JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Hemant Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mrs. Bulbul Godiyal, Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Janardan Singh on behalf of contesting opposite party nos. 6 and 7. 2. The opposite parties nos.6 and 7 of W.P. No. 22981 (MS) of 2019 namely Smt. Prabhawati and Vijay Kumar have instituted a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India bearing No. 7563 (MS) of 2020 wherein a limited prayer has been made that the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Tehsil Tarabganj, District Gonda be directed to expeditiously decide the case bearing No. T201908300603097; under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (Smt. Prabhawati Singh and Another Vs. Amar Bahadur Singh and other) preferably within a period of 3 months. In the aforesaid petition, Smt. Jasoda Singh (the petitioner in the instant petition) has been impleaded as opposite party no. 4. Thus the said petition has been connected with W.P. No. 22981 (MS) of 2019. Since the issue involved in present petition will impact the grant of relief in the other petitions, hence, both the petitions are being decided by this common judgment for the convenience the facts are being noticed from The petitioner assails the order dated 26.06.2019 passed by the SDM, Tahsil, Tarabganj, District Gonda whereby the Suit of the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 has been registered, notices were issued to the defendants of the suit and further as an interim measure, the parties have been directed not to change the nature of the property in question and also under challenge is the institution of the suit itself before the SDM under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. 3. Primarily, it is the entire proceedings which are under challenge, however, for the sake of convenience, the three main prayers sought by the petitioner in the W.P. No. 22981 (MS) of 2019 are reproduced for ready reference. “(a) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 passed by the opposite party no. 2 and 3 on the application for interim relief filed along with application moved under Section116 of the Revenue Code contained as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition. (b) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite party no. 2 and 3 on the application for interim relief filed along with application moved under Section116 of the Revenue Code contained as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition. (b) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite party no. 2 and 3 to forthwith cancel/terminate the pending proceeding initiated on the basis of application moved by the Opposite Party No. 6 and 7 under Section 116 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 on the ground that they had sold their right and title of their part of Gata No. 291 situated in Village Baghusra, pargana Mahadeva, Tehsil Tarabganj, District Gonda after executing sale deed in favour of the Nandini Committee of the Nandini Mahavidyalaya, run by the powerful politician through registered sale deed dated 02.07.2019. (c) To issue a writ order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the Opposite Party No. 2 to 5 to not restrain the petitioner under the garb of the order dated 26.06.2019 and allow the petitioner to complete his roof work of the constructed building.” 4. The proposition canvassed by Sri Hemant Mishra is two fold. Firstly, it is alleged that the suit under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 was not maintainable at the behest of the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 in light of the averment contained in the suit itself and more particularly in paragraph 4. The paragraph 4 of the plaint in suit (a copy of which has been brought on record as Annexure No. 2) is reproduced as under:- ^^/kkjk 4&;g dh oknhx.k ,oa izfroknhx.k vius va'k ds eqrkfcd og Hkh ckaV ds vuqlkj dkfct nkf[ky pys vk jgs gSA^ 5. It has been submitted that once the opposite party nos. 5 and 6 in the suit itself stated that on the basis of an oral settlement/partition, parties were in possession of their respective shares, hence, there was no question of the suit being maintainable for partition. 6. The other ground urged by Sri Mishra has further two limbs (i) the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 had already sold their share in the property in question in favour of a Society which is controlled by an influential Member of Parliament and thus, the opposite parties nos. 6. The other ground urged by Sri Mishra has further two limbs (i) the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 had already sold their share in the property in question in favour of a Society which is controlled by an influential Member of Parliament and thus, the opposite parties nos. 6 and 7 having alienated and transferred, their right were no more the Bhumidhar of the land in question, accordingly, the suit filed by them in terms of under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 could not proceed as the suit can only be prosecuted by a bhumidhar against his co-sharers (ii) the other limb on which Sri Mishra has stressed is that the land in question in respect of which the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 had filed the suit, of which the petitioner was also a co-sharer and the petitioner had got her share declared as non-agricultural in terms of Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, hence, once the land had lost the character of being an agricultural land, therefore, the partition /division of such property cannot be done under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 rather the opposite party nos. 5 and 6 ought to have taken recourse before some other forum. 