JUDGMENT : 1. Notices were issued to respondent No. 2 by the earlier order of this Court dated 25.07.2018. 2. Office has reported by its report dated 27.09.2018 that notices have been served personally. 3. The service on respondent No. 2 is sufficient. 4. Heard Sri R.M. Tripathi, learned counsel for applicant as well as learned A.G.A. for the State. 5. No one appears on behalf of respondent No. 2. 6. By means of the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicant has assailed the order passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh dated 11.06.2018 in Criminal Revision No. 103/2017 (District Government Counsel (Criminal), Pratapgarh Vs. Sri Kant) and Criminal Revision No. 104/2017 (Uma Shankar Vs. State of U.P. and Sri Kant Mishra) allowing the said revisions filed by the State and Uma Shankar respectively against the order dated 06.04.2017 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 13, Pratapgarh. By means of the said impugned order, the trial court rejected the application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. It has been submitted by the counsel for the applicant that a complaint was lodged by Sri Sukhra on 10.03.1993 under Section 467, 468, 409, 420, 421 I.P.C., P.S. Lalganj, District - Pratapgarh. 7. It has further been submitted that after investigation the chargesheet was submitted and during trial five witnesses were examined by the prosecution. Towards the end of the trial one Mr. Uma Shanker appeared before the trial court on 06.10.2015 and moved an application with a request to file certain documents. On the said application, comments of the State/Prosecution Officer were sought for. Incidentally, the State also filed an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to summon the said Uma Shanker as witness with the object of placing the receipt No. 33/39281 as evidence before the Court. The applicant filed his objection against the said application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The learned trial court by means of the judgment and order dated 06.04.2017 has rejected the application moved by Uma Shanker. Aggrieved by the order of trial court dated 06.04.2017, Uma Shanker as well as State filed Criminal Revisions which have been allowed by means of impugned order dated 11.06.2018 8. Aggrieved by the order of trial court dated 06.04.2017, Uma Shanker as well as State filed Criminal Revisions which have been allowed by means of impugned order dated 11.06.2018 8. One of the main contention raised by the counsel for applicant is that the said revision is not maintainable inasmuch as under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. a revision is not maintainable against an interlocutory order, and the order of the trial court passed in exercise of power vested under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. rejecting the application for summoning of any witness or any witness not included in the chargesheet was the interlocutory order and therefore the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh has wrongly exercised the powers not vested in him under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. 9. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Sethuraman Vs. Rajamanickam, 2009 (2) SCC (Cr) 627, in paragraph No. 5 of the said judgment, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has categorically held that the orders passed by the trial court refusing to to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C., paragraph No. 4 is quoted as under:- "Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397 (2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397 (2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside." 10. It has been submitted by learned counsel for applicant that despite the fact that such objection was never raised before the revisional court still this Court in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. will have the jurisdiction to set aside the proceedings as the same are arbitrary and without jurisdiction. 11. It is clear from the report as well as the arguments raised by learned counsel for applicant that the trial court had rejected the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. by a detailed order dated 06.04.2017. Aggrieved by the said order, the said Uma Shanker as well as State filed a revision which was allowed on merits. The trial court only considered the necessity and relevance of the receipt sought to be placed before the trial court in evidence without looking into the fact as to whether the revision itself was maintainable or not. 12. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohit alias Sonus & another Vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2013 (3) SCC (Cri.) 727 held that sub-section (2) of Section 397 puts a restriction on exercise of such power in relation to an interlocutory order passed by the Criminal courts in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. 13. Hon'ble the supreme Court in the case of Girish Kumar Suneja Vs. C.B.I., 2011 (14) SCC 809 describing different nature of orders and while dealing with the scope of Section 397 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure held as follows:- "17. There are three categories of orders that a court can pass-final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a court can exercise its revision jurisdiction-that in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the court can exercise this revision jurisdiction since it is not a interlocutory order. 18. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath Vs. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397 (2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. 18. The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath Vs. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397 (2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly, it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(20 of Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 by 4 of 5(5) CRM-M-29578-2019 (O&M) contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reserved, ti has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind -an order taking congnizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in natu4re, but when an order taking congnizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue." 14. In light of the fact that order under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order and therefore against the rejection of an application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., a revision was not maintainable and therefore learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh has wrongly assumed jurisdiction and exercised the revisional powers under Section 397 Cr.P.C. Under such circumstances, the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh should not have interfere with the order passed by trial court. The impugned order dated 11.06.2018 is clearly erroneous and is accordingly is set aside. 15. The application is allowed. 16. The trial court is expected to conclude the trial expeditiously without giving any unnecessary adjournments.