JUDGMENT M. G. Uma, J. - The appellant is before this Court aggrieved by the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 28/8/2010 passed by the learned Fast Tract Court-II Koppal, (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the trial Court' ) in S.C.No.37/2009 where under the respondent accused was found not guilty for the offences punishable under Section 509, 506 and 306 of IPC and acquitted him for the said offences. 2. Heard the learned advocates Sri. B.C.Patil for the appellant and perused written submissions filed by him. I have also heard Sri. C.R.Hiremath, for respondent No.1 and Sri. Ramesh B.Chigari, HCGP for respondent No.2, who supported the contention of appellant. 3. Parties are referred to as per their rank assigned to them before the trial Court. 4. Brief facts of the case are as follows: It is contention of the prosecution that accused and deceased Manjula were working as teachers in Government Higher Primary School in Kukanapalli and the accused with an intention to insult and to outrage the modesty of the deceased Manjula was making signs and gesturers seeking sexual favours from her. He was also threatening the deceased and criminally intimidating her and thereby instigating her to commit suicide. Due to the abatement by the accused, the deceased committed suicide on 27/1/2009 at 7.30 p.m. by self immolation by pouring kerosene and setting fire, which has resulted in her death on 29/1/2009, thereby the accused committed the offence punishable under Sections 509, 506 and 306 of IPC. 5. On the basis of the statement of the injured, the complaint was filed by CW-1. Munirabad police registered FIR in Crime No.34/2009 for the offences punishable under Sections 506, 354 and 509 of IPC. During investigation the injured had died and after investigation, the charge sheet was came to be filed for the offences punishable under Sections 506, 509 and 306 of IPC. 6. The committal Court took cognizance of the matter and after following the procedure as contemplated under Sections 207 and 208 of Cr.P.C., passed the committal order as required under Section 209 of Cr.P.C. The learned Principal District and Sessions Judge, Koppal, made over the matter to the Fast Track Court II Koppal, for disposal in accordance with law. The trial Court after securing the presence of the accused framed charges against his for the above said offences. Accused has pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The trial Court after securing the presence of the accused framed charges against his for the above said offences. Accused has pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. After hearing the prosecution and the learned Advocate for the accused, the trial was fixed. 7. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused, got examined 22 witnesses, got marked 17 documents and identified 4 material objects. The statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. The accused has denied the incriminating materials available on record but has not chosen to lead any evidence in support of his defence. The trial Court after taking into consideration all these materials on record, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused for all the above said offences. 8. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, PW-2-the father of the deceased preferred this appeal on various grounds. It is contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused and the impugned judgment has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The prosecution witnesses examined before the trial Court spoke about commission of the offence by the accused and unnatural death of the deceased due to the abatement by the accused is also proved. But inspite of that, the trial Court proceeded to acquit the accused without any basis. The finding of the trial Court that the prosecution has not proved Exs.P11 and 17, i.e. the statement of the victim which was treated as first information and the dying declaration of the deceased, recorded just before death, have not been proved. The evidence of PW-22 fully supports the contention of the prosecution that the injured had given the dying declaration as per Ex.P17 while she was in fit state of mind. The trial Court should have relied on the said dying declaration and should have convicted the accused for the above said offences. All the circumstantial witnesses i.e., PWs.1 to 3 and PW9 i.e. the treating Doctor, have also supported the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances, the trial Court committed an error in acquitting the accused without any basis. The trial Court should have relied on the said dying declaration and should have convicted the accused for the above said offences. All the circumstantial witnesses i.e., PWs.1 to 3 and PW9 i.e. the treating Doctor, have also supported the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances, the trial Court committed an error in acquitting the accused without any basis. Hence, he prays for allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court and to convict the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 506, 509 and 306 of IPC in the interest of justice. 