein he has clearly stated that no such incident was witnessed by him. He further submitted that according to the post mortem report Ex.P27, there was only incised wound, found on the dead body and no injuries corresponding to the contention of the prosecution that the motorcycle dashed against the deceased by the accused before assaulting her with the axe. Moreover it is the evidence of PW16 that the deceased had not taken any food on the date of the incident and she had left the house empty stomach. But as per the post mortem report Ex.P27, partially digested food particles were present in the intestine, which also creates doubt in the mind of the Court. 11. Moreover it is the evidence of PW16 that the deceased had not taken any food on the date of the incident and she had left the house empty stomach. But as per the post mortem report Ex.P27, partially digested food particles were present in the intestine, which also creates doubt in the mind of the Court. 11. He further submitted that even though it is stated that the FIR was registered at 12.00 in the noon on the date of the incident, the FIR which is marked as per Ex.P20 reached the learned Magistrate at 7.45 p.m. Under such circumstances, the version of the prosecution that there was prompt lodging of the complaint cannot be believed. There is inordinate delay in registering the FIR which also gives rise to a reasonable doubt in the case made out by the prosecution. When the evidence of PW16 and 17 is not trustworthy and creates serious doubt, such evidence should have been rejected by the trial Court. He further submitted that, when the version of the prosecution witnesses is not supported by the medical evidence and when there are material contradictions, discrepancies and improvements, the version should have been rejected. 12. Learned advocate for the appellant placed his reliance on the case KRISHNEGOWDA AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA connected with NANJE GOWDA AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, (2017) 13 SCC 98 in support of his contention that when there are material contradictions and improvements in the version of related witnesses and if there are material inconsistencies about the injuries inflicted on the deceased, version of such witnesses cannot be believed, unless such evidence is corroborated by independent witnesses. If the version of the sole eye witness is reliable, then only the conviction can be based on such evidence of the eye witness. On the other hand, if it is not found reliable, the Court may look for independent corroboration of his testimony. 13. The learned advocate for the appellant also relied on the decision in ANIL PHUKAN Vs. STATE OF ASSAM, (1993) 3 SCC 282 to support his contention that, if the single eye witness is not found to be wholly reliable witness and there are some circumstances, which may show that he could have an interest in the prosecution, under such circumstances, the Courts cannot rely on such uncorroborated testimony to convict the accused. 14. STATE OF ASSAM, (1993) 3 SCC 282 to support his contention that, if the single eye witness is not found to be wholly reliable witness and there are some circumstances, which may show that he could have an interest in the prosecution, under such circumstances, the Courts cannot rely on such uncorroborated testimony to convict the accused. 14. The learned advocate has also relied on the decision in VADIVELU THEVAR Vs. THE STATE OF MADRAS, (1957) AIR SC 614 and RAMJI SURJYA AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, (1983) AIR SC 810 in support of such contention. 15. Therefore the learned advocate submitted that in the case on hand, when the version of the sole eye witness-PW17, who is son of the deceased, does not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court and when the Court looks for corroboration of his version and where there are no other supporting evidence, such uncorroborated version of PW17 is to be discarded. 16. Therefore it is his submission that the trial Court should have acquitted the accused by extending the benefit of doubt and seeks indulgence of this Court to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court and to acquit the accused for the above said offence in the interest of justice. 17. Per contra learned additional SPP vehemently contended that the case of the prosecution rests on the version of the eye witness PW17. He fully supported the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances, the motive as suggested by the accused is of no importance. Even otherwise as per the case made out by the prosecution, the accused had a strong motive to commit the offence as he being the brother of the deceased, was not happy with the conduct of the deceased as she had claimed 1/4th share in the properties belonging to her father and FDP No.7/2012 was already filed and notice was also issued to the accused. The prosecution produced Ex.P32 and 33 to substantiate this contention. He submitted that as per the case made out by the prosecution, the incident had taken place at 9.30 am and PW16-the informant, lodged the first information at 12.00 in the noon and immediately the FIR was registered. There is prompt lodging of the first information which gives credence to the contention of the prosecution. He submitted that as per the case made out by the prosecution, the incident had taken place at 9.30 am and PW16-the informant, lodged the first information at 12.00 in the noon and immediately the FIR was registered. There is prompt lodging of the first information which gives credence to the contention of the prosecution. Even though the FIR had reached the learned Magistrate at 7.45 pm, the said delay is satisfactorily explained by PW19 the police constable who carried the FIR. Therefore it cannot be said that the informant had gained time and there is embellishment in the facts put forth by the prosecution. 