JUDGMENT : 1. This is the defendant’s Second Appeal, being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 17.11.1991 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Sitapur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1988 whereby the First Appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the 3rd Additional Munsif, Sitapur in R.S. No. 379 of 1983 dated 20.04.1988 by which the suit of the plaintiff-respondent no. 1 was decreed for a relief of cancellation of sale deed dated 01.06.1982. 2. The above second appeal was admitted by this Court by means of the order dated 06.12.2017 on the following substantial questions of law which are being re-produced hereinafter for convenient perusal. 1. Whether the first appellate court could legally decide the first appeal without framing the points for determination, giving its decision thereon and recording the reasons for the decision, as mandated by the provision contained in Order 41, Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether the registration of the sale deed in question dated 01.09.1982, in which the plaintiff/respondent acknowledged the receipt of the agreed sale consideration of Rs.10,000/-, gives rise to a presumption of due execution of the sale deed after receipt of the consideration, as provided in Sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act? 3. Whether after recording a finding that after execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff/respondent's father Heera Lal deposited Rs.10,000/-in his account, the first appellate Court was justified in drawing an inference from this finding itself, that the plaintiff/respondent did not get any consideration, when Section 2 (d) of the Contract Act, 1872 defines consideration as: "(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise;"? 3. In order to appreciate the submissions of learned counsel for the respective parties, certain brief facts giving rise to the above second appeal are being noticed hereinafter. 4. The plaintiff-respondent no. 1instituted a suit for cancellation of sale deed dated 01.06.1982 before the Court of Munsif, Sultanpur which was registered as R.S. No. 379 of 1983. 3. In order to appreciate the submissions of learned counsel for the respective parties, certain brief facts giving rise to the above second appeal are being noticed hereinafter. 4. The plaintiff-respondent no. 1instituted a suit for cancellation of sale deed dated 01.06.1982 before the Court of Munsif, Sultanpur which was registered as R.S. No. 379 of 1983. It was pleaded that the property in question i.e. Plot No. 214 measuring 2.05 acres situated in Gram, Sahibnagar, Pargana & Tehsil Misrit, District Sitapur was purchased by the plaintiff’s father-in-law in the name of the plaintiff. It was further pleaded that in the Hindu Calender Month of Baisakh in the year 1982, the plaintiff had gone to her parent’s home to attend a wedding of her cousin brother Jai Dayal. It is during that period that the defendants detained the plaintiff at her parental home and by exercising coercion and undue influence got the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant nos. 1 and 2 who are the appellants before this Court. 5. In paragraph 5 of the plaint it was pleaded by the plaintiff that the suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 01.06.1982 deserved to be decreed as the sale deed was void for the reason that at the time of its execution the plaintiff was a minor. The other grounds upon which the sale deed was challenged was to the effect that the said sale deed dated 01.06.1982 was without consideration and it was got executed from the plaintiff by exercising undue influence. It was also pleaded that the father of the plaintiff had informed that he was in need of some money and was in the process of obtaining a loan for which he wanted the plaintiff (his daughter) to stand as a surety and it is for the aforesaid purpose that certain documents had to be executed and it is in this backdrop that the aforesaid document was executed by the plaintiff which later on revealed that it was a document regarding the sale of the property in question, hence the suit for cancellation of sale deed. 6. The defendants contested the suit by filing their written statement. It was specifically pleaded that at the time of the execution of the sale deed the plaintiff was a major. 6. The defendants contested the suit by filing their written statement. It was specifically pleaded that at the time of the execution of the sale deed the plaintiff was a major. It was also pleaded that the property had not been purchased by the father-in-law of the plaintiff in her name rather the property was given to the plaintiff in dowry at the time of her wedding, however, since her husband and the father-in-law (of the plaintiff) at the relevant time did not have the means to purchase the property and, therefore, it was transferred in the name of the plaintiff by her father. It was also stated that the plaintiff was never detained in her parental home. She regularly used to come and visit her father from the residence of her in-laws and that the sale deed was executed with the knowledge of the plaintiff for a valuable sale consideration of Rs. 20,000/-and as such the plea and grounds raised by the plaintiff challenging the sale deed were false. It was also stated that the plaintiff had another property which was also sold by her on 19.10.1983 in favour of Smt. Sheela and Smt. Kusumlata, however, for malafide reasons the plaintiff had challenged only the sale deed executed in favour of the defendants no. 1 and 2. 