9. Per contra, the learned Advocate for the respondent-accused supported the findings of the trial Court and submitted that there are no eye-witnesses to the incident. Even though PWs.1 to 3 have deposed before the trial Court, they are only hearsay witnesses. Recording of the statement as per Ex.P11, was by police officer and it cannot be the basis for convicting the accused. Further even though Ex.P17 was relied upon by the prosecution and even though it is styled as dying declaration, the Doctor who was treating the injured had never certified with regard to her mental status. The contents of Ex.P17 do not inspire confidence to base the conviction on the said document, which is not corroborated by any material evidence. Under such circumstances, it is his submission that the trial Court rightly acquitted the accused by forming an opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There are no good grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court and therefore, he prays for dismissal of appeal as devoid of merits by confirming the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court. 10. I have given my anxious consideration to the materials placed before the court, including the TCR. As per the case made out by the prosecution, on 27/1/2009, the statement of the injured Manjula was recorded as per Ex.P1 by the P.S.I. of Munirabad police station. As per this information, the accused who was working as co-teacher in the Government Primary School was eveteasing the injured, since several days and was trying to outraged her modesty. Even though he was warned several times, inspite of that, he was threatening the injured and he was calling her over phone. As per this information, the accused who was working as co-teacher in the Government Primary School was eveteasing the injured, since several days and was trying to outraged her modesty. Even though he was warned several times, inspite of that, he was threatening the injured and he was calling her over phone. This information was given to the mother by the injured who advised her to tolerate his misdeeds with patience, but they were thinking to get transfer to any other place. However, the accused had not stopped his misdeeds. The informant further stated that as she could not tolerate such misdeeds by the accused, poured kerosene on her and lit fire on 27/1/2009 at 7.30 a.m. She further stated that her mother Padma and other neighbours came and tried to doze the fire and she was shifted to Munirabad Government Hospital in an ambulance for treatment. 11. It is stated that the PSI of Munirabad police station received MLC intimation and visited the hospital and recorded the statement. It is also stated that since there were burn injuries on the hands and fingers, the right toe impression was taken by the P.S.I. on her statement and the same was treated as first information. It is stated that the condition of the injured started deteriorating and her dying declaration as per Ex.P17 was recorded on 28/1/2009. Subsequently, the injured had succumbed to the injuries on 29/1/2009 at 10.00 p.m. and thereafter, Section 306 of IPC was invoked by the investigating officer. 12. To prove the contention of the prosecution, it has examined PW-1, the mother of the deceased. She has stated that she was staying with her daughter Manjula who was working in the Government Primary School. The accused was also working as teacher and he used to tease her by making inappropriate gesturers. But she had not informed this fact with any other person. On 27/1/2008 at 7.00 a.m., she had been lavatory and by the time she returned, her daughter Manjula had sustained burn injuries and the neigbhours had came and dozed the flame. Thereafter, the injured was shifted to Munirabad Hospital. She stated that it is the accused who is responsible for the death of her daughter. During cross examination witness stated that even though the accused was teasing and harassing her daughter, the said fact was not informed to the head master or any other teachers. Thereafter, the injured was shifted to Munirabad Hospital. She stated that it is the accused who is responsible for the death of her daughter. During cross examination witness stated that even though the accused was teasing and harassing her daughter, the said fact was not informed to the head master or any other teachers. It was also not informed to the school development committee witnesses stated that the houses of the President and Vice President of said committee is situated nearby her house. But neither she nor her daughter have informed them regarding the misdeeds of the accused. They have also not complained against the accused to the B.E.O. or any other higher officer. Witness stated that the accused had teased and harassed her daughter only once. Witness stated that they cook food by using kerosene stove and also with fire wood hearth. Witness stated that she use to store kerosene in two cans, but pleaded her ignorance as to how her daughter caught fire. 13. Pw-2 is the father and PW-3 is the grand mother of the deceased. Admittedly, both of them were not staying with the deceased at the time of the incident. They have given hearsay evidence. 14. Pws.