18. He further submitted that even though it is submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant that there are material contradictions, discrepancies and improvements, there is nothing of that sort which go to the root of the matter. Moreover minor discrepancies are bound to occur in the case of this nature which cannot take away the effect of positive evidence led by the prosecution. PW16 the first informant being the sister of the deceased and PW17- the sole eye witness being the son of the deceased, have stated categorically regarding the commission of the offence by the accused and they have withstood searching cross examination by the learned advocate for the accused. There is absolutely no reason to disbelieve their version. Even though the panchas to the inquest, spot and seizure mahazar witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution, sufficient materials are placed before the Court to prove that the deceased had died a homicidal death at the scene of offence as contended by the prosecution. The recovery of the weapon that is axe, which is as per MO-2, at the instance of the accused is also spoken to by the investigating officer-PW26 and there is no reason to disbelieve his version. PW23 is the doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased, issued the post mortem report as per Ex.P27, which clearly goes to show that the death of the deceased was due to hemorrhage shock secondary to incised wound with sharp weapons and it corresponds with the injuries that can be caused with MO-2 the axe, which is a sharp edged weapon. 19. 19. He further submitted that either PW16 the sister of the deceased or PW17 her son, are not having any reason to falsely implicate the accused, leaving the real culprit, if somebody else had caused the death of the deceased. Moreover, the conduct of the accused immediately after the incident also to be taken into consideration. He further contended that even though the incident had taken place on 21.04.2015 at about 9.30 am, the accused was absconding till 30.04.2015 and on that date, he surrendered before the learned Magistrate. When he was given to police custody, his voluntary statement as per Ex.P21 was recorded and he assisted the investigating officer in the presence of panchas, in recovery of the axe-MO-2 and also his blood stained clothe as per MO-7. No reasonable explanation is given by the accused for these incriminating materials placed before the Court. He further submitted that PW17 was consistent in his version while deposing before the Court and there is no reason to disbelieve his version or to disbelieve the other materials on record. He further submitted that the trial Court has rightly formed an opinion that the prosecution is successful in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, which does not call for any interference by this Court. No good grounds are made out to set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and therefore the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence is to be confirmed by dismissing the appeal as devoid of merits. He prays accordingly. 20. We have carefully and cautiously perused the materials on record including the trial Court records. 21. Admittedly the case of the prosecution rests on the version of the eye witness PW17 who is none other than the son of the deceased. It is the specific contention of the prosecution that PW17 had accompanied the deceased while she was going and when the accused had caused her death by assaulting with an axe. PW17 stated that immediately after the incident, he came running and informed the fact to his aunt-PW16 who in turn lodged the first information at the earliest possible time. 22. PW17 stated that immediately after the incident, he came running and informed the fact to his aunt-PW16 who in turn lodged the first information at the earliest possible time. 22. Pw16 and 17 have deposed before the trial Court that the accused come to the scene of offence on a motorcycle and dashed the same to the deceased and as a result of which the deceased had fallen on the road and thereafter the accused had assaulted her with an axe, which has resulted in her death. Even though these witnesses categorically stated regarding the accident caused to the deceased by the accused with his motor cycle, the first information-Ex.P6 is silent about any such accident caused by the accused. The incident said to have been taken place at 9.30 am on 21.04.2015 and the first information as per Ex.P6 was lodged on the same day at 12.00 in the noon. Even though there is prompt lodging of the complaint, there is absolutely no reason as to why there is no mention regarding the accused coming on the motorcycle and dashing against the deceased prior to assaulting her with axe. It is the material omission on the part of the first informant PW16, who has not explained it satisfactorily. 23. As per the case made out by the prosecution, it is not only PW17 who is the eye witness to the incident. PW9 and 10 were also cited by the prosecution as eye witnesses, but they have not chosen to support the case of the prosecution for the reasons best known to them. Even during cross examination by the learned public prosecutor, nothing has been elicited from them. Moreover, PW17 has categorically stated that at the scene of the offence, at the time of commission of the offence, one or two persons were there but he does not know their names. The investigating officer has not made any attempt to cite them as witnesses. Even though PW9 and 10 were cited as eye witnesses, they have not supported the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances, it is only PW17 who gives the version regarding commission of the offence by the accused. 24. The investigating officer has not made any attempt to cite them as witnesses. Even though PW9 and 10 were cited as eye witnesses, they have not supported the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances, it is only PW17 who gives the version regarding commission of the offence by the accused. 