7. Upon the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed 4 issues. On behalf of the plaintiff, Sri Om Prakash was examined as P.W. 1, Dr. M. Shamin Senior Radiologist was examined as P.W. 2 while the plaintiff herself was examined as P.W. 3. Sri Bechey Lal and Ram Sunder were examined as plaintiffs-witness no. 4 and 5. The defendant Sri Vedvrat examined himself as D.W. 1 whereas Sri Ramdeen and Naseer Khan were examined as D.W. No. 2 and 3. After analysing the evidence, the Trial Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff was a minor on the date of the execution of the sale deed, coupled with the fact that by malafide and by exercising undue influence the document was executed for which the consideration was also not paid, accordingly, the suit was decreed by means of judgment and decree dated 20.04.1988. 8. The defendants no. 8. The defendants no. 1 and 2 preferred the Regular Civil Appeal before the District Judge, Sitapur which was also dismissed by means of the impugned judgment and decree dated 17.01.1991 and it affirmed the decree passed by the lower court. 9. The appellants being aggrieved by the concurrent findings have assailed the 2 judgments and decree of the Court below have preferred the above second appeal. 10. Heard Sri Shubhash Vidyarthi, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri U.S. Sahai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and perused the record. 11. Sri Vidyarthi while assailing the two judgments and decree has forcefully argued that the First Appellate Court had erred in not framing the points for determination nor there was material on record to indicate what prevailed in the mind of the First Appellate Court to carve out a new plea for the plaintiff/respondent and thereafter affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. It has also been argued by Sri Vidyarthi that from the perusal of the judgment especially in light of the submissions made before the First Appellate Court, it would indicate that neither the submissions have been recorded nor there is any discussion of the submissions and as such in a cursory manner the First Appellate Court has affirmed the judgment and decree which is an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction by the First Appellate Court. 12. It has also been argued that the First Appellate Court being the final court of fact before whom both the facts and law was open to be agitated and the matter was argued in detail yet it has not considered the submissions of the counsel for the appellants in the correct perspective and the learned Appellate Court below has erred in carving out a new case for the plaintiff-respondents which was neither pleaded nor proved before the Trial Court. 13. 13. To elaborate the submission it been submitted that the First Appellate Court has borrowed the principles and granted the benefit of Pardanasheen lady, which is also available to people who are rustic and come from villages and this benefit has been granted to the plaintiff while there were no pleadings to the aforesaid effect nor there was any evidence led by the plaintiff in this regard and accordingly, the approach of the First Appellate Court stood vitiated the moment it extended the aforesaid benefit to the plaintiff, inasmuch as, the First Appellate Court also erred in incorrectly shifting the burden of proof on the defendants as it proceeded on the premise that the defendants/appellants were in a position to dominate the will of the plaintiff which is wholly incorrect nor there was any pleading or evidence to support the same. 14. Sri Vidyarthi has also submitted that the First Appellate Court has not considered the evidence of the plaintiff rather only the evidence of the defendants have been cursorily noticed in piecemeal while forgetting that the plaintiff had challenged the sale deed which was a registered document and as such there was a presumption to its due execution and attestation and accordingly the burden was on the plaintiff to have lead cogent and convincing evidence to rebut not only the presumption attached to the document but also to prove the grounds upon which the plaintiff had assailed the sale deed and from her own evidence the aforesaid facts were not established and, therefore, the plaintiff who was to stand on its own feet and could not take the benefit of any weakness of the case of the defendants and this aspect of the matter has been completely lost sight of by the First Appellate Court, which has vitiated the judgment. 15. It has also been urged that amongst the grounds raised by the plaintiff assailing the sale deed in question, the First Appellate Court while re-appraising the evidence, upset the finding regarding the minority of the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court held that the plaintiff was not a minor and this finding recorded by the First Appellate Court has not been assailed by the plaintiff during the second appeal by filing any cross objections. The First Appellate Court held that the plaintiff was not a minor and this finding recorded by the First Appellate Court has not been assailed by the plaintiff during the second appeal by filing any cross objections. Once, the aforesaid finding had been upset, the only other ground available to the plaintiff as pleaded by her was regarding non-payment of the consideration as well as undue influence exercised while executing the document. This aspect of the matter was not established by the evidence of the plaintiff and as such the First Appellate Court has erred in affirming the decision of the Trial Court and, accordingly, both the judgment and decree are bad in the eyes of law and cannot sustain judicial scrutiny. 