JUDGMENT : 1. Initially, the instant writ petition was filed by the petitioner challenging Clause 4 of the impugned order dated 31.08.2020 to the extent of posting and taking over charge on the post of Director/Principal Medical Superintendent, Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow by Dr. Rajeev Lochan (opposite party no.3). The petitioner, inter alia, had further prayed for a direction to the opposite party no.3 not to function and work on the said post and also direct the opposite parties no.1 and 2 to appoint/post a regular promoted Director, Medical and Health Services on the abovesaid post. 2. The instant writ petition was entertained by this Court on 02.11.2020 and during the course of argument, on the objection raised by learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State, the petitioner had sought for some time to file an affidavit stating therein that as to how, the petitioner is affected by the impugned order. 3. In pursuance to the order dated 02.11.2020, the petitioner filed an application bearing No.66564 of 2020 supported by an affidavit, whereby, the petitioner had sought for certain amendments in the pleadings of the writ petition and also the prayer clause. 4. Considering the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and also the no objection of the State, the application is allowed. 5. With the consent of the parties, this Court proceeds to hear the matter finally at the admission stage. 6. By means of amendment application, the petitioner has sought for quo-warranto restraining the opposite party no.3 to continue on the post of Director/Principal Medical Superintendent of Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow and remove him forthwith from the said post while declaring his appointment as illegal and void. He also prayed for a direction to the opposite parties no.1 and 2 to hold regular selection on the said post in accordance with Rules. 7. Submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that initially the petitioner was appointed on the post of Medical Officer vide order dated 18.05.1990 in the Provincial Medical and Health Service Cadre, Uttar Pradesh. Later on, the petitioner was promoted on the post of Senior Consultant (Neuro Physician) (Level-IV). At present, the petitioner is posted as Senior Neuro Physician at Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow [(Senior Consultant) (Level-IV)]. 8. Later on, the petitioner was promoted on the post of Senior Consultant (Neuro Physician) (Level-IV). At present, the petitioner is posted as Senior Neuro Physician at Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow [(Senior Consultant) (Level-IV)]. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the opposite party no.3 was initially appointed on the post of Medical Officer in Provincial Medical and Health Services Cadre, Uttar Pradesh. Subsequently, he was promoted on the next promotional post in the cadre and lastly, he was promoted to the post of Additional Director, Medical Health. 9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has again submitted that the opposite party no.3 was never promoted to the post of Director, Medical and Health Services rather he was retired on 31.08.2019 from the post of Additional Director Medical Health after attaining the age of superannuation. The State Government while creating an Ex-cadre post of Additional Director in the department of Medical and Health Services, Uttar Pradesh had re-appointed/re-employed the opposite party no.3 on the said Ex-cadre post for one year vide order dated 31.08.2019 and directed him to hold the post of Officiating/In-charge, Director/Principal Medical Superintendent, Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow during re-appointment/re-employment. Vide order dated 31.08.2020, the re-appointment/re-employment of the opposite party no.3 was extended for a period of three years. 10. It has also been submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that considering the increase of outdoor and indoor patient of specialist doctors and in order to provide medical facilities to poor people, the State Government vide Government Order dated 13.01.2014 had decide to re-appoint/re-employed the retired specialist doctor of Provincial Medical and Health Cadre upto the age of 65 years. Thereafter, vide Government Order dated 19.07.2017, the State Government after considering the abovesaid increase of outdoor and indoor patient had decided to give re-appointment/re-employment to the retired MBBS Medical Officers upto the age of 65 years or regularly selected candidate from Commission whichever is earlier on the post of “Consultant”. While issuing the Government Orders dated 13.01.2014 and 19.07.2017, it was clarified that the abovesaid reappointment/re-employment shall be given only to Specialist Doctors/Consultants but they have not discharged any administrative post and during the said period they will