JUDGMENT 1. This revision petition, under Section 397 read with 401 read with section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been preferred by the petitioner/accused assailing the order dated 18/12/2019 passed by IV Additional Sessions Judge, Vidisha in S.T. No.76/2019, whereby the charge under Section 306 of the IPC has been framed against the petitioner. 2. Prosecution story, in short, is that on 21/4/2019 one Rajesh Dangi (since deceased) committed suicide by ending his life on a Railway track. It is alleged that he was having an affair with the petitioner, who used to extort money from him under threat of false implication in a case. As such, she harassed Rajesh to such an extent that he was left with no other option except to take the extreme step. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been falsely implicated. Prima facie no case is made out against the petitioner from the FIR and statements recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. There is no evidence on record to suggest that she had instigated the deceased to commit suicide. The ingredients of section 107 of the IPC are missing in the present case. Accordingly, it is submitted that the trial Court has committed grave illegality in framing charge under section 306 of the IPC against the present petitioner and the order impugned is liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra , the prayer has been opposed by the learned Panel Lawyer. He invited attention of this Court to the statements of the witnesses recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C., wherein, it has come that petitioner was in relationship with the deceased. She used to take money from him and pressurize him for giving more money. She was also opposing his marriage and used to threaten him of implicating in a case. Under such circumstances, Rajesh had committed suicide. It is submitted that the petitioner was instrumental in harassing Rajesh to such an extent, that he has ended his life. As such, the trial Court has rightly framed charge under section 306 of the IPC and no indulgence is warranted. 5. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Section 306 of I.P.C. reads as under :- ' 306. Abetment of suicide. As such, the trial Court has rightly framed charge under section 306 of the IPC and no indulgence is warranted. 5. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Section 306 of I.P.C. reads as under :- ' 306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine." 'Abetment' is defined under Section 107 of I.P.C. which reads as under :- '107.Abetment of a thing.A person abets the doing of a thing, who First.Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Illustration A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C. Explanation 2.Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." 7. T he Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapur vs. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under :- ''35.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ( (2009) 16 SCC 605 to contend that the offence under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC is completely made out against the accused. of NCT of Delhi) ( (2009) 16 SCC 605 to contend that the offence under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC is completely made out against the accused. It is not the stage for us to consider or evaluate or marshal the records for the purposes of determining whether the offence under these provisions has been committed or not. It is a tentative view that the Court forms on the basis of record and documents annexed therewith. No doubt that the word 'instigate' used in Section 107 IPC has been explained by this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh ( (2001) 9 SCC 618 ) to say that where the accused had, by his acts or omissions or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may have to be inferred. In other words, instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. All cases may not be of direct evidence in regard to instigation having a direct nexus to the suicide. There could be cases where the circumstances created by the accused are such that a person feels totally frustrated and finds it difficult to continue existence." (Emphasis supplied) 8. If the allegations made against the petitioner are considered in the light of the above-mentioned law, then it is clear that the allegations against the petitioner are that she was harassing the deceased for the last several days, pressurizing him for money and threatening him of false criminal prosecution. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Parmar vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 2013 SC 633 has held as under:- '14. The Magistrate, in exercise of its power under Section 190 Cr.P.C., can refuse to take cognizance if the material on record warrants so. The Magistrate must, in such a case, be satisfied that the complaint, case diary, statements of the witnesses recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., if any, do not make out any offence. At this stage, the Magistrate performs a judicial function. However, he cannot appreciate the evidence on record and reach a conclusion as to which evidence is acceptable, or can be relied upon. Thus, at this stage appreciation of evidence is impermissible. At this stage, the Magistrate performs a judicial function. However, he cannot appreciate the evidence on record and reach a conclusion as to which evidence is acceptable, or can be relied upon. Thus, at this stage appreciation of evidence is impermissible. The Magistrate is not competent to weigh the evidence and the balance of probability in the case." (Emphasis supplied) 10. T he Supreme Court in the case of Soma Chakravarty vs. State (Th. CBI) reported in 2007 AIR SCW 3683 has held as under:- '20. It may be mentioned that the settled legal position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on the basis of material on record the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial." (Emphasis supplied) 11. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 2018 has held as under:- '... ...Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. . ' This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Trial Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused." 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander & Anr. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under:-- '17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the 'record of the case' and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code. 18. x x x x x x x 19. At the initial stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned not with proof but with a strong suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, which, if put to trial, could prove him guilty. All that the court has to see is that the material on record and the facts would be compatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The final test of guilt is not to be applied at that stage. We may refer to the well-settled law laid down by this Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39 : (SCC pp. 41-42, para 4) '4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused, as provided in Section 228. If, on the other hand, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227." 13. It is well established principle of law that at the time of framing of charge, meticulous appreciation of evidence is not required and even a strong suspicion is sufficient to frame the charges. 14. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is sufficient material on record to prima facie show commission of offence by the petitioner as it has come on record. No illegality could be pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner in the order framing charge. 15. Accordingly, this case fails and is hereby dismissed. 16. Needless to st ate that the trial court shall decide the trial strictly in accordance with law and the evidence which would come on record without being influenced by the observation made by this Court in this case.