16. Sri. U.S. Sahai, learned counsel for the respondents has supported the judgment of the two courts below. It has been submitted that the finding regarding undue influence and that non-payment of consideration while executing the document in question, are pure findings of facts. These findings which have been recorded on the basis of evidence and material on record are not open to be assailed in exercise of powers under Section 100 C.P.C. It has also been urged that the appellants have not been able to demonstrate as to how the aforesaid findings are bad, inasmuch as, unless a perversity is shown, the findings cannot be upset especially when they have been concurrently affirmed by the two courts. 17. Sri Sahai has also submitted that the plaintiff while examining herself had categorically pleaded and had also stated on oath that she did not execute the documents by her own will. She also pleaded and made a statement before the Court that she was not aware of the nature of the transaction coupled with the fact that it was her husband and her father-in-law who used to look after her property and that the plaintiff had been detained by her father at his residence and coerced her into executing the document which later revealed was a sale deed and this statement could not be shown to be false and accordingly cannot be challenged nor it was established that it was erroneous, hence, the judgment passed by the two courts do not require any interference and as such the second appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 18. 18. The Court has given its anxious consideration to the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record carefully. 19. At the very outset, it may be stated that as far as the first question formulated by this Court is concerned, whether the First Appellate Court could decide the First Appeal without framing the points for determination, giving its decision thereon, and recording the reasons for the decision as mandated by the Order 41Rule 31 C.P.C. as bestowed upon it in law. It relates to the manner in which a first appeal is to be decided rather this Court finds that the First Appellate Court has not yet discharged its duty of dealing with the submissions and the evidence of the parties while giving its decision. It is now fairly stated that First Appeal is a substantial right for the parties. The First Appellate Court while expressing the general agreement with the finding recorded by the Trial Court in Appeal should not do in a fashion that it appears to be a camouflage adopted by the Appellate Court from shirking the duty cast on it. The First Appellate Court being the final Court of facts is required to advert to the submissions, evidence and the findings recorded by the Trial Court and thereafter by applying its own judicial mind must record its affirmance or its dessent. The Apex Court in the case of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari reported in 2001 SCC (3) 179...has held as under:- “The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the finding of the Trial Court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for re-hearing both on questions of facts and law. The judgment of the First Appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, and all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the Appellate Court. While reversing a finding of fact, the Appellate Court must come in a close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the Trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing an appeal further that the First Appellate Court has discharged the duty expected of it.” 20. While reversing a finding of fact, the Appellate Court must come in a close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the Trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the Court hearing an appeal further that the First Appellate Court has discharged the duty expected of it.” 20. The aforesaid proposition has also been considered lately by the Apex Court in the case of Sudarsan Puhan Vs. Jayanta Mohanti 2018 (10) SCC 552 wherein considering the duties of the First Appellate Court and the manner in which the first appeal is to be decided has extensively dealt with the said issue by considering the earlier decisions of the Apex Court on the aforesaid subject and the relevant paragraphs of which reads as under:- 23. This Court also in various cases reiterated the aforesaid principle and laid down the powers of the appellate court under Section 96 of the Code while deciding the first appeal. 24. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 25. In [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 ], this Court held as under : (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) “15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” 26. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” 26. The above view was followed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in [Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ] , wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 27. In [H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 ], this Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.” 28. Again in [Jagannath v. Arulappa, (2005) 12 SCC 303 ] , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2) “2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.” 