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2020 DIGILAW 148 (ORI)

Rajiv Kumar Parida v. State of Odisha

2020-07-24

MOHAMMAD RAFIQ, SAVITRI RATHO

body2020
JUDGMENT : MOHAMMAD RAFIQ, J. 1. Appellant Rajiv Kumar Parida seeks to challenge the judgment dated 17.02.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge by which the writ petition filed by Smt. Manjubala Pradhan-respondent no. 7, was allowed and the order of her suspension dated 26.09.2019 as the Sarpanch of Kotsahi Gram Panchayat, was quashed and set aside. 2. The case set up by respondent No. 7 in the writ petition was that she was elected as Sarpanch of Kotsahi Gram Panchayat by defeating the wife of the present appellant-Rajiv Kumar Parida in the year 2017. Sri Rajiv Kumar Parida, opposite party no. 7 in the Writ Petition bearing WP (C) No. 1523 of 2020, filed a complaint before the authorities including the Collector and District Magistrate, Balasore, making certain allegations against the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner. The Collector and District Magistrate, Balasore entrusted the matter to the District Panchayat Officer, Balasore, opposite party no. 4, for enquiry. When the matter was pending with the District Panchayat Officer, the present appellant-Rajiv Kumar Parida filed a writ petition, bearing WP (C) No. 23538 of 2017, before this Court, which was disposed of with a direction to the Collector and District Magistrate to decide his (appellant’s) representation within a time frame. The Collector and District Magistrate thereupon required the District Panchayat Officer to expedite the enquiry and submit report, who submitted a detailed report on 29.12.2017 concluding therein that although all the works have been completed, but proper procedures as per the Government guidelines, have not been followed. A show-cause notice was issued to the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner-Sarpanch and also to the Panchayat Executive Officer, for not following the procedures and guidelines of the Government. The District Panchayat Officer also requested the Executive Engineer, RWSS to verify the ratio of population in number of TWS project taken up in the Gram Panchayat with reference to the existing tube wells. 3. That on the basis of the said report, a show-cause notice was issued to the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner by the Collector and District Magistrate, Balasore to which she submitted a detailed reply on 5.5.2018. The District Panchayat Officer, Balasore-opposite party no. 4 issued notice to the respondent no. 3. That on the basis of the said report, a show-cause notice was issued to the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner by the Collector and District Magistrate, Balasore to which she submitted a detailed reply on 5.5.2018. The District Panchayat Officer, Balasore-opposite party no. 4 issued notice to the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner to which she has submitted her reply on 15.5.2018 stating that she has already filed reply to show-cause notice issued against her on 6.2.2018, and further she has also submitted reply to the show-cause notice issued by the Collector, Balasore, both of which may be treated as reply to show-cause notice dated 15.05.2018. The Collector and District Magistrate, Balasore-opposite party no. 3 vide his letter dated 26.9.2019 forwarded the matter to opposite party no. 2-Additional Secretary to Government, Panchayati Raj and Drinking Water Department, Odisha for taking action against the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner for wilfully violating the provisions of Section 19 of Odisha Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 (for short ‘the Act’) who by invoking Sub-Section (2) of Section 115 as well as Section 19 of the Act, placed the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner-Sarpanch under suspension with immediate effect. 4. The writ petition was contested by the State Government, but without filing any counter affidavit. However, stand of the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the State before the learned Single Judge was that the Government having exercised the power under sub-section (2) of Section 115 of the Act, there remains very limited scope for this Court to interfere with the same. He submitted that outcome of the fact finding enquiry made by the Collector and District Magistrate clearly discloses that the respondent no. 7-Sarpanch has wilfully violated the provisions of Section 19 of the Act and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of Grama. 5. Learned Single Judge relying on earlier judgments of this Court in Tarini Tripathy vs. Collector, Koraput and Others, (1986) 62 CLT 548 and Ch. 7-Sarpanch has wilfully violated the provisions of Section 19 of the Act and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of Grama. 