7. On the strength of the aforesaid propositions, it has been urged by Sri Mishra that for all the aforesaid reasons, the suit filed before the SDM was neither maintainable nor could proceed, hence, the SDM, Tahsil, Tarabganj, District Gonda exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the suit and in passing an interim order on the very first day. 8. It has further been alleged that all this has been done only at the behest of the influential Member of Parliament and in the aforesaid circumstances, the proceedings being de-hors, the provisions of law cannot sustain for a minute, accordingly, not only the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 deserves to be quashed but so also the entire proceedings in the shape of the pending suit under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 be terminated/set aside. 9. Mrs. Bulbul Godiyal, learned Senior Counsel while refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that relying upon para 4 alone of the suit filed before the SDM is quoting the actual facts out of context. 9. Mrs. Bulbul Godiyal, learned Senior Counsel while refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that relying upon para 4 alone of the suit filed before the SDM is quoting the actual facts out of context. It is the complete and full plaint which is to be read as a whole in order to determine the nature of the cause of action and the relief which has been prayed. 10. Mrs. Bulbul Godiyal has further alleged that neither the suit is barred, inasmuch as, on the date of the institution of the suit, the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 were the Bhumidhar and the recorded owners of the land in question and any subsequent change or transfer of title is not going to affect the suit. She has also urged that merely because a declaration is issued under Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 it would not change the nature of the land in so far as the applicability of Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is concerned. Moreover, the petitioner while filing the instant writ petition did not disclose the fact that the alleged order by which the petitioner had got the land declared as nonagricultural in terms of Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue, 2006 had already been stayed by the Commissioner by means of order dated 03.10.2019. 11. It has also been submitted that the petitioner is filing multiple petitions only to harass the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 and in the said petitions, the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 were not impleaded as a party. It has been submitted that the land belonging to opposite party nos. 6 and 7 is situated towards the main road which has a higher value and the petitioner in the garb of raising constructions attempted to encroach upon and usurp the land of the opposite parties nos. 6 and 7 which prompted them to institute a suit seeking a division. Since the suit was registered and notices were issued, the court concerned was well within its domain and jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances to pass an order directing the parties not to change the nature of the land. 6 and 7 which prompted them to institute a suit seeking a division. Since the suit was registered and notices were issued, the court concerned was well within its domain and jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances to pass an order directing the parties not to change the nature of the land. Such an order did not adversely affect the rights of any of the parties rather it protected the same, accordingly, the order dated 26.06.2019 does not suffer from any error and has been passed in sound exercise of jurisdiction, whereas the petitioner has a right to assail the aforesaid order before the Court concerned. 12. Thus, it has been urged that the petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed whereas the petition filed by the opposite parties nos. 6 and 7 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India bearing W.P. No. 7563 (MS) of 2020 be allowed and the proceedings before the SDM, Tehsil, Tarabganj, District Gonda be expedited. 13. Sri Mishra in reply to the aforesaid submissions has drawn the attention of the Court to an order passed by a Division Bench of this Court dated 18.07.2019 in W.P. No. 19436 (MS) of 2019. Sri Mishra has also taken the Court through various orders which are said to have been passed in a PIL (Civil) Petition No. 14756 of 2018 which have been filed with the writ petition and referring to the aforesaid, it has been urged that the entire State actually is working in cahoots with the Member of the Parliament who is very influential in the area and is running as many as 54 educational institutions managed by various societies which are under his control and tutelage. In the aforesaid backdrop, it has been submitted by Sri Mishra that he has no faith of getting any justice from the Court of the SDM, Tehsil, Tarabganj, District Gonda. For all the aforesaid reasons, he has prayed that not only the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 be set aside but also the proceedings in the shape of the Suit under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 be terminated/quashed. 14. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the record. 15. For all the aforesaid reasons, he has prayed that not only the impugned order dated 26.06.2019 be set aside but also the proceedings in the shape of the Suit under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 be terminated/quashed. 14. The Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the record. 15. Before dealing with the respective contentions, it will be apposite to note relevant facts leading up to the writ petition No. 22981 (MS) of 2019 which are relevant for effective adjudication of the controversy in between the parties. 