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Allahabad High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 1301 (ALL)

Meva Lal v. State Of U. P.

2020-11-10

J.J.MUNIR

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against an order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Allahabad dated 02.05.2019 in Criminal Revision No. 86 of 2019, dismissing the said revision and affirming an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad dated 11.12.2018 in Case Crime No. 682 of 2014, under Section 279/304A I.P.C., P.S. Civil Lines, District Allahabad (now Prayagraj). The learned Magistrate by his order, last mentioned, has required the petitioner on his application seeking release of his car, bearing registration No. U.P. 70 CA 9417, to furnish a sum of Rs. 5 lacs in cash or in the form of bank security, as a condition precedent to the consideration of his application. 2. Meva Lal, the petitioner is a retired government servant. He is aged about 74 years. He was an employee with the District Collectorate, Allahabad (now Prayagraj). Meva Lal purchased a second-hand car on 18.04.2017 from Mrs. Archana Mohan w/o Sudhanshu Asthana r/o 573-A/4, Bailly Colony, Rajapur, Police Station Cantt., District Prayagraj. The car is a Hyundai i10. He purchased the said vehicle for a price of Rs. 2 lacs. Meva Lal applied to the Registering Authority under Sub Section (1) of Section 50 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 requesting that transfer of ownership may be entered in his name, in the certificate of registration. This application was accepted by the Registering Authority and his name was entered in the certificate of registration dated 12th March, 2013, on 18.04.2017. Meva Lal also took out an insurance policy that covers inter alia 3rd party risks. This policy was purchased from the United India Insurance Company Limited. It was issued on 09.03.2018. The policy was valid from 10.03.2018 to 09.03.2019. 3. Meva Lal says that on 15.09.2018 at 5:45 in the evening hours, the S.H.O., Civil Lines along with one Deena Nath, a Sub Inspector and four police constables were about their task of checking vehicles at the Subhash Chauraha, Civil Lines, Prayagraj. Sub Inspector Deena Nath signalled Meva Lal’s car to stop and asked him to show its papers. Meva Lal claims that he produced all documents relating to the car required under the law, but Deena Nath had something else in mind. He demanded some illegal gratification. Meva Lal firmly declined. Annoyed, Deena Nath Yadav seized Meva Lal’s car. Sub Inspector Deena Nath signalled Meva Lal’s car to stop and asked him to show its papers. Meva Lal claims that he produced all documents relating to the car required under the law, but Deena Nath had something else in mind. He demanded some illegal gratification. Meva Lal firmly declined. Annoyed, Deena Nath Yadav seized Meva Lal’s car. Meva Lal says that on his demand, as to why his car had been seized, S.I. Deena Nath Yadav told him that the vehicle was wanted in connection with Case Crime No. 682 of 2014, under Section 279, 304-A I.P.C., P.S. Civil Lines, District Allahabad (now Prayagraj). Meva Lal further says that he asked the Sub Inspector to show him a copy of the FIR, so that he may know that his car was indeed wanted in connection with that crime, but the police officer declined that request. Meva Lal secured a copy of the FIR under reference, which is one registered on 16.10.2014. It presently bears Case Crime No. 682 of 2014, under Section 279, 304A I.P.C., P.S. Civil Lines, District Allahabad, but earlier, it was registered as Case Crime No. 632 of 2014 at the same police station. Meva Lal asserts with reference to the contents of the said FIR that it does not show that his vehicle is mentioned there or otherwise wanted. 4. In these circumstances, Meva Lal made an application seeking release of his car to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad. The accident subject matter of Case Crime No. 682 of 2014 was a fatal accident, where one Viswajeet Sachan s/o Sadhu Ram Sachan lost his life. The learned Magistrate, by his order dated 11.12.2018, required the applicant to furnish in cash a sum of Rs. 5 lacs or a bank security worth the said amount, to be appropriated towards payment of compensation that may be awarded in the claim by the deceased’s heirs, relating to the accident. The Magistrate ordered that the release application would be considered on merits, once the aforesaid deposit was made good or security furnished. The Magistrate put this condition precedent, subject to fulfillment of which he would consider the release application, on the strength of Rule 203-B (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998. 5. Aggrieved, Meva Lal carried a revision to the learned Sessions Judge, Allahabad where it was numbered as Criminal Revision No. 86 of 2019. The Magistrate put this condition precedent, subject to fulfillment of which he would consider the release application, on the strength of Rule 203-B (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998. 5. Aggrieved, Meva Lal carried a revision to the learned Sessions Judge, Allahabad where it was numbered as Criminal Revision No. 86 of 2019. This revision came up for determination before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Allahabad, who dismissed the same by means of his order dated 02.05.2019. Both these orders shall hereinafter be referred to collectively as ‘the impugned orders’; singularly they shall be referred to as the context may require. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State, dated 10th July, 2019, to which a rejoinder dated 22nd July, 2019 has been put in on behalf of Meva Lal. Meva Lal has further filed a supplementary affidavit dated 30th July, 2019, on 23rd September, 2019. A supplementary counter affidavit on behalf of the State to the supplementary has been put in on 9th August, 2019. Meva Lal has rebutted it with the supplementary rejoinder affidavit presented on 21st September, 2019. 7. Parties have exchanged much pleadings because they are at issue as to how this car, that is subject matter of release proceedings, came to be connected to the crime. Also, the police dispute the manner of apprehension of the vehicle that Meva Lal has asserted. 8. Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. J.P. Tripathi, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State. 9. It is submitted by Mr. Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner that a reading of the FIR relating to Case Crime No. 682 of 2014 does not show the slightest involvement of the car in question, or for that matter, of any four wheeler whatsoever. It is a complete account of the occurrence which has no place for the involvement of a car, let alone the car in question. He submits that the FIR specifically describes the offending vehicle as a two wheeler, a Pulsar motorcycle bearing registration No. U.P. 70 BN 8519. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the FIR, to its face, is telltale that S.I. Deena Nath has falsely implicated Meva Lal’s vehicle in connection with this crime, misusing his statutory powers. He submits that the FIR specifically describes the offending vehicle as a two wheeler, a Pulsar motorcycle bearing registration No. U.P. 70 BN 8519. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the FIR, to its face, is telltale that S.I. Deena Nath has falsely implicated Meva Lal’s vehicle in connection with this crime, misusing his statutory powers. Learned counsel also submits that the accident in question involved a solitary vehicle, a Pulsar motorcycle bearing the registration number, last mentioned that happened on 16.10.2014, at the road crossing of the Accountant General’s Office. He asserts that the car in question which is a four wheeler of Hyundai make, bearing registration No. U.P. 70 CA 9417, has nothing to do with the accident dated 16.10.2014. In addition, he submits that Meva Lal was not the owner of the car on 16.10.2014 which he, as already said, acquired second hand on 18.04.2017. He is, therefore, in no way liable, either under the criminal law or for the compensation claim arising from the accident dated 16.10.2014. At the most, learned counsel submits that Meva Lal could be regarded as a witness, who holds custody of material evidence in the crime, which he would be obliged to produce at the trial. 10. Mr. Tripathi, the learned Additional Government Advocate on the other hand has refuted the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. He urges that Rule 203-B (3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short, ‘the Rules’) are unambiguous and do not invest the Court with jurisdiction, in case of a fatal motor accident, to release a vehicle involved therein when the vehicle is not covered by an insurance policy against 3rd party risks, unless the owner/registered owner of the vehicle furnishes sufficient security, to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, to pay compensation that may be awarded in the claim petition concerning the accident. He submits that there is no issue about the fact that the accident here was a fatal accident. 11. It is also a fact, according to Mr. Tripathi, that the petitioner was the registered owner of the vehicle, when it was seized and the release applied for. He submits that there is no issue about the fact that the accident here was a fatal accident. 11. It is also a fact, according to Mr. Tripathi, that the petitioner was the registered owner of the vehicle, when it was seized and the release applied for. He points out that in the report submitted under Rule 203-A in Form SR-48 Ka, the insurance policy/insurance certificate number and its particulars have not been indicated by the Investigating Officer, which would show that the vehicle was not covered by an insurance policy, against third party risks. In the circumstances, the Court had no option but to require the registered owner to furnish security that would be appropriated towards satisfaction of an award, which the claims tribunal may render. He has taken this Court through the Investigating Officer’s report dated 08.11.2018 submitted to the C.J.M. in Form 48 Ka, annexed to the writ petition, part of Annexure No. 5. He also submits that the supplementary affidavit annexes a copy of the claim petition, filed on behalf of the deceased’s heirs. In the claim petition, there is a clear mention of the involvement of the car in question, besides the motorcycle mentioned in the FIR. The registration numbers of both vehicles appear in column No. 15 of that petition. 12. It is also pointed out that in the first paragraph of the claim petition, the manner of the accident described, mentions the involvement of both vehicles, leading to fatal consequences for the victim. In the circumstances, learned A.G.A. submits that the learned Magistrate had no option but to insist on strict compliance with the provisions of Section 203-B (3) of the Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at this stage, points out that the FIR does not at all indicate a word about the involvement of any four-wheeler. The four-wheeler has been brought in, in the claim petition because the police involved this vehicle without basis, whereas the claimants have thought that they would receive a higher compensation, may be under some ill-advice, owing to the involvement of a car in that accident. 