5. Learned Single Judge relying on earlier judgments of this Court in Tarini Tripathy vs. Collector, Koraput and Others, (1986) 62 CLT 548 and Ch. Srinivas vs. State, 1987 (2) OLR 407 in paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment concluded thus:- “...............A plain reading being given to the above order, it appears that based on the report that the petitioner has wilfully violated the provision of Section 19 of the OGP Act, it is said that the petitioner has violated the provision of Section 19 of the OGP Act and her acting in a manner which is prejudicial to the interest of the Grama and as such her further contention as Sarpanch of Kotsahi Grama Panchayat is detrimental to the interest of the inhabitants of the said Grama Panchayat. But, there is no such note as to any such opinion to have been formed based upon the said report as to the existence of circumstances in the direction of wilful violation of the provision of Section 19 of the Act and the action in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Grama in saying that the continuation of the petitioner as the Sarpanch is detrimental to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama Panchayat. Furthermore, no reason has also been assigned. Therefore, the order of suspension of the petitioner who is the Sarpanch of Kotsahi Gram Panchayat as under Annexure-1 cannot be sustained in the eye of law.” 6. We have heard Mr. S.P.Mishra, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. P.K. Rath, S.K. Behera, P. Nayak, S. Das and S. Rath for the appellant, Mr. Ashok Kumar Parija, learned Advocate General for the State and Mr. D.P. Dhal, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent No. 7-original writ petitioner. 7. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant Rajiv Kumar Parida, submitted that the order of suspension of the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner-Sarpanch was passed by the State Government on the basis of the enquiry report of District Panchayat Officer wherein allegation of financial irregularities were found proved against her and the Panchayat Executive Officer. 7. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant Rajiv Kumar Parida, submitted that the order of suspension of the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner-Sarpanch was passed by the State Government on the basis of the enquiry report of District Panchayat Officer wherein allegation of financial irregularities were found proved against her and the Panchayat Executive Officer. Paras 1,2,3 and 4 of the report make it clear that the Panchayat Secretary made payments to the contractors on the basis of the order passed by the respondent no. 7-Sarpanch in respect of works of which payments were already made. On being confronted with this, the executant contractors in some cases have even refunded the amounts. All these payments were made in complete violation of Section 19 of the Act read with Rule 15(4) of The Odisha Gram Panchayat Rules, 2014 (for short ‘the Rules’) without following the provisions of law. 8. Learned Senior counsel argued that the Collector after receiving reply of the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner to the show-cause notice submitted his report to the Government. Accordingly, charges were framed against Respondent no. 7 on allegations of financial irregularities as no document or vouchers were available on record. This is a clear case of misuse of power dealing with financial matters, amounting to dereliction of duty. It is submitted that although learned Single Judge quoted Section 115 of the Act, but omitted to notice that this provision has been amended in the year 2004. Learned Single Judge has relied on the decision of this Court in Tarini Tripathy and Ch. Srinivas (supra), which are based on pre-amended Section 115 of the Act and have therefore no application to the present case. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that Division Bench of this Court in Sarat Ch. Mohanty vs. State of Orissa, 2016 (2) OLR 707 has also reiterated the same law by relying on previous judgment in Tarini Tripathy (1986) 62 CLT 548 and Baikunthanath Mohanty vs. State of Orissa, 1987 (2) OLR 391 , but again without noticing the amendments in Section 115(1) and Section 115(2) of the Act. Therefore, ratio of the judgment of this Court in Sarat Ch. Mohanty (supra) is also not applicable to the present case. 9. Mr. Therefore, ratio of the judgment of this Court in Sarat Ch. Mohanty (supra) is also not applicable to the present case. 9. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has omitted to consider the judgment of the Single Bench of this Court in Smt. Bharati Pradhan vs. State of Odisha, 2012 SCC Online Ori. 52 : (2013) 115 CLT 847 wherein change of law has been noticed in paras 21 and 25 of the report and it has been held that the Government under Section 115(3) of the Act, has the power to revoke the suspension and it is open for the suspended Sarpanch to apply before the Government for revocation of the order of suspension. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that as there are allegation of financial irregularities and non-compliance of statutory provisions of law, if suspension is revoked, there is every possibility of the respondent no. 7-Sarpanch tampering with the records. Since the charges have been framed in the present case against respondent No. 7-writ petitioner-Sarpanch, it is open for her to file reply and the enquiry can be expedited. It is therefore prayed that the present Writ Appeal may be allowed and the impugned judgment may be set aside. 10. Learned Advocate General has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. He however submitted that since the charge memo has already been served on the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner, the authorities shall make an endeavour to conclude the enquiry in a time bound manner as may be directed by this Court and pass the final order. 