29. Again in [B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 808] , this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-31, paras 3-5) “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. 530-31, paras 3-5) “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 ], SCC p. 188, para 15 and [Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 ], SCC p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.” 30. The aforementioned cases were relied upon by this Court while reiterating the same principle in [SBI v. Emmsons International Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 174 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 289] and [UPSRTC v. Mamta, (2016) 4 SCC 172 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 594 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 269] . 21. As far as the provision of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. is concerned it has been the subject matter of consideration in a number of decisions. From the reading of provision of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C., it would indicate that the provisions are salutary in nature and the object thereof is to focus on the contentions of the parties and the Appellate Court in understanding in adjudicating the rival claims. The provisions thereof must be complied with and non-compliance of the provisions of the Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. may be an irregularity of serious nature. The Apex Court in the case of G. Saraswati Vs. Rathinammal 2018 (3) SCC 340 considering the scope and applicability of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. has held as under:- “10. Time and again, this Court has emphasised on the courts the need to pass reasoned order in every case which must contain the narration of the bare facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case, the submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues involved and the reasons in support of the findings on all the issues in support of its conclusion. It is really unfortunate that the Division Bench failed to keep in mind this principle while disposing of the appeal and passed a cryptic and unreasoned order. It is really unfortunate that the Division Bench failed to keep in mind this principle while disposing of the appeal and passed a cryptic and unreasoned order. Such order undoubtedly cause prejudice to the parties because it deprived them to know the reasons as to why one party has won and the other has lost. We can never countenance the manner in which such order was passed by the High Court which has compelled us to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits.” 22. Lately the Apex Court in the case of R.S. Anjayya Gupta Vs. Thippaiah Setty and Others reported in 2019 (7) SCC 300 in para 13 to 17 has held as under:- 13. We have heard Mr Shailesh Madiyal, counsel for the appellant. The main contention of Mr Madiyal is that the High Court dismissed the first appeal cursorily without discussing or considering the documentary or oral evidence produced by the parties. Further, the plaintiff had failed to plead and also to prove that the joint family was in possession of a nucleus and which was adequate to fund the purchase of properties at Schedules A and B respectively. Hence, no presumption of jointness of the said property can be drawn in this case. It is then urged that both the courts have failed to consider crucial evidence which established that the appellant had paid for the purchase of the suit scheduled properties with his own, personal funds and hence, was the absolute owner thereof. He also contends that the trial court grievously erred in putting the burden of establishing the existence and adequacy of such a nucleus on the appellant-original Defendant 1 and the High Court ought not to have supported such an approach. He also contends that the trial court grievously erred in putting the burden of establishing the existence and adequacy of such a nucleus on the appellant-original Defendant 1 and the High Court ought not to have supported such an approach. Mr Madiyal refers to the judgments of [C. Venkata Swamy v. H.N. Shivanna, (2018) 1 SCC 604 , paras 10-11, 1318 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 280] , Madhukar v. Sangram [Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , para 5] , Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh [Mudi Gowda Gowdappa Sankh v. Ram Chandra Ravagowda Sankh, (1969) 1 SCC 386 , para 6] , G. Narayana Raju v. G. Chamaraju [G. Narayana Raju v. G. Chamaraju, AIR 1968 SC 1276 , para 3] and Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade [Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade, (2007) 1 SCC 521 , paras 12-17] to buttress his submissions. 14. We have also heard Mr Raghavendra Srivatsa, counsel for Respondent 1 (plaintiff), who argues that the evidence on record shows that the members of the family were living as an undivided joint family and that the suit scheduled properties were purchased in the name of the appellant on legal advice but in fact the consideration amount was paid from the joint family funds. He then contends that it is settled law that once admitted or proved that there was a sufficient joint family nucleus out of which the properties could be acquired, thereafter, the presumption would arise that the properties are joint family properties. It is then for the opposing party, in this case, the appellant, to prove that he had acquired the properties out of his own funds. In the present case, the business conducted from the suit scheduled properties were clearly established as joint family business being run by the family members and acquired out of joint family funds. The appellant failed to impeach the evidence given by Respondent 1-plaintiff and the existence of the joint family nucleus had been proved by Respondent 1-original plaintiff and admitted by the appellant-original Defendant 1. 