13. This Court has given a thoughtful consideration to the matter and perused the record. What is not in doubt is the fact that when the accident took place, Meva Lal was not the registered owner of the car or any kind of an owner. 13. This Court has given a thoughtful consideration to the matter and perused the record. What is not in doubt is the fact that when the accident took place, Meva Lal was not the registered owner of the car or any kind of an owner. The Court says so because Rule 203-B of the Rules contemplates liability, not only of the registered owner, but also of the owner who could be a person other than the registered owner. This is evident from the terms of Rule 203-B. 14. A perusal of the report submitted by Investigating Officer in SR Form 48 Ka dated 28.11.2018 shows that in column 8, it is clearly mentioned that the name and address of the owner at the time of the accident was: Archana Mohan w/o Sudhansu Asthana r/o 573-A/4, Bailley Colony Rajapur, P.S. Cantt., District Allahabad. Thus, it is admitted to the prosecution that on the date of the accident, the petitioner, Meva Lal had nothing to do with the vehicle, let alone be its registered owner. He has absolutely no connection to the accident. 15. A reading of the FIR does show that it carries a graphic and comprehensive description of the accident, where the solitary offending vehicle identified, is a motorcycle of Pulsar make, bearing registration No. U.P. 70 BN 8519. It is a way with reporting motor accidents that FIR’s, subject to some exceptions, carry a detailed account, at least indicating the complete description of the offending vehicle. The FIR here, even if a generalisation is to be eschewed, certainly carries a comprehensive account. There is absolutely no mention of a four-wheeler being involved across the length and breadth of it. The Court does not wish to comment much about this issue, as it would ultimately be a matter to be judged at the trial. The remarks in this connection carried in this judgment must be understood as limited to the purpose of a decision about the unconditional maintainability of the release application and nothing more. These ought not to weigh with the Court holding trial. 16. This Court notices that the involvement of the car in question was brought in through a written application made on behalf of Neelima Sachan, the deceased’s wife to the S.S.P., Allahabad (now Prayagraj) annexed as CA-1 to the supplementary counter affidavit. These ought not to weigh with the Court holding trial. 16. This Court notices that the involvement of the car in question was brought in through a written application made on behalf of Neelima Sachan, the deceased’s wife to the S.S.P., Allahabad (now Prayagraj) annexed as CA-1 to the supplementary counter affidavit. This application, of which a photostat copy is annexed, does not bear any date. This application has been described in paragraph 4 of the supplementary counter affidavit, where also, there is no reference to the date when this application was made on behalf of Neelima Sachan. An eye-witness of the occurrence, a certain Imtiyaz Husain, has been recorded by the police in a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. mentioned in CD-11. A photostat copy of the aforesaid CD also shows overwriting in the CD number, where CD-10 has been overwritten with CD-11. The I.O. has signed this particular part of the case diary on 13.12.2015. There is a mention of the vehicle in the said CD. There could be some doubts about the manner in which it has been written, but again this Court does not wish to comment on this point. The vehicle has been shown parked outside the railway station, unclaimed in CD-27, dated 16.09.2018. About this discovery and recovery of the car in question, there is GD entry number 14 dated 16.09.2018, made at 5 minutes past 11 o’clock. The police, therefore, in substance, deny all that Meva Lal has said about the apprehension of his vehicle, while he was moving in it at the Subhash crossing, Civil Lines. This Court need not go into the precise detail of how the vehicle was apprehended and fell into the hands of the police. What is notable is the fact that it is not in issue at all that at the time of accident, Meva Lal was not the owner or the registered owner, as already said. 17. In a case like this, would the provisions of Rule 203-B(3) at all apply? Rule 203-B (3) is designed to ensure through the criminal justice system and before the vehicle is released, recovery of money that may be applied towards satisfaction of the award or some part of it, which the claims tribunal may make in the case of a fatal accident. Rule 203-B (3) is designed to ensure through the criminal justice system and before the vehicle is released, recovery of money that may be applied towards satisfaction of the award or some part of it, which the claims tribunal may make in the case of a fatal accident. It is designed ultimately to ensure ready satisfaction of the award of the claims tribunal, or so much of it as may be satisfied, out of proceeds collected from the owner or the registered owner, before he takes back the offending vehicle. The provisions of