JUDGMENT : N.B. Suryawanshi, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Family Court No. 4, Nagpur in Petition No. B-30/2012 in favour of the respondent - Aruna. 2. Brief facts necessary for decision of the present appeal are as follows:- Respondent – Aruna approached Family Court by filing Petition No. B-30/2012 under Section 7 (g) [(g) appears to be wrongly quoted] of the Family Courts Act, 1984 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, contending therein that she is legally wedded wife of appellant - Durgaiya and their marriage was solemnized on 11.07.1979 at Nagpur as per the Hindu rites and customs. During the cohabitation of Aruna and Durgaiya, she gave birth to three male children. Durgaiya was suspecting her character and used to level false allegations against her. He used to demand Rs.20,000/- from her and used to beat her. On 10.09.1994, on account of demand of Rs.20,000/-, Aruna was beaten mercilessly by Durgaiya, who poured kerosene on her and drove her out of the matrimonial house. The marriage between Aruna and Durgaiya is not yet dissolved by decree of any competent Court, and therefore, their relationship as husband and wife still subsists. Durgaiya during the subsistence of marriage with Aruna, performed second marriage with respondent no. 2 - Laxmibai alias Bayaka, w/o. Pocham Kunarppu, District – Adilabad on 02.02.1995. However, their marriage is not a legal as the marriage of Laxmibai with her husband Pocham S/o. Malaiyya Kunarppu is not dissolved. Aruna further contended that on 16.10.1995, Durgaiya after illegal marriage with Laxmibai, changed the nomination in his service record in the office of Commanding Officer, HQMC (Unit), Air Force, Vayusena, Nagpur by deleting the name of Aruna, the name of Laxmibai was inserted by stating that Aruna was missing since 07.02.1989. Durgaiya was serving as Watchman in Security Section at Headquarters Maintenance Command (Unit) and, he was in a position to maintain her. She filed petition for maintenance, which was pending in the Family Court No. 2, Nagpur. Aruna also contended that she sought information from the office of Commanding Officer, HQMC (Unit), Air Force, Nagpur in respect of change of nomination by Durgaiya and she came to know the said fact, when she approached the office on 24.12.2010. By amending the petition, Aruna claimed that Durgaiya has retired from his service on superannuation on 30.06.2013. Aruna also contended that she sought information from the office of Commanding Officer, HQMC (Unit), Air Force, Nagpur in respect of change of nomination by Durgaiya and she came to know the said fact, when she approached the office on 24.12.2010. By amending the petition, Aruna claimed that Durgaiya has retired from his service on superannuation on 30.06.2013. She, therefore, claimed the following reliefs:- (a) A declaration that second marriage of Durgaiya with Laxmibai is illegal, null and void. (b) A declaration that Aruna alone is entitled to remain as the sole nominee of Durgaiya in his service record. (c) A declaration that changes made by Durgaiya from time to time in the nomination form in his service record and substitution of the name of Aruna with the name of Laxmibai is illegal, null and void and Aruna is entitled for service benefits of Durgaiya. (d) A mandatory injunction directing the office of Commandant to effect necessary changes of inclusion of the name of Aruna in the service record of Durgaiya. 3. Durgaiya appeared and resisted the claim by filing written statement and denied all the allegations made by Aruna. Durgaiya contended that Aruna had full knowledge of his marriage with Laxmibai, for which Aruna herself is responsible. Aruna eloped with young boy of 19 years age, namely Sanju Ahire on 07.02.1989 living behind Durgaiya and three sons aged at about 8, 6, and 4 years respectively. Aruna had deserted him and their three minor children 24 years back. He alleged that Aruna failed to perform her duties as a wife and mother. She lead adulterous life for more than 24 years. Being a Watchman, Durgaiya was required to do night duty leaving their small children at home, hence he was required to perform second marriage. 