15. The appellant failed to impeach the evidence given by Respondent 1-plaintiff and the existence of the joint family nucleus had been proved by Respondent 1-original plaintiff and admitted by the appellant-original Defendant 1. 15. The respondents have relied on Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade [Appasaheb Peerappa Chamdgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chamdgade, (2007) 1 SCC 521 , paras 12-17] in support of the submission that when it is proved or admitted that a family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus. Additionally, reliance is placed on [V.D. Dhanwatey v. CIT, (1968) 2 SCR 62 , paras 4-5 : AIR 1968 SC 683 ] for the same proposition. While, refuting the argument that the High Court cursorily dismissed the first appeal without adverting to the relevant points and evidence on record, it is urged by the respondents that the High Court after noticing the relevant aspects was pleased to uphold the finding of fact recorded by the trial court being convinced that the same was just and proper. It was unnecessary for the High Court to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court as observed by a three-Judge Bench in [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , para 15] and [U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekar, (2017) 15 SCC 309 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 682]. 16. After cogitating over the rival submissions made during the elaborate arguments by the respective counsel and who had invited our attention to the pleadings and evidence on record, we deem it to appropriate to relegate the parties before the High Court for consideration of the first appeal afresh. We say so for more than one reason. The first is that, the High Court has disposed of the first appeal by a cryptic judgment. For, the first five paragraphs of the impugned judgment are only reproduction of the submissions made by the counsel for the parties concerned. We say so for more than one reason. The first is that, the High Court has disposed of the first appeal by a cryptic judgment. For, the first five paragraphs of the impugned judgment are only reproduction of the submissions made by the counsel for the parties concerned. After doing so, in para 6 of the impugned judgment, the High Court straightaway proceeded to affirm the opinion of the trial court that the suit properties forming part of Schedule A and Schedule B to the plaint, are the joint family properties. It is apposite to reproduce paras 6 and 7, whereby the first appeal has been disposed of. The same read thus: (R.S. Anjayya Gupta case [R.S. Anjayya Gupta v. Thippaiah Setty S., 2004 SCC OnLine Kar 656], SCC OnLine SC) “6. I find no merit in the appeal insofar as A and B Scheduled properties are concerned. The opinion of the trial court that they are the joint family properties is sound and proper. But in respect of the sale of agricultural lands made by Defendants 2 and 3 and plaintiff. I feel that the appellant can make another application before the trial court for an enquiry to find out whether the impugned sales would bind the appellant. To that extent, the appellant can pursue his remedy for another preliminary decree before the trial court. 7. Insofar as A and B Scheduled properties are concerned the finding of the trial court is sound and proper. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.” 17. To that extent, the appellant can pursue his remedy for another preliminary decree before the trial court. 7. Insofar as A and B Scheduled properties are concerned the finding of the trial court is sound and proper. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of.” 17. In a recent decision of this Court in U. Manjunath Rao [U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekar, (2017) 15 SCC 309 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 682] , the Court after adverting to Santosh Hazari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , para 15] , Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh [Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 , para 15] , Madhukar [Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756 , para 5] , H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith [H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 , para 3] and SBI v. Emmsons International Ltd. [SBI v. Emmsons International Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 174 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 289] went on to observe thus: (U. Manjunath Rao case [U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekar, (2017) 15 SCC 309 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 682] , SCC pp. 313-15, paras 11-14) “11. … ‘3. … Thus, in the first appeal the parties have the right to be heard both on the questions of facts as well as on law and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all the aspects and decide the case by ascribing reasons.’ 12. In this context, we may usefully refer to Order 41 Rule 31 CPC which reads as follows: ‘ORDER 41 Appeals from Original Decrees ***31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.—The judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state— (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.’ 