Section 203-A and 203-B of the Rules are quoted in extenso: “203-A. Duties of Investigating Police Officer– (1) The Investigating Police Officer shall prepare a site plan, drawn on scale as to indicate the layout and width etc. of the road/roads or place as the case may be, the position of Vehicle/Vehicles, or persons, involved and such other facts as the case may be relevant, authenticated by the witnesses and in case no witness is available same shall be recorded, so as to preserve the evidence relating to accident. He shall also get the scene of accident photographed from such angles as to clearly depict the accident, as above, inter-alia for the purpose of proceeding before the Claims Tribunal. (2) The Investigation Police Officer shall get full particulars of the insurance Certificate/ Policy in respect of the Motor Vehicle involved in the accident and to require the production of documents mentioned in-sub-section (1) of Section 158, and thereupon either to take the same in possession against receipt, or to retain the photocopies of the same, after attestation thereof by the person producing them. (3) The Investigating Police Officer may verify the genuineness of the documents gathered under sub-rule (2) by obtaining confirmation in writing from the authority purporting to have issued the same. (3) The Investigating Police Officer may verify the genuineness of the documents gathered under sub-rule (2) by obtaining confirmation in writing from the authority purporting to have issued the same. (4) The Investigating Police Officer shall submit detailed report regarding the accident to the Claims Tribunal, along with site plan and photograph prepared under sub-rule (1), documents gathered and verified under sub- rules (1) and (3) or action taken, in case of documents found forged copies of report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, medico legal reports and post-mortem report (in case of death), First Information Report, by not later than fifteen days or receipt of order/requisition issued by the Claims Tribunal: Provided that such information may also be furnished to the Insurance Company if requested by or through its agent or by the injured/sufferer or next of the kin or legal representatives of the deceased of the accident. The Investigating Police Officer shall submit report under this rule to the Claims Tribunal in Form SR 48-A. (5) Duties of Investigating Police Officer, enumerated in sub-rules (1) to (3) shall be construed as if they are included in Section 23 of U.P. Police Act, 1861 and any break thereof, shall entail consequences envisaged in that law. 203-B. Prohibition against release of vehicle.-(1) No vehicle, involved in any accident, shall be released by investigating Police Officer or any Police Officer superior to him unless a release order is passed, by the court having jurisdiction. (2) No vehicle, involved in any accident shall be released by the Judicial Magistrate, having jurisdiction, unless the compliance of sub-rules (1) to (3) of Rule 203-A is ensured from the investigating Police Officer and duly attested copies of Registration Certificate, Insurance Certificate, Route Permit, Fitness Certificate of vehicle as the case may be and driving license of the driver who was driving at the time of accident, are filed by the applicant. (3) No court shall release a vehicle involved in accident causing death or permanent disability when such vehicle is not covered by Policy of Insurance against third party risks unless the owner/registered owner of the vehicle furnishes sufficient security to the satisfaction of the Court to pay compensation that may be awarded in a claim case arising out of such accident. (4) Where the vehicle is not covered by a policy of insurance against third party risks, or when the owner/registered owner of the vehicle has failed to furnish sufficient security under sub-rule (3), or the policy of insurance produced by owner is found fake/forged, the vehicle shall be sold in public auction by the Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction, on expiry of six months of the vehicle being seized by the investigating Police Officer and proceeds thereof, shall be deposited with the Claims Tribunal, having jurisdiction over the area in question, for the purpose of satisfying the compensation to be awarded in claim case." 18. A reading of Rules 203-A and 203-B together leads one to the conclusion that it is the owner or the registered owner at the time when the accident occurred, who alone would be within the mischief of this Rule. If, by some failure of the Investigating Agency or some other cause, the vehicle is transferred to a third party by the registered owner, the third party having no concern with the accident, the provisions of Rule 203-B would not impinge upon such transferee owner’s rights to secure release. This would be the conclusion from the whole gamut of the provisions. The Rule contemplates, in the first instance, particulars of the insurance policy to be secured by the I.O. and disclosed to the Magistrate and in the event of the vehicle not being covered by a policy of insurance against third party risk, the owner or the registered owner of the vehicle may be required to furnish sufficient security that may satisfy an award made by the claims tribunal relating to the accident. The policy of insurance contemplated in the scheme of Section 203 A and 203B (3) is a policy covering the vehicle at the time of the accident. Here, the registered owner, who is a transferee and had nothing to do with the vehicle when it caused the accident, can possibly never furnish the insurance policy which sub-rule (3) of Rule 203 B envisages. A fortiorari he cannot be made liable to furnish security for the satisfaction of an award that the tribunal may make in relation to the fatal accident. 