JUDGMENT S. K. Sahoo, J. - The petitioners in this writ petition have challenged the impugned order dated 30.04.1994 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha, Cuttack in O.E.A. Revision Case No.46 of 1992 vide Annexure-7 in exercise of the power under section 38 B of the Odisha Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereafter 'O.E.A. Act') in setting aside the order dated 30.07.1979 of the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar passed in Vesting Case No.795/70-71 vide Annexure-4. 2. The case of the petitioners is that on 25.04.1936 through Hata Patta, Raja Madhusudan Dev of Patia gave the agricultural land situated in Mouza Chandrasekharpur, area Ac.1.43 dec. and Ac.1.07 dec. in sabik plot nos.300 and 299 respectively in favour of late Anadi Charan Sahoo, the grandfather of the petitioners for cultivation as a tenant under him. The said land corresponds to Hal Plot nos.334 and 335 respectively under Rakhit Holding no.472. The status of land in dispute was 'Niji Chasa' as per R.O.R. published in the year 1931 vide Annexure-1. The grandfather of the petitioners being a tenant under Raja of Patia, paid the rent which was accepted by Raja of Patia and rent receipt thereof was issued vide Annexure-2. In the year 1943, Raja of Kanika purchased the estate of Patia by auction and became landlord in respect of agricultural land in dispute and grandfather of the petitioners became deemed tenant under Raja of Kanika, who also accepted the rent for the year 1943 onwards and issued rent receipts in favour of the grandfather of the petitioners. The estates were vested in the State Government in the year 1954 and accordingly, estate of Kanika was vested in the said year and grandfather of the petitioners being in possession of the agricultural land in dispute by raising paddy crops became tenant under State Government by paying rent. The Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar initiated a proceeding under section 8(1) of the 'O.E.A. Act' to enquire about the possession and tenancy of the grandfather of the petitioners and the same was registered as Vesting Case No.795/70-71 and after due enquiry and on receipt of Amin's report, he passed the order dated 30.07.1979 (Annexure-4) in favour of the grandfather of the petitioners and held him to be a tenant and settled the land with him. The R.O.R. was corrected in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 34 of the Odisha Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962 and published accordingly in the year 1981 vide Annexure-5 recording the name of late Anadi Charan Sahoo in respect of land in dispute and rent was paid and accepted by the State Government for the years 1974 to 1981, 1982 to 1985, 1985-1986 and for the year 1989 to 1994 and rent receipts were issued vide Annexures-8/a, 8/b, 8/c, 8/d, 8/e, 8/f and 8/g annexed to the affidavit of petitioner no.2 Jitendra Kumar Sahoo dated 13.08.2019. The petitioners in shape of memo filed the order sheet of Suit No.2794 of 1987 initiated under section 22(3) of Odisha Survey and Settlement Act, 1958 by the Settlement Authority and the order sheet indicates that notice was issued to the G.A. Department who did not appear and participate in the enquiry in respect of village-Chandrasekharpur, P.S.-New Capital, Unit No.41, Dist.- Puri and the grandfather of the petitioners was accepted as 'stitiban rayat' and accordingly, R.O.R. was published in the year 1988 and the grandfather of the petitioners was recorded as 'stitiban status' and the State Government accepted rent for the year 2000 to 2001 and issued rent receipt in favour of late Anadi Charan Sahoo. On the basis of reference from Collector, Puri for revising the aforesaid order dated 30.07.1979 of Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar passed in Vesting Case No.795/70-71, O.E.A. Revision Case No.46 of 1992 under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act was initiated by the Member, Board of Revenue. In the reference letter, it was indicated that while recognizing Anadi Charan Sahoo as a tenant under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act and correcting the current R.O.R., the Tahasildar failed to verify the Ekpadia as well as the genuineness of the 'handwritten Patta'. The Collector also expressed doubts about the genuineness of the orders as the signatures of the Tahasildar on the case record on 15.07.1979, 16.07.1979 and 30.07.1979 did not appear to tally with each other. The Member, Board of Revenue after hearing the respective parties, in the impugned order dated 30.04.1994 has been pleased to hold as follows:- "7. A perusal of the L.C.R. shows that the opp. party filed an application in Form "H" for settlement of suit land. The Member, Board of Revenue after hearing the respective parties, in the impugned order dated 30.04.1994 has been pleased to hold as follows:- "7. A perusal of the L.C.R. shows that the opp. party filed an application in Form "H" for settlement of suit land. Section 8-A(1) read with Rule 6 of O.E.A. Act prescribes Form "H" for settlement of homestead and agricultural lands under sections 6 and 7 of the said Act. The claim for settlement under sections 6 and 7 is meant for the Ex-intermediary. In the instant case, the claim petition was filed by the opp. party when evidently he was not an intermediary. There was no scope for the opp. party to apply under sections 6 and 7 for settlement of land on which his tenancy right is claimed to have been created before the date of vesting. 