JUDGMENT : AMIT B. BORKAR, J. : Through this appeal, the appellant challenges the judgment and order dated 28-8-2019, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Khamgaon in Sessions Case No. 96/2016 convicting and sentencing her in the manner stated hereinafter:— Under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default to undergo three month's simple imprisonment. 2. In short, the prosecution case runs as under:— One Shewantabai Shankar Pande was residing at village Gadegaon Khurd. Her husband Shankar died in the year 2006. She had three sons namely Ramesh, Ganesh and Vilas. Ramesh is residing along with his family at village Korala Pimpri, Tq. Malkapur. Other sons Ganesh and Vilas were staying along with Shewanta. Ganesh married to this accused before about 11 years. Out of the wedlock, they had begotten one son and one daughter. The younger son of Shewanta namely Vilas is mentally ill. He is bachelor and used to be at home. Ganesh is cultivating some land at village Lohara, Tq. Shegaon as a partner in cultivation. 3. On 9-9-2016 at about 3.00 p.m., Pandurang Mahadeo Pande, the cousin brotherinlaw of Shewanta came back to village Sawargaon and he was passing from the house of Shewanta. That time, her younger son Vilas was found sitting in front of the house and called him. Pandurang asked him as to what was happened. Vilas told him that accused has confined his mother Shewanta inside the house by locking the door, she went away somewhere along with her children. Vilas also told Pandurang that he was hungry and asked for bread (Hkkdj). Pandurang found that house was locked. He called from outside, but there was no response from the inside. 4. Then Pandurang called Chairman of Tanta Mukti Samiti Ramkrushna Hingankar, Pandurang Bawaskar and Police Patil Nimbalkar. He narrated the incident to them. Police Patil Nimbalkar broke open the lock of the door by using stone. All of them went inside the house. They found that Shewanta was lying on the bed having quilt on her body. They removed the quilt and found that there were injuries on the head and ear of Shewanta and blood was oozing. They found that Shewanta was no more. 5. Pandurang Pande immediately rushed to the Police Station, Jalgaon Jamod and lodged report by raising suspicion on the accused. They removed the quilt and found that there were injuries on the head and ear of Shewanta and blood was oozing. They found that Shewanta was no more. 5. Pandurang Pande immediately rushed to the Police Station, Jalgaon Jamod and lodged report by raising suspicion on the accused. It was recorded by PSO Kishor Sherki, PSI. Thereby Crime No. 400/2016 came to be registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Prior to that, PSI Sandip Mupade was sent to the spot of incident by PI Patkar. He proceeded to the spot and prepared its panchnama. He seized bedding of Shewanta under panchnama, collected samples of blood stained earth and simple earth. He also prepared inquest panchnama on the dead body of Shewanta. He sent the dead body to the Rural Hospital, Jalgaon Jamod for postmortem. He wrote letter to the Medical Officer for collection of blood sample and sample of hair of deceased Shewanta. After conducting postmortem, he handed over the dead body to the son of Shewanta namely Ramesh Pande. Then he deposited seized articles in the Malkhana. 6. Further investigation was handed over to API Rathod. As the accused being a lady, he obtained permission from the J.M.F.C. to arrest her in the night time. Accordingly, he arrested her under panchnama by giving notice to her husband. On 10-9-2016 and while in custody, accused made disclosure statement and shown her willingness to get weapon used in the commission of offence i.e. an axe, which was recovered from the house, concealed by her in the heap of firewood. Consequent to her disclosure statement, she led panchas and API Rathod to her house and produced from the heap of firewood, an axe. It came to be seized under the panchnama. The photographs were also taken of the entire exercise. On the same day, API Rathod seized key of the lock of the house of the deceased from the accused under panchnama, so also her clothes. P.C. Fufate brought clothes of deceased from the hospital and those also came to be seized under panchnama. 7. On 11-9-2016, API Rathod seized blood sample of the accused. He wrote letter to the Medical Officer asking him to give his opinion about the time of death and whether death could be caused by the seized article, i.e. axe. P.C. Fufate brought clothes of deceased from the hospital and those also came to be seized under panchnama. 7. On 11-9-2016, API Rathod seized blood sample of the accused. He wrote letter to the Medical Officer asking him to give his opinion about the time of death and whether death could be caused by the seized article, i.e. axe. On 18-9-2016, he sent seized muddemal articles to R.F.S.L., Amravati. After completion of remaining formalities, he submitted the chargesheet. 