4. He further contended that Aruna has failed to take any action and/or file any proceeding over past 24 years to ascertain her status as legally wedded wife by filing any proceedings like proceeding for restitution of conjugal rights. It is further contended that in matrimonial cases, if the spouse is unheard of for more than 7 years, a presumption can be drawn under Section 108 of Evidence Act, 1972, that the spouse is dead. It is further contended that in matrimonial cases, if the spouse is unheard of for more than 7 years, a presumption can be drawn under Section 108 of Evidence Act, 1972, that the spouse is dead. As Aruna was missing for more than 23 years without any contact with Durgaiya or with their three sons, therefore, the second marriage between him and Laxmibai is legal and valid marriage, which he performed out of compulsion and due to circumstances created by Aruna. Durgaiya further contended that he was justified in substituting the name of Aruna with Laxmibai. Durgaiya lodged police complaint about missing of Aruna on 09.02.1989. Aruna is still staying with Sanjay Ahire at Bilaspur and after 24 years of desertion, she has leveled false and baseless charges against Durgaiya, only with a view to bring her case within limitation. The proceedings filed by Aruna is beyond limitation and the Family Court has no jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed by Aruna in her petition. Laxmibai - respondent no. 2, also filed her written statement and opposed the claim of Aruna. Her written statement is on the lines of Durgaiya’s written statement. The Commanding Officer of Durgaiya, original respondent no. 3 filed reply submitting that the Family Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the petition filed by Aruna. It was further submitted that Aruna filed a representation stating that she got married with Durgaiya in 1979, and due to misunderstanding with him, she left matrimonial house on 06.02.1989. Durgaiya lodged complaint i.e. wife Aruna is missing on 07.02.1989 at Sadar Police Station, Nagpur. Durgaiya was serving as Watchman in the office of original respondent no. 3. He remarried with Smt. Laxmibai and at his instance, on the basis of affidavit dated 21.03.1998, the name of Smt. Laxmibai was entered in the service record of Durgaiya. Durgaiya retired on superannuation on 30.06.2013. He is drawing provisional pension under Rule 69 of Central Civil Services, Rules 1972. The original respondent no. 3, therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition filed by Aruna. 5. Before the Family Court, Aruna examined herself as PW-1 in support of her case. Durgaiya examined himself as RW-1 and examined one Paresh S/o Ganesh Nitnawre, Lower Division Clerk from the office of original respondent no. 3 as RW-2 and Laxmibai was examined as RW-3. The original respondent no. 3, therefore, prayed to dismiss the petition filed by Aruna. 5. Before the Family Court, Aruna examined herself as PW-1 in support of her case. Durgaiya examined himself as RW-1 and examined one Paresh S/o Ganesh Nitnawre, Lower Division Clerk from the office of original respondent no. 3 as RW-2 and Laxmibai was examined as RW-3. After considering the evidence and documents on record, the learned Family Court was pleased to partly allow the petition filed by Aruna and gave following reliefs :- (i) A declaration that Aruna is entitled to be a sole nominee of Durgaiya being his legally wedded wife. (ii) A declaration that the act of Commanding Officer in canceling the claim of Aruna and entering the name of Laxmibai as nominee in the service record of Durgaiya is illegal. (iii) By mandatory injunction, original respondent no. 3 was directed to re-enter the name of Aruna as nominee of Durgaiya in his service record, by deleting the name of Laxmibai. (iv) Durgaiya was directed to pay Rs.5,000/- towards expenses of litigation. Aggrieved by the above judgment, Durgaiya and Laxmibai have filed the present Family Court Appeal. 6. The learned advocate for the appellants submitted that the Family Court has committed an error in partly allowing the petition filed by Aruna. It is submitted that after marriage, Aruna resided with Durgaiya only for a period of 91/2 years, three sons were born out of the wedlock. One Sanjay Ahire used to frequently visit Durgaiya’s house in his absence while he used to be on duty in shifts as a Watchman. Aruna lead adulterous life with Sanjay Ahire and ultimately on 07.02.1989, she eloped with Sanjay Ahire, who at that time was merely 19 years old. In spite of best possible efforts, Aruna could not be traced. A missing complaint in respect of Aruna was filed by Durgaiya at Sadar Police Station, Nagpur on 09.02.1989. On 12.10.1995, the Sadar Police Station informed Durgaiya that Aruna could not be traced in spite of sincere efforts by police and the search is closed. Durgaiya filed divorce petition before the Family Court seeking divorce from Aruna, which was transferred to Family Court and the same was dismissed in default. Due to desertion by Aruna and as children were small, Durgaiya was constrained to perform second marriage with Laxmibai. Durgaiya filed divorce petition before the Family Court seeking divorce from Aruna, which was transferred to Family Court and the same was dismissed in default. Due to desertion by Aruna and as children were small, Durgaiya was constrained to perform second marriage with Laxmibai. In these compelling circumstances, Durgaiya requested his employer on 16.10.1995 to delete the name of Aruna and enter the name of Laxmibai as he performed marriage with Laxmibai on 02.02.1995. Because of the pursession of Durgaiya, ultimately name of Laxmibai and three sons born from her were included in the official records after a gap of 14 years on 05.05.2003. 