11. Per contra, Mr. D.P. Dhal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No. 7-writ petitioner submitted that in so far as the allegation that Palli Sabha was conducted on 14.9.2017 but notice thereof was issued on 6.9.2017, is concerned, the appellant-Rajiv Kumar Parida was himself present in the Palli Sabha and has also put his signature in the notice dated 6.9.2017. The Palli Sabha was attended by more than 200 people. Thus, the relevant guidelines were substantially followed and no prejudice has been caused to anyone. As regards the other allegations, even the District Panchayat Officer in his report has found that all the works were duly completed, but there was minor omission of certain procedures. The Palli Sabha was attended by more than 200 people. Thus, the relevant guidelines were substantially followed and no prejudice has been caused to anyone. As regards the other allegations, even the District Panchayat Officer in his report has found that all the works were duly completed, but there was minor omission of certain procedures. It is contended that the Collector has disposed of the representation of the appellant-Rajib Kumar Parida without giving any opportunity of hearing to the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner. His order is silent whether any opportunity was given to her even though she was arrayed as opposite party no. 2 in that representation. The Collector and District Magistrate, Balasore illegally concluded in his notice dated 26.9.2019 that respondent No. 7-writ petitioner has wilfully violated the provisions of the Act and rules whereas no such finding of wilful violation of the Act and Rules was recorded by the District Panchayat Officer in his report. There was thus no basis with either the Collector or the State Government to conclude that the action of respondent no. 7-writ petitioner was prejudicial to the interest of the Grama and as such, her further continuance as Sarpanch of Kotsahi Gram Panchayat is detrimental to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama Panchayat. 12. It is argued that as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa and Others vs. Md. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 , in order to justify invocation of Section 115(1) of the Act, action complained of must have been wilfully done by the Sarpanch. According to report of the District Panchayat Officer, there was no wilful conduct of the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner for abusing the power. It has been held by this Court in Tarini Tripathy (supra) that Section 115 of the Act postulates three requirements, which have not been satisfied in the present case. It is contended that the Collector having formed an opinion without there being a finding in the report submitted by the District Panchayat Officer about wilful omission, minor procedural irregularity or lapse might not justify the conclusion that continuation of the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner as Sarpanch would be detrimental to the interest of Gram Panchayat. The order of suspension has thus been mechanically passed without the due application of mind. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra). 13. 7-writ petitioner as Sarpanch would be detrimental to the interest of Gram Panchayat. The order of suspension has thus been mechanically passed without the due application of mind. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra). 13. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions, gone through the cited precedents and examined the material on record. 14. Much has been argued on behalf of the appellant about the effect of amendment in Section 115 of the Act vide Notification No. 1040 dated 12.10.2004. It has been contended that the judgments of this Court in Tarini Tripathy, Ch. Srivas and Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra), being based on preamended Section 115 of the Act, their ratio shall not apply to the present case. Since the judgment in Sarat Ch. Mohanty vs. State of Orissa (supra) is founded on those judgments, ratio thereof would also not be applicable to the present case. Learned Single Judge has slipped into error of law by relying on those judgments. 15. In order to properly appreciate the provision contained in Section 115 of the Act, we shall have to trace its legislative history. Section 115 of the Act, 1964, as originally engrafted in the Act, which the Division Bench of this Court interpreted in Tarini Tripathy (supra) was as under:- “S.115. Suspension and removal of Sarpanch, Naib Sarpanch and member: (1) If on the report of the Sub-divisional Officer, the Collector is of the opinion that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or violates the provisions of this act or the rules or orders made thereunder or abuses the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama, he may, by order, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from office and report the matter to the State Government. (2) The State Government, on the report of the Collector under Sub-Section (1) shall, or if the State Government themselves are of the opinion that the circumstances specified in the said sub-section exist in relation to a Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, then on their own motion, may, after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, remove him from the office of Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be. (3) In the case of Sarpanch or Naib-Sarpanch, if he is not already under suspension in pursuance of an order under Sub-Section (1), the State Government may, pending the disposal of the proceedings before them under Sub-Section (2), suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be. (3-a) The State Government may at any time during the pendency of proceedings before them under Sub-Section (2) revoke the order of suspension of a Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch passed under Sub-Section (1) or under sub-section (3). (4) A Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch on removal from office under sub-section (2) shall also cease to be a member of the Grama Panchayat, and such person shall not be eligible for election as member for a period not exceeding four years as the State Government may specify. (5) The provisions of this section shall, so far as may be, apply in respect of any member of the Grama Panchayat not being a Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, provided that no such member shall be liable to be placed under suspension under the said provision. (6) (a) Whenever the Collector is of the opinion that the Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat has failed in convening any meeting of the Grama Panchayat within a period of three continuous months he may, after making such enquiry as he deems fit, by order, remove the Sarpanch from Office and may also declare him not to be eligible for election as member for a period not exceeding one year as he may specify in his order, and on such order being made the Sarpanch shall cease to be a member of the Grama Panchayat. (b) Nothing contained in the preceding sub-sections shall apply in respect of a default as specified above.” 