8. In view of committal of the case to the Sessions Court under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), prosecution opened its case as per Section 226 of the Cr.P.C. by filing the draft charge at Exh.2. After considering the material on record, Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused at Exh.4 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was read over and explained to her in vernacular. However, she denied her guilt and claimed the trial. 9. In support of its case, prosecution examined in all 9 witnesses. The incriminating circumstances, which appeared in the case of prosecution were put to accused by invoking the provisions of Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.. Her defence, which emerges out from the line of cross-examination of the witnesses and her examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is that she is falsely implicated. She is innocent. Her brother-in-law Vilas committed murder of his mother Shewanta. 10. In all, during the trial the prosecution examined 9 witnesses. We may straight away mention that there is no eyewitness of the incident and the case hinges purely on circumstantial evidence. During trial, the prosecution sought to establish four circumstances and the learned Trial Judge held that all of them were established. They were: (a) motive; (b) discovery of weapon; (c) subsequent conduct; and (d) seizure of key of house. The learned Trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant in the manner stated above, vide the impugned judgment. Hence this appeal. 11. Shri Nihal Dharmadhikari, learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that there are material contradictions in deposition of Nivrutti (PW2). In the cross examination, Nivrutti (PW2) admitted that to reach the village from Police Station it takes 30 minutes. As per Exh.28recovery panchnama, the time is written as 17.51 to 19.15 p.m.. Hence this appeal. 11. Shri Nihal Dharmadhikari, learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that there are material contradictions in deposition of Nivrutti (PW2). In the cross examination, Nivrutti (PW2) admitted that to reach the village from Police Station it takes 30 minutes. As per Exh.28recovery panchnama, the time is written as 17.51 to 19.15 p.m.. In the cross examination, Nivrutti (PW2) has admitted that he returned to village at 5.30 to 6.00 p.m. Hence, Nivrutti (PW2) could not have reached Police Station at Jamod in 11 minutes. In the evidence, Nivrutti (PW2) stated that he identifies the signature on Exh.28recovery panchnama, but in cross examination Nivrutti (PW2) stated that he had no occasion to put signature on any panchnama. He submitted that deposition of Nivrutti (PW2) has vital contradictions in relation to disclosure and recovery panchnama, which creates reasonable doubt regarding genuineness of those documents. No date is mentioned on Exh.28, which also creates suspicion about genuineness of document. He submitted that C.A. reports at Exh.15 to 18 are inconclusive. He further submitted that seizure form of key and lock under Exh.65 has irregularities as the accused has not signed seizure form. The witnesses present at the time of seizure were not examined. There was material on record to show that Vilas Pandey was mentally unstable. Pandurang (PW1) admitted that Vilas was violent and had to be tied by rope and used to pelt stones. He submitted that the prosecution has failed to complete the chain of the events and link it to the appellant. Therefore, he submitted that the appeal deserves to be allowed. 12. Shri S.S. Doifode, learned A.P.P. submitted that the accused has made disclosure statement while in custody of Police in the presence of independent witness PW2. It is supported by discovery of axe used by her in commission of the offence. He submitted that the subsequent conduct on the part of the accused in not accompanying her husband Ganesh (PW5), is the evidence of the fact of commission of murder of her mother-in-law by the appellant. There is seizure of key under seizure-form, which perfectly matches with the lock and key of ‘Rajvansh’ Company. This also connects the appellant with the commission of murder of her mother-in-law. Also there were blood stains on the saree of the appellant, which came to be seized at her instance. There is seizure of key under seizure-form, which perfectly matches with the lock and key of ‘Rajvansh’ Company. This also connects the appellant with the commission of murder of her mother-in-law. Also there were blood stains on the saree of the appellant, which came to be seized at her instance. The weapon under seizure form Exh.29 also points out towards involvement of the appellant in the crime. He submitted that there used to be differences between the accused and her mother-in-law on account of domestic quarrel, which was the motive behind commission of the crime. Therefore, he prayed for dismissal of appeal. 13. We have perused the statements of the witnesses examined by the prosecution to prove the said circumstances; the material exhibits tendered and proved by the prosecution and the impugned judgment. After giving our anxious consideration to the matter, we are satisfied that this is a case, wherein the appellant deserves the benefit of doubt. 