not be given any cadre post. While issuing the Government Orders dated 13.01.2014 and 19.07.2017, it was clarified that the abovesaid reappointment/re-employment shall be given only to Specialist Doctors/Consultants but they have not discharged any administrative post and during the said period they will not be given any cadre post. From the abovesaid Government Orders, it is clear that firstly the opposite party no.3 is not doing any work of Specialist Doctor and secondly, in view of the provisions of said Government Orders, posting of opposite party no.3 on the administrative post of In-charge Director/Principal Medical Superintendent, Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow is totally illegal and arbitrary and without any authority. 11. It has been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that instead of giving posting to any regular selected and promoted Director, Medical and Health Services like the petitioner on the post of Director/Principal Medical Superintendent, Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow, the opposite party no.1 is continuously give posting to opposite party no.3 on the said post, which is against the provisions of Government Orders dated 13.01.2014 and 19.07.2017 and the Fundamental Rules. As per the provisions of Service Rules, 2004 and amendment Rules, 2011, the post of Director/Principal Medical Superintendent, Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow is a promotional post and because of illegal appointment of opposite party no.3, who has no requisite qualification for the said post, the petitioner as well as other doctors could not be considered for promotion, which is totally illegal, arbitrary and not only in violation of statutory provisions of Service Rules but also in violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. From the perusal of the Service Rules, 2004, amended Rules 2011 as well as in view of the provisions of Rule 56 (a-1)(a-2) of Financial Hand Book Vol-II Part 2 to 4, the opposite party no.3 cannot be appointed on the post in question. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has again contended that on similar facts, a Writ Petition No.190 (SB) of 2014 [Provincial Medical Services Welfare Association through General Secretary Vs. State of U.P. and others] was filed before this Court and the Division Bench vide order dated 30.05.2014 had held that the extension in service given to Dr. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has again contended that on similar facts, a Writ Petition No.190 (SB) of 2014 [Provincial Medical Services Welfare Association through General Secretary Vs. State of U.P. and others] was filed before this Court and the Division Bench vide order dated 30.05.2014 had held that the extension in service given to Dr. Baljit Singh Arora on the post of Director General, Medical and Health Services was not in accordance with law rather the same was not only in violation of provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India but also in violation of the Service Rules because of under favour given by the Minister concerned out of way and forfeiting the valuable legal rights of other eligible officers those who are waiting in queue for promotion and posting on the said post in question. 13. So far as the locus standi to challenge the appointment of opposite party no.3 is concerned, it has been submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that admittedly the office of Director/Principal Medical Superintendent, Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow is a public office and the abovesaid question has already been decided by this Court vide judgment and order dated 10.01.2012 passed in Writ Petition No.1428 (MB) of 2011 (Nand Lal Jaiswal Vs. The Secretary, Government of U.P. and others). Vide judgment and order dated 10.01.2012, the Division Bench while relying upon the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh; AIR 1966 SCC 828 has held that the petitioner being General Secretary of the Employees’ Union seems to possess locus standi to prefer the writ petition. It has also been held that a writ in the nature of quo warranto, as held by the Supreme Court, may be filed by any person challenging the right of authority to hold public office. 14. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has vehemently opposed the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and submitted that the instant writ petition is nothing but only an arm-twisting and misconceived. The petitioner is habitual to file such frivolous petitions against the department before this Court. There is no illegality in the impugned order. The State Government has rightly extended the service of opposite party no.3. 15. The petitioner is habitual to file such frivolous petitions against the department before this Court. There is no illegality in the impugned order. The State Government has rightly extended the service of opposite party no.3. 15. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has further submitted that the extension has been given to the opposite party no.3 in public interest. The State Government has power to grant extension under Clause 56(a-2) of U.P. Fundamental (Second Amendment) Rules, 2010. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has again submitted that the petitioner has no locus standi to prefer such writ petition and, therefore, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 17. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has again submitted that the petitioner has no locus standi to prefer such writ petition and, therefore, the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 17. Before entering into the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to reproduce the impugned order dated 31.08.2020 for ready reference: ^^izknsf'kd fpfdRlk ,oa LokLF; lsok laoxZ ds vij funs'kd xzsM ds fpfdRlkf/kdkjh Mk0 jktho ykspu izHkkjh funs'kd@izeq[k fpfdRlk v/kh{kd] cyjkeiqj] fpfdRlky; y[kuÅ tks viuh vf/ko"kZrk vk;q iw.kZ dj fnuk¡d 31-08-2019 dks lsok fuo`fŸk gq, dks 'kklu ds dk;kZy; Kki la[;k&2976@jksd&2&ik¡p&2019 fnuk¡d 31-08-2019 ds }kjk dk;ZHkkj xzg.k djus dh frfFk ls 01 o"kZ rd ds fy, vij funs'kd ds ,d fuloxhZ; in l`ftr djrs gq, mDr fuloxhZ; in ij fuEufyf[kr 'krksZ ds v/khu iqufuZ;kstu fd;s tkus ds vkns'k fuxZr fd;s x;s gSa%& ¼1½& iquZ;kstu dh vof/k eas Mk0 jktho ykspu dks for ¼lkekU; vuqHkkx&3 ds 'kklukns'k fnuk¡d 15-12-1983 ds vuqlkj ;g fu;r osru vuqeU; gksxk tks iquZ;ksftr dkfeZd }kjk lsokfuo`fRr ds le; izkIr vfare osru esa ls 'kq) isa'ku ¼jkf'kdj.k ds iwoZ½ dks ?kVk dj izkIr gks vFkok iquZ;kstu in ij osrueku dk vf/kdre , nksuksa esa ls tks de gksA ¼2½& iqu;kZstu dh vof/k esa Mk0 jktho ykspu vius fpfdRldh; dk;kZsa dk fuoZgu iwoZor djrs jgsaxsA ¼3½& iqu;ksZtu dh vof/k esa Mk0 jktho ykspu dks vLFkk;h ljdkjh lsod ekurs gq, foRrh; fu;e laxzg ds [k.M&2 Hkkx&2 ls 4 ds lgk;d fu;e&157, rFkk jkT; ljdkj }kjk le;≤ ij ikfjr vkns'kksa ds vuqlkj vLFkk;h deZpkjh dh Hkk¡fr vkdfLed vodk'k vuqeU; gksxk] fdUrq vftZr vodk'k dks uxnhdj.k vuqeU; ugha gksxkA ¼4½& iqu;ksZtu vof/k dh x.kuk isa'ku gsrq ugha dh tk;sxhA ¼5½& iqu;ksZtu dh vof/k esa Mk0 jktho ykspu dks ;k=k HkRrk rFkk nSfud HkRrs muds osru ,oa isa'ku ds ;ksx ds vuqlkj vuqeU; njksa ij] ;k=k HkRrk fu;e&16&,& ds vuqlkj ns; gksaxsA 6& Mk0 jktho ykspu dk iquZ;ksZtu fdlh Hkh le; lekIr djus dk vf/kdkj 'kklu esa fufgr gksxkA 2& pw¡fd mDr in ds Hkfo"; esa pyrs jgus ds laHkkouk gS vkSj ftu mn~ns';ksa dh iwfrZ ds fy, mDr in lqftr fd;k x;k Fkk] mldh vko';drk vHkh Hkh fo|eku gksus ds n`f"Vxr Jh jkT;iky vij funs'kd ds mDr fu%laoxhZ; in dh fujUrjrk fnuk¡d 28-02-2021 rd c<+k;s tkus rFkk mDr in ij Mk0 jktho ykspu dh] dh x;h iqu;ksZtu dh vof/k dks ,d o"kZ ds fy, foLrkj fn;s tkus dh lg"kZ Lohd`fr iznku djrs gSaA 3& mi;qZDr ds lEca/k esa gksus okyk O;; pkyw foRRkh; O;; ds vk;&O;d ds vuqnku la[;k&32 ds vUrxZr ys[kk'kh"kZd&2210&fpfdRlk rFkk yksd LokLF; ¼,yksiSFkh foHkkx½ ¼v;kstusRrj i{k½ &01 'kgjh LokLF; lsok,a&110& vLirky rFkk vkS"k/kky;&04 ,yksiSFkh ,dhd`r fpfdRlky; vkSj vkS"k/kky; ds uke Mkyk tk;sxkA 4& Mk0 jktho ykspu fu;fer O;oLFkk gksus@vxszrj vkns'kksa rd izHkkjh funs'kd@izeq[k fpfdRlk v/kh{kd] cyjkeiqj fpfdRlky;] y[kuÅ ds in dk dk;Z ns[krs jgsaxsA 5& mDr vkns'k for foHkkx ds v'kkldh; i= la[;k&bZ&3&805@nl&2020 fnuk¡d 31-08-2020 esa izkIRk mudh lgerh ls tkjh fd;s tk jgs gSaA^^ 18. Vide order dated 31.08.2020, the services of the opposite party no.3 have been extended for three years on the post of Director/Principal Medical Superintendent, Balrampur Hospital, Lucknow. As per Rule 56 (a-1) read with Rule 56(a-2) of the U.P. Fundamental Second Amendment Rules, 2010, the State Government may extend the services of a Government Servant after the age of superannuation. The services of the Government Servant may be extended in public interest with the prior approval of the Cabinet. The petitioner has failed to make out any case or produce any document to show that the extension of the petitioner is against the provisions of Fundamental Rules as well as the Government Orders dated 13.01.2014 and 19.07.2020. The petitioner also failed to show that the opposite party no.3 is not a qualified person for the post in question. There is no averment that the opposite party no.3 does not possess the required qualification. 19. The Privy Council in a case reported in AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 90 Hamid Hasan Nomani vs. Banwarilal Roy and others, while considering the nature of quo warranto observed that an information in the nature of quo warranto is the modern procedure replacing the obsolete High Prerogative Writ of quo warranto. It is used to try the civil right to a public office. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1965 SC 491 , The University of Mysore vs. C.D.Govinda Rao and another had relied upon the definition given in Halsbury's Law of England, to quote relevant portion:- "An information in the nature of quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined." Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active held, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue writ of quo warrnto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not." 21. In the case of J.A. Samaj vs. D. Ram; AIR 1954 Pat 297 , election to the Working Committee of the Bihar Rajya Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, was challenged by a Writ of Quo Warranto, the Hon'ble High Court of Patna, held thus:- "The remedy which Article 226 contemplates is a, public law remedy for the protection and vindication, of a public right. It is essential in this connection to remember that there is a distinction between jus privatum and jus publicum which is the most fundamental distinction of corpus juris. This Roman distinction has been carried into modern law and the scope of public law in this context embraces all the rights, and duties, of which the State or some individual holding in W.P.No.24464 of 2019 delegated authority under it, is one part and the subject is the other part. The language of the Article 226 supports the inference that the remedy is provided only for the assertion of a public law right. The language of the Article 226 supports the inference that the remedy is provided only for the assertion of a public law right. Article 226 states that the High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority, including it appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, man damns, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. All these writs are known in English law as prerogative writs, the reason being that they are specially associated with the King's name. These writs were always granted for the protection of public interest and primarily by the Court of the King's Bench. As a matter of history the Court of the King's Bench, was held to be coram rege ipso and was required to perform quasi-governmental functions. The theory of, the English law is that the King himself superintends the due course of justice through his own Court-preventing cases of usurpation of jurisdiction and insisting on vindication of public rights and personal freedom of his subjects. That is the theory of the English law and our Constitution makers have borrowed the conception of prerogative writs from the English law. The interpretation of Article 226 must therefore be considered in the background of English law and so interpreted, it is obvious that the remedy provided under Article 226 is a remedy for the vindication of a public right." 22. In the case of Mohammad Tafiuddin and others Vs. State of West Bengal and others; 1979 (2) CLJ 494, at paragraph Nos.13 to 16, the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta, held thus:- “13. In terms of the determinations in the case of Hamid Hasan Vs. Banwarilal Roy and others; AIR 1947 P. C. 90 an information in the nature of quo warranto is the modern from of the obsolete writ of quo warranto, which lay against a peon, who claimed or usurped in office franchise or liberty, to enquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined. It has also been observed to be a remedy to try the Civil right to a public office. In view of the determinations in the case of University of Mysore Vs. It has also been observed to be a remedy to try the Civil right to a public office. In view of the determinations in the case of University of Mysore Vs. Govinda Rao; MANU/SC/0268/1963 : AIR 1965 SC 491 the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against statutory, provisions or statutes, it also protects a subject from being deprived or public office, to which he may have a right. As observed in the case of Statesman (P) Ltd. Vs. H.R. Deb; MANU/SC/0123/1968 : AIR 1968 SC 1495 the High Court in a proceeding for quo warranto should be also in its pronouncement unless there is a case of infringement of law. 14. A Writ of quo warranto is not the same as a Writ of Certiorari, or Prohibition or Mandamus and in a such a proceeding for quo warranto, it is not necessary for the applicant to establish that he has been prejudicially affected by any wrongful act of public nature or that his fundamental right is infringed or that he is denied any legal right or that any legal duty is owed to him. The scope of a proceeding for quo warranto is very limited and it is only for the determination, whether the appointment of the Respondent is by a proper authority and in accordance with law, if there is some express statutory provision. The High Court's power of interference in a proceeding for quo warranto is also limited and it cannot act as an appellate authority. Quo warranto, in terms of the determination in the case of Bhaimlal Chunilal Vs. State of Bombay; MANU/MH/0030/1954 : AIR 1954 Bom. 116 is a remedy given in law at the discretion of the Court and is not a proceeding or a writ of course. The