19. There is another facet of the matter. A fortiorari he cannot be made liable to furnish security for the satisfaction of an award that the tribunal may make in relation to the fatal accident. 19. There is another facet of the matter. The subsequent owner of the vehicle has no liability to satisfy the award involving the vehicle that he owns, which was earlier involved in an accident at some point of time when someone else was the registered owner. Rather, it is the registered owner at the time of accident who alone would be liable to satisfy the award made by a claims tribunal. 20. In this connection, reference may be made to the guidance of the Supreme Court in Prakash Chand Daga v. Saveta Sharma, 2019 (2) SCC 747 . Here, the issue was where a vehicle had been transferred and the statutory period prescribed under Section 50(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act to report the transfer to the Registering Authority had not expired or the transfer of ownership entered in the certificate of registration, an accident took place, would the transferor be liable to satisfy an award made by the claims tribunal? Their Lordships in Prakash Chandra Daga (supra) held: 5. It is true that in terms of Section 50 of the Act, the transfer of a vehicle ought to be registered within 30 days of the sale. Section 50(1) of the Act obliges the transferor to report the fact of transfer within 14 days of the transfer. In case the vehicle is sold outside State, the period within which the transfer ought to be reported gets extended. On the other hand, the transferee is also obliged to report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction the transferee has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept. Section 50 thus prescribes timelines within which the transferor and the transferee are required to report the factum of transfer. As per sub-section (3) of said Section 50, if there be failure to report the fact of transfer, fine could be imposed and an action under Section 177 could thereafter be taken if there is failure to pay the amount of fine. These timelines and obligations are only to facilitate the reporting of the transfer. It is not as if that if an accident occurs within the period prescribed for reporting the said transfer, the transferor is absolved of the liability. These timelines and obligations are only to facilitate the reporting of the transfer. It is not as if that if an accident occurs within the period prescribed for reporting the said transfer, the transferor is absolved of the liability. 6. Chapter XII of the Act deals with the Claims Tribunals and as to how applications for compensation are to be preferred and dealt with. While considering such claims, the Claims Tribunal, in case of an accident is required to specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or whether such amount be paid by all or any of them, as the case may be. It is well settled that for the purposes of fixing such liability the concept of ownership has to be understood in terms of specific definition of “owner” as defined in Section 2(30) of the Act. 7. In Pushpa v. Shakuntala [Pushpa v. Shakuntala, (2011) 2 SCC 240 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 399 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 682] the vehicle in question belonged to one Jitender Gupta who was its registered owner. He sold said vehicle to one Salig Ram on 2- 2-1993 and gave its possession to the transferee. Despite said sale, the change of ownership was not entered in the Certificate of Registration. The earlier insurance policy having expired, the transferee took out fresh insurance policy in the name of original owner Jitender Gupta. In an accident that took place on 7-5-1994, two persons lost their lives. The heirs and legal representatives lodged separate claims and an issue arose as to who was liable as owner. The submissions that Jitender Gupta, the registered owner had no control over the vehicle and the possession and control of the vehicle was in the hands of the transferee and as such no liability could be fastened on the transferor were rejected by this Court. It was observed in para 11 as under: (SCC p. 244) “11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of the vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor the transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change of the name of the owner in the certificate of registration of the vehicle. It was observed in para 11 as under: (SCC p. 244) “11. It is undeniable that notwithstanding the sale of the vehicle neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor the transferee Salig Ram took any step for the change of the name of the owner in the certificate of registration of the vehicle. In view of this omission Jitender Gupta must be deemed to continue as the owner of the vehicle for the purposes of the Act, even though under the civil law he ceased to be its owner after its sale on 2-2-1993.” 