14. We have already observed earlier that there are no eyewitnesses of the incident and the prosecution case squarely rests on circumstantial evidence. It is well settled that before a conviction can be sustained on circumstantial evidence, prosecution has to prove:— (a) the various circumstances on which the prosecution relies; (b) that cumulatively all the circumstances unerringly lead to the guilt of the accused; (c) the circumstances established are wholly inconsistent with the inference of innocence of the accused, and (d) that they are incapable of being explained on any other reasonable hypothesis, excepting that of the guilt of accused. We have to examine whether the stringent tests to be borne in mind before sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence are satisfied in the instant case. 15. We now come to the first circumstance of recovery of bloodstained knife on the pointing out of the appellant. Learned Sessions Judge relied upon circumstance that weapon used in the crime was recovered at the instance of the appellant. As per the case of prosecution, the incident occurred on 9-9-2016 at 19.00 hours. The investigation was started immediately on 9-9-2016 itself. In the spot panchnama, there is detailed description of all things present on the spot including description of heap of woods. It is stated in spot panchnama that all physical things on the spot and in the kitchen were seized by the prosecution. The investigation was started immediately on 9-9-2016 itself. In the spot panchnama, there is detailed description of all things present on the spot including description of heap of woods. It is stated in spot panchnama that all physical things on the spot and in the kitchen were seized by the prosecution. Once all physical things in the kitchen were seized by the prosecution on 9-9-2016, it is difficult to believe that there was recovery of weapon on 10-9-2016, at the instance of the appellant below the heap of wood in the kitchen. Apart from the above suspicious circumstance, the time mentioned in recovery panchnama is 17.51 hours as starting time of panchnama. Disclosure statement at Exh.27 was started at 5.15 p.m. and it was completed at 5.40 p.m. Nivrutti (PW2) stated in the evidence that it takes at least half an hour to reach village Gadegaon from Jalgaon Jamod, which is about 18 to 20 kms. The recovery panchnama and seizure form is signed by Nivrutti (PW2). Nivrutti (PW2) in his cross-examination admitted that after he returned home on 10-9-2016, he had no occasion to put signature on any panchnama. He further admitted that he returned home on 10-9-2016 at about 5.30 to 6.00 p.m. Nivrutti (PW2) further admitted that on 9-9-2016, Police came to village Gadegaon at about 10.00 a.m. to 10.30 a.m., but nobody accompanied them and they did not come to the village in the evening time. Therefore, the admissions of Nivrutti (PW2) create doubt about recovery and seizure panchnama at Exh. 27 and 28, relied upon by the prosecution and same would not constitute incriminating evidence. 16. We are constrained to observe that after the gravest circumspect we have reached the conclusion that the said recovery would not constitute incriminating evidence within the ambit of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The said section reads thus:— “Section 27. Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” The said Section is in exception to the provisions contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The former makes a confession to a Police Officer inadmissible in law and the latter only admissible if made in the presence of a Magistrate. 17. A perusal of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would show that it is not recovery simplicitor at the instance of the accused from a certain place about which he has knowledge, which would make the said recovery incriminating evidence. What would make it incriminating evidence is his statement that he had concealed the article sought to be recovered at a certain place and its recovery on his pointing out from that place. 18. If we examine the recovery of the bloodstained axe in the said perspective, the said recovery would not be incriminating evidence within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In this connection, it would be pertinent to refer to the admissible portion of recovery panchanama, which is in Marathi. It shows that the appellant had pointed at blood stained axe from heap of wood in the kitchen. In the recovery panchanama, there is no whisper of the fact that it was the appellant, who had concealed the axe in the kitchen from where it was recovered. 19. In such a situation, we feel the safer and wiser course would be to go by the recovery panchanama and if that is done, the said circumstance cannot be held to incriminate the appellant. 