-4, 6 to 13 are the colleagues of the deceased who were working with her in the school. PW-5 is the owner of the house where the incident had taken place. None of these witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution. 15. Pws.-14 and 15 are the spot mahazar panchas to Ex.P9. They have also not supported the case of the prosecution. PW-16 is the inquest Mahazar pancha to inquest Mahazar Ex.P10. PW-17 is the head constable who recorded the statement of the injured as per Ex.P11. PW-18 is the ASI who received the statement of the injured and registered the FIR as per ExP13. PW-19 is the doctor who treated the injured. PW-20 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the body of the deceased and issued the post mortem report as per Ex.P12. PW-21 is the investigation officer who investigated in to the matter and filed the charge sheet. PW-22 is the Tahsildar who recorded the dying declaration of the injured as per Ex.P17. 16. PW-20 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy over the body of the deceased and issued the post mortem report as per Ex.P12. PW-21 is the investigation officer who investigated in to the matter and filed the charge sheet. PW-22 is the Tahsildar who recorded the dying declaration of the injured as per Ex.P17. 16. From the evidence of PWs-1 to 3, PW16-the inquest Mahazar Pancha, PW-20,the doctor who conducted the post mortem examination, it is clear that the deceased had died unnatural death due to burn injuries. Even the learned Advocate for the accused has not disputed the said fact. Now, I have to consider as to whether the accused was responsible and whether he abated commission of the suicide by the deceased. 17. The prosecution is relying on Ex.P11-the statement of the injured recorded as first information. As per this statement, both hands and fingers of the injured were burnt and therefore, her impression of the right toe was taken on the statement which is as per Ex.P11. The injured states that the accused was teasing and harassing her inspite of advise and warning. She also stated that the accused was calling her over phone and was threatening her. The prosecution is heavily relying on Ex.P17-the dying declaration said to have been given by the injured while she was in the death bed. 18. Since there are no eye witnesses to the incident, the proof or otherwise of Ex.P17 will decide the fate of the accused. Therefore, I have carefully considered Ex.P17-the dying declaration of the deceased. As per Ex.P12-the PM report, the deceased had sustained 95-97% ante mortem infected burn injuries and she had died due to Septicemic shock as a result of infection, consequent to the burn sustained. Ex.P16 is the requisition given by the PW-22, the Tahsildar addressed to the casualty Medical Officer-VIMS Hospital, Ballary, where the injured was being treated requesting him to give his opinion as to whether the injured was in conscious state and is in a position to give her statement. 19. Ex.P17 is the dying declaration recorded by PW-22, the Tahsildar which is in the question and answer format. 19. Ex.P17 is the dying declaration recorded by PW-22, the Tahsildar which is in the question and answer format. To the question No.16 as to how the injuries were sustained, the injured appears to have stated that it was the accused who was the co-teacher was giving her sexual harassment and she could not tolerate such harassment and committed suicide by self immolation. Question No.27 in this document is left blank, where the name of the Doctor who is present and read over the contents of the declaration in Kannada is to be mentioned. It is pertinent to note that nowhere in this dying declaration, the name of the Doctor who was present at the time of recording the dying declaration is mentioned. Nor there is any certification by the Doctor who was treating her regarding her mental status to give this statement. Even though the prosecution produced Ex.P16 the requisition for giving the opinion of the Doctor regarding her mental status, nothing has been placed before the Court to the effect that the injured was in fit state of mind to give her statement. The incident in question had occurred on 27/1/2009. The dying declaration is said to have recorded on 28/1/2009 and it is the contention of the prosecution that the injured had succumbed to the injuries on 29/1/2009 and 10.00 p.m. 20. With these back ground, let me considered the evidence of PW-22 the Tahsildar who recorded the dying declaration. Witness stated that on 28/1/2009 he visited the VIMS Hospital, Balalry, as per the request by the investigating officer and gave requisition to the duty doctor seeking the information about the condition of the injured for the purpose of recording the dying declaration. Witness specifically stated that there were four or five persons relating to the injured, who were present in the hospital, and even though they were sent out while recording the statement, the injured was very much afraid while giving the statement. 