8. In the decision in Naveen Kumar [Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar, (2018) 3 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 661] the legal position was adverted to and this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 11-12, paras 13-14) “13. The consistent thread of reasoning which emerges from the above decisions is that in view of the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), it is the person in whose name the motor vehicle stands registered who, for the purposes of the Act, would be treated as the “owner”. However, where a person is a minor, the guardian of the minor would be treated as the owner. Where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement is treated as the owner. In a situation such as the present where the registered owner has purported to transfer the vehicle but continues to be reflected in the records of the registering authority as the owner of the vehicle, he would not stand absolved of liability. Parliament has consciously introduced the definition of the expression “owner” in Section 2(30), making a departure from the provisions of Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act. The principle underlying the provisions of Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor accident or, in the case of a death, the legal heirs of the deceased victim should not be left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the registering authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. A claimant for compensation ought not to be burdened with following a trail of successive transfers, which are not registered with the registering authority. To hold otherwise would be to defeat the salutary object and purpose of the Act. Hence, the interpretation to be placed must facilitate the fulfilment of the object of the law. In the present case, the first respondent was the “owner” of the vehicle involved in the accident within the meaning of Section 2(30). The liability to pay compensation stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has proceeded [Vijay Kumar v. Rakesh, 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 18767] upon a misconstruction of the judgments of this Court in Reshma [HDFC Bank Ltd. v. Reshma, (2015) 3 SCC 679 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 379 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 408] and Purnya Kala Devi [Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam, (2014) 14 SCC 142 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 251 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 304] . 14. The submission of the petitioner is that a failure to intimate the transfer will only result in a fine under Section 50(3) but will not invalidate the transfer of the vehicle. In T.V. Jose [T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M., (2001) 8 SCC 748 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 94], this Court observed that there can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. But for the purposes of the Act, the person whose name is reflected in the records of the Registering Authority is the owner. The owner within the meaning of Section 2(30) is liable to compensate. The mandate of the law must be fulfilled.” 9. The law is thus well settled and can be summarised: (SCC pp. 625-26, para 4) “4. … even though in law there would be a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in RTO records, from liability to a third person. … Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that [such registered owner] stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person.” [P.P. Mohammed v. K. Rajappan, (2008) 17 SCC 624 , para 4 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 587] 21. … Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that [such registered owner] stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person.” [P.P. Mohammed v. K. Rajappan, (2008) 17 SCC 624 , para 4 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 587] 21. The principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court, therefore, makes it clear that the liability to satisfy an award made by the claims tribunal is of the registered owner, when the accident takes place. The provisions of Rule 203-B (3) would, therefore, not apply in a case where the vehicle is seized from the hands of a registered owner, who is a transferee and not at all connected to the offending vehicle when the accident happened. The scope of the provisions of Rule 203-B (3) stood exhausted here, upon transfer of the vehicle in favour of Meva Lal and the time it was seized. The Rule applies not by virtue of seizure of the vehicle in connection with a fatal motor accident, but by virtue of the vehicle being in the hands of the registered owner, or may be the owner, at the time when the accident took place; and such a registered owner, or the owner, seeking release. 22. In the opinion of this Court, both the Courts below were, therefore, in manifest error to require the petitioner to deposit in cash a sum of Rs. 5 lacs, or in the alternate, furnish bank security before his application for release was considered. 23. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 11.12.2018 and 02.05.2019 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 9, Allahabad, respectively, are hereby set aside. It is ordered that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad shall proceed to decide the petitioner’s release application within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of a computer generated and self attested copy of this order downloaded from the official website of High Court Allahabad, in accordance with law, after hearing the parties concerned, but without requiring the petitioner to make any cash deposit or furnish bank security.