8. Besides, the opp. party produced some rent receipts before Tahasildar only for the years 1942, 1943 and 1952 though he claims to have acquired the land since the issue of the "hand written Patta" i.e. from 25.04.36. Unless continuous rent receipts from the date of granting of lease Patta namely 1936 till the year of vesting namely 1954 are produced, it cannot be presumed that opp. party's possession was continuous on regular payment of rent to the Ex-intermediary from the time the hand written Patta was granted in the year 1936. Out of this relevant period, the rent receipts produced in this Court by the opp. party relate to 1942 (with 3 years back rent) and 1952 only. The rent receipts relating to the years after 1979 i.e. after the date of the Tahasildar's order settling the land with the opp. party are not material in the present context. The Tahasildar also failed to verify the Ekpadia or Tenant's Ledger. Now the opp. party is also unable to file this very important and relevant document i.e. Tenant's Ledger. The list of documents filed by the opp. party shows against serial No.5 that the Tenant's Ledger is filed by him. On verification of the said document, it is clear that this is a document issued by the Tahasildar after settlement of land in favour of the opp. The list of documents filed by the opp. party shows against serial No.5 that the Tenant's Ledger is filed by him. On verification of the said document, it is clear that this is a document issued by the Tahasildar after settlement of land in favour of the opp. party and it is not a Tenant's Ledger which is opened in the Tahasil on the basis of Ekpadia filed by the Ex-intermediary and on the basis of which the rent is collected. In the absence of the proper Tenant's Ledger and continuous rent receipts, a deeming provision like section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act will not have any application as the opp. party cannot prove his continuity of tenure as a tenant immediately before the date of vesting. Hence it appears that the Tahasildar acted beyond his jurisdiction by entertaining an application which was misconceived and settling the land on a wrong interpretation of the relevant provisions in the statute. 9. It is further seen that the R.O.R. is finally published in favour of the State Government and without making State as a party to the case, the Tahasildar -cum- O.E.A. Collector should not have settled land in favour of the opp. party. The land reserved for "Unnat Jojana Jogya" should not have been settled without de-reservation by the Collector under Orissa Government Land Settlement Act. The Tahasildar is competent to correct the R.O.R. for any event which takes place after its final publication but for any event which takes place prior to final publication of the R.O.R., the Tahasildar is incompetent to correct the R.O.R. as the forum is available under section 15 of the Orissa Survey & Settlement Act. Moreover the estate vested in the year 1954 and the opp. party filed his claim for the disputed land in 1971 after a lapse of 17 years. 10. I also find from the L.C.R. that the signatures of the Tahasildar on 15.07.79, 16.07.79 and 30.07.79 do not appear to tally with each other. This lends credence to the Collector's reservation about the genuineness of the orders." After analysing the above, the Member, Board of Revenue has been pleased to hold that the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar exercised a jurisdiction which was not vested on him and passed orders which are erroneous and need revision. Accordingly, the order dated 30.07.79 of Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar passed in Vesting Case No.795/70-71 was set aside 3. Mr. Accordingly, the order dated 30.07.79 of Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar passed in Vesting Case No.795/70-71 was set aside 3. Mr. Ganeshwar Rath, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners in his imitable style contended that the order of the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar dated 30.07.1979 is an administrative order under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act and therefore, it is not revisable under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act. He placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Basanti Kumari Sahoo -Vrs.- State of Orissa and others, (1992) 73 CutLT 868 which was followed in the cases of Daitary Rout -Vrs.- State of Orissa, (2005) 100 CutLT 329 and Bhagaban Kar -Vrs.- State of Orissa, (2008) 2 OrissaLR 838 . It was argued that even though the Hata Patta dated 25.04.1936 issued by Raja of Patia was unregistered but rent was paid by the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo which was accepted and when Raja of Kanika purchased the estate of Patia, he also accepted rent from the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo treating him as a tenant and cultivating agricultural land. He placed reliance on section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 which deals with effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered and more particularly placed emphasis on the proviso to the said section which states that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the Registration Act, 1908 or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered might be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. Reliance was placed in the case of Rai Chand Jain -Vrs.- Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991) AIR SC 744 and it was argued that an unregistered lease deed can be looked into for collateral purpose. Reliance was placed in the case of Rai Chand Jain -Vrs.- Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991) AIR SC 744 and it was argued that an unregistered lease deed can be looked into for collateral purpose. He placed reliance in some of the cases of this Court i.e. Basiruddin -Vrs.- State of Orissa,1961 ILR 595 , The State of Orissa -Vrs.- Bhakta Charana Naik,1965 31 CutLT 654 , The Collector of Puri -Vrs.- Budhinath Samantray,1969 35 CutLT 552 , Naban Bewa -Vrs.- Nabakishore Samal, (1964) AIR Orissa 16 and Jagannath Nanda -Vrs.- Bishnu Dalei,1974 40 CutLT 888 to substantiate that for creating an agricultural tenancy, no formal document is required to be executed but it can be created by giving possession and accepting rent and issuing rent receipts. Learned counsel further placed reliance in the case of Gangayya -Vrs.- S. Mandan Chand Samdaria, (1973) AIR Madras 262 to argue that unregistered lease can be used to prove the date on which possession in the hands of the tenant commenced. It was further argued that the Collector, Puri doubted the genuineness of the orders passed by the Tahasildar as the signatures of the Tahasildar on three different dates did not appear to tally with each other which was also accepted by the Member, Board of Revenue without any cogent reason. According to the learned counsel the word 'appears' imports lesser degree of probability than proof as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pyare Lal Bhargava - Vrs.