21. During cross examination, witness pleaded his ignorance about the name of the Doctor from whom he got the opinion about the fitness of the injured. Witness stated that the relatives of the injured were standing near the door and they were visible to the injured as they were standing just 10ft. away. He stated that on enquiry, the injured was initially stated that she has sustained accidental burn. Witness stated that the relatives of the injured were standing near the door and they were visible to the injured as they were standing just 10ft. away. He stated that on enquiry, the injured was initially stated that she has sustained accidental burn. He also stated that the injured was very much afraid while giving the statement. He pleaded his ignorance that she was looking at her relatives while giving the statement. Witness also stated that the injured had not stated that the deceased was eve teasing or harassing her or that he was calling her over phone and criminally intimidating her. Witness admitted that in question No.27, the name of the Doctor is not mentioned nor his signatures were obtained to confirm that the injured was in fit state of mind to give the declaration. 22. Even though the prosecution examined PW-19, the Medical Officer in Government Hospital at Munirabad, where the injured was initially admitted for treatment and who endorsed on Ex.P11, he admitted that he had not endorsed on Ex.P11 that the injured was conscious, but stated that she had sustained III degree grievous burn injuries and stated that such injured will not be having consciousness. But however, he denied the suggestion that the injured was not in conscious state while recording Ex.P11. 23. It is pertinent to note that even though it is the contention of the prosecution that the deceased was in fit state of mind to record her dying declaration as per Ex.P17, it does not bear the endorsement of the Doctor to that effect. The prosecution has also not examined any of the Doctor to speak about the fitness of the injured to give her declaration as per Ex.P17. Even though Ex.P16 the requisition for furnishings the opinion about the fitness of injured is produced, it does not bear any certificate from the doctor who was on duty about the fitness of the injured. 24. The learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon several decisions in support of his contentions including the decision in Sukanti Moharana Vs. State of Orissa, (2009) 9 SCC 163 to rely on the dying declaration Ex.P17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above decision held that the dying declaration could be relied upon as the same was trustfully recorded and it gave a vivid account of the manner in which the incident had taken place. State of Orissa, (2009) 9 SCC 163 to rely on the dying declaration Ex.P17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the above decision held that the dying declaration could be relied upon as the same was trustfully recorded and it gave a vivid account of the manner in which the incident had taken place. Relying on such dying declaration the Hon'ble Supreme Court recorded its conviction against the accused. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered Section 32 of the Evidence Act as an exception to the general Rule as contained in Section 60 of the Act, which mandates the oral evidence in all cases must be direct. But specifically stated that before recording the declaration of the injured, the officer concerned must find that the declarant must be in fit condition to make the declaration in question. This observation was extracted by the Hon'ble Apex Court from its earlier judgment in Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 . It also referred to its decision in Vikas Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 2 SCC 516 wherein it is reiterated the principles governing the dying declaration as stated in Paniben Vs. State of Gujarat, (1992) 2 SCC 474 , at Para 45 of the said judgment which reads is as under:- "The Court, referring to earlier case law, summed up principles governing dying declaration as under: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (ix) Normally the court in Order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon." 25. In the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that even though the deceased had suffered 90% to 95% burn injuries, there was no reasons as to why the dying declaration which is otherwise found to be proved voluntarily and correct, should be rejected, simply because the person who recorded the dying declaration did not take the signatures or thumb impression of the deceased on it. On finding the dying declaration as true and made voluntarily and also trustworthy and since there was no reason as to why the same is to be disbelieved, the said dying declaration was accepted. 