JUDGMENT : 1. By means of instant petition, the petitioner has called in question the order dated 14.2.2019 passed by Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, U.P. Kanpur rejecting the application of the petitioner praying for setting aside the exparte award dated 20.12.2017 (published on the notice board on 19.5.2018) in Adjudication Case No.33 of 2015. 2. The background facts leading to the instant petition are that respondent no.2 raised an industrial dispute alleging that he was appointed on the post of Mistri/Mechanic by respondent no.3 in the month of February, 1991; that he worked till 31.10.2014; that his service was illegally terminated without passing any order in writing on 1.11.2014. The application filed in this regard by respondent no.2 dated 13.3.2015 was registered as C.P. Case No.47 of 2015. On 10.8.2015, respondent no.2 sought impleadment of the petitioner in C.P. Case No.47 of 2015. Since the conciliation proceedings did not yield any result, therefore, the dispute was referred under Section 4K for adjudication by the Labour Court and it came to be registered as Adjudication Case No.33 of 2015. The petitioner was represented by Sri Gyaneshwar Mishra. According to the petitioner, Sri Gyaneshwar Mishra, due to his personal problems, could not attend the case on regular basis and later, abstained from appearing in the case without any information to the petitioner, resulting in an exparte award dated 20.12.2017 being passed against it. The Labour Court directed for reinstatement of respondent no.2 with continuity of service and full back wages. According to the petitioner, it came to know of the exparte award when copy of the same was received by it on 26.5.2018. On 11.6.2018, it moved an application for setting aside the exparte award alongwith affidavit of Manager (Operation). The application was opposed by respondent no.2. The Labour Court by impugned order rejected the said application holding that the explanation furnished for non-appearance is not satisfactory and also on the ground that under Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act, an application praying for setting aside of exparte award could be filed only within ten days from the date of publication of the award. In other words, the view taken is that after expiry of the time prescribed under Rule 16 (2), the award had become enforceable rendering the Labour Court functus officio to entertain or decide any application. 3. In other words, the view taken is that after expiry of the time prescribed under Rule 16 (2), the award had become enforceable rendering the Labour Court functus officio to entertain or decide any application. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the first place the Labour Court has committed a manifest illegality in ignoring cogent explanation offered by the petitioner entitling it to a hearing and case being decided on merits. In support of the said submission, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in M.K. Prasad Vs. R. Arumugam, 2001 (3) AWC 2395 . In addition, it is urged that the law that after publication of award and expiry of the prescribed period, the award becomes enforceable rendering the Labour Court/Tribunal functus officio is no longer good law in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. vs. Phool Chand, (2018) (16) SCC 567. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent workman submitted that the Labour Court has rightly discarded the explanation furnished by the petitioner for its non-appearance when the matter was taken up for hearing. He further submitted that the other reasoning given by the Labour Court that the application was not entertainable in view of Rule 16 (2), as it was filed beyond ten days from the date of passing of the award, is also perfectly legal and valid. 5. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. is by a Larger Bench of Three Judges resolving divergent views in Sangham Tape Company Vs. Hans Raj, (2005) 9 SCC 331 and Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi Vs. L.H. Patel, (2009) 2 SCC 81 . The reference to the Larger Bench was made for answering the following question:- “1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court becomes functus officio after 30 days of the pronouncement/publication of the award and loses all powers to recall an ex parte award on an application made by the aggrieved party after 30 days from the date of pronouncement/publication of the award is the question that once again arises for consideration in these cases.” 6. It is pertinent to note paras 2 and 3 of the referring order to have an insight into the background in which two conflicting views were taken:- “2. It is pertinent to note paras 2 and 3 of the referring order to have an insight into the background in which two conflicting views were taken:- “2. It may be noted that on this question two Division Bench decisions have taken apparently conflicting views. In Sangham Tape Co. v. Hans Raj a two-Judge Bench held and observed that an application for recall of an ex parte award may be entertained by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court only in case it is filed before the expiry of 30 days from the date of pronouncement/ publication of the award. A contrary view was taken in Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi v. L.H. Patel to which one of us (Aftab Alam, J.) was a party. 