- State of Rajasthan, (1963) AIR SC 1094 . He emphasized that when the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar passed the order settling the land with deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo on 30.07.1979, almost about fifteen years after, it was not proper on the part of the Member, Board of Revenue to revise the order exercising power under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act. Reliance was placed on several decisions of this Court in the cases of Sri Laxman Kanda -Vrs.- State of Orissa, (1991) 2 OrissaLR 50 , Mst. Surya Rana -Vrs.- State of Orissa, (1996) 1 OrissaLR 180 , Labanyabati Devi -Vrs.- Member, Board of Revenue, (1993) 76 CutLT 937 and Nityananda Satpathy -Vrs.- Member, Board of Revenue, (1996) 2 OrissaLR 26 2. Surya Rana -Vrs.- State of Orissa, (1996) 1 OrissaLR 180 , Labanyabati Devi -Vrs.- Member, Board of Revenue, (1993) 76 CutLT 937 and Nityananda Satpathy -Vrs.- Member, Board of Revenue, (1996) 2 OrissaLR 26 2. While concluding his argument, the learned counsel submitted that since the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind and there is patent illegality in the order, the same is liable to be set aside. Mr. Kishore Kumar Mishra, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate on the other hand supported the impugned order and submitted that the claim of the petitioners relating to possession over Sabik Plot Nos.300 and 299 in Mouza Chandrasekharpur which corresponds to Hal Plot Nos.334 and 335 respectively under Rakhit holding No.472 is based on the handwritten unregistered patta executed by the late Raja Madhusudan Dev of Patia. The handwritten patta by the Ex-intermediary dated 25.04.1936 cannot be accepted as genuine in the absence of Ekpadia prepared by the Ex-intermediary. It is further argued that it cannot be presumed that the petitioner was in possession on the date of vesting in absence of continuous rent receipts. While recognizing the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo as a tenant under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act, the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar did not take into account the genuineness of the handwritten patta. He placed reliance in the case of State of Orissa -Vrs.- Baidyanath Jena, (2013) 116 CutLT 805 and argued that a tenant can only be recognized under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act if the intermediary was validly inducted with registered document as per section 17 of the Registration Act. He argued that the Amin's report with regard to the land in question showed that the same had been recorded in Rakhit Khata in favour of State in the record of rights of the year 1974 and as such the Tahasildar has no jurisdiction to settle such land in favour of a private person like the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo without first dereserving it as per the order of the Collector. It is contended that the petitioners produced rent receipt before the Tahasildar only for the year 1942, 1943 and 1952 though they claim to have acquired the land since 1936. According to Mr. It is contended that the petitioners produced rent receipt before the Tahasildar only for the year 1942, 1943 and 1952 though they claim to have acquired the land since 1936. According to Mr. Mishra, the order passed by the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar cannot be said to be an administrative order under any stretch of imagination as the Tahasildar by his order dated 30.07.1979 has arrived at a clear finding that the lessee in the Vesting Case No.795/70-71 was a tenant under Ex-intermediary before the vesting of estate and he would be deemed to be a tenant under Government from the date of vesting in the same rights and subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as he was entitled to immediately before the date of vesting as contemplated under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act. Such a finding of the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar is totally erroneous in the eye of law as the petitioners failed to produce continuous rent receipts. It is contended that since there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue and the conclusions arrived at by the revisional authority are reasonable, the writ petition should be dismissed. 4. There is no dispute that the impugned order under Annexure-7 has been passed in exercise of the power conferred under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act which was about fifteen years after the passing of the order by Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar in the vesting case. The section clearly states that for the purpose of satisfying itself regarding the regularity of any proceeding in which any subordinate authority has made any decision or passed an order under the O.E.A. Act and also for verifying the correctness, legality or propriety of the decision taken by such subordinate authority, the Board of Revenue can call for and examine the record of such proceeding on its own motion or on a report submitted by the Collector. If the revisional authority feels that any decision or order passed by the subordinate authority needs to be modified, annulled or remitted, it may pass the order accordingly which can be done only after giving opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. If the revisional authority feels that any decision or order passed by the subordinate authority needs to be modified, annulled or remitted, it may pass the order accordingly which can be done only after giving opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties. In the case of Sri Laxman Kanda (supra) which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, taking into account the fact that the petitioner in that case was a tribal and he was in possession of the land since 1945 and since 1965 his sons were in possession of the land, it was held that ordinarily a person who has continued in possession for such length of time is not to be disturbed even if he is not a tribal and that more weightage is to be attached when the person concerned is one such. The initiation of the proceeding by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner under section 12(3) of the Orissa