7. The claim of Aruna is not just legal and proper as she was leading adulterous life and the same is also not within limitation. Aruna had knowledge about Durgaiya’s marriage in 1997, and therefore, she ought to have approached the Family Court earlier within limitation. However, she has belatedly filed proceedings before the Family Court by stating that cause of action arose on 21.12.2010. This aspect is not properly considered by the learned Family Court. The representation of Aruna dated 24.12.2010 addressed to the original respondent no. 3 to include her name as nominee contains false and baseless ground and the same was filed with mala fide intention to create cause of action and with a view to extract monetary benefits from Durgaiya at the time of his retirement. Aruna has persistently made contradictory statements throughout various proceedings. Considering the same, the Family Court ought to have denied relief to her. The learned Trial Court failed to consider the preliminary objections in respect of limitation raised by Durgaiya in his written statement. The learned Trial Court has upheld the legal right of Aruna, but failed to note that she has not performed any duties as a mother towards her three sons, so also as a wife towards Durgaiya. Hence, the learned Trial Court ought to have refused relief to her. The learned Trial Court has upheld the legal right of Aruna, but failed to note that she has not performed any duties as a mother towards her three sons, so also as a wife towards Durgaiya. Hence, the learned Trial Court ought to have refused relief to her. By placing reliance on the exception under Section 494 of Indian Penal Code (IPC), it is submitted that the said exception lays down that if, the spouse is continuously absent for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time and if the person contracting such subsequent marriage, shall inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted, the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge. The learned advocate vehemently argued that this provision is clearly applicable in the facts of the present case and the same is in favour of appellant - Durgaiya. Since Aruna did not lodge any report to police or to the employer of Durgaiya about second marriage, the same should be held against Aruna. Further submission is that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to decide the issue of nominee and to direct the employer to delete the name of Laxmibai and to enter the name of Aruna in the service record of Durgaiya. Since nomination is a service matter, the Family Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the plea in respect of nomination. The Family Court has erred in coming to the conclusion that it has jurisdiction under Section 7 (1) (b) and (d) to grant reliefs in favour of Aruna. The learned advocate for the appellants, therefore, prayed for allowing the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree. In support of arguments, reliance is placed upon following judgments:- (1) Balbir Singh .Vrs.. Baljinder Kaur, a Division Bench Judgment of Punjab and Harayana in FAO-M-74-2019. (2) P. Mohandas Panicker ..Vrs.. K. K. Dakshayani, a decision of Kerla High Court in Mat. Appeal No. 15 of 2006. (3) P. V. Josheph Christian ..Vrs.. Deenamma Josheph Christian, II (2004) DMC 592, (2003) 1 GLR 196 (4) Union of India ..Vrs.. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr., 2012(5) ALL MR 462 (S.C). 8. Per contra, the learned advocate for the respondent - Aruna supported the decision of the learned Trial Court. Appeal No. 15 of 2006. (3) P. V. Josheph Christian ..Vrs.. Deenamma Josheph Christian, II (2004) DMC 592, (2003) 1 GLR 196 (4) Union of India ..Vrs.. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr., 2012(5) ALL MR 462 (S.C). 8. Per contra, the learned advocate for the respondent - Aruna supported the decision of the learned Trial Court. It is submitted that Aruna got knowledge about the change of nomination on 24.12.2010, when she visited the office of employer of Durgaiya, therefore, she filed objection with the employer vide Exhibit - 70 on 24.12.2010. Hence, from the date of knowledge, the present petition before the Family Court filed by Aruna is well within limitation. The Family Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by Aruna in terms of Section 7 (1) (b) and (d) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. It is submitted that the marriage between Durgaiya and Aruna was not dissolved at any point of time by a decree of competent Civil Court, hence the Family Court was justified in allowing the petition. Section 494 of IPC is not applicable in the facts of the present case. The learned advocate further contended that the judgments relied upon by the appellant are not applicable in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and prayed for dismissal of Family Court Appeal. 