High Court can in a proceeding for quo warranto, as observed in the case of Lalit Mohan Das Vs. Biswanath Ghosh; MANU/WB/0250/1951 : AIR 1952 Cal. 868 , issue an order not only prohibiting an officer from acting in an office to which he is not entitled, but can also declare the Office to be vacant. The High Court can in a proceeding for quo warranto, as observed in the case of Lalit Mohan Das Vs. Biswanath Ghosh; MANU/WB/0250/1951 : AIR 1952 Cal. 868 , issue an order not only prohibiting an officer from acting in an office to which he is not entitled, but can also declare the Office to be vacant. As observed in Hamid Hasans case (Supra) information in the nature of quo warranto is in nature of a Civil proceedings and such writ can be issued when a post created under or by a statute or a public office, is usurped wrongly, illegally or without any authority. The tests of public office, as observed in the case of Sashi Bhusan Ray v. Pramatha Nath Bandopadhaya MANU/WB/0366/1966 : 70 CWN 892, are whether to the duties of office are of public nature and whether it is a substantive office under a statute. It has been held and observed in the case of Amarendra Chandra Aich Vs. Narendra Kumar Basu; MANU/WB/0036/1953 : 56 CWN 449, that a writ of quo warranto will not be available in respect of an office of private nature. 15. Thus, in terms of the determinations an the case of University of Mysore v. Govinda (Supra) the first and foremost criteria for the issue of a writ of quo warranto should be that the office must be public and pursuant to the determinations in the case of Shyabudinsab Mohidinsate Akki v. Gadaj Belgeri Municipal Borough AIR 1975 SC 314, a proceeding for quo war-ranto will not be in respect of office ox a private charitable institution or of a private association and the test of a public office is whether the duties of the office are public nature. On the basis of the determinations as mentioned above, it can also be deduced that the office moist be substantive in character and must be, as mentioned hereinbefore created by statute or by Constitution itself. So neither the statutory nor constitutional character being satisfied in the instant case is so far the offices of Respondent Nos. 4 or 7 of 18 (a), I am of the view that even inspite of the determinations on merit, the petitioners would not be entitled to the issue of a writ of quo warranto. 16. So neither the statutory nor constitutional character being satisfied in the instant case is so far the offices of Respondent Nos. 4 or 7 of 18 (a), I am of the view that even inspite of the determinations on merit, the petitioners would not be entitled to the issue of a writ of quo warranto. 16. In order to succeed in obtaining a writ or an order in the nature of Mandamus, which is the second prayer the petitioners must "establish that he has a legal right to the performance by the opposite party of legal duty imposed by a statute and such right must exist at the date of the petition. A mandamus will not issue if the duty required to be performed is discretionary. A mandamus will also not issue to compel the performance of anything which an authority has the power to do unless the power becomes coupled with a duty. " it is not all wrong which can be cured by a writ of Mandamus. Mandamus literally means a command. It is a demand for some activity on the part of the body or persons to whom it is addressed. In view of the character of entitlement and more particularly when the petitioners have a legal right to the performance of duty or obligation by the authority concerned in terms of Article 154, which in my view has not been duly discharged in the formation of the said Board or delegation of powers to the same, the same being neither a statutory body nor a body or authority under the Constitution of India, the petitioners can claim the issue of a Mandamus, requiring the notifications as impeached not to be given effect to. Thus, the second prayer of the petitioners should succeed.” 23. In Arun Kumar Vs. Union of India; AIR 1982 Raj 67 , in para 4 to 6, the Rajasthan High Court has held as under: “4. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Court to issue to any person or authority including the Government within its territorial jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari prohibition or quo-warranto for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for the enforcement of the legal rights and for any other purpose. 5. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Court to issue to any person or authority including the Government within its territorial jurisdiction, directions, orders or writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari prohibition or quo-warranto for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for the enforcement of the legal rights and for any other purpose. 