13. On a perusal of the said Rule, it is quite clear that the judgment of the appellate court has to state the reasons for the decision. On a perusal of the said Rule, it is quite clear that the judgment of the appellate court has to state the reasons for the decision. It is necessary to make it clear that the approach of the first appellate court while affirming the judgment of the trial court and reversing the same is founded on different parameters as per the judgments of this Court. In Girijanandini Devi [Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 ], the Court ruled that while agreeing with the view of the trial court on the evidence, it is not necessary to restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given in the trial court judgment which is under appeal should ordinarily suffice. The same has been accepted by another three-Judge Bench in Santosh Hazari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , para 15] . However, while stating the law, the Court has opined that expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage to be adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. We are disposed to think, the expression of the said opinion has to be understood in proper perspective. By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that the first appellate court can quote passages from the trial court judgment and thereafter pen few lines and express the view that there is no reason to differ with the trial court judgment. That is not the statement of law expressed by the Court. The statement of law made in Santosh Hazari [Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , para 15] has to be borne in mind. 14. In this regard, a three-Judge Bench decision in [Asha Devi v. Dukhi Sao, (1974) 2 SCC 492 ] is worthy of noticing, although the context was different. In the said case, the question arose with regard to power of the Division Bench hearing a letters patent appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge in a first appeal. The Court held that the letters patent appeal lies both on questions of fact and law. In the said case, the question arose with regard to power of the Division Bench hearing a letters patent appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge in a first appeal. The Court held that the letters patent appeal lies both on questions of fact and law. The purpose of referring to the said decision is only to show that when the letters patent appeal did lie, it was not restricted to the questions of law. The appellant could raise issues pertaining to facts and appreciation of evidence. This is indicative of the fact that the first appellate court has a defined role and its judgment should show application of mind and reflect the reasons on the basis of which it agrees with the trial court. There has to be an “expression of opinion” in the proper sense of the said phrase. It cannot be said that mere concurrence meets the requirement of law. Needless to say, it is one thing to state that the appeal is without any substance and it is another thing to elucidate, analyse and arrive at the conclusion that the appeal is devoid of merit.” 23. This Court also while considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter in the case of Dalla Vs. Naanhu 2019 (37) LCD 360 had the occasion to consider the scope and applicability of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. and this Court has held as under:- 23. The spirit of the provision is to ensure that the appellate Court must record reasons for the decisions and is to focus attention of the Court to rival contentions of the parties which arise for determinations and also to offer the litigating parties an opportunity of knowing and understanding the grounds upon which the decision is founded in a view to enable them to know the basis of decision and if they think proper and so advised to avail the remedy of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC. 28. It would indicate that a decision of a Court cannot be upset merely based on technical or immaterial defects. The Rules of procedure are made to sub-serve the ends of justice. 28. It would indicate that a decision of a Court cannot be upset merely based on technical or immaterial defects. The Rules of procedure are made to sub-serve the ends of justice. The object of Section 99 CPC is to prevent technicalities from overcoming the ends of justice and from operating as a means of circuity of litigation where the decision is correct on merits and is within the jurisdiction of the Court, no error or defect or irregularity which does not go to the root of the matter will vitiate the order or invalidate the action. (See: Mohammad Husain Khan V. Babu Kishva Nandan Sahai, AIR 1937 PC 233 and Kiran Singh and others V. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 ). 30. Thus, it would been seen that where a judgment passed by the first appellate Court though otherwise conforms to the requirements as provided under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, that is to say that the first appellate Court has made a narration of facts of the case of the parties to the lis, the issues arising in the case and submissions urged by the parties, the legal principles applicable to the issues and reasons in support of the findings in support of its conclusion, it would substantially comply with the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC and merely by not stating the points of determination in so many words, it would not make the judgment wholly void. 33. The purpose and object of incorporating Section 99 CPC is to prevent mischief, which may be caused by the reversal of the decree in a case of this kind. Thus, unless and until the non-compliance of Order XLI and Rule 31 CPC is of such a nature that it affects the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court or the soul of the provision is robbed by not discussing the bare facts, issues arising therefrom, the rival points urged and recording of reasons upon which the judgment is based, till then minor infraction of the aforesaid provision will not give a latitude to a party to assail a judgment and seek its reversal only on this infraction under Section 100 CPC. 24. 