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2020 DIGILAW 144 (CAL)

Central Model School, Barrackpore v. Defence Estate Officer

2020-02-05

RAJASEKHAR MANTHA

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JUDGMENT 1. The short question raised in the instant writ petition is as to whether the Defence Estate Officer appointed for the defence establishment at Barrackpore under Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 , can be a complainant and also pass orders of demolition under Section 5(a)(b)(c) of the 1971 Act. 2. In the instant case, the DEO not only initiated the proceedings but also proposed to act as a Judge/Adjudicator. He also in course of the proceedings filed affidavit-in- opposition/rejoinder to the defense version. The defense was spear headed by a third party unauthorized occupants of a Government bungalow measuring about 300 sq. meters, located at no. 23, River Side Road, P.O. and P.S. Barrackpore, District 24 Parganas Noth is under the ownership of Ministry of Defence (said bulgalow). 3. The brief facts relevant to the case are that the said bunglow admittedly under the ownership of the Ministry of Defense, and under the operational control of the General Officer in Charge, Indian Army, was under the permissive occupation of one Shree Maharaj and Ajit Kumar Ghosh as holder of Occupancy Right (HOR). 4. The HOR had without the consent of General Officer in Charge, of the area, Indian Army (GOC) illegally inducted the petitioners and allowed them to occupy the said premises. The said unauthorized occupants are running a school thereat. 5. On or about July 31, 2018, the Estate Officer under authority conferred under Sub-Section 1 of Section 5(b) of the 1971 Act issued notice expressing prima facie opinion that the erection and construction work commenced on the said premises was unauthorized and illegal and asked the petitioners to show cause as to why the said construction should not be demolished. On the same day a stop work notice was issued by the DEO under Sub-Section 2 of Section 5(b) of the 1971 Act. 6. The petitioners filed a written objection cum application to the said notice of the DEO. In reply to the written objection, the DEO filed a rejoinder that was entitled 'Affidavit-In- Opposition' and in the cause title to the same the DEO described himself as 'Plaintiff'. 7. The writ petition was filed immediately thereafter and the proceedings under 1971 Act by the DEO came to be stayed by a Co-ordinate Bench in order dated January 7, 2019. 8. 7. The writ petition was filed immediately thereafter and the proceedings under 1971 Act by the DEO came to be stayed by a Co-ordinate Bench in order dated January 7, 2019. 8. The only question urged in the writ petition is the authority of the DEO in having issued the 5(b) notices, under Sub-Section (1) and (2) thereof. It is also argued that since the DEO has described himself as plaintiff, he has become Judge in his own cause and hence the proceedings are vitiated. 9. The preliminary objection raised by the Counsel for the respondent as regards maintainability of the writ petition is answered by the Counsel for the petitioners that since violation of the principle of natural justice is asserted, the availability of an appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act is not a bar to entertain the writ application. 10. This Court proposes to deal with the preliminary objection together with the main issue as regards the proceedings themselves in the context of the scheme of the 1971 Act. 11. The vires of the 1971 Act has not been challenged in the instant proceedings and rightly so since the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Chagganlal reported in AIR 1974 SC 2009 , upheld the Constitutional validity of the 1971 Act. The argument of the petitioners is that the DEO has acted as a Judge in his own cause therefore does not and cannot survive, as such authority is conferred under the 1971 Act itself. 12. The next limb of the argument of the Counsel of the petitioners is that there is no complainant or plaintiff in the instant case and hence, the DEO cannot act as an adjudicator and also a complainant in the instant case. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioners relies upon a decision of a Single Bench of this Court reported in 1985 (1) CLJ 332. 14. It is clear and evident from the scheme of the Public Premises Act 1971 as enunciated by the Honble Supreme Court in Chagganlal decision (supra) as also the decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Indian Bank Bangalore vs. M/s. Blaze and Central (P) Ltd. & Ors. 14. It is clear and evident from the scheme of the Public Premises Act 1971 as enunciated by the Honble Supreme Court in Chagganlal decision (supra) as also the decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Indian Bank Bangalore vs. M/s. Blaze and Central (P) Ltd. & Ors. reported in AIR 1986 Karnataka 258 that when a statute itself permits an Estate Officer to be not only a complainant but also an adjudicator, the same must be deemed as an exception to the general principle of law that a person cannot be a Judge in his own cause. 15. The General Principle of Common Law, cited by the counsel for the petitioner has undergone a sea-change and has been watered down by legislative enactments. Instances of this nature are available in the provisions of the Arbitration Act where one party often reserves the right to appoint its own employee as arbitrator. Other statutes in this regard are also referred to in the Indian Bank Case (Supra) herein above. Similarly other statutes like the SARFAESI Act, 2002, also prescribe appointment of an employee as 'Authorized Officer' who is not only an adjudicator but also enforcer of the claims of a Bank/Financial Institution under Section 13 and 14 thereof. 16. Since the DEO in the instant case has acted strictly in terms of Section 3, 5, 5A, 5B & 5C of the 1971 Act , this Court finds absolutely no infirmity in the impugned proceedings. 17. What however remains to be considered is effect of the Affidavit in Opposition/Rejoinder filed by the DEO, indicating that he was the plaintiff, in the impugned proceedings. 18. This Court sees that the 1971 Act and the Rules framed thereunder had not contemplated of any plaintiff and defendant as in regular civil proceedings or under Statute enacted by the States. 19. A Specially Act like the 1971 Act, aims to provide a exclusive and speedy remedy to Central Government and Establishment under the control of the Central Government Act, to be able to evict unauthorized occupants from their premises. Given the aforesaid laudable object, normal rules of adversarial proceedings are not attracted to proceedings under the 1971 Act. This Special Act of 1971 provides codified rules and procedure which duly factor in the principles of natural justice. 20. Given the aforesaid laudable object, normal rules of adversarial proceedings are not attracted to proceedings under the 1971 Act. This Special Act of 1971 provides codified rules and procedure which duly factor in the principles of natural justice. 20. In the aforesaid circumstances, the DEO rejoinder filed by the Defence Estate Officer entitled 'Affidavit-in-Opposition' must be deemed as a prior notice of the circumstances adverse to petitioners that would weigh in the mind of the DEO. 21. The petitioners have thus being given due notice of such circumstances and would be better placed to contest such proceedings. 22. For the reasons stated herein above, the interim order of stay is vacated forthwith. The writ petition is dismissed. The proceedings before the Defence Estate Officer shall be completed as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of a copy of this order. 23. The facts and circumstances of the case and given the law as it stands, discussed hereinabove, this Court has no hesitation to find that the writ petition is speculative and dishonest and lawful proceedings of the State have been stalled for period of one year. Hence, Costs at Rs. 51,000/- are imposed to the writ petitioners to be paid to the Defence Estate Officer. 24. Payment of Costs is a precondition for entertaining the defense of the petitioners in the proceedings impugned. In default of payment of costs the proceedings shall be taken up ex parte by the DEO. 25. After the judgment is dictated in open Court, the learned Counsel for the petitioners prays for the stay of the operation of the order. Such prayer is considered and refused. 26. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on urgent basis.