20. We are fortified in our view by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pohalya Motya Valvi vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1980) 1 SCC 530 . A perusal of paragraph Nos. 13, 14 and 15 would show that in the said case, spear was recovered on the pointing out of the accused, but in the recovery memo there was no mention of authorship of its concealment by the accused and the fact that he gave information leading to its discovery. The Supreme Court in paragraph no. 16 held that this recovery was of no consequence. It made some observations in paragraph no. 15, which we feel are pertinent to extract. It reads thus :— “15. The Supreme Court in paragraph no. 16 held that this recovery was of no consequence. It made some observations in paragraph no. 15, which we feel are pertinent to extract. It reads thus :— “15. …… The recovery of a bloodstained spear becomes incriminating not because of its recovery at the instance of the accused but the element of criminality tending to connect the accused with the crime lies in the authorship of concealment, namely, that the appellant who gave information leading to its discovery was the person who concealed it.” 21. The circumstance about seizure of key of the house of the appellant is concerned, the seizure-form (Exh.65) does not bear signature of the accused. Moreover, panchas of the said seizure-form have not been examined by the prosecution therefore, the said circumstance cannot be used against the appellant to prove her involvement in the crime. 22. The motive of domestic quarrel with the deceased without any details as to when and how quarrels took place between the appellant and the deceased, cannot be used against the appellant. There is vague statement in the evidence that there used to be domestic quarrels between accused and deceased which is not enough to prove sufficient motive to implicate the appellant in the alleged crime. The case of prosecution on the basis of alleged domestic quarrels, without details, is not so strong so as to implicate the appellant in the crime. It is well settled that mere existence of motive by itself is not an incriminating circumstance and it cannot give rise to an inference of guilt nor can it form basis of conviction. 23. Learned Sessions Judge has held that the accused refused to accompany her husband to village Gadegaon after the incident which plays very important role while determining her guilt in view of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. There are certain factors of subsequent conduct, which can be said to be material, like change of life from poverty prior to offence and rich lifestyle subsequent to offence, the accused is absconding or hiding or fleeing the country, keeping things concealed or tampering with the evidence etc. In addition, there are physical symptoms like fear, paleness, trembling, fainting, weeping, sweating, fluttering of voice etc. All these afford a presumption of guilt, according to circumstances of the case. In addition, there are physical symptoms like fear, paleness, trembling, fainting, weeping, sweating, fluttering of voice etc. All these afford a presumption of guilt, according to circumstances of the case. There must be proper material showing the subsequent conduct of the accused to make it relevant. Mere refusal to accompany husband to the spot of incident, in the facts of present case may not be a relevant subsequent conduct under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 24. In our judgment, a strong suspicion and may be true but can never constitute a valid legal foundation, either for recording conviction or for sustaining it. The same is only done when the Courts are convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. This is not the case here. 25. We are fortified in our view by the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs. State of Punjab, reported in (1957) AIR (SC) 637. In paragraph No. 9 of the aforesaid decision, Their Lordships of the Apex Court have observed:— ‘Suspicion however, strong, cannot take the place of proof’. In paragraph no. 12 of the same decision, Their Lordships have observed this:— “between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’ there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered, by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence”. We find that in the instant case, this long distance has not been traveled; much less traveled by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence. In the result, we are left with no other option, but to allow this appeal and acquit the appellant. 26. Pursuant to the above discussion we find that the prosecution has failed to adduce clinching circumstantial evidence, which conclusively and unerringly points to the guilt of the appellant. As a logical corollary of our finding, the appellant has to be given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. Hence, we pass the following order:— (i) The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial No. 96/2016 on 28th August 2019 is set aside and conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is quashed. Hence, we pass the following order:— (i) The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Trial No. 96/2016 on 28th August 2019 is set aside and conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is quashed. (ii) The appellant Pratibha W/o. Ganesh Pande is acquitted of the charge of commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. (iii) The appellant is in jail, undergoing the sentence imposed by the impugned judgment and order. The appellant be released forthwith, if not required in any other offence. (iv) Muddemal Property, if any, be dealt with according to law. Appeal allowed.