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2020 DIGILAW 1331 (ALL)

Om Prakash v. State Of U. P.

2020-11-17

MUNISHWAR NATH BHANDARI, PIYUSH AGRAWAL

body2020
JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition has been filed with the following reliefs which are quoted herein for ready reference-: “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing to the respondent no.2 to decide the application of the petitioner under Section 28A Land Acquisition Act dated 20.02.2020 very expeditiously by the reasoned and speaking order and communicate to the petitioners. (ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing to the respondents to provide the compensation of the petitioners of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 65/-per sq. yard along with other benefit and interest of the solatium according to law. (iii) Issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. (iv) Award to cost of the petition in favour of the petitioners.” 2. It is a case where a land belonging to the petitioners in village Gujarpur was acquired. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (In short “Act of 1894”) was published on 01.03.1989. An award was thereupon made after completion of the process. The petitioners accepted the compensation. It is alleged that the compensation of other land was determined on higher side subsequently on a reference under Section 18 followed by the judgment of the Civil Court and finally by the Apex Court on 05.12.2016. The petitioners made an application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 on 20.02.2020 for enhancement of compensation. A perusal of the application shows that land of the petitioners was in village Gujarpur while the land of others was in village Haldona Ecchar Kaasna Tugalpur. In any case, the question for our consideration would be as to whether a direction for enhancement of compensation can be given in the light of Section 28A of the Act of 1894 and for that consideration of the application having not preferred within three months to the award of the Court.. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the issue raised in this petition is pending consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Muni Ram and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 42598/2019. The prayer was to defer the matter awaiting judgment of the Apex Court. 4. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the issue raised in this petition is pending consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Muni Ram and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 42598/2019. The prayer was to defer the matter awaiting judgment of the Apex Court. 4. For our perusal, judgment of this Court in the case of Patram and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ C No. 15726 of 2019 decided on 16.09.2019 has been referred wherein Muni Ram was alleged to be a party. The judgment in the case of Patram (supra) has been perused by us to find out as to whether it was in reference to the same facts, as are available on record. In the instant case, application is under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 and was not submitted within three months, rather it was after more than three years from order of the Court. We find that in the case of Patram (supra), the issue aforesaid has not been discussed and decided. 5. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners made a reference of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sukhdeo and others Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1992 Allahabad 142. A reference of paragraph 7 and 8 of the said judgment has been given to indicate that the period of limitation cannot be counted in rigid manner but has to be from the date of knowledge of the award of the Court and accordingly delay in maintaining the application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 should not be determined rigidly. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further made a reference of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. Subbarayudu and others Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), 2017 (8) SCALE Page 61 wherein the amount was enhanced after condoning the delay, as the Special Appeal was dismissed by the High Court having being filed with the delay of 3671 days. 7. A further reference of the judgment of this Court in the case of Karan Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ C No. 329 of 2020 decided on 07.01.2020 has been given. Therein direction was given for consideration of pending application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894. 7. A further reference of the judgment of this Court in the case of Karan Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ C No. 329 of 2020 decided on 07.01.2020 has been given. Therein direction was given for consideration of pending application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894. Similar order was passed in the case of Ramesh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ C No. 603 of 2020 decided on 28.01.2020. The prayer of learned counsel for the petitioners is accordingly to pass a similar order. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further made a reference of Section 28A (3) of the Act of 1894 to press upon the Court to direct the respondents to refer the matter for enhancement of compensation. It is submitted that irrespective of sub-section 1 and 2 of Section 28A, the matter needs to be referred to the Court under sub-Section 3 of Section 28A and accordingly prayer is to direct the authorities to refer the matter to the Court under sub-Section 3 of Section 28A of the Act of 1894. 9. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record carefully. The fact available on record shows that a notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was published in the Gazette on 01.03.1989. The land belonging to the petitioners was acquired though copy of the award has not been enclosed along with the writ petition and even the petitioners have not given detail for it other than the date of award, which is 30.06.1990. The contents of the writ petition do not show refusal or protest to accept the amount of compensation and in the absence of any pleading, it goes without saying that the petitioners accepted the compensation without protest. The application under Section 28-A of the Act of 1894 was preferred on 20.02.2020 in reference to the judgment of the Apex Court dated 05.12.2016 after more than three years. 