3. In both cases, that is to say, Sangham Tape Co. and Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi, the Court referred to and relied upon the earlier decisions in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal and Anil Sood v. Labour Court but read and interpreted those two decisions completely differently.” 7. The Larger Bench of the Supreme Court, while answering the reference, took into consideration virtually all previous judgements on the point and thereafter observed as follows:- “31. Therefore, all the decisions hereinabove noted by us referred to Grindlays (supra). On a close reading of paragraph-14 of Grindlays (supra), in the background of the analysis of law under paragraphs-10 to 13, it is difficult for us to comprehend that the power to set aside an ex parte award is not available to a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. On the principles of natural justice, and on a purposive interpretation of the scheme of the Act and Rules, we find it difficult also to discern that the ratio of the decision in Grindlays (supra), is what is stated in paragraph-14 to the extent that an application for setting aside an ex parte award has to be filed within 30 days of publication of the award. On the contrary, the ratio in Grindlays (supra) is that the Tribunal can exercise its ancillary and incidental powers, on the broader principles contained under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. No doubt, the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the Labour Court/Tribunal.” 8. Thereafter, the Larger Bench laid down its conclusions in paragraphs 34, 35 and 37 of the Law Report as follows:- "34. No doubt, the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the Labour Court/Tribunal.” 8. Thereafter, the Larger Bench laid down its conclusions in paragraphs 34, 35 and 37 of the Law Report as follows:- "34. In case a party is in a position to show sufficient cause for its absence before the Labour Court/Tribunal when it was set ex parte, the Labour Court/Tribunal, in exercise of its ancillary or incidental powers, is competent to entertain such an application. That power cannot be circumscribed by limitation. What is the sufficient cause and whether its jurisdiction is invoked within a reasonable time should be left to the judicious discretion of the Labour Court/Tribunal. 35. It is a matter of natural justice that any party to the judicial proceedings should get an opportunity of being heard, and if such an opportunity has been denied for want of sufficient reason, the Labour Court/Tribunal which denied such an opportunity, being satisfied of the sufficient cause and within a reasonable time, should be in a position to set right its own procedure. Otherwise, as held in Grindlays [Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 309], an award which may be a nullity will have to be technically enforced. It is difficult to comprehend such a situation under law. 37. Merely because an award has become enforceable, does not necessarily mean that it has become binding. For an award to become binding, it should be passed in compliance with the principles of natural justice. An award passed denying an opportunity of hearing when there was a sufficient cause for non-appearance can be challenged on the ground of it being nullity. An award which is a nullity cannot be and shall not be a binding award. In case a party is able to show sufficient cause within a reasonable time for its non-appearance in the Labour Court/Tribunal when it was set ex parte, the Labour Court/Tribunal is bound to consider such an application and the application cannot be rejected on the ground that it was filed after the award had become enforceable. The Labour Court/Tribunal is not functus officio after the award has become enforceable as far as setting aside an ex parte award is concerned. The Labour Court/Tribunal is not functus officio after the award has become enforceable as far as setting aside an ex parte award is concerned. It is within its powers to entertain an application as per the scheme of the Act and in terms of the rules of natural justice. It needs to be restated that the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a welfare legislation intended to maintain industrial peace. In that view of the matter, certain powers to do justice have to be conceded to the Labour Court/Tribunal, whether we call it ancillary, incidental or inherent." 9. It is thus well settled now that the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, in exercise of its ancillary and incidental powers, is competent to entertain an application to set aside an exparte order/award and the said power cannot be circumscribed by any limitation. The ratio in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420, as interpreted by the Larger Bench is that the Tribunal can exercise the said power on the broader principles contained under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the Labour Court/ Tribunal. In case a party is in position to show sufficient cause for its absence before the Labour Court/Tribunal, it is competent to entertain such application and exercise its judicious discretion to find out whether the party has approached within reasonable time and whether sufficient cause has been shown or not. Merely because an award has become enforceable upon expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication would not mean that it has also become binding on the party seeking recall of the exparte order/award. For an award to become binding, it should have been passed in compliance with the principles of natural justice. An award passed denying