16. Admittedly, one Sri Pateshwari Singh was the recorded tenure holder of the land in question. Sri Pateshwari Singh in his lifetime had executed various sale deeds in favour of different persons in respect of his land holding of Gata No. 291. He also executed a sale deed in favour of Sri Paras Nath, the husband of the petitioner for an area of 0.200 hectares. Later, Sri Paras Nath Singh transferred the aforesaid property in favour of his wife Smt. Jasoda Singh by means of a sale deed executed on 19.08.2014 and thus, the present petitioner became the owner in respect of 0.0200 hectares of Gata No. 291. 17. Similarly, Sri Pateshwari Singh had executed sale deeds in favour of the other persons who have been impleaded as opposite party nos. 1 to 6 in the suit. After his death his remaining share in the property devolved upon his wife and son who are the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 and who have a share of 0.1845 hectares which is joint with the petitioner and opposite party nos. 4, 6 to 9 of this petition. 18. From the record, it transpires that the petitioner had made an application under Section 80 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 for declaring her share as non-agricultural. The SDM concerned by means of an order dated 20.05.2019 declared the land of Gata No. 291 admeasuring 0.020 hectares as non-agricultural. 19. It is further pleaded that after the land was declared as nonagricultural, the petitioner had put a tin shed on certain part of her land and was raising constructions to complete her house and only the roof was to be placed over the structure, however, in the meantime, the SDM concerned on the suit filed by the opposite party nos. It is further pleaded that after the land was declared as nonagricultural, the petitioner had put a tin shed on certain part of her land and was raising constructions to complete her house and only the roof was to be placed over the structure, however, in the meantime, the SDM concerned on the suit filed by the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 passed the ex-parte order dated 26.06.2019 and though it only directed the parties not to change the nature of the land in question, however, by using the influence, the opposite party nos. 2 and 3 in connivance with the opposite party no. 6 and 7 stopped the construction of the petitioners. 20. It has also been submitted that the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 in connivance with the Member of Parliament as well as with the aid of State Machinery is trying to implement the order dated 26.06.2019 and in the garb thereof intend to demolish the construction of the petitioner. It has also been pleaded that the petitioner had earlier preferred a Writ Petition before a Division Bench of this Court bearing W.P. No. 19436 (MB) 2019 wherein the Court as an interim measure granted the aforesaid protection, the relevant portion thereof reads as under:- “6. We hereby direct Superintendent of Police Gonda and District Magistrate Gonda to ensure that appropriate security, as required by facts and circumstances, is provided to the petitioner so that her rights on the property, in case established, are protected. Not only life and liberty of the petitioner is required to be protected but also use of her property is required to be protected. In this regard relevant order be passed/issued within three days of receipt of certified copy of this order.” 21. Shri Raj Baksh Singh shall convey the order to Superintendent of Police Gonda and District Magistrate Gonda for immediate compliance.” 22. It further transpires that the aforesaid writ petition came to be allowed finally by means of judgment dated 23.01.2020 and the relevant portion of the said judgment dated 23.01.2020 reads as under:- “35. The order quoted above was passed by this court in the given circumstances and shows specific direction on Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, Gonda to ensure appropriate security. It is not only protection of life and liberty to the petitioner but for use of property. The order quoted above was passed by this court in the given circumstances and shows specific direction on Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, Gonda to ensure appropriate security. It is not only protection of life and liberty to the petitioner but for use of property. The official respondents were expected to comply the directions aforesaid but they initiated proceedings under Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C. This is sufficient to show their involvement thus, proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. were stayed by the Single Judge in Writ Petition No.22981 (M/S) of 2019. The fact given above shows intervention of the court against the action of official respondents for resorting to the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. instead of giving protection to the petitioner and her family members pursuant to the order of this court dated 18.7.2019. It is alleged to be for the reason that respondent no.11 is sitting Member of Parliament and belongs to Ruling party. Even if the allegation aforesaid are ignored, the fact remains that the official respondents have not acted in consonance to the order passed by this court on 18.9.2019 and aforesaid is sufficient to substantiate the allegation made by the petitioner against them. 36. Taking overall facts into consideration, we find merit in the writ petition to direct the official respondents to give an adequate protection to the petitioner and their family members to save their life and liberty. 