Prevention of Land Encroachment Act, 1972 against the petitioners in the year 1983 was held to be erroneous in law and accordingly quashed. In the case of Mst. Surya Rana (supra), it is held that the legality of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 38- A(2)(bb) read with Rule 38-A(10)(bb) of the Orissa Land Reforms (General) Rules, 1965 framed under the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 has to be tested on touchstone of reasonableness of time. Even though no period of limitation is prescribed, power has to be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept that it must be done within a reasonable time. Absence of a provision prescribing a period of limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act, or to prevent miscarriage of justice or misuse or abuse of the power by lower authorities. It is true that when benefit has been obtained by fraud, it does not lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to plead limitation to get away with the order. Lapse of time is no excuse to refrain the authority exercising statutory powers to unravel fraud and set the matter right. It is true that when benefit has been obtained by fraud, it does not lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to plead limitation to get away with the order. Lapse of time is no excuse to refrain the authority exercising statutory powers to unravel fraud and set the matter right. In the case of Labanyabati Devi (supra), it is held that since the learned Member, Board of Revenue exercised his suo motu jurisdiction under section 59(2) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960 after a lapse of twelve years, it was held to be a case of unreasonable delay and accordingly, the order passed by learned Member was quashed. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nityananda Satpathy (supra) held that the power of the Board of Revenue under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act to revise a decision or order of any authority subordinate to it, has to be exercised in a reasonable manner within a reasonable time and no hard and first rule can be laid down as to what should be the reasonable time as each case has to be decided on facts and circumstances peculiar to it. In that case since the power under section 38-B was exercised more than a quarter of century, it was held that during such long years, the lands might have suffered transfer from one hand to another creating new rights and liabilities amongst themselves and unsettling a settled position in abject disregard of consequences cannot be countenanced and accordingly, the entire proceeding before the Member, Board of Revenue was quashed on the ground that the revisional authority failed to exercise the power in a reasonable manner within a reasonable time. The decision rendered by this Court in Nityananda Satpathys case, (2003) 7 SCC 146 was set aside on some other grounds by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.7670 of 1997 decided on 31.07.2003. In the case of State of Orissa and others -Vrs.- Brundaban Sharma and another, (1995) Supp3 SCC 249 , a question arose before the Hon'ble Apex Court as to whether Board of Revenue was justified in exercising its jurisdiction under sec. 38-B of the O.E.A. Act after a lapse of twenty seven years. In the case of State of Orissa and others -Vrs.- Brundaban Sharma and another, (1995) Supp3 SCC 249 , a question arose before the Hon'ble Apex Court as to whether Board of Revenue was justified in exercising its jurisdiction under sec. 38-B of the O.E.A. Act after a lapse of twenty seven years. The Hon'ble Court held that when the revisional power was conferred to effectuate a purpose, it is to be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Absence of limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act or to prevent miscarriage of justice or violation of the provisions of the Act or misuse or abuse of the power by the lower authorities or fraud or suppression. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. It was further held that it cannot be said that the Board of Revenue exercised the power under section 38-B after an unreasonable lapse of time, though from the date of grant of patta by the Tehsildar was of twenty seven years. In the case of Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham -Vrs.- K. Suresh Reddy and others, (2003) 7 SCC 667 , the Hon'ble Apex Court had the occasion to consider section 50-B(IV) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, which provides that the Collector might suo motu at any point of time, call for and examine the record relating to any certificate issued or proceedings taken by the Tahasildar under the section for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such certificate or as to the regularity of such proceedings and pass such order in relation as he may think fit. Exercise of suo motu power at any time only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date but that does not mean that at any time should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, at any time must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation. In this view, at any time must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation. In the case of Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and others -Vrs.- Balasaheb Tukarm Shevale and others, (2009) 9 SCC 352 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect settled things to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that an exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein. Thus the legal principle which is set out from the above citations is that even though no period has been prescribed for exercising the power under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act, the revisional authority has to exercise the same within a reasonable time and that to in a reasonable manner. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as to what would be the reasonable time. There cannot be any hard and first rule for that. However, when fraud has been committed in obtaining an order or the decision of the subordinate authority is based on forged documents or there is suppression of material facts or there is violation of the provision of the Act, the revisional authority would be fully justified in exercising its power under section 38-B at any point of time in order to prevent miscarriage of justice or misuse or abuse of the power committed by the subordinate authority in granting relief to any party. In the case in hand, the settlement of land is stated to have been made with disregard to the provisions under O.E.A. Act and relevant documents were not taken into account before settling the land, handwritten patta by the Ex-intermediary was accepted as genuine without Ekpadia prepared by the Ex-intermediary, continuous rent receipts from the date of grant of lease patta were not produced to substantiate possession of the land, tenancy ledger was not verified and the signatures of the Tahasildar in the order sheet on three different dates which were stated to have been passed within a period of fifteen days did not tally with each other. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that even in such a case also, power under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act should not have been exercised by the revisional authority almost about fifteen years after the order passed by the Tahasildar, cannot be accepted. 5. Coming to the next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the order of the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar dated 30.07.1979 is an administrative order under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act and therefore, it cannot be revised under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act, let us first take into account the citations placed in that respect. In the case of Smt. Basanti Kumari Sahoo (supra), a Full Bench of this Court while considering the provisions under sections 8(1) and 38-B of the O.E.A. Act held that section 8(1) of the Act is declaratory in nature and no proceeding is contemplated under section 8(1) and therefore, no power of adjudication of tenancy right is vested in any revenue authority and it does not envisage settlement of land belonging to the Government with tenancy right. The State being the owner of the land i.e. landlord, is entitled to receive rent from its tenants including persons deemed to be tenants under it under section 8(1). Its rights are akin to a landlord. No enquiry is contemplated and the decision may partake the trappings of adjudication, it is not one in exercise of powers under section 8(1) which does not authorise a proceeding or adjudication, but the enquiry is akin to an enquiry necessitated to be undertaken by an agent of landlord. Its rights are akin to a landlord. No enquiry is contemplated and the decision may partake the trappings of adjudication, it is not one in exercise of powers under section 8(1) which does not authorise a proceeding or adjudication, but the enquiry is akin to an enquiry necessitated to be undertaken by an agent of landlord. It is further held that if in exercise of power under section 8(1), the officer settles the land with the applicant in course of a proceeding and confers tenancy right, the proceeding, the adjudication and the settlement are without jurisdiction and the Board of Revenue in exercise of power conferred by section 38-B would be entitled to annul the same. The Court went on to decide the question as to whether the order which was annulled by the Board of Revenue was passed in purported exercise of jurisdiction under section 8(1) or that order was an administrative order of the officer, in charge of collection of revenue on behalf of the State. The Hon'ble Court held that the application filed by the petitioner under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act seeking settlement of the land with her was disposed of by the officer as Estate Abolition Collector purporting to exercise jurisdiction under section 8(1) which he did not possess. It was held that the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction under section 38-B to revise the order passed by the Estate Abolition Collector, Bhubaneswar. It was further held that even though the petitioner might have misconceived the position of law and made application under section 8(1), the Tahasildar should have considered the same on administrative side with a view to satisfy himself if the petitioner was a tenant under the State prior to vesting. The misconceived application did not absolve the Tahasildar from proceeding in the right manner. The misconceived application did not absolve the Tahasildar from proceeding in the right manner. It was further held that the provisions contained in section 8(1) is a decision on the administrative side and not an order passed under section 8(1) so as to liable to be revised by the Board of Revenue under section 38-B. Having said so, the Hon'ble Court held that where the land has been settled, fresh tenancy right has been created in purported exercise of powers under section 8(1), the Board of Revenue would be entitled to annul the decision or correct the error in exercise of powers conferred on it under section 38-B. Accordingly, the decision of the Board of Revenue annulling the order of the Tahasildar was held to be justified and the Tahasildar was directed to consider the application filed by the petitioner afresh on the administrative side and to take his own decision. The petitioner challenged the order of the Full Bench before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.118 of 1995 which arises out of SLP(C) No.10014 of 1992 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 23.01.1995 reported in 1995 (I) Orissa Law Reviews (SC) 587 held that the High Court justified the Board's order to the extent it annulled the Tahasildar's order but interfered with it solely on the ground that the Board has no jurisdiction since the Tahasildar's order was not a quasi-judicial order. In other words, according to the High Court, the Tahasildar's order was an administrative order. It was further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if that be so, one fails to understand why the matter should be remitted to the Tahasildar once again to take an administrative decision. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside and it was directed to the High Court to proceed to decide the matter on merits on the premise that the Board of Revenue had exercised the right of jurisdiction under section 38-B of the Act. In the case of Bhagaban Kar (supra), a Division Bench of this Court relying upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Basanti Kumari Sahoo (supra) held that a tenant cannot claim settlement of a land in his favour under the O.E.A. Act and he is only to be recognized as a tenant under the State. In the case of Daitary Rout (supra), it was held that the order under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act passed by the O.E.A. Collector cannot be construed to be an order creating any right in favour of the petitioner for the first time and therefore, cannot be subjected to the revisional jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act. Section 8 of the O.E.A. Act, which deals with continuity of tenure of tenants clearly stipulates that the tenant inducted by an Ex-intermediary who was in possession of the lands on and from the date of vesting, shall be deemed to be tenant under the State Government. Such person shall hold the land in the same rights and subject to the same restrictions and liabilities as he was entitled or subject to immediately before the date of vesting. This section even does not contemplate for making of an application and initiation of a proceeding by the O.E.A. Collector within the meaning of the Act. No quasi-judicial proceeding is required to be initiated. Section 8(1) does not contemplate any determination of rights by the authorities under the Act in respect of rival claims claiming tenancy though on the administrative side, the appropriate authority may try to find out the person from whom rent is to be accepted. The Tahasildar is not always bound to accept a claim raised by a person to the effect that he was inducted as a tenant, without verifying as to whether the claim is genuine or not. For arriving at such satisfaction, the Tahasildar has to conduct an enquiry which is more in the nature of administrative enquiry and not quasijudicial. In the order passed by the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar, opposite party no.4, a clear finding has been arrived at that the lessee Anadi Charan Sahoo in the Vesting Case No.795/70-71 was a tenant under the Ex-intermediary before the vesting of the estate and he is deemed to be tenant under the Government on and from the date of vesting in the same rights and subject to same restrictions and liabilities as he was entitled to immediately before the date of vesting as contemplated under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act. We are of the view that such order passed by the opposite party no.4 cannot be said to be an administrative order inasmuch as the lands were never settled under the lease principle rather the opposite party no.4 held that the lands were deemed to have been settled in favour of Anadi Charan Sahoo under the O.E.A. Act. Without most vital documentary evidence like continuous rent receipts, Ekpadia prepared by the Ex-intermediary or verification of tenancy ledger, the opposite party no.4 seems to have invoked the deeming provision under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act and ordered correction of the entry in the R.O.R. in favour of Anadi Charan Sahoo. The record of right of the lands showed that the same was recorded in Rakhit khata in favour of the State Government in the year 1974 and without any order of dereservation from the Collector as provided under the Odisha Government Land Settlement Act, 1962, the opposite party no.4 has settled the land in favour of a private person like Anadi Charan Sahoo. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we find no illegality on the part of the Board of Revenue in initiating the revisional proceeding under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act on the reference from Collector, Puri for revising the order of the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar passed in the vesting case. 6. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even though the Hata Patta issued by Raja of Patia was an unregistered one but rent was paid by the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo which was accepted and when Raja of Kanika purchased the estate of Patia, he also accepted rent from the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo treating him as a tenant and cultivating agricultural land. It is pertinent to note that Ekpadia prepared by the Ex-intermediary was not produced. Even though the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo claimed to have been inducted as a tenant since 1936 but some rent receipts for the year 1942, 1943 and 1952 were produced before the Tahasildar. The continuous rent receipts have not been produced. The tenancy ledger was also not verified by the opposite party no.4. Even though the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo claimed to have been inducted as a tenant since 1936 but some rent receipts for the year 1942, 1943 and 1952 were produced before the Tahasildar. The continuous rent receipts have not been produced. The tenancy ledger was also not verified by the opposite party no.4. Thus there cannot be any doubt that the aforesaid documents which were very much essential for entertaining a claim of continuous possession of the land with the deceased since 1936 were not verified by the opposite party no.4. Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 deals with effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered. An unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by the Registration Act, 1908 or by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by registered instrument. By virtue of section 6 of Act 48 of 2001, with effect from 24.09.2001, the words "or as evidence of part performance of a contract for the purposes of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882" was omitted. Thus even an unregistered document can be received as evidence for the purposes mentioned in the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that unregistered handwritten patta can be used for collateral purpose in view of the proviso to section 49 of the Registration Act. The literal meaning of the word 'collateral' itself shows that it is only 'supplementary or secondary purpose' and 'not direct'. Passing of the title to the lessee of land by