an opportunity of hearing when there was a sufficient cause for non-appearance can be challenged on the ground of it being nullity. An award which is a nullity cannot be and shall not be a binding award. In case a party is able to show sufficient cause within a reasonable time for its nonappearance in the Labour Court/Tribunal when it was set ex parte, the Labour Court/Tribunal is bound to consider such an application and the application cannot be rejected on the ground that it was filed after the award had become enforceable. In case a party is able to show sufficient cause within a reasonable time for its nonappearance in the Labour Court/Tribunal when it was set ex parte, the Labour Court/Tribunal is bound to consider such an application and the application cannot be rejected on the ground that it was filed after the award had become enforceable. The Labour Court/Tribunal is not functus officio after the award has become enforceable as far as setting aside an ex parte award is concerned. It is within its powers to entertain an application as per the scheme of the Act and in terms of the rules of natural justice. The judgment in Suraj Malting was rendered in context of the Central Act (Industrial Disputes Act, 1947). The instant Act applicable in U.P. contains pari materia provisions, some of which are relevant to note. 10. Section 5-C (3) invests the Labour Court/Tribunal with the same powers as are vested in a Civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of following matters, namely:- “(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath or affirmation or otherwise; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents and material objects; (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses; (d) inspection of any property or thing including machinery concerning any such dispute; and (e) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed;” 11. Section 6 of the Act lays down the manner in which award is to be given and published. Sub-section (3) provides that every award shall within a period of 30 days of its receipt by the State Government be published in such manner as the State Government thinks fit. Under sub-section (4), the State Government has been invested with power to a limited extent and upon factors mentioned thereunder, to remit the award for reconsideration. An award published as per provisions of Section 6-A has been given finality subject to clerical or arithmetical errors being corrected, in which case, again the procedure relating to publication of award has to be followed. Section 6-A provides for commencement of the award. The relevant part of Section 6-A is as follows:- “6-A. Commencement of the award. -(1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 6:” 12. Section 6-A provides for commencement of the award. The relevant part of Section 6-A is as follows:- “6-A. Commencement of the award. -(1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section 6:” 12. Section 6-D is also worth noticing, which reads thus:- “6-D. Commencement and conclusion of proceeding. Proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of reference of a dispute to adjudication, and such proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 6-A.” 13. The State Government has framed Rules in exercise of power under Section 23 of the Act. Rule 16 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 framed by the State Government, on which reliance has been placed in the impugned order, reads thus:- “16. Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-parte. -(1) If, on the date fixed or on any other date to which the hearing maybe adjourned, any party to the proceedings before the Labour Court or Tribunal or an Arbitrator is absent, though duly served with summons or having the notice of date of hearing, the Labour Court or Tribunal or the Arbitrator, as the case may be, may proceed with the case in his absence and pass such order as it may deem fit and proper. (2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator may set aside the order passed against the party in his absence, if within ten days of such order, the party applies in writing for setting aside such order and shows sufficient cause for his absence. The Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator may require the party to file an affidavit, setting the cause of absence. As many copies of the application and affidavit, if any, shall be filed by the party concerned as there are persons on the opposite side. Notice of the application shall be given to the opposite parties before setting aside the order.” 14. Again, under Rule 21, the Labour Courts/Tribunals have been invested with the power of a civil court in respect of discovery and inspection; granting of adjournment; reception of evidence taken on affidavit. 15. Notice of the application shall be given to the opposite parties before setting aside the order.” 14. Again, under Rule 21, the Labour Courts/Tribunals have been invested with the power of a civil court in respect of discovery and inspection; granting of adjournment; reception of evidence taken on affidavit. 