JUDGMENT 1. Heard. 2. This Petition has been filed by the petitioners-State seeking review of the order of this Court dated 20/06/2018, whereby the order dated 08/08/2016 rejecting the claim of the respondent for compassionate appointment has been set aside and the competent authority has been directed to consider the case of the respondent for appointment on compassionate ground within a time bound period. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the order passed by this Court is liable to be reviewed and recalled because the order rejecting the respondent's claim dated 08/08/2016 was not under challenge in Writ Petition. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in matter of Bharat Amratlal Kothari and another Vs. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi and other s, reported in 2010(1) SCC 234 . 4. Learned counsel for the respondent opposing the petition has submitted that the order was very much under challenge in the writ petition and its correctness has been duly examined. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the original record of the Writ Petition, it is found that the order dated 08/08/2016 was challenged by the respondent (writ petitioner) by duly stating so in paragraph 1(A) of the Writ Petition. The reply of respondent also reveals that the respondent had tried to justify the said order. Though, in the relief clause, the writ petitioner had omitted to specifically challenge it but considering the writ petition as a whole it is clear that the writ petitioner had raised challenge to order dated 08/08/2016. This Court in the light of the pleadings of the parties has duly considered the issue and by a detailed reasoned order dated 20th June 2018 had allowed the writ petition by setting aside the order dated 08/08/2016. This Court was exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore in the light of the pleadings of the parties the Court had moulded the relief. 6. Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the order dated 23/11/2016, whereby similar review petition no.736/2016 in case of the Deputy General Manager Vs. General Secretary was rejected by observing as under :- "4. 6. Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance upon the order dated 23/11/2016, whereby similar review petition no.736/2016 in case of the Deputy General Manager Vs. General Secretary was rejected by observing as under :- "4. Thus, besides seeking enhancement of compensation amount, t h e respondent a ls o sought "any o the r relief deemed fit in the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice" 5. Evidently, the finding by the Labour Court that the termination stands vitiated because o f non-compliance of Rule 77 of the Rules of 1957 was never challenged by the petitioner-employer and is thus allowed to attain finality.(Therefore, the decision in State Bank o f Bikaner & Jaipurvs. Om Prakash Sharma (2006) 5 SCC 123 which interprets Rule 77 of Rules of 1957 is of no assistance to the petitioner. 6.As the retrenchment was held to be bad by the Labour Court following the la w laid down in M /s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. (1979) 2 SCC 80 and reiterated in Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya(D.ED.) (2013) 10 SCC 324 and Tapash Kumar Paul vs.BSNL: (2014) 4 SCR 875 and in order to do complete justice,the relief has been moulded from that of compensation to reinstatement. 7.It has been held in B.C.Chaturvedi vs. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 that: 25.No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have thought that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty. I have said so because the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was amended to insert section 11A in it to confer this power even on a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under section11A is available to be exercised, even if there beno victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. It may be that this power was conferred on these adjudicating authorities because of the prevalence of unfair labour practice or victimisation by the management. Even so, the power under section11A is available to be exercised, even if there beno victimisation or taking recourse to unfair labour practice. In this background, I do not think if we would be justified in giving much weight to the decision of the employer on the question of appropriate punishment in service matters relating to Government employees or employees of the public corporations. I have said so because if need for maintenance of office discipline be the reason of our adopting a strict attitude qua the public servants, discipline has to be maintained in the industrial sector also. The availability of appeal etc. to public servants does not make a real difference, as the appellate/revisional authority is known to have taken a different view on the question of sentence only rarely. I would, therefore, think that but for the self-imposed limitation while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, there is no inherent reason to disallow application of judicial mind t o the question of proportionately of punishment/penalty. But then, while seized with this question as a writ court interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly disproportionate. 26. I had expressed my unhappiness qua the first facet of the case, as Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court in paras 20 and 21 of Krishna Chandra v. Union of India, AIR 1992 Orissa 261(FB) , by asking why the power of doing complete justice has been denied to the High Courts ? I feel happy that I have been able to state, as a Judge of the Apex Court, that the High Courts too are to do complete justice. This is also the result of what has been held in the leading judgment. 8. Reliance placed on the decision in Ranu Hazarika vs.State of Assam : (2011) 4 SCC 798 , wherein their Lordships were pleased to observe that - oeWe are of the view that the impugned observation by the High Court would be clearly inimical to the rule of law. While it is trite that Courts can exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief, however,s uc h discretion cannot b e exercised to perpetuate and encourage an illegality. While it is trite that Courts can exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief, however,s uc h discretion cannot b e exercised to perpetuate and encourage an illegality. (See : M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. Vs.Radhey Shyam Sahu ) ; is of no assistance to the petitioner,as the petitioner having accepted the finding by the Labour Court that retrenchment of the workman is illegal, it does not lie with the petitioner to seek a finding vide a Review petition that the termination held to be bad on the anvil of violation of Rule 77 of Rules of 1957 be held to be illegalbe cause of the decision in State B a nk of Bikaner & Jaipur(supra). 9.On the contrary, in Jasmer Singh vs. State of Haryana ( 2015) 4 SCC 458 ,it has been held: 20.In view of the aforesaid statement of law the setting aside of the Award by the learned Single Judge which is affirmed by the Division Bench is vitiated in law as the same is contrary to the judgments of this Court referred to supra, upon which the learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placed reliance in support of t he correctness o f t he finding recorded b y the labour court o n the various issues,particularly the finding of fact that the workman has worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and termination order is void abinitio in law for non- compliance of Sections25-F (clauses (a) and (b)), 25-G and 25-H of the Act, therefore, t h e Industrial Tribunalcum- Labour Court has rightly set aside the order of termination of services of the workman and awarded the order of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. 10. Thus, when there is violation of the provisions contained under Section 25H of Industrial Disputes Act,1947 (and Rule 7 7 of the Rules of 1957 emanates therefrom), reinstatement with continuity and full back-wages can be awarded. 11. 10. Thus, when there is violation of the provisions contained under Section 25H of Industrial Disputes Act,1947 (and Rule 7 7 of the Rules of 1957 emanates therefrom), reinstatement with continuity and full back-wages can be awarded. 11. In Om Prakash vs. Ram Kumar (1 9 9 1 ) 1 SCC 441 , Mohan Aba Prasad vs Bhaskar Balwant Aher (Dead)through LRs (2000) 3 SCC 190 and Waryam Singh v s Amarnath AIR 1954 SC 215 relied on by the petitioner were the cases between landlord and tenant and in the context o f controversy therein that in an action by the landlord the tenant is expected to defend only the claim made against him and if a cause of action arises to the landlord on the basis of the plea set up by the tenant, in such action, it is necessary that the landlord seeks to enforce that cause of action in the same proceedings by suit at the amendment or by separate proceedings to entitle the landlord to relief on the basis of such cause of action. It was held that the principle that the Court is to mould the relief taking into consideration subsequent events is no tapplicable in such cases. These decisions are distinguishable on facts and the principle of law in the matter relating to a workman governed by Labour Law." 7. So far as, the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Amratlal Kothari ( supra) relied upon by the counsel for the review petitioner is concerned, in that case the petitioner had omitted to claim certain important reliefs but that is not so in the present case. As in this case the order dated 08/08/2016 has been specifically questioned in paragraph 1(a) of the petition. 8. Having regard to the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the order dated 20th June 2018 does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of record and no case for review is made out. The Review Petition is accordingly dismissed .