JUDGMENT : 1. By the present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking directions for quashing and setting aside the order dated 24.11.2005 imposing the penalty of stoppage of one increment without future effect and also ordering recovery of the amount of Rs.3,23,392.32/-by fixing 36 installments of Rs.5,000/- and a last installment of Rs.1,43,392.32/-. 2. At the outset, learned advocate Mr.Nisarg Raval has submitted that the issue raised in the petition is squarely covered by the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Mishra, (1998) 7 SCC 84 and in the case of SBI & Ors. Vs. Arvind K. Shukla, (2004) 13 SCC 797 and in the case of Yoginath D. Bagde Vs. State of Maharashtra and anr., AIR 1999 SC 3734 . He has submitted that in the present case, though the inquiry officer has exonerated the petitioner from the charges except one charge, which was partly proved. However, the Disciplinary Authority has reversed the findings of the inquiry officer of exonerating the petitioner from the charges by imposing the aforenoted penalty. He has submitted that the entire procedure followed by the Disciplinary Authority is contrary to the aforementioned decisions of the Apex Court. Learned advocate has thus, submitted that the impugned order of punishment may be set aside. 2.1 As regards the imposition of recovery is concerned, he has submitted that in fact the inquiry officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority have failed to prove the actual loss caused to the Government. He has submitted that there is no findings with regard to the same and hence, the order of recovery is also required to be set aside. 2.2 Learned advocate Mr.Nisarg Raval has submitted that the petitioner has already retired from the service on reaching the age of superannuation on 31.12.2008 and hence, the amount, which is recovered from him may be refunded to him. 3. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.H.S.Munshaw, while placing reliance on the affidavit has submitted that the Disciplinary Authority before disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer, has taken into consideration all the materials available on record. 3. Per contra, learned advocate Mr.H.S.Munshaw, while placing reliance on the affidavit has submitted that the Disciplinary Authority before disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer, has taken into consideration all the materials available on record. Learned advocate has also submitted that the petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his case by the Disciplinary Authority before disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer and hence, the judgments of the Apex Court, upon which the learned advocate Mr.Raval has placed reliance are not applicable to him. 3.1 Learned advocate Mr.Munshaw has further submitted that in fact the petitioner has committed gross misconduct and hence, when it was found by the Disciplinary Authority that the petitioner was responsible for the shortage of petrol and diesel of 6880 litres from 12.09.2002 in as much as the keys of the petrol pump was with the petitioner from 12.09.2002 and he was in charge of the petrol pump from 12.09.2002 hence, it was decided to initiate proceedings against him. 3.2 Learned advocate Mr.Munshaw has further submitted that after an examination of the entire record, the Disciplinary Authority decided to disagree with the findings of the inquiry officer and found that the petitioner had indulged himself in the serious misconduct. He has finally submitted that looking to the penalty, which is imposed upon the petitioner, the same cannot be said to be disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and proved against the petitioner. 4. I have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and necessary documents as pointed out by them are also perused. 5. The petitioner was serving as an Assistant Manager at petrol pump in charge, Subhanpura, Vadodara. The charge-sheet dated 27.06.2003 was issued to the petitioner inter alia alleging the irregularities of shortage 6880 liters in the stock of petrol. 6. The charge-sheet reveals that the petitioner was subjected to departmental inquiry for three (3) charges. It appears that charge one (1) charge was further divided into two (2) sub-charges. After holding the detailed departmental inquiry, the inquiry officer vide his report dated 03.12.2004 exonerated the petitioner for two(2) charges, whereas for the 3rd charge, was held to be partly proved. A perusal of the report of the inquiry officer reveals that with regard to 3rd charge, he has held that the actual loss, which is caused, cannot be determined. After holding the detailed departmental inquiry, the inquiry officer vide his report dated 03.12.2004 exonerated the petitioner for two(2) charges, whereas for the 3rd charge, was held to be partly proved. A perusal of the report of the inquiry officer reveals that with regard to 3rd charge, he has held that the actual loss, which is caused, cannot be determined. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the findings of the inquiry officer and issued 2nd show-cause notice dated 19.03.2005 to the petitioner disagreeing with all the findings of the inquiry officer. A comprehensive notice was issued to the petitioner and from the show cause notice dated 19.03.2005, it emerges that the Disciplinary Authority has held that the petitioner is responsible for the misconduct and has opined that the petitioner is responsible for the loss of 603 litres of petrol and 277 litres of diesel as per the documentary evidence and the inquiry officer has incorrectly appreciated the same. The petitioner replied to the same on 25.04.2005. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority passed the impunged order of punishment dated 24.11.2005 imposing a minor punishment of stoppage of one increment without future effect and also simultaneously ordered recovery of an amount of Rs.3,23,,392.32./The observation made by the Disciplinary Authority in the show-cause notice reveals that the Disciplinary Authority has considered all the documentary evidence and has concluded that the petitioner is responsible for the financial loss occurred to the petrol pump and such evidence is enough to prove the charges against him. 7. In the considered opinion of this Court, the approach of the Disciplinary Authority is absolutely contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments. Further, after recording aforesaid observations on the documentary evidence, the Disciplinary Authority has issued show-cause notice. Thus, by recording the tentative findings by the Disciplinary Authority in the show cause notice dated 19.03.2005 the findings of the inquiry officer in favor of the petitioner are reversed which is impermissible. 8. Learned advocate Mr.Raval for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jitendrakumar Vallabhdas Chotai Vs. Principal District Judge & Disciplinary Authority, Rajkot & Anr., (2017) 4 GLR 3585 . 8. Learned advocate Mr.Raval for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Jitendrakumar Vallabhdas Chotai Vs. Principal District Judge & Disciplinary Authority, Rajkot & Anr., (2017) 4 GLR 3585 . While dealing with the similar issue and after survey of the judgments of the Apex Court including the decision in case of Yoginath Begade(supra) this Court has observed thus: 5.3………In Yoginath B. Bagde Vs State of Maharashtra [ (1999) 7 SCC 739 ] was a case with reference to Rule 9(2) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979 in which there was no provision requiring the Disciplinary Authority to give opportunity of hearing to the delinquent before differing with the inquiry officer. The Apex Court observed to hold, “But the requirement of ‘hearing’ in consonance with the principles of natural justice even at that stage has to be read into R. 9(2) and it has to be held that before the Disciplinary Authority finally disagrees with the findings of the enquiring authority, it would given an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer so that he may have the opportunity to indicate that the findings recorded by the enquiring authority do not suffer from any error and that there was no occasion to take a different view. The disciplinary authority, at the same time, has to communicate to the delinquent officer the ‘TENTATIVE’ reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiring authority so that the delinquent officer may further indicate that the reason on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority proposes to disagree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority are not germane and the finding of ‘not guilty’ already recorded by the enquiring authority was not liable to be interfered with.” 5.4 In S.P. Malhotra Vs Punjab National Bank [ (2013) 7 SCC 251 ] the appellant was appointed as Clerk-cum-Cashier in the respondent Bank. It was held that in the event the Disciplinary Authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer, it must record reasons for disagreement and communicate the same to the delinquent. In that case the said court nothaving been resorted to, punishment of dismissal was set aside. Here also, the Apex Court relied on in ECIL (supra) and other decisions on the point, to record as under. In that case the said court nothaving been resorted to, punishment of dismissal was set aside. Here also, the Apex Court relied on in ECIL (supra) and other decisions on the point, to record as under. “The view taken by this court in the aforesaid case has consistently been approved and followed as is evident from the judgments in Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. AIR 1999 SC 3374 ; State Bank of India & Ors. v/s K.P.Narayanan Kutty, AIR 2003 SC 1100 ; J.A. Naiksatam vs. Prothonotary and Senior Master, High Court of Bombay & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 1218 ; P. D. Agrawal vs. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 2006 Sc 2064 ; and Ranjit Singh vs. Union of India & ors. AIR 2006 SC 3685 .” 5.5 The decision in Lav Nigam (supra), a similar question arose as regards the procedure to be followed by the disagreeing disciplinary authority. It was held that the Disciplinary Authority is bound to give notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the charged employee, where after the petitioner would again have to be served with a notice relating to punishment proposed, in the event the Disciplinary Authority stands not satisfied after considering the explanation of the delinquent. 