9. Heard learned advocate for the parties, perused the original record, notes of evidence as well as written notes of arguments filed by respective advocates of both the parties. Considering the rival contentions, the following points arises for our consideration. (i) Whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to entertain the reliefs claimed by Aruna? (ii) Whether the Family Court was justified in granting reliefs in favour of respondent – Aruna? 10. To consider the arguments in respect of jurisdiction, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions. Section 7 of Chapter III of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short ‘the said Act, 1984’) provides for jurisdiction of the Family Court, which reads thus:- 7. 10. To consider the arguments in respect of jurisdiction, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions. Section 7 of Chapter III of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short ‘the said Act, 1984’) provides for jurisdiction of the Family Court, which reads thus:- 7. Jurisdiction.- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall – (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district Court or any subordinate civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district Court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation.- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:- (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) ………. (f) ………. 11. Section 7 (1) (a) of the said Act, 1984, confers on Family Court all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suites and proceedings of the nature referred to in explanation. In terms of Section 7 (1) (b) of the said Act, 1984, the Family Court is deemed to be a District Court for the purposes exercising such jurisdiction under such law, or as the case may be such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. In terms of Section 7 (1) (b) of the said Act, 1984, the Family Court is deemed to be a District Court for the purposes exercising such jurisdiction under such law, or as the case may be such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Thus in view of the above quoted provision, the Family Court has all the jurisdiction of the District Court and is deemed to be a District Court for exercising such jurisdiction. As per explanation (b) of Section 7 (1) of the said Act, 1984, the Family Court can grant declaration as to validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person. In the present case, it is an admitted position on record that marriage between Durgaiya and Aruna was not dissolved by a decree of competent Court, therefore Aruna’s status as legally wedded wife of Durgaiya cannot be disputed. Therefore, Family Court was well within its jurisdiction in granting the declaration in favour of Aruna that she is legally wedded wife of Durgaiya in terms of Clause (b) of explanation to Section 7 (1) of the said Act, 1984. 12. The declaration in respect of nomination has been granted by the Family Court by placing reliance on Clause (d) of the explanation to Section 7 (1), which confers jurisdiction on the Family Court to entertain a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction ‘in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship’. Since the nomination and subsequent deletion of the name of Aruna was a circumstance arising out of her marital relationship with Durgaiya, the Family Court had jurisdiction to entertain the prayers and grant relief of injunction in favour of Aruna which, according to us is rightly granted by the learned Family Court by giving cogent reasons. We accordingly answer point no. (i) holding that in terms of explanation (b) and (d) to Section 7 (1) of the said Act, 1984, the Family Court was having jurisdiction to entertain and grant the reliefs claimed by Aruna in her petition. 13. The definition of family given in Rule 2 (c) of the General Provident Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960, reads thus : 2. (i) holding that in terms of explanation (b) and (d) to Section 7 (1) of the said Act, 1984, the Family Court was having jurisdiction to entertain and grant the reliefs claimed by Aruna in her petition. 