ORDER : I.A. No. 1903 of 2019 This interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 97 days in preferring the present appeal. 2. The appellants have enumerated the reason which, according to the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, is sufficient cause for condoning the delay by assigning the reason therein that due to communication gap the order of disposal/dismissal of the writ petition was not communicated in time and when it was communicated, some time was taken in arranging the money and therefore, the delay has been caused. Learned counsel further submits that if the delay in filing the instant appeal would not be condoned, the appellants will suffer irreparable loss and injury. 3. The respondent Central Coalfields Limited is represented through their counsel, Mrs. Rashmi Kumari, who has raised objection in condoning the delay. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the reason assigned in the interlocutory application as also considering the fact that if the appeal would not be decided on merit and if it will be dismissed on the point of limitation, the issue which has been agitated by the appellant will remain undecided, therefore, this Court is of the view that delay in filing the appeal is fit to be condoned. Accordingly, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned. 5. I.A. No. 1903 of 2019 stands allowed. L.P.A. No. 703 of 2018 6. The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 24.07.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No. 6358 of 2017 whereby and whereunder the directions sought for by the appellants to appoint them in terms of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of Coal India Limited on the ground of acquisition of land for Rajrappa Project, has been declined to be interfered with by dismissing the writ petition. 7. 7. The brief facts required to be referred herein which are important for adjudication of the lis read hereunder as :- It is the case of the writ petitioners that the land recorded in the name of the ancestor of the petitioners, namely, Late Yamuna Devi measuring an area of 8.94 acres appertaining to Khata No. 83, Plot No.1305, and 5.00 acres at Khata No. 83, Plot No. 700 totaling 13.94 acres at Mauza Sewai in the district of Ramgarh, has been acquired by the respondents for Rajrappa Project vide Land Acquisition Case No. 1/90-91 wherein Late Yamuna Devi was recognized as Raiyat over the said piece of land. The dependents of the original raiyat had been continuously approaching the respondent authorities for employment since 11.01.1999 but no heed was paid to that. In the meanwhile, the Coal India Limited has come out with a rehabilitation policy to provide employment to land losers known as “Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of Coal India Limited, 2012”. According to the appellants, the said scheme provides that Company will rehabilitate and resettle the affected persons of the coalfields area making provision therein that the employment would be provided to the land losers limited to the total number of acres of land acquired divided by two. It further provides therein that for two acres of land one employment would be considered. The appellants, in pursuance to the aforesaid policy, have represented before the respondent authorities by filing repeated representation but having not been considered, writ petition was filed being W.P.(S) No. 6358 of 2017 for issuance of a direction for appointment in lieu of acquisition of land in pursuance to the aforesaid rehabilitation and resettlement policy. The aforesaid writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 24.07.2018 which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 8. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, assisted by Mr. Lukesh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that in pursuance to the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2012, the cases of the appellants are required to be considered since the aforesaid policy contains a provision for providing employment in favour of the land losers by containing specific provision therein that the appointment is to be provided to the land losers limited to the total number of acres of land acquired divided by two. Herein, the total area of land acquired is 13.94 acres and as per the aforesaid provision of providing appointment equal to the total number of acres of land acquired divided by two, for every two acres of land acquired, employment of one person is required to be considered but the aforesaid provision of the scheme has not been followed, therefore, in the present case, once the respondents have come out with the policy for rehabilitation and resettlement, it is incumbent upon the respondent authorities to act in pursuance to the aforesaid policy decision by providing appointment, but the learned Single Judge has not taken into consideration that this aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the authorities concerned. Further, it has been submitted that the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of delay which according to the learned counsel, is also not a justified ground to deny the claim since admittedly herein the lands have been acquired and, therefore, irrespective of the delay, the appointment has to be provided by the respondent authorities. 9. Per contra, Mrs. Rashmi Kumari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Central Coalfields Limited has vehemently argued by taking the ground about applicability of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2012 which, according to the learned counsel, cannot be applied in a case of acquisition made in the year 1962 and 1978 in pursuance to the Land Acquisition proceeding of the year 1990. She further submits that the compensation has already been paid in favour of the appellants and the claim has been agitated by the appellants only on the basis of the policy decision of the year 2012 by making so called representations and finally approaching to this Court in the year 2017 which is after lapse of 27 years, which according to her, is hopelessly barred by the principle of delay and laches which has duly been considered by the learned Single Judge and taking the aforesaid ground, the writ petition has been dismissed, therefore, there is no infirmity in the same. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submissions, the undisputed fact in this case is that the land has been subjected to the Land Acquisition Proceeding in the year 1990 in a case of acquisition made in the year 1962 and 1978. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submissions, the undisputed fact in this case is that the land has been subjected to the Land Acquisition Proceeding in the year 1990 in a case of acquisition made in the year 1962 and 1978. The further undisputed fact herein which would be evident from the cause title of the appellants about their respective ages which is 33 years so far as the appellant No.1, namely, Narendra Choudhary is concerned, 41 years so far as appellant No.2, Tanubala Choudhary, is concerned, 36 years so far as it relates to appellant No.3, Veena Choudhary is concerned and 24 years so far as it relates to appellant No.4 Akash Bharti is concerned. 