37. The order given hereinabove is not to affect any of the proceedings pending before the revenue or civil court rather those would be decided independent to it based on the evidence lead by the parties therein and for that any observations or finding herein would not bind the court. The observations herein have been made only to see whether the case is made out for grant of relief to the petitioner.” 23. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the petitioner being aggrieved by filing of the suit under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, coupled with the grant of exparte interim order has preferred the instant petition. A coordinate Bench of this Court by means of order dated 29.08.2019 had passed an order staying the operation and effect of the order dated 26.06.2019 passed by the SDM concerned and also directed that the proceedings initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C. also be kept in abeyance. 24. A coordinate Bench of this Court by means of order dated 29.08.2019 had passed an order staying the operation and effect of the order dated 26.06.2019 passed by the SDM concerned and also directed that the proceedings initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C. also be kept in abeyance. 24. Though various allegations and counter allegations have been leveled by the parties during the course of hearing and the petitioner has chosen not to mince any word in criticizing the SDM who has been impleaded in his personal capacity as opposite party no. 3 as well as the SHO, Police Station, Wazirganj, District Gonda as opposite party no. 5. However, the allegations relates to mal-administration and using of political influence at the behest of the Member of Parliament, however, surprisingly, the said Member of Parliament has not been impleaded as a party, though, it has been alleged by Sri Mishra that the opposite party nos. 6 and 7 have also sold their share in respect of the property in favour of a Society and a copy of the sale deed has also been brought on record as Annexure No. 9, however, the said Society has also not been impleaded as a party in the present petition. 25. Be that as it may, the point for consideration before this Court is (i) whether this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 can quash the order passed by the SDM concerned so also the entire proceedings of the suit filed under Section 116 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. 26. Before answering the aforesaid issue, it will be relevant to notice the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jacky Vs. Tiny Alias Antony and Others reported in 2014 (6) SCC 508 wherein the issue before the Apex Court was whether in exercise of the powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can a plaint be set aside. 27. The Apex Court considering the earlier judgments of the Apex Court on the aforesaid points in paragraphs 13 and 15 has held as under:- “13. The nature and scope of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was considered by this Court in Jai Singh v. MCD [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 782]. In the said case, this Court held: (SCC pp. 390-91, para 15) ……….“15. The nature and scope of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was considered by this Court in Jai Singh v. MCD [ (2010) 9 SCC 385 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 782]. In the said case, this Court held: (SCC pp. 390-91, para 15) ……….“15. We have anxiously considered the submissions of the learned counsel. Before we consider the factual and legal issues involved herein, we may notice certain well-recognised principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High Court, under this article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well-known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a ‘bull in a china shop’, to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.” “15. A petition under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India can neither be entertained to decide the landlord-tenant dispute nor is it maintainable against a private individual to determine an intense dispute including the question whether one party is harassing the other party. A petition under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India can neither be entertained to decide the landlord-tenant dispute nor is it maintainable against a private individual to determine an intense dispute including the question whether one party is harassing the other party. The High Court under Article 227 has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them within the bounds of their authority but it was not the case of the 1st respondent that the order passed by the Munsif Court was without any jurisdiction or was so exercised exceeding its jurisdiction. If a suit is not maintainable it was well within the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the same in appropriate proceedings but in no case power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to question a plaint.” 28. The aforesaid issue regarding the power of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of vacating interim order passed by the Civil Courts also came up before the Apex Court in the Case of Virdudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai and Others Vs. Tuticorin Educational Society and Others reported in 2019 (9) SCC 538 wherein in paragraph nos. 10, 11 and 13, the Apex Court has held as under:- “10. Primarily the High Court, in our view, went wrong in overlooking the fact that there was already an appeal in CMA No. 1 of 2018 filed before the Sub-Court at Tuticorin under Order 41, Rule 1(r) of the Code, at the instance of the fifth defendant in the suit (third respondent herein), as against the very same order of injunction and, therefore, there was no justification for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 11. Secondly, the High