5. The founding fathers of the Constitution have couched the Article in comprehensive phraseology to enable the High Court to remedy injustice wherever it is found, but it is equally true that a person invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court should be an aggrieved person. If he does not fulfil the character of an aggrieved person and is a 'stranger' the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy save in very special and exceptional circumstances. The petitioner challenging the order must have some specialised interest of his own to vindicate, apart from a political concern, which belongs to all. Legal wrong requires a judicial and enforceable right and the touchstone to the justiciability is injury to legally protected right. A nominal, imaginary, a highly speculative adverse effect to a person cannot be said to be sufficient to bring him within the expression of "aggrieved person". The words "aggrieved person" cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid formula. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse facts and circumstances of each case, nature and extent of the petitioner's interest and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. 6. Any information in the nature of quo warranto would not be issued, and an injunction in lieu thereof would not be granted as a matter of course. It is in the discretion of the Court to refuse or grant it according to the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court would inquire into the conduct and motive of the applicant and where there are grounds for supposing that the relator was not the real prosecutor but was the instrument of other persons and was applying in collusion with stranger, the Court may refuse to grant a writ of quo warranto.” 24. The Madras High Court in the case of Dr. S. Mahadevan Vs. Dr. S. Balasundaram and others; (1986)1 Mad LJ 31 held as under: "For the issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the court asks the question - Where is your warrant of appointment? The Madras High Court in the case of Dr. S. Mahadevan Vs. Dr. S. Balasundaram and others; (1986)1 Mad LJ 31 held as under: "For the issuance of a writ of quo warranto, the court asks the question - Where is your warrant of appointment? It enjoins an enquiry into the legality of the claim which the party asserts to an office and if the appointment and holding on to the office are illegal and violative of any binding rule of law, then the court shall oust him from his enjoying thereof. This Court, within the scope of the enquiry for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto, is not concerned with any other factor except the well laid down factors: which require advertence to and adjudication. The existence of the following factors have come to be recognised as conditions precedent for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto: (1) the office must be public; (2) the office must be substantive in character, that is, an office independent of in title; (3) the office must have been created by statute or by the Constitution itself; (4) the holder of the office must have asserted his claim to the office; and (5) the impugned appointment must be in clear infringement of a provision having the force of law or in contravention of any binding rule of law. This Court shall not frown upon an appointment to the office on the ground of irregularity, arbitrariness or caprice or mala fides and these features, even if they are present, could not clothe this court with the power for the issuance of a writ of quo warranto. The scope of the enquiry is riveted to only the aforesaid factors. Prerogative writs, like the one for quo warranto, could be and should be issued only within the limits, which circumscribe their issuance. It is not possible to widen their limits. A writ of quo warranto is of a technical nature. It is a question to an alleged usurper of an office to show the legal authority for his appointment and holding on to it. If he shows his legal authority, he cannot be ousted from the office. It is not possible to widen their limits. A writ of quo warranto is of a technical nature. It is a question to an alleged usurper of an office to show the legal authority for his appointment and holding on to it. If he shows his legal authority, he cannot be ousted from the office. The invalidity of the appointment may arise either for want of qualifications prescribed by law or want of authority on the part of the person who made the appointment, or wants of satisfaction of the statutory provisions or conditions or procedure governing the appointment and which are mandatory. This Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, can issue a writ of quo warranto only if the salient conditions delineated above stand satisfied and not otherwise." 