11. The land acquisition proceeding was started in the year 1990, therefore, in the year 1990 age of the appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3 was 05 years, 13 years and 08 years respectively and so far as the appellant No. 4 is concerned, he was not even born at that time. The further admitted fact as has been stated in course of argument by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the amount of compensation has already been paid in favour of the predecessor in interest of the appellants who were original raiyats. Admittedly the land was acquired in pursuance to the provision of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and at the time of acquisition or when the acquisition proceeding was initiated, there was no law pertaining to providing appointment in favour of the land losers as also no policy has been brought on record, rather, the first policy has been floated by the Coal India Limited in the year 2012 known as “Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of Coal India Limited, 2012” which contains the provision to provide appointment against the total land acquired divided by two. It is the admitted case of the appellants that it is only after the policy of the year 2012, they have started raising the demand by filing representations in the year 2015. Ultimately, when no action was taken by the authorities on the said representations, the writ petition was filed which was dismissed, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 12. Ultimately, when no action was taken by the authorities on the said representations, the writ petition was filed which was dismissed, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 12. The contention which has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the writ petition should not have been dismissed but the said contention is not acceptable to this Court for the following reasons :- (i) Admittedly, the land has been acquired in the year 1962 and 1978, however, the acquisition proceeding was started in the year 1990 which had culminated into passing of award for compensation. It is not the case of the appellants that before filing of the writ petition, any application was filed or any court of law was approached for seeking a direction upon the respondents herein to provide appointment on compassionate ground in lieu of acquisition of land. Therefore, this Court is of the view that in a case of acquisition of land in the year 1962 and 1978 for which acquisition proceeding was initiated in the year 1990, it is not proper for a Court to pass a positive direction after lapse of considerable period of about 40-50 years from the date of acquisition and 27 years from the date of order of acquisition proceeding. This Court, having heard the submissions, is of the view that merely filing representations cannot be a ground for condoning the delay and laches as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C.Jacob Vs. Director of Geology & Mining & Another reported in (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 961. Reliance is also being made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex court in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 wherein at para 2 their Lordships have held that – “2. … … … It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. … … … It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High court was right in dismissing the appellant's petition as well as the appeal.” In the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India and Others reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that :- “9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1967 SC 993 ). There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray, ( AIR 1976 SC 2617 ) making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik ( AIR 1976 SC 1639 ). In this context, reference of a judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik ( AIR 1976 SC 1639 ). In this context, reference of a judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. And Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1004 [S.L.P. (C) Nos. 30404-30442/2017] is required to be referred wherein the land losers had approached the court of law after inordinate delay seeking enhanced compensation which the Hon’ble Apex Court has refused to condone. In the aforesaid case, in para-21, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held which reads hereunder as :- “21. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz., laches and delay. It is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent.” It is evident from the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baljeet Singh (supra) which was a case for seeking a direction for compensation in lieu of acquisition of land and the Hon’ble Apex Court has declined to condone the delay of 21 years. This Court, therefore, is of the view that when in the matter of compensation delay of 21 years has not been condoned by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the question of providing appointment on the ground of acquisition of land to the dependents of the displaced raiyat will have to be considered in high pedestal in comparison to that of the compensation as because the appointment, if provided, to the dependents of the displaced raiyat, the same will be by virtue of compassion and it has been settled that the appointment either by virtue of compensation in lieu of acquisition of land or the appointment on compassionate ground due to death of the bread earner, thus the same are contrary to the principle laid down under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the same is to be treated as an exception. Here, in the present case also, the claim is being made after 27 years from the date of acquisition. At the time of acquisition of initiation of proceeding for acquisition, the petitioners were minor as has been discussed at paragraph 10 and 11 hereinabove. Here, in the present case also, the claim is being made after 27 years from the date of acquisition. At the time of acquisition of initiation of proceeding for acquisition, the petitioners were minor as has been discussed at paragraph 10 and 11 hereinabove. However, at the risk of repetition the same is reiterated herein that when the land was acquired and a proceeding was initiated in the year 1990, the age of the appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3 was 05 years, 13 years and 08 years respectively and so far as the appellant No. 4 is concerned, he was not even born at that time (ii) The case of the appellants is also not fit to be considered as because the whole case of the appellants/writ petitioners is that their cases are required to be considered on the basis of Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy of Coal India Limited, 2012 but the question here would be about its applicability in the present factual scenario since admittedly herein the land was acquired and acquisition proceeding was initiated much much before the policy of the year 2012 and, therefore, said policy would not be applicable by giving its retrospective application. There is no dispute in the position of law that appointment in a case of acquisition of land is to be considered and made only on the basis of the scheme applicable on the date of acquisition. Admittedly, no policy decision was there either at the time of acquisition of the land i.e. in the year 1962 or 1978 or in the year when the acquisition proceeding was initiated i.e. in the year 1990 and as such, the policy of the year 2012 cannot be made applicable in a case of acquisition which has been made prior to the floating of the said scheme in the year 2012. (iii) The learned Single Judge, basing upon the factual aspect as also delay of 27 years, has dismissed the writ petition extending no interference to the relief sought for by the writ petitioner, which according to us, is not faulted with coupled with the legal position about the applicability of the policy of the year 2012 which cannot be made applicable with retrospective effect which is the sole ground for consideration for appointment on compassionate ground agitated by the appellants. On this account also the case of the appellants is not fit to be considered on the basis of the subsequent policy decision. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered view that learned Single Judge has committed no error in passing the impugned order. 14. In the result, the instant appeal being devoid of merit, is dismissed.