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2020 DIGILAW 137 (MP)

Kanhaiyalal v. Sureshchandra

2020-01-24

VANDANA KASREKAR

body2020
JUDGMENT 1. The appellants have filed this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 05/11/2019 passed by II Additional District Judge, Shujalpur, District - Shajapuir in RCA No.14- A/2017 thereby confirming the judgment and decree dated 20/07/2017 passed by 1 st Civil Judge Class-II, Shujalpur in Civil Suit No. 55-A/2017. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff has filed a suit for eviction against the present appellants under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on the ground of bonafide requirement of the tenanted shop for the alleged business of the respondent/plaintiff. The suit was contested by the appellants by denying all the averments of the plaint. It is denied that the suit is required by the respondent/plaintiff for his alleged business of furniture. It is stated that respondent is 68 years old. On theses premises, he prayed for dismissing the suit. 3. The trial Court framed the issues and after recording the evidence, decreed the suit in favour of the respondent under Section 12(1)(f) of the Accommodation Control Act. Against the said judgment and decree, the appellants have preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court by the impugned judgment and decree affirmed the judgment passed by the trial Court. Being aggrieved by that judgment and decree, the appellants has preferred this appeal. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants argues that both the Courts below have erred in decreeing the suit of the respondent. He submits that the finding recorded by both the Courts below that the appellants needs the suit premises bonafide is perverse. The judgment passed by both the Courts below is without appreciating the evidence on record. In the present case, the respondent has filed a civil suit for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Accommodation Control Act. The trial Court decreed the suit under Section 12(1) (f) of the Act. Against the said judgment and decree, the appellants have preferred the Second Appeal. Therefore, in light of the aforesaid arguments, he submits that the appeal deserves to be admitted. 5 On the other hand, counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has stated that the respondent does not possesses any other accommodation for doing the said business. He intends to start his own business of furniture, therefore, the respondent/plaintiff on 31/03/2013, requested the appellants to vacate the shop. 5 On the other hand, counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has stated that the respondent does not possesses any other accommodation for doing the said business. He intends to start his own business of furniture, therefore, the respondent/plaintiff on 31/03/2013, requested the appellants to vacate the shop. It is also alleged that the appellants had executed agreement of rent on 31/03/2013 itself to vacate the shop on 30/02/2014. When the shop was not vacated, he filed the civil suit for eviction under section 12(10(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. 6 Thus, on the basis of over all evidence, both the Courts have given the finding that the plaintiff requires the suit accommodation bonafidely for doing business. Thus, both the Court below have recorded the concurrent finding in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. There is no perversity in the findings recorded by both the Courts. The Apex Court in the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malan Bi (Dead) By Legal Representatives and Another, (2016) 10 SCC 315 has held that the second appeal can be admitted only on substantial questions of law. Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Mehmooda Gulshan Vs. Javaid Hussain Mungloo, (2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 683 in para 14 has held as under :- ' 14. In Bega Begum Vs. Abdul AhadKhan, this Court has taken the view that the requirement only connotes an element of genuine need. To quote from para 13:(SCCp.279) 13.Moreover, Section11(h) of the Act uses the words 'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word 'requirement' and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need. " 7. The Supreme Court in number of cases has held that in exercise of powers under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, the Court can interfere with the finding of fact only if the same is shown to be perverse and based on no evidence. Some of these judgments are- Hajazat Hussain Vs. Abdul Majeed & others, 2011 (7) SCC, 189 , Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin, 2012 (8) SCC 148 and Vishwanath Agrawal Vs. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, 2012 (7) SCC, 288 . 8. Thus, in light of the aforesaid, as there is no perversity or illegality committed by both the Courts below. I do not think it fit to interfere into the concurrent finding of facts recorded by both the Courts. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed . 10. However, looking to the fact that appellant-tenant is continuing business for last so many years, it shall be expedient in the interest of justice to protect the possession of appellantstenant for six month only on following terms and conditions :- (i) The appellants shall occupy the suit premises upto 30 th September, 2020 (ii) The appellants shall deposit the entire arrears of rent within four weeks, if not already deposited. (iii) The appellants shall continue to pay regular rent on 5 th day of every succeeding month. (iv) The appellants shall not alter or bring any change in the suit premises during the currency of the said period. (v) The appellants shall not transfer or create third party right over the suit premises to the prejudice of the respondent-plaintiff-landlord. (vi) The appellants shall vacate the suit premises on or before 30 th September, 2020 peacefully. (vii) Failure or deviation any of the conditions stipulated herein above shall entail eviction of the appellant-tenant forcefully by local Police force on an application filed in that behalf. (vi) The appellants shall vacate the suit premises on or before 30 th September, 2020 peacefully. (vii) Failure or deviation any of the conditions stipulated herein above shall entail eviction of the appellant-tenant forcefully by local Police force on an application filed in that behalf. C.C. as per rules.