JUDGMENT : N.S. SANJAY GOWDA, J. 1. The plaintiffs in O.S. Nos. 165 and 166 of 2009 are in second appeals. 2. The facts leading given rise to the second appeals are as follows: Andanagouda, the father of Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda (the plaintiffs) was married to one Gulavva (defendant No. 1). According to Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda, their father Andanagouda had divorced Gulavva in the year 1958 and at the time of divorce, he had executed a registered maintenance deed dated 16.03.1958 (Ex.P4), by which Gulavva was given a life interest in respect of suit properties in lieu of maintenance. 3. Gulavva, however, under two sale-deeds dated 14.07.2008, sold the suit properties to Umesh and Shekharappa (plaintiffs in O.S. Nos. 165 and 166 of 2009 respectively). Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda, thus, filed a suit for declaration that the sale-deeds executed by Gulavva in favour of Umesh and Shekharappa were null and void. They also sought for a consequential decree of injunction. 4. It may be pertinent to state here that the purchasers i.e. Umesh and Shekharappa, prior to the filing of the suit by Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda had filed two suits for injunction against Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda in O.S. Nos. 114/2009 and 115/2009. All the four suits were clubbed and heard together. 5. The Trial Court, on consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced before it, came to the conclusion that admittedly the suit properties had been given to Gulavva under Ex.P4 a registered maintenance deed in lieu of her pre-existing right to maintain herself and by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, this limited right of hers stood enlarged to an absolute right and consequently the sale-deed executed by Gulavva in favour of Umesh and Shekharappa were valid. 6. The Trial Court also found that Umesh and Shekharappa were in possession of the suit property pursuant to the sale-deed and it therefore proceeded to decree the suits filed by Umesh and Shekharappa and granted them an injunction. 7. Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda, being aggrieved, preferred appeals. 8. The Appellate, Court on re-appreciation of the evidence, concurred with the finding of the Trial Court that the suit properties had been given to Gulavva under a registered deed to maintain herself and by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, this limited right stood enlarged and the suit properties became her absolute properties. 8. The Appellate, Court on re-appreciation of the evidence, concurred with the finding of the Trial Court that the suit properties had been given to Gulavva under a registered deed to maintain herself and by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, this limited right stood enlarged and the suit properties became her absolute properties. The Appellate Court held that the alienation made by her was therefore valid and could not be challenged by the sons of Andanagouda i.e. Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda. The Appellate Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeals filed by them. 9. It is against this concurrent finding that Sakkaragouda and Rajendragouda are in second appeals. 10. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment of the supreme court in the case of Shivdev Kaur (D) by LRs. and Others vs. R.S. Grewal, 2013 SAR (Civil) 698. The reliance placed upon the said decision would have no application, since in that case, the Apex Court was considering the life interest created through a Will, whereas in the instant case, the life interest was created in lieu of the preexisting right of Gulavva for maintenance. In this set of facts, the decision rendered in Vaddeboyina Tulasamma and Others vs. Vaddeboyina Sesha Reddi (dead) by LRs. AIR 1977 SC 1944 by the Apex Court, which would squarely apply. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that the limited interest created in Gulavva would not be enlarged by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. This argument of the learned counsel is directly opposed to the ruling of the Apex Court in Tulasamma’s case and cannot be therefore accepted. 12. Learned counsel, however, submitted that the defendants had not proved the execution of the sale-deed and it would be essentially for them to prove this fact when the plaintiffs had categorically stated that Gulavva has not executed any sale-deed. 13. It is not in dispute that Andanagouda executed a registered maintenance deed in favour of his wife Gulavva at the time of divorce. It is also not in dispute that as per maintenance deed, Ex.P4, life interest had been given in the suit properties to Gulavva in lieu of her preexisting right of maintenance. 13. It is not in dispute that Andanagouda executed a registered maintenance deed in favour of his wife Gulavva at the time of divorce. It is also not in dispute that as per maintenance deed, Ex.P4, life interest had been given in the suit properties to Gulavva in lieu of her preexisting right of maintenance. In the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Tulsamma’s case, it will have to be held that limited interest created in favour of Gulavva stood enlarged and she became the absolute owner of the suit properties. 14. Both the Courts were therefore justified in holding that the sale made by Gulavva was valid and the claim made by the sons of Andanagouda for reversion is untenable. 15. It is to be stated here that in the present case, Gulavva, who was a party, did not dispute the execution of the sale-deed. Thus, the validity of the sale-deed could not be questioned by the plaintiffs, who were admittedly not parties to the sale-deed. 16. It is to be mentioned here that only if the properties stood reverted to the plaintiffs on the death of Gulavva, they would have a right to claim the suit property. If, in law, the life interest created in favour of Gulavva stood enlarged into an absolute right, the right of the plaintiffs would stand extinguished and they would have no right to challenge the sale made by Gulavva. 17. Learned counsel sought to place reliance on the deposition given by Gulavva in another suit in O.S. No. 28/2010, which she had filed for partition against the other members of the family, in which, she had stated that she had not executed any sale-deed. 18. In my view, the deposition rendered by Gulavva, in some other suit, in which, the defendants herein were not parties, will have no bearing to the present suit, more so, when in the present case, Gulavva herself admitted the execution of the sale-deed. 19. I find no question of law, much less, a substantial question of law arising for consideration in these second appeals and they are accordingly dismissed. 20. In view of the dismissal of the appeals, the pending applications, if any, do not survive for consideration.