24. When the accused came on a motorcycle and dashed against the deceased and thereafter assaulted her on her neck with an axe, PW17 did not raised any hue and cry nor he tried to rescue his mother who fell helplessly on the road. On the other hand, he coolly ran away from the scene of the offence to inform the fact to PW16. Even though it can be said that different persons react differently in a given situation, the conduct of PW17 in running away from the scene of the offence, cannot be said as normal. He being the son of the deceased who was in his 20s, could have resisted or could have raised hue and cry to alarm the neighbors. 25. As already noted, the case of the prosecution wholly rests on the evidence of PW17, who is the sole eye witness to the incident. Even though PW17 supported the case of the prosecution, the improvement made to the case of the prosecution by saying that the accused had come on a motorcycle and dashed the same to the deceased, before assaulting her with the axe and his conduct immediately after the incident, gives rise to a reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene of offence. When reasonable doubt arises in the mind of the Court regarding the version of the sole eye witness, it is always advisable to look for corroboration. In the present case, even though the prosecution cited PW9 and 10 as eye witnesses, they have not supported the case and they have turned hostile. Under such circumstances, except the version of PW17, no other material is placed before the Court. 26. It is well settled proposition of law that whenever the case of the prosecution rests on the version of the sole eye witness, the prudence demands for corroboration of his evidence. It is not the requirement of law which requires corroboration of the version of eye witness, but as rule of prudence, the Court can look for corroboration. 27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in VADIVELU THEVAR Vs. It is not the requirement of law which requires corroboration of the version of eye witness, but as rule of prudence, the Court can look for corroboration. 27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in VADIVELU THEVAR Vs. THE STATE OF MADRAS (supra) made this position very clear and held as under: "11. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid it down that "no particular number of witnesses shall in any case, be required for the proof of any fact." The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's 'Law of Evidence' -9th Edition, at pages 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in S.134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that "Evidence has to be weighed and not counted". Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well- established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for, proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have, therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution." 28. This proposition of law was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in RAMJI SURJYA AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (supra) wherein it is held that: "8. There is no doubt that even where there is only a sole eye-witness of a crime, a conviction may be recorded against the accused concerned, provided the Court which hears such witness regards him as honest and truthful. But prudence requires that some corroboration should be sought from the other prosecution evidence in support of the testimony of a solitary witness particularly where such witness also happens to be closely related to the deceased and the accused are those against whom some motive or ill-will is suggested." 29. It is trite law that was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ANIL PHUKAN Vs. STATE OF ASSAM wherein it is held as under: "3. This case primarily hinges on the testimony of a single eye witness Ajoy PW3. Indeed, conviction can be based on the testimony of a single eyewitness and there is no rule of law or evidence which says to the contrary provided the sole witness passes the test of reliability. So long as the single eyewitness is a wholly reliable witness the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. Indeed, conviction can be based on the testimony of a single eyewitness and there is no rule of law or evidence which says to the contrary provided the sole witness passes the test of reliability. So long as the single eyewitness is a wholly reliable witness the courts have no difficulty in basing conviction on his testimony alone. However, where the single eyewitness is not found to be a wholly reliable witness, in the sense that there are some circumstances which may show that he could have an interest in the prosecution, then the courts generally insist upon some independent corroboration of his testimony, in material particulars, before recording conviction. It is only when the courts find that the single eyewitness is a wholly unreliable witness that his testimony is discarded in toto and no amount of corroboration can cure that defect. It is in the light of these settled principles that we shall examine the testimony of PW3 Ajoy." 30. By looking at the materials placed before the Court by the prosecution, a reasonable doubt will arise about commission of the offence by the accused but it is the basic principle of criminal jurisprudence that the accused is presumed to be innocent, until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Wherever a reasonable doubt arises in the mind of the Court in the case made out by the prosecution, the benefit of such doubt should always enure to the accused. If there are material contradictions which create serious doubt in the mind of the Court about truthfulness of the witness and if it appears to the Court that there are improvements made to the case of the prosecution, then it is not safe to rely on such evidence and it cannot be a basis to convict the accused. This proposition of law is reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in KRISHNEGOWDA AND OTHERS and NANJE GOWDA AND ANOTHER (supra), wherein it is held as under; "26.....High Court has failed to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of the trial, there were lapses on the part of investigating agency and the evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 27 to 31.xxxx 32. It is to be noted that all the eyewitnesses were relatives and the prosecution failed to adduce reliable evidence of independent witnesses for the incident which took place on a public road in the broad daylight. Although there is no absolute rule that the evidence of related witnesses has to be corroborated by the evidence of independent witnesses, it would be trite in law to have independent witnesses when the evidence of related eyewitnesses is found to be incredible and not trustworthy. The minor variations and contradictions in the evidence of eyewitnesses will not tilt the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused but when the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses proves to be fatal to the prosecution case then those contradictions go to the root of the matter and in such cases accused gets the benefit of doubt. 