15. Rule 16 is the source of power of the Labour Court/Tribunal to proceed with the case in absence of a party duly served with summons or having notice of date of hearing. It has also been conferred power to set aside the order passed against the party in his absence provided sufficient cause is shown for absence. The Rule provides that such application has to be filed within 10 days from the date of passing of the order. The said time limit, in my opinion, is not an embargo placed upon the Labour Court/Tribunal to entertain application even if the delay in filing such application is sufficiently explained. If the application is filed within 10 days, the party will not be asked to explain why it had not approached earlier, but it has only to show sufficient cause for its absence. However, after 10 days, the party seeking setting aside of an exparte order, apart from showing sufficient cause for non-appearance, will also have to furnish explanation for not filing application within 10 days. This is all that the provision means in prescribing a time limit for filing the application. Any other interpretation would be contrary to the broad principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Suraj Malting and would render the provision illegal and ultra vires. The above interpretation, while obviating the need to strike down the provision, would offer a practical solution and also sub-serve the ends of justice. Take for instance a case where a party is not duly served with summons and comes to know of the exparte award or the order to proceed exparte after expiry of 10 days. In such a case, if the time limit prescribed under Rule 16 (2) is held to be sacrosanct, the Labour Court/Tribunal would stand denuded of its power to set aside the exparte order/award. It would be against basic tenets of jurisprudence that dispute between the parties should be decided after due service of notice and opportunity of hearing to both the sides. It would be against basic tenets of jurisprudence that dispute between the parties should be decided after due service of notice and opportunity of hearing to both the sides. Rule 16 (2) was thus not an impediment in the way of the Labour Court in entertaining the application filed by the petitioner for setting aside the exparte award or deciding the same on merits. The view taken to the contrary is manifestly illegal. 16. In the instant matter, it is worth noticing that the award was published on 19.5.2018 and as per Section 6-A, the award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication. The application was filed on 11.6.2018 i.e. before expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award or its becoming enforceable under law. In such view of the matter, even otherwise, the application having been filed before the award became enforceable could not be thrown out on the ground that it was filed beyond the period prescribed under Rule 16 (2). 17. Coming to the second aspect as to whether the Labour Court/Tribunal committed any error in declining to accept the explanation offered by the petitioner for its non-appearance, it is worthwhile to note the exact explanation offered by the petitioner for its non-appearance. The case taken by the petitioner in this regard was that it came to know of exparte award on 26.5.2018. Its Manager Mahendra Singh Shekhawat (who filed affidavit in support of the application) met the authorised representative Sri Gyaneshwar Mishra. At that stage, he informed the Manager that since 5th July, 2017 he had to make frequent visits to his home district Jaunpur on account of personal work and that he had deputed his junior to do pairvi in the case, but who did not discharge the responsibility properly. Thereafter, the Manager requested the authorised representative to take appropriate steps so that the matter is decided on merits, but he expressed his inability and said that he will not be able to take any step in this regard till August, 2018 as he will remain busy with his personal work. Thereafter, the petitioner Company approached another person to act as its representative and got the application filed without any further delay on 11.6.2018. Thereafter, the petitioner Company approached another person to act as its representative and got the application filed without any further delay on 11.6.2018. The Labour Court has observed that the petitioner has offered a confusing explanation and in case it was having knowledge that its authorised representative was visiting his home district on regular basis, it ought to have authorised another person to act on its behalf. Evidently, the Tribunal has completely misread the explanation offered by the petitioner. In M.K. Prasad (supra) where also explanation offered was that the counsel did not appear after a particular date to contest the case without any information to the party, the Supreme Court has observed thus:- “10. In the instant case, the appellant tried to explain the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree as is evident from his application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanied by his own affidavit. Even though the appellant appears not to be as vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but on his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable...” 18. In my opinion, it is a fit case where the explanation offered has to be accepted in the interest of justice. While at the same time, the inconvenience cause to the respondent workman could be compensated in terms of cost. 19. Accordingly, the application dated 11.6.2018 filed by the petitioner for setting aside exparte award is allowed. The exparte award dated 20.12.2017 is set aside subject to payment of a cost of Rs.5000/- to the respondent-workman within three weeks from today. The Tribunal shall now decide the matter afresh, after providing opportunity of hearing to both the sides. 20. The writ petition stands allowed accordingly.