10. The question for our consideration is as to whether application under Section 28-A is maintainable in the instant case so as to direct for its consideration. The application under Section 28-A of the Act of 1894 was preferred on 20.02.2020 in reference to the judgment of the Apex Court dated 05.12.2016 after more than three years. 10. The question for our consideration is as to whether application under Section 28-A is maintainable in the instant case so as to direct for its consideration. For ready reference, Section 28A is quoted herein : - 28A Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court-: (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under subsection (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18. 11. An application under Section 28A is maintainable within three months from the date of the award of the Court enhancing the compensation. 11. An application under Section 28A is maintainable within three months from the date of the award of the Court enhancing the compensation. In the instant case, the petitioners have relied on the judgment of Apex Court dated 05.12.2016 and if at all it is taken to be in reference to the acquisition of land under the same notification, the application under Section 28A is much beyond the period of three months. In fact after more than three years and thereby is not maintainable. The exclusion is only the period requisite for obtaining a copy of the award of the Court. The “Court” otherwise means the “Principal Civil Court” as defined under the Act of 1894. 12. This Court is not having authority rather for that any other Court to make interpretation of the provisions different than what has been legislated by the Parliament. A direction for consideration of the application under Section 28A can be given if it is submitted as per the statutory provision and not otherwise. A perusal of the application filed by the petitioners reveals it to be in reference to Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Article 141 provides for precedence to be followed but in the instant case we do not find a judgment of the Apex Court in favour of the petitioners on the issues involved in the present case rather it is against them. The issue is as to whether application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 would be maintainable beyond the period given therein. 13.The issue in reference to limitation for maintaining an application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894, has been decided by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Mangatu Ram and others, 1997 (6) SCC 59 . It has been held that an application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 would be maintainable when it is submitted within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court. If an application is submitted beyond the period given therein, would be barred by limitation. Paragraph 17 of the said judgment is quoted herein for ready reference-: “17. In respect of the notification published on 18.06.1984, the Collector made his award on 31.01.1986 under Section 11. If an application is submitted beyond the period given therein, would be barred by limitation. Paragraph 17 of the said judgment is quoted herein for ready reference-: “17. In respect of the notification published on 18.06.1984, the Collector made his award on 31.01.1986 under Section 11. On reference under Section 18 at the instance of some claimants, the reference Court, by its award and decree dated 21.11.1988, enhanced the compensation. The application under Section 28A was filed on 01.10.1991. The written application can be filed by some who had not sought the reference under Section 18. Though they are entitled to make the application, the application should be filed within three months from the date of the award of the reference Court excluding the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the award as provided under proviso to Section 28A. Since the application under Section 28A was filed beyond three months, on the above facts, the same is barred by limitation. The award of the enhanced compensation to the respondents in this appeal is clearly illegal and without jurisdiction.” 14. The same issue was decided by the Apex Court in its earlier judgment in the case of Babua Ram and Others Vs. State of U.P. and another, 1995 (2) SCC 689 . The issue was decided not only in reference to the limitation for an application but even as to which award of the Court should be taken note for the purpose of reckoning maintainability of the application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 and limitation. It was held that the subsequent award of the Court would not give successive cause of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. Paragraph 20 of the said judgment is quoted herein for ready reference-: “20. It was held that the subsequent award of the Court would not give successive cause of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. Paragraph 20 of the said judgment is quoted herein for ready reference-: “20. The question then is when exactly the period of limitation starts running for making an application in writing under Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A. A bare reading of Sub-section (1) along with its proviso would indicate that the making of the award by the civil court or judicial officer which becomes the judgment and decree under Section 26, is the starting point from which the period of limitation is allowed for making an application under Section 28-A. However, the person aggrieved in computing the period of three months allowed for making an application under Section 28-A would be entitled to exclude the day on which the award was pronounced by the court or