5.5.1 It was held, “The conclusion of the High Court was contrary to the consistent view taken by this court that in case the Disciplinary Authority differs with the view taken by the inquiry officer, he is bound to give a notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the appellant. It is only after hearing the appellant that the Disciplinary Authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed.” 5.5.2 It was further stated and it covers the facts of this case to apply squarely,”... It is clear that no notice at all was given before the Disciplinary Authority recorded its final conclusions differing with the finding of fact of the inquiry officer. The notice to show cause was merely a show-cause against the proposed punishment. In view of the long line of authorities, the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside. The notice to show cause was merely a show-cause against the proposed punishment. In view of the long line of authorities, the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside. 5.5.3 The Court also showed manner of granting relief by stating, “The proceedings may be recommenced from the stage of issuance of a fresh show-cause notice by the Disciplinary Authority to the appellant indicating his tentative disagreement with the findings of the inquiry officer.” 7.1 The ratio of Kunj Behari Mishra (supra) was explained in Canara Bank Vs Shri Debasis Das [ AIR 2003 SC 2041 ] wherein the Apex Court highlighted and underlined the aforesaid proposition of law. In S.P. Malhotra (supra), the Supreme Court further explained to hold as under. “In fact, not furnishing the copy of the recorded reasons for disagreement from the enquiry report itself causes the prejudice to the delinquent and therefore, it has to be understood in an entirely different context than that of the issue involved in ECIL (supra).” 7.5 In State Bank of India Vs K.P. Narayan Kutti [ (2003) 2 SCC 449 ], “In para 19 of the judgment in Punjab National Bank case extracted above, when it is clearly stated that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2) [Rule 50(3)(ii) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules, is identical in terms applicable to the present case] and the delinquent officer will have to be given an opportunity to persuade the Disciplinary Authority to accept the favourable conclusion of the enquiry officer, we find it difficult to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that unless it is shown that some prejudice was caused to the respondent, the order of dismissal could not be set aside by the High Court.” 9. In the case of Lav Nigam Vs. In the case of Lav Nigam Vs. Chairman and MD, ITI Ltd & Anr., (2006) 9 SCC 440 , which is referred to by the coordinate Bench (in paragraph No. 5.5 in the case of Jitendrakumar Vallabhdas Chotai) has observed thus: “The conclusion of the High Court was contrary to the consistent view taken by this Court that in case the disciplinary authority differs with the view taken by the inquiry officer, he is bound to give a notice setting out his tentative conclusions to the appellant. It is only after hearing the appellant that the disciplinary authority would at all arrive at a final finding of guilt. Thereafter, the employee would again have to be served with a notice relating to the punishment proposed.” 10. From the conspectus of the aforementioned observations of the Supreme Court and this Court. The following aspects are required to be maintained when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. (a) There has to be tentative/proposed findings of the disciplinary authority disagreeing with the inquiry officer’s report recorded in the show cause notice. The show cause notice of disagreement should be issued to the delinquent calling upon him as to “why the findings which are in his favour is/are not required to be reversed”. (c) While issuing the show cause notice, the expression “charges are proved” should be avoided, since; the same will reflect a predetermined application of mind on behalf of the disciplinary authority. (d) Such show cause notice shall not stipulate the imposition of particular penalty, minor or major. The expression “why any of the penalty/punishment shall not be imposed” should be avoided. (e) After considering the reply of the delinquent to the show cause notice of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to pass an order recording a definite finding of guilt reversing the findings of the inquiry officer, by holding the charges as proved or not proved. (f) After recording such findings, it is essential that the delinquent is issued a final show cause notice calling upon his explanation for imposition of penalty. [Vide Lav Nigam (Supra)]. (g) After receipt of the reply to the show cause notice, the disciplinary authority has to pass reasoned and speaking order imposing appropriate penalty. 11. (f) After recording such findings, it is essential that the delinquent is issued a final show cause notice calling upon his explanation for imposition of penalty. [Vide Lav Nigam (Supra)]. (g) After receipt of the reply to the show cause notice, the disciplinary authority has to pass reasoned and speaking order imposing appropriate penalty. 11. Thus, the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority does not meet with the parameters enunciated by the Apex Court in the aforementioned decisions of the Apex Court. Hence, the punishment order which is premised on such faulty procedure cannot be sustained. Since the petitioner has already retired on 31.12.2008, the issue of remanding the matter to the Disciplinary Authority from the stage of such defect would not arise. 12. On the bedrock of the aforenoted observations, the impugned orders dated 24.11.2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 20.04.2006 passed by the appellate authority of the respondent Corporation are quashed and set aside. The respondents are also directed to refund the amount, which is recovered from the petitioner. Appropriate order shall be passed within a period of two(2) months from the date of receipt of writ of the order of this court. The writ petitioner succeeds. Rule is made absolute.