33. It is the duty of the Court to consider the trustworthiness of evidence on record. As said by Bentham, "witnesses are the eyes and ears of justice". In the facts on hand, we feel that the evidence of these witnesses is filled with discrepancies, contradictions and improbable versions which draws us to the irresistible conclusion that the evidence of these witnesses cannot be a basis to convict the accused. 34. to 43.xxxx 44. The Court should always make an endeavor to find the truth. A criminal offence is not only an offence against an individual but also against the society. There would be failure of justice if innocent man is punished. The Court should be able to perceive both sides i.e. the prosecution as well as the defence." 31. In the case on hand, other eye witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution and it is only PW17-son of the deceased supported the case of the prosecution as eyewitness. The discussion held above discloses that PW16 being the sister and PW17 being the son of the deceased tried to improvise their version from stage to stage and even the conduct of PW17 immediately after the incident gives rise to a reasonable doubt but unfortunately, we cannot find any corroboration to his version. The discussion held above discloses that PW16 being the sister and PW17 being the son of the deceased tried to improvise their version from stage to stage and even the conduct of PW17 immediately after the incident gives rise to a reasonable doubt but unfortunately, we cannot find any corroboration to his version. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is not advisable to rely on such uncorroborated evidence of PW17 to convict the accused, that too when it is the settled proposition of law i.e. the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 32. It is stated that the accused had a motive to commit the offence as deceased had claimed her share and had even filed final decree proceedings in FDP No.7/2012. It is well settled proposition of law that when there are eye witnesses to the incident, the motive will play a limited role. Therefore the said motive may not be taken as sole ground to draw an inference that the accused has committed the offence. 33. It is contended by the learned additional SPP that there is prompt lodging of the first information and there is absolutely no reason for PW16 and 17 to falsely implicate the accused. Of course, the prompt lodging of the first information is one of the circumstances to believe the version of the prosecution and no reason for false implication may also be one of the reason to believe its version, but solely on these grounds, it cannot be held that the prosecution is successful in proving the guilt of the accused on such circumstance. 34. The learned Addl.SPP drawn our attention to Ex.D4 and evidence of DW1 and 2 and submitted that such defence taken by the accused is apparently false and when the accused takes a false defence, it is a circumstance against him. We have considered Ex.D4 in the light of the evidence of DW1 and 2 and also cross examination of PW17, where Ex.D4 was came to be marked. Even though PW17 admitted his signature found on Ex.D4-the affidavit said to have sworn by this witness, stating that he is not an eye witness to the incident, he specifically denied its contents. We have considered Ex.D4 in the light of the evidence of DW1 and 2 and also cross examination of PW17, where Ex.D4 was came to be marked. Even though PW17 admitted his signature found on Ex.D4-the affidavit said to have sworn by this witness, stating that he is not an eye witness to the incident, he specifically denied its contents. Even though DW1 and 2 i.e. the advocate who drafted Ex.D4 and the Notary public who attested it, have deposed before the Court, the contents of this document cannot be taken into consideration to falsify the version of PW17 who deposed before the Court on oath. Moreover the version of DW1 and 2 do not inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to accept their version. Therefore we are of the opinion that Ex.D4 is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. But however, these materials will not tilt the balance infavour of the prosecution. 35. In view of the discussions held above, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC beyond reasonable doubt and the benefit of such doubt should always enure to the accused and he is entitled to be acquitted. 36. We have gone through the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court. The trial Court proceeded to convict the accused on the uncorroborated version of the sole eye witness PW17, inspite of the material omissions and contradictions. Therefore we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside. Accordingly we proceed to pass the following: ORDER The appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 13.4.2017 and order of sentence dated 15.04.2017 passed by the learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Bagalkote in S.C.No.73/2015 is set aside. The accused is acquitted for the charges levelled against him. The Jail Authorities are hereby directed to release the appellant/accused Ravi S/o. Somanagouda @ Yallanagouda Patil forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Registry is directed to send back the Trial Court records forthwith.