13. The definition of family given in Rule 2 (c) of the General Provident Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960, reads thus : 2. Definitions 1[(c) “Family” means- (i) in the case of a male subscriber, the wife or wives, parents, children, minor brothers, unmarried sisters, deceased son’s widow and children and where no parents of the subscriber is alive, a paternal grandparent: Provided that if a subscriber proves that his wife has been judicially separated from him or has ceased under the customary law of the community, to which she belongs to be entitled to maintenance she shall henceforth be deemed to be no longer a member of the subscriber’s family in matters to which these rules relate unless the subscriber subsequently intimates, in writing to the Accounts Officer that she shall continue to be so regarded ; 14. Taking into consideration the definition of ‘family’ in above Rule, only legally wedded wife can be said to be included in the definition of Family, as proviso to Rule 2 (c) casts a duty on the subscriber to prove i.e. wife has been judicially separated from him or has ceased under the customary law of the community. She can be deemed to be no longer a member of subscriber’s family. Admittedly in the present case, Durgaiya has failed to prove that Aruna has been judicially separated from him or she has ceased to be his wife under the customary law of the community, to which Aruna and Durgaiya belong to be entitled to maintenance. On the contrary, she is awarded maintenance @ Rs.2000/- per month from Durgaiya by Family Court in PE-321/2011. Hence, Aruna being legally wedded wife of Durgaiya, she needs to be regarded as a member of Durgaiya’s family. 15. Clause 19.1 of the Central Government Employees Group Insurance Scheme, 1980 (for short ‘the said Scheme, 1980’) makes a provision for nomination. On the contrary, she is awarded maintenance @ Rs.2000/- per month from Durgaiya by Family Court in PE-321/2011. Hence, Aruna being legally wedded wife of Durgaiya, she needs to be regarded as a member of Durgaiya’s family. 15. Clause 19.1 of the Central Government Employees Group Insurance Scheme, 1980 (for short ‘the said Scheme, 1980’) makes a provision for nomination. The Head of office has to obtain from every Government servant, who is a member of the said Scheme, 1980, a nomination conferring on one or more person a right to receive amount that may become payable under the Scheme in event of his death before attaining the age of superannuation. Clause 19.3, reads thus:- 19.3 If a member of the ‘scheme’ has a family at the time of his making the nomination he shall make such nomination only in favour of a member or members of his family. For this purpose, family will have the same meaning as assigned to it in the General Provident Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960. 16. The provision in respect of nomination in Clause 19.3 also mentions that the member of the scheme if has a family, he shall make such nomination only in favour of a member or members of his family and for this purpose, family will have the same meaning as assigned to it in General Provision Fund (Central Services) Rules, 1960, which are already reproduced herein above. In this view of the matter, also respondent - Aruna was justified in seeking declaration and injunction in respect of her nomination in the service record of Durgaiya from the Family Court. 17. The index card issued to Durgaiya by Ministry and Health of Family Welfare of Government of India, which also mentions ‘family’ that includes only ‘wife’ (or husband), children or step children or adopted children and dependent parents, minor brother upto 18 years, sisters, widow daughters and sisters, here also reference to wife will have to be read as legally wedded wife. 18. 18. Conjoint reading of Section 7 of the said Act, 1984, the definition of ‘family’ in General Provident Fund, Rules, 1960 (for short, ‘the said Rules, 1960’) and Clause 19.3 of the said Scheme, 1980 leads us to a conclusion that Aruna being legally wedded wife was justified in claiming the reliefs in respect of nomination, as she falls within the definition of 'Family' given in the General Provident Fund (Central Scheme Rules, 1960) and her nomination in the service record of Durgaiya according to us is a circumstance arising out of her marital relationship with Durgaiya. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept the arguments of the appellants that the change of the nomination in service record is a service dispute within purview of administrative law and the Family Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. 20. Aruna has claimed that on 24.12.2010, when she visited the office of the employer of Durgaiya, she came to know about change of nomination. Aruna has filed application Exhibit - 70 on 28.12.2010 raising grievance about cancellation of her nomination and addition of name of second appellant - Laxmibai as a nominee of Durgaiya. The petition was filed by Aruna before the Family Court on 21.07.2012, this was within three years from the date of knowledge on 24.12.2010. In that view, there is no substance in the argument of appellant that the proceeding filed by Aruna was beyond limitation. 