an instrument cannot be said to be collateral purpose i.e. supplementary or secondary purpose. It is the main purpose for which the instrument is executed affecting the immovable property comprised in the said instrument. Passing of the title to the lessee of land by an instrument cannot be said to be collateral purpose i.e. supplementary or secondary purpose. It is the main purpose for which the instrument is executed affecting the immovable property comprised in the said instrument. The expression "collateral purposes" is a very vague one and the Court must decide in each case whether the purpose for which unregistered document is sought to be used as really a collateral one or is to establish directly the title to immovable property sought to be conveyed by the document. By the simple device of calling "collateral purpose", a party cannot use an unregistered document in any legal proceedings to bring about indirectly the fact which would have had it registered. Therefore, as a rule, as a proof of passing of title in favour of any person, an unregistered document cannot be received in evidence. A document required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting the immovable property but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts or for any collateral purpose i.e. for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. An unregistered document can be looked into for collateral purposes even though it does not create title in respect of the land and the factum of date of commencement of possession on the basis of such document can be taken into account provided there is other evidence to show the continuity of possession. In the case of Gerua Biswal -Vrs.- Kshyama Biswal, (1962) AIR Orissa 107 , it is held that, where in the case of an unregistered Kararnama when the members of a joint family effect a severance in status and each of the parties gave up his claim in respect of certain family lands already in the exclusive possession of the other, the document is inadmissible under section 49 of the Registration Act as evidence of any transaction affecting the properties for want of registration and further no oral evidence can be given to prove the terms of the partition in view of section 91 of the Evidence Act. Though the document could be used for 'collateral' purpose for proving the severance of joint family status, it would not be admissible to prove the nature of possession subsequent to the execution of the document because that would be using the document virtually for proving the allotment of the properties at the partition, the very purpose for which it is prohibited to be used under section 49 of the Act. In the case of Dandapani Sahoo -Vrs.- Kshetra Sahoo and others, (1965) 31 CutLT 33 , it was held that there is no dispute over the proposition that an unregistered partition deed can be used as an evidence to show severance of joint status, but it is not admissible to prove the actual allotment of specific properties to different shares. In the case of Baidyanath Jena (supra) on which the learned counsel for the State placed reliance, it was held that a tenant can only be recognized under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act if the intermediary was validly inducted with registered document as per section 17 of the Registration Act, sections 105 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act and followed by Ekpadia submitted by the intermediary with the approval of the Board of Revenue under section 5 of the O.E.A. Act. Though reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Rai Chand Jain (supra) that an unregistered lease deed executed by both the parties can be looked into for collateral purposes and also in the case of Gangayya (supra) to fortify the contention that unregistered lease deed can be used to prove the date on which possession in the hands of the tenant commenced, but it cannot be lost sight of the fact that though it is the case of the petitioners that the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo was inducted as a tenant by Raja Madhusudan Dev of Patia since 1936 for agricultural purposes but only rent receipts for the year 1942, 1943 and 1952 were produced before the Tahasildar. In absence of any continuous rent receipts or tenancy ledger and Ekpadia prepared by the Ex-intermediary the continuity of possession with the deceased on the date of vesting cannot be accepted. In absence of any continuous rent receipts or tenancy ledger and Ekpadia prepared by the Ex-intermediary the continuity of possession with the deceased on the date of vesting cannot be accepted. Moreover the copy of the unregistered Hata Patta annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition does not contain any seal of Raja Madhusudan Dev of Patia or the signatures of the Raja or the tenant. The top and bottom date of the document vary. The document seems to have been executed on 25.04.1936 but one person has signed the document putting the date as 24.04.1936. Therefore, the authenticity of the document is also doubtful. Therefore, we are of the humble view that the unregistered Hata Patta is no way helpful to show that the deceased was in possession of the land as a tenant under the Ex-intermediary before the date of vesting and therefore, he would be deemed to be a tenant under the State Government from the date of vesting. At this stage, some of the decisions of this Court cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners needs consideration. In the case of Basiruddin (supra), it is held that no formal document is necessary to create an agricultural tenancy. In the said case, while considering section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, it was held that the State like any ordinary landlord, can induct a tenant for cultivation of land for agriculture purposes who may acquire all the rights of a tenant available to him in law without a formal document being executed and the question of execution of a document in the manner prescribed under section 175(3) does not arise at all. In the case of Bhakta Charana Naik (supra), it is held that it is open to a landlord to create a tenancy by giving possession and accepting rent and such a tenancy can be proved by evidence other than the production of the lease deed. In