the judicial officer and the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the award which is a judgment and decree under Section 26. In other words, the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A excludes the requisite time taken for obtaining the copy of the award and in computation of the period of three months from the date of the award, the time required to obtain a certified copy of the award should be excluded. Limitation begins to run from the date the award was pronounced by the court under Section 26. It is well-settled that the law of limitation limits the time after which a suit or other proceeding cannot be entertained in a court of justice or before appropriate authority, though it does not affect the substantive rights of the parties. Once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court. Explanation to Section 11 provides internal evidence in this behalf to make the point poignantly clear which states that in computing two years period to make award under Section 11, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 is stayed by an order of a court, should be excluded. Explanation to Section 11 provides internal evidence in this behalf to make the point poignantly clear which states that in computing two years period to make award under Section 11, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 is stayed by an order of a court, should be excluded. The legislature prescribed three months' limitation to quicken diligence like caveat emptor and provided to a non-protester right to redetermination provided the application in writing is made to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the civil court of original jurisdiction, excluding the requisite time taken to obtain a copy of the award. In other words, the right and remedy provided by Section 28-A(1) stands extinguished with the expiry of three months from the date of the award under Section 26. It is true that in a given set of facts, there could be more than one reference under Section 18 at the behest of different claimants of the lands covered by Section 4(1) Notification and the court may make successive awards at various times. Compensation given in the respective awards may vary and may be higher than the one given in an earliest award. In the teeth of the express language in Sub-section (1) of Section 28-A, limitation of three months once expires in respect of earliest award by efflux of time, none of the later awards could provide any assistance to revive the lapsed time under Section 28-A(1) nor provide fresh cause of action or successive causes of action when multiple awards are made at different times or dates. Application under Section 28-A(1) may be made at the instance of the self-same person or different persons. Any other interpretation would amount to re-writing the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 28A. The judgment and decree of the Court of appeal either under Section 54 or under Section 96 of C.P.C. or under Articles 132, 133 or 136 of the Constitution does not furnish fresh cause of action nor provide fresh limitation to make application under Section 28-A(1) of the Act as has already been held in that they are not covered under Part III of the Act. May be that they are continuation of original decree made in Section 26(2) and in law the executable decree is that of the Supreme Court of the High Courts. But the legislature has conferred right of reopening the award under Section 11 only when the civil court under Section 26 awarded higher compensation in Part III to a person having an interest in the land covered by the same Notification under Section 4(1) and an application in writing if made within limitation.” 15. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and another Vs. Marri Venkaiah and Others, 2003 (7) SCC 280 , the issue determined by the Apex Court is even in reference to the knowledge of the award of the Court, while considering the provision of Section 28A. It was held that only period requisite for obtaining copy can be excluded and not in reference to the knowledge of the order. Paragraph 7 of the said judgment is quoted herein for ready reference-: “7. Plain language of the aforesaid Section would only mean that the period of limitation is three months from the date of the Award of the Court. It is also provided that in computing the period of three months, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award is to be excluded. Therefore, the aforesaid provision crystallizes that application under Section 28-A is to be filed within three month from the date of the award by the Court by only excluding the time requisite for obtaining the copy. Hence, it is difficult to infer further exclusion of time on the ground of acquisition of knowledge by the applicant.” 16. A perusal of the para quoted above shows that in a given case, the acquisition of knowledge of the award of the Court by the applicant has not been accepted for exclusion of the period of limitation. 17. In the subsequent judgment, it was further held that the application under Section 28A of the Act should be in reference to the award passed by the Principal Civil Court. In any case, even if, in the instant case, subsequent order is also taken note of i.e. of the Apex Court, the application was moved much beyond the period of limitation. The issue aforesaid was decided by the Apex Court even in the case of Tota Ram Vs. In any case, even if, in the instant case, subsequent order is also taken note of i.e. of the Apex Court, the application was moved much beyond the period of limitation. The issue aforesaid was decided by the Apex Court even in the case of Tota Ram Vs. State of U.P. and others, 1997 (6) SCC 280 . Paragraph 3 of the said judgment is relevant and is quoted herein for ready reference-: “3. A reading thereof clearly that a person whose land is acquired under a common notification issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act but who failed to avail of the remedy of reference under Section 18, is eligible to make a written application within three months from the date of the award of the court enhancing the compensation. It has been interpreted by this court that the "court " means court of original civil jurisdiction to whom reference under Section 18 would lie. Admittedly, the award of the reference court having been made on 18.05.1990, the limitation began to run from that date. The proviso to Section 28-A gives a right to the persons to obtain the certified copy of the award and decree and the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the award and the decree shall be excluded in computing the period of three months. In view of the express language, the question of knowledge does not arise and, therefore, the plea of the petitioner that the limitation of three months begins to start from the date of the knowledge is clearly unsustainable and cannot be accepted. The High Court, therefore, is rightly in its decision in that behalf.” 