21. It is admitted position on record that marriage between Durgaiya and Aruna was solemnized on 11.07.1979 as per Hindu rites and customs. Three male children are begotten from the said wedlock. The marriage between Durgaiya and Aruna is not dissolved by a decree of a competent Civil Court, therefore, status of Aruna as legally wedded wife of Durgaiya cannot be disputed. Since Durgaiya has performed second marriage with Laxmibai, while his marriage with Aruna was subsisting, the second marriage is void and Laxmibai cannot be said to be legally wedded wife of Durgaiya. Even if the contentions of Durgaiya that Aruna resided separately for a period of more than 23 years is accepted still that itself does not dissolve the marriage between Durgaiya and Aruna. 22. Even if the contentions of Durgaiya that Aruna resided separately for a period of more than 23 years is accepted still that itself does not dissolve the marriage between Durgaiya and Aruna. 22. The allegations of Durgaiya that Aruna is leading adulterous life and has failed to perform duties of a mother and wife and her desertion has compelled him to perform second marriage with Laxmibai are unacceptable and they do not further the case of Durgaiya in any manner, in absence of declaration and dissolution of his marriage with Aruna by decree of a competent Civil Court. During the subsistence marriage with Aruna, Durgaiya has performed marriage with Laxmibai, which cannot be said to be legal. The allegations of adultery have no relevance in the present case as the same does not in any manner affect the merits of the claim of Aruna. 23. Appellants have relied upon the following decisions:- (a) In Balbir Singh (supra), a decree passed in favour respondent – wife under Section 11 read with Section 5 (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, thereby declaring the marriage between the parties null and void was questioned by appellant – husband, who at the time of marriage was having living spouse. On merits, the appeal was dismissed by the Punjab and Harayana High Court. This decision has no relevance to the facts of the present case. (b) P. Mohandas (supra) is in respect of divorce claimed by appellant/husband on the ground that wife was living in adulterous life. The Trial Court dismissed proceedings filed by husband seeking dissolution of marriage. The High Court allowed the appeal on the basis of evidence adduced before the Family Court and granted decree of divorce under Section 13 (1) (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, this authority does not help the appellant in any manner. (c) Union of India (supra) is the decision on the point of inference under Section 114(g), in which it is held that ‘issue of drawing adverse inference is required to be decided by the Court taking into consideration pleadings of parties and deciding whether any document/evidence, withheld, has any relevance at all or omission of its production would directly established the case of other side. The Court cannot loose sight of the fact that burdens of proof on the party, which makes a factual averment’. This authority is not applicable in the present case. The Court cannot loose sight of the fact that burdens of proof on the party, which makes a factual averment’. This authority is not applicable in the present case. (d) The decision in P. V. Joseph (supra) is on the point that a civil suit was instituted under Section 10 of the Divorce Act, 1869 for dissolution of marriage on the ground that respondent - wife was guilty of adultery and question referred to the High Court was whether passing of decree for dissolution of marriage is whether the factual profile and the evidence on record constitutes a legal launching pad for passing of decree for dissolution or not ? This authority is rendered in different facts and is of no help to the case of appellants. 24. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the Family Court was right in partly allowing the petition filed by Aruna by giving cogent reasoning. We do not find any illegality or error in findings recorded by the learned Family Court. We accordingly answer point no. (ii), holding that the Family Court was justified in granting reliefs in favour of respondent – Aruna. We are of the considered view that the appeal filed by the appellants is devoid of any substance and the appellants have failed to make out any case to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Court, which is impugned herein. Hence, the following order. ORDER (i) The Family Court Appeal is dismissed (ii) Parties to bear their own costs.