the case of Budhinath Samantray (supra), even though it was a case of unregistered lease deed but it was held that plaintiff can prove his tenancy by payment and acceptance of rent from him by the landlord by proving the rent receipts. In the case of Budhinath Samantray (supra), even though it was a case of unregistered lease deed but it was held that plaintiff can prove his tenancy by payment and acceptance of rent from him by the landlord by proving the rent receipts. In the case of Naban Bewa (supra), it is held that if the lease was for agricultural purposes, under section 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease can be created orally and by delivery of possession and in order to confer any lease-hold right, a registered document is not essential. In the case of Jagannath Nanda (supra), it is held that a formal document is not necessary to create an agricultural tenancy and a tenant can be inducted to one agricultural holding by mere acceptance of rent whereafter he would acquire the status of a tenant. The above decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners are no way helpful for the petitioners as even though it is claimed to be an agricultural tenancy from the year 1936 by virtue of Annexure-1, the authenticity of which is doubtful feature but continuous rent receipts are lacking apart from the vital documents like tenancy ledger and Ekpadia. 7. In the reference letter submitted to the Member, Board of Revenue, it is indicated that while recognizing the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo as a tenant under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act and correcting the current R.O.R. under Rule 34 of Orissa Survey and Settlement Rules, 1962, the Tahasildar failed to verify the Ekpadia as well as the genuineness of the 'handwritten patta'. The Collector also expressed doubts about the genuineness of the orders as the signatures of the Tahasildar on the case record on 15.07.1979, 16.07.1979 and 30.07.1979 did not appear to tally with each other. The Member, Board of Revenue initiating a revision proceeding under section 38-B of the O.E.A. Act after receipt of the reference letter verified the lower Court record and found that the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo filed an application in Form 'H' for settlement of suit land. Form 'H' as per Rule 6 of the Odisha Estate Abolition Rules, 1952 is for settlement of homestead and agricultural land under sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.A. Act which is meant for the Ex-intermediary. Form 'H' as per Rule 6 of the Odisha Estate Abolition Rules, 1952 is for settlement of homestead and agricultural land under sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.A. Act which is meant for the Ex-intermediary. Since the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo was not an intermediary, the learned Member rightly held that there was no scope on the part of the deceased to apply in Form 'H' for settlement of land on which his tenancy right was claimed to have been created before the date of vesting. According to us, there is no perversity in such finding. The rent receipts pertaining to the years 1942, 1943 and 1952 were produced before the Tahasildar by the deceased claiming to have acquired the land through handwritten patta in the year 1936. The learned Member held that the rent receipts are not continuous till the year of vesting from the date of handwritten patta. The rent receipt vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition does not indicate the signature of the issuing person. The years have been overwritten. Therefore, we are of the view that the learned Member rightly held that in absence of continuous rent receipts, proper tenant's ledger and Ekpadia, a deeming provision like section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act will have no application. It is also not disputed that even though the estate was vested in the year 1954 but the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo filed his claim application in the year 1971 which was after a lapse of seventeen years. The lands in question as per 1974 settlement operation was recorded under Rakhita Khata and kissam was 'Unnat Jojana Jogya' and no possession note in favour of the deceased was mentioned in the R.O.R. and there was no dereservation order passed by the Collector under Odisha Government Land Settlement Act and therefore, the learned Member rightly held that the Tahasildar -cum- O.E.A. Collector should not have settled the land in favour of the deceased. The learned Member also on verification of the L.C.R. found that the signatures of the Tahasildar on three different dates within a span of fifteen days did not appear to tally with each other. The learned Member also on verification of the L.C.R. found that the signatures of the Tahasildar on three different dates within a span of fifteen days did not appear to tally with each other. Even though in the case of Pyare Lal Bhargava (supra), it is held that the word 'appears' imports lesser degree of probability than proof but there are several other grounds as discussed above were taken into account by the learned Member to hold the illegality committed by the Tahasildar in holding the deceased Anadi Charan Sahoo to be a tenant under section 8(1) of the O.E.A. Act. We are satisfied that there is proper assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the documents by the learned Member, Board of Revenue while passing the impugned order under Annexure-7 in setting aside the order dated 30.07.1979 of the Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar in Vesting Case No.795/70-71 and it stands the test of judicial scrutiny. We find no illegality, impropriety or perversity in the said order rather it appears to be a reasoned order. Therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob -Vrs.- K.S. Radhakrishnan, (1964) AIR SC 477 , we do not find it to be a fit case to exercise our certiorari jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order. In view of the foregoing discussions, we find no merit in the writ application which is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated 01.06.1994 passed in Misc. Case No.4000 of 1994 stands vacated. No cost. S. Panda, A.C.J. I agree.