24. If the aforesaid principles as noticed above are applied to the present case at hand it would indicate that the First Appellate Court has definitely shirked from its responsibility as the First Appellate Court to decide the matter in the correct perspective. This Court finds that only the First Appellate Court failed to frame the points of determination but it would been seen that the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellate before the First Appellate Court, the evidence of the plaintiff has also not been considered. The First Appellate Court has merely given a judgment of affirmance without considering the evidence available on record. It has incorrectly applied the principles which are applicable to a pardanasheen lady and persons who are rustic, illiterate and belong to the villages especially in absence of any pleading and evidence to the aforesaid effect. Thus, it was not open for the First Appellate Court to have granted the aforesaid benefit, inasmuch as, it changed the complexation of the matter and it is for the aforesaid reason that the First Appellate Court has also shifted the burden on the defendant, which is also incorrect. 25. It would be seen that in the ordinary course, the burden of proof rests on the person who attacks. In the present case, it was the plaintiff who attacked the sale deed and thus the burden was on the plaintiff to have proved her case. However, the First Appellate Court by extending the benefit of the plea available to a Pardanasheen lady has also inappropriately shifted the burden of the proof on the defendants. From the entire plaint and the evidence of the plaintiff there is not a whisper or a foundation to the effect that the plaintiff was ever illiterate or that she was entitled to the benefit of a pardanasheen lady. From the entire plaint and the evidence of the plaintiff there is not a whisper or a foundation to the effect that the plaintiff was ever illiterate or that she was entitled to the benefit of a pardanasheen lady. Thus, there being no factual foundation for the aforesaid, the First Appellate Court erred in granting the benefit of a pardanasheen lady to the plaintiff and also inappropriately shifted the burden upon the defendant and thereafter the evidence of the defendants alone was scrutinized by the First Appellate Court and it arrived at the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of a illiterate pardanasheen lady and it ignored the evidence of the plaintiff altogether rather it merely considered the evidence of the defendants and has affirmed the findings which in the opinion of this Court is not the correct manner in which the appeal is to be decided. The defendant-appellant could not be placed in a more disadvantageous position before the First Appellate Court then it already was especially in absence of any cross appeal by the plaintiff. 26. This Court is of the opinion that the approach and the manner in which the first appeal has been decided is erroneous and consequently on this question alone, the second appeal is being allowed. 27. It is made clear that the Court has not examined the other questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants which is indicated in substantial questions of law no. 2 and 3 which has been framed by this Court, thus, the ends of justice can be met if the above second appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the First Appellate Court to re-hear the appeal on merits and decide the same in accordance with law after framing the points for determination and considering the submissions of learned counsel for the respective parties. 28. Since the proceedings commenced in the year 1983, accordingly, this Court is of the view that the First Appellate Court shall make an endevour to finally hear and decide the first appeal remanded to it, expeditiously and without granting any unnecessary adjournments to the parties so as to complete the entire exercise within a period of 6 months from the date a certified copy of this order is placed before the Court concerned. 29. With the aforesaid, the above second appeal is allowed. 29. With the aforesaid, the above second appeal is allowed. The Judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court dated 17.11.1991 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the First Appellate Court to consider and decide the Regular Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1988 afresh in light of the observations made hereinabove after affording the opportunity to the parties concerned who shall be entitled to raise all grounds afresh before the First Appellate Court within the time span as mentioned hereinabove. The parties shall appear before the First Appellate Court on 27.01.2020. 30. There shall be no order as to costs. 31. The record of the court below shall be remitted to the court concerned within a period of 10 days from today and the registry to ensure the same.