26. But in the present case, even though the signature or thumb impression of the deceased was not taken on the dying declaration-Ex.P17, it cannot be the reason to reject the dying declaration for the simple reasons that the victim had sustained 95-97% burn injuries including on her hands and fingers. But apparently, no materials are placed before the Court to prove the fitness of the deceased to give such a declaration. No doctor spoke about her mental condition nor there are any documents to prove the fitness of the deceased to give the dying declaration. Ex.P17 does not satisfy the requirement of the principles governing the dying declaration as summed up in Paniben Vs. State of Gujarat (supra) by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 27. Even the evidence of PW-22 who recorded the dying declaration is not satisfactory to rely on the same. Ex.P17 does not satisfy the requirement of the principles governing the dying declaration as summed up in Paniben Vs. State of Gujarat (supra) by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 27. Even the evidence of PW-22 who recorded the dying declaration is not satisfactory to rely on the same. The witness specially states that four or five relatives of the deceased were standing nearby her and deceased was frightened while giving the declaration. All these facts and circumstances do not repose confidence about the genuinity of the dying declaration Ex.P17. Unfortunately, expect Ex.P17- there are no other materials against the accused to attract either Sections 506, 509 or 306 of IPC. 28. To attract Section 306 of IPC, the prosecution has to establish that the suicide committed by the deceased was infact abatted by the accused. There should be an abatement for commission of the crime. Direct involvement of the accused in commission of the offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence under Section 306 of IPC. This proposition of law was laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment in Chitresh Kumar Chpra Vs. State of NCT Delhi, (2009) 16 SCC 605 . "11. Section 306 of the IPC reads as under: "306. Abetment of suicide If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." From a bare reading of the provision, it is clear that to constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC, the prosecution has to establish: (i) that a person committed suicide, and (ii) that such suicide was abetted by the accused. In other words, an offence under Section 306 would stand only if there is an "abetment" for the commission of the crime. 13. As per the Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". It is manifest that under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence under Section 306 of the IPC. " 29. I may also refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Sampat Babso Kale and another Vs. State of Maharshtra, (2019) AIR SC 1852 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court even though held that the dying declaration stands proved, considered the fact whether the accused can be convicted only on the basis of such dying declaration when the victim has sustained 98% of burn injuries and Doctor had given the evidence that the injured was given the pain killer and was injected at 3.30 a.m. and thereafter, the dying declaration was recorded. Serious doubt as to whether the victim was in fit state of mind to make the statement while suffering from 98% burn, was considered. The Hon'ble Apex Court expresses its opinion that the victim must have been in great agony and once a sedative had been injected, the possibility of her being in a state of delusion cannot be completely ruled out. The Apex Court noted that the endorsement made by the Doctor that the victim was in fit state of mind to make the statement has been made, not before the statement but after the statement was recorded. But normally it should be the other way round. 30. In the present case, there is not even an endorsement either before or after recording the statement of the injured about her fitness by the doctor and even the evidence of Taluka Executive Magistrate-PW22 discloses that the injured was very much afraid and her relatives were standing nearby. All these facts and circumstances will not inspire confidence in the mind of the court and I feel it is not safe to believe such dying declaration as the sole basis to convict the accused. 31. From the discussion held above, it is clear that there are no direct evidence about the involvement of the accused in abating commission of the suicide by the deceased nor there are any material to attract Sections 506 or 509 of IPC. 31. From the discussion held above, it is clear that there are no direct evidence about the involvement of the accused in abating commission of the suicide by the deceased nor there are any material to attract Sections 506 or 509 of IPC. The only material relied on by the prosecution is Ex.P17, is not proved by the prosecution in accordance with law. In the absence of any medical evidence to prove the fit state of mind of the deceased to give the declaration and that the declaration was voluntary, the same cannot be relied upon. Therefore, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 509, 506 and 306 of IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is naturally entitled to the benefit of doubt and is entitled to be acquitted. 32. I have gone through the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court. It has taken into consideration all these materials on record and has arrived at right conclusion in acquitting the accused. I do not find any reason to interfere with same. Hence, I proceed to pass the following:- ORDER Appeal is dismissed as devoid of merits. The judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 28.08.2010 passed by the Fast Track Court-II, Koppal, in S.C. No.37/2009 is confirmed.