Court ought to have seen that when a remedy of appeal under Section 104(1)(i) read with Order 43, Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was directly available, Respondents 1 and 2 ought to have taken recourse to the same. It is true that the availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. It is true that the availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. In A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan [A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695 ], this Court held that “though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well-recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies before he resorts to a constitutional remedy”. “13. Therefore wherever the proceedings are under the Code of Civil Procedure and the forum is the civil court, the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a measure of self-imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article 227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is provided under the Code of Civil Procedure itself.” 29. Thus, in the backdrop of the aforesaid decisions, if the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner is noticed, it would indicate that the petitioner has prayed that the suit filed by the opposite parties nos. 6, 7 be set aside and also the interim order dated 26.06.2019 be quashed. 30. The U.P. Revenue Code is a self-contained Act and Section 214 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 deals with the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure and it reads as under:- “214. Applicability of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Limitation Act, 1963.-Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Code, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to every suit, application or proceedings under this Code. Similarly, Section 207 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 deals with the First Appeal in respect of final order/decree and certain orders and aforesaid section reads as under:- “207. Similarly, Section 207 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 deals with the First Appeal in respect of final order/decree and certain orders and aforesaid section reads as under:- “207. First Appeal:-(I) Any party aggrieved by a final order or decree passed in any suit, application or proceeding specified in [column 2] of the Third Schedule, may refer a first appeal to the Court or officer specified against it in [Column 4], where such order or decree was passed by a Court or officer specified against it in (Column 3) thereof (2) A first appeal shall also be against an order of the nature specified- (a) in Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; or (b) in Section 104 of the said Code; or (c) In Order XLIII, Rule 1 of the First Schedule to the said Code. (3) The period of limitation for filing a first appeal under this Section shall be thirty days from the date of the order or decree appealed against. 31. Thus, from the conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that in so far as the first relief claimed by the petitioner regarding quashing of the interim order dated 26.06.2019 is concerned, the petitioner has an adequate efficacious statutory remedy of appeal. In so far as the quashing of the suit is concerned on the grounds urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner and noticed hereinabove, this Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid grounds can also be urged before the court concerned who has ample power to deal with the same and if necessary has the power to reject the plaint in terms of the order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. 32. In view of the aforesaid, this Court deems appropriate not to deal with and give any finding on the merits of the submissions and propositions canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties lest it may adversely affect or prejudice the rights of either of the parties before the Trial Court. 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute the aforesaid legal proposition in so far as availability of adequate statutory remedy and the applicability of C.P.C. proceedings under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is concerned. 34. The apprehension of the petitioner in respect of opposite party nos. 33. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute the aforesaid legal proposition in so far as availability of adequate statutory remedy and the applicability of C.P.C. proceedings under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is concerned. 34. The apprehension of the petitioner in respect of opposite party nos. 2 and 3 can also be ventilated before the appropriate authorities in accordance with law as the U.P. Revenue Code confers powers including the power to transfer proceedings from one Court to another and even from one District to another. 35. Thus, taking a complete and holistic view of the entire matter including the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court in para 37 of its judgment dated 23.01.2020 passed in W.P. No. 19436 (M/B) of 2019, this Court is of the considered opinion that the relief as prayed by the petitioner cannot be granted at this stage and the petitioner shall be at liberty of appearing before the Court concerned and raising all the objections before the Court concerned. In case if any such objections are taken by the petitioner, it is expected that the opposite party no.2 shall consider and decide the matter expeditiously by providing a complete opportunity of hearing to the parties and decide it strictly in accordance with law. 36. In light of the aforesaid, the Writ Petition No. 22981 (MS) of 2019 stands dismissed and the Writ Petition No. 7563 (MS) of 2020 is disposed of in terms of this order.