25. In Devi Prasad Shukla and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another; 1989 Lab IC 1086, at paragraph No.34, the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court, held thus:- "34. To illustrate the point, we may mention that in a writ petition even the person called upon to show whether he possesses the necessary qualifications prescribed for that office can also be asked whether the authority which he produces is by the person who is authorised to make appointment to the Office which he holds. By showing that he possesses the necessary qualifications by demonstrating that there is no legal impediment in the way of his appointment to the office and by showing that the person who issued the appointment or warrant of his appointment is authorised by law to do so, no writ of quo warranto will be issued against him. If all these things are demonstrated by him in his favour, he cannot be said to be a usurper." 26. A writ of quo warranto poses a question to the holder of a public office. In plain English language, the question is “where is your warrant of appointment by which you are holding this office ?” In its inception in England such a writ was a writ of right issued on behalf of the Crown requiring a person to show by what authority he exercised his office, franchise, or liberty. In plain English language, the question is “where is your warrant of appointment by which you are holding this office ?” In its inception in England such a writ was a writ of right issued on behalf of the Crown requiring a person to show by what authority he exercised his office, franchise, or liberty. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Volume II, describes it as “a legal proceeding that is brought by the state, sovereign, or public officer, has a purpose similar to that of the ancient writ of quo warranto, is usually criminal in form and sometimes authorizes the imposition of a fine but is essentially civil in nature and seeks to correct often at the relation or on the complaint of a private person a usurpation, misuser, or nonuser of a public office or corporate or public franchise, and may result in judgments of ouster against individuals and of ouster and seizure against corporations.” Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 11, Para 281(1) contains a summary of the decisions of English Courts with regard to the discretion of the Court in issuing a writ of quo warranto. It is said that “An information in the nature of a quo warranto was not issued, and an injunction in lieu thereof will not be granted, as a matter of course. It is in the discretion of the Court to refuse or grant it according to the facts and circumstances of the case . . . . the Court might in its discretion decline to grant a quo warranto information where it would be vaxatious to do so, or where an information would be futile in its results, or where there was an alternative remedy which was equally appropriate and effective.” The leading case on the subject of quo warranto from which many of the statements are derived is R. v. Speyer, (1916) 1 K.B. 595. Lord Reading, Chief Justice has observed: “If the irregularity in the appointment of an office held at pleasure could be cured by immediate reappointment, the Court in the exercise of its discretion would doubtless refuse the information.” Lush, J. expressed the view that the Court would not make an order ousting the holders of public offices from their office if the existing defect, if there is one, could be cured, and they could be reappointed. Rex v. Stacey, 99 English Reports 938 (2) holds that writ of quo warrant, is not a motion of course and it is in the discretion of the Court to issue it considering the circumstances of the case. Frederic Guilder Julius v. The Right Rev. The Lord Bishop of Oxford: The Rev. Thomas Thellusson Carter, 5 Appeal Cases 214 (3) also states that the issue of writ of quo warranto is in the discretion of a Court. The Canadian view as stated in The King exrel Boudret v. Johnston, (1923) 2 Deminion Law Reports 278 (4) is that the Court has to take into consideration public interest, the consequences to follow the issue of a writ of quo warranto and all the circumstances of the case. These general propositions have been accepted in America as appears from the statements contained in sections 5, 9, 10 and 18 in American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 65. 27. In the instant case, the allegations are made against the opposite party no.2 and even taking it for granted that there is any misuse of power, and consequentially the contention that the said extension has been made without approval without any supporting material, argument of non-approval of the cabinet as required under the provisions of Fundamental Rules, I do not find anything against the opposite party no.3 and, therefore, mere submission of illegality in the appointment of opposite party no.3 would not attract a writ of quo-warranto. 28. In the light of the above discussion and decisions, prayer sought for quo-waranto is not maintainable. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed. No costs.