18. The para quoted above not only makes it clear that knowledge of the order would not be relevant rather exclusion is of the period requisite for obtaining certified copy and in the judgment (supra) it has further been held that the Court means “the Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction” to whom reference under Section 18 was made. In the instant case, the date of award by Principal Civil Court has not been given otherwise limitation has to be determined from the date of the award of the Principal Civil Court. In the instant case, the date of award by Principal Civil Court has not been given otherwise limitation has to be determined from the date of the award of the Principal Civil Court. However, as clarified earlier, even if it is taken from the date of the judgment of the Apex Court, the application was moved after more than three years i.e. period much beyond the limitation given under Section 28A of the Act of 1894. 19. In that regard, another judgment of the Apex Court relevant to the present matter is in the case of Sakuru Vs. Tanaji, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 1279. In the said case, it was made clear that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to an application before the authority. It applies only to the proceeding before the Court. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment is quoted herein for ready reference-: “3. After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah's case is perfectly correct and sound. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli & Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51, Nityananda M. Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors. [1970] 1. S.C.R. 396 and Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad and Ors. [1976] 2. S.C.R. 845 that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to proceedings in "Courts" and not to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. The Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant herein under Section 90 of the Act not being a Court, the Limitation Act, as such, had no applicability to the proceedings before him. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. But even in such a situation the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such as the Collector, the power to extend the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to such proceedings. Hence it becomes necessary to examine whether the Act contains any such provision entitling the Collector to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in the filing of the appeal. The only provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is Section 93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms:- "93. Limitation -Every appeal and every application for revision under this Act shall be filed within sixty days from the date of the order against which the appeal or application is filed and the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply for the purpose of the computation of the said period." On a plain reading of the section it is absolutely clear that its effect is only to render applicable to the proceedings before the Collector, the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to 'computation of the period of limitation. The provisions relating to computation of the period of limitation are contained in Sections 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of the period of limitation. It is only after the process of computation is completed and it is found that an appeal or application has been filed after the expiry of the prescribed period that the question of extension of the period under Section 5 can arise. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah's case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector.” 20. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Venkaiah's case that Section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to the proceedings before the Collector.” 20. The judgment aforesaid has been quoted because learned counsel for the petitioners has made a reference of the judgment of the Apex Court where condonation of delay in filing of the special appeal before the Division Bench was allowed without realizing that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies therein being in the Court proceeding whereas it does not apply to an application before the authority. 21. Thus, for all the reasons and in reference to the judgments quoted above, we do not find that any of the judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioners provides assistance. Yet, we are dealing with those judgments/orders, as cited before us. 22. In this regard, we are first considering the order of the Apex Court in the case of Muni Ram and others (supra) wherein after condoning the delay, notice on the S.L.P. has been issued. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to a copy of the judgment of this Court in the case of Patram and others (supra) to indicate that the S.L.P. in the case of Muni Ram and others was against the said judgment, though we do not find name of Muni Ram in the case of Patram and others (supra) but taking it as per the statement of the counsel, we have gone through the judgment in the case of Patram and others. We find no discussion in reference to the issue involved in regards to the period to make an application. The direction in the case of Patram and others (supra) is for consideration of the application and if the facts narrated in the said judgment are taken note of, the application for it was submitted on 04.03.2017 i.e. within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Apex Court dated 05.12.2016 and in the instant case, it is after the period of more than three years. Thus, judgment in the case of Patram and others (supra) will have no bearing on the issue involved in this case. Thus, judgment in the case of Patram and others (supra) will have no bearing on the issue involved in this case. The pendency of the S.L.P. is not in reference to the issue of delay in maintaining application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 so as to defer the hearing of this case. 23. So far as the judgment of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Sukhdeo and others (supra) is concerned, while considering the facts of that case, the Court noted about the knowledge of the award because application to seek reference under Section 18 was filed beyond the period given under the said provision. The Court noted the date of the award and the date of knowledge. In the said judgment, it has not been held that an application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 can be preferred beyond the period given therein and for that even an application under Section 18 rather had rigidly applied but was from the date of the knowledge of the award though the award is published in the Gazette but ignoring the aforesaid, the judgment in the case of Sukhdeo and Others (supra) was given but without ignoring the period of limitation. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of A.P. Vs. Marri Venkaiah (supra) however deals with the issue otherwise and is binding on this Court. The date of knowledge is not relevant for Section 28A of the Act of 1894. The issue of knowledge was decided by the Apex Court even in the case of Tota Ram (supra). 24. The case of the petitioners is not otherwise in reference to the knowledge of judgment of the Apex Court rather it has not been even mentioned either in the writ petition or in the application. Accordingly, the judgment in the case of Sukhdeo and others (supra) provides no assistance to the petitioners. 25. The next judgment cited by the counsel for the petitioners is in the case of K. Subbarayudu and others (supra) wherein the issue was different then what is involved in the present matter. In that case, an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court was preferred with the delay of 3671 days, thus, was dismissed. 25. The next judgment cited by the counsel for the petitioners is in the case of K. Subbarayudu and others (supra) wherein the issue was different then what is involved in the present matter. In that case, an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court was preferred with the delay of 3671 days, thus, was dismissed. The Apex Court interfered therein but not in reference to the delay in filing of the application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 so as to apply the said judgment in the present case. An appeal before the High Court can be supported by an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay but such a provision does not apply for an application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894. There is no provision for condoning the delay in maintaining the application under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 and there is no prayer for it in the application at Annexure-2. Thus, the judgment in the case of K. Subbarayudu and others (supra) does not provide any assistance rather the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sakuru (supra) would apply. It is held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply for an application before the authority. It has been discussed in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner then cited other judgments of this Court where directions were given for consideration of the application. We find no discussion in reference to provisions of Section 28A (1) indicating the period for maintaining application whereas in the present matter, we have discussed the issue aforesaid. An application filed beyond the period given under Section 28A of the Act of 1894 would not be maintainable. A direction for its consideration can be given only when it is maintainable and not otherwise. Thus, any of the judgments by this Court where the issue in reference to Section 28A (1) has not been determined, cannot have bearing in the present matter. 27. An argument has been raised in reference to Section 28A (3) of the Act of 1894 without realizing that it is not independent but is in reference of sub-Section 2 of Section 28A. 27. An argument has been raised in reference to Section 28A (3) of the Act of 1894 without realizing that it is not independent but is in reference of sub-Section 2 of Section 28A. Sub-Section 2 directs the Collector to hold enquiry into the matter on the receipt of an application under sub-Section 1 and according to give notice to all concerned for opportunity of hearing. Sub-Section 3 to Section 28A provides that if an award passed under sub-Section 2 is not acceptable to any person then he may, by written application, seek reference of the matter for determination of the compensation by the Court. For application of sub-Section 3, the necessity is of an award under sub-Section 2 of Section 28A which does not exist. 28. In the light of the aforesaid, we are unable to pursue ourselves to accept any of the prayers made in the writ petition. A direction to the authority to consider the application cannot be given without considering relevant provisions of the law. We have recorded our finding that the application under Section 28A is not maintainable in this case having been filed after lapse of three years of the judgment. Accordingly, the directions sought by the petitioners cannot be given. 29. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.