16. (b) Nothing contained in the preceding sub-sections shall apply in respect of a default as specified above.” 16. The aforequoted Sub-Section (1) of Section 115 was later amended vide Orissa Gram Panchayat Amendment Act No. 9 of 1991 promulgated by notification dated 2nd May, 1991 and for the words “on the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Collector” the words “the Collector on an enquiry or inspection made by him or on the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer” were substituted. The amended sub-section (1) of the Section 115 of the Act thereafter read as under:- “Section 115. Suspension and removal of Sarpanch, Naib-Sarpanch and member: (1) If the Collector on an enquiry or inspection made by him or on the report of Sub-Divisional Officer, is of the opinion that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or violates the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder or abuses the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama, he may, by order, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from office and report the matter to the State Government.” 17. Later on, by retaining sub-sections (4) to (6) of Section 115 of the Act in their original form, sub-section (1), (2) and (3) and (3a) were substituted by new sub-section (1), (2) and (3) vide Orissa Grama Panchayat Amendment Act, 2004 (Orissa Act 9 of 2004) vide Notification no. 1040 dated 12.10.2004, which now read as under:- “S.115. Later on, by retaining sub-sections (4) to (6) of Section 115 of the Act in their original form, sub-section (1), (2) and (3) and (3a) were substituted by new sub-section (1), (2) and (3) vide Orissa Grama Panchayat Amendment Act, 2004 (Orissa Act 9 of 2004) vide Notification no. 1040 dated 12.10.2004, which now read as under:- “S.115. Suspension and removal of Sarpanch, Naib Sarpanch and member: (1) If the State Government, on the basis of a report of the Collector or the Project Director, District Rural Development Agency, or suo motu are of the opinion that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or violates the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder or abuses the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama, they may after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, remove him from the office of Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be. (2) The State Government may, pending initiation of the proceeding on the basis of their opinion under sub-section (1), by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from the office. (3) The State Government, at any time during the pendency of proceeding under sub-section (1), revoke the order of suspension of a Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch passed under sub-section (2).” 18. Comparison of the original sub-section (1) of Section 115 with the sub-section (1) amended in 1991 shows that both of them dealt with suspension and empowered the Collector to pass the order of suspension, with the only difference that while in the former, he would act on the report of Sub-Divisional Officer but in the later, the Collector, apart from acting on the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer, could himself make an enquiry or inspection and pass the order of suspension on that basis. Thus, Sub-section (1) of Section 115, as per original provision considered in Tarini Tripathy (supra) empowered the Collector also to place Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat under suspension on arriving at the satisfaction that if he or she “wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or violates the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder or abuses the powers, rights, and privileges vested in him or acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Gram and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Gram.” While un-amended sub-section (2) of Section 115 provided for removal of Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch after giving a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, Sub-section (3) of Section 115, both before and after amendment in 1991, provided that if the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, has not already been placed under suspension pursuant to the order of the Collector passed under Section 115(1) of the Act, the State Government may pending disposal of the proceedings under sub-section (2), place the Sarpanch or Naib Naib Sarpanch under suspension. But the amendment notified on 12.10.2004 has taken away that power from the Collector. Now as per Section 115(2) of the Act, the State Government may pending disposal of the proceedings before it under sub-section (1), by order, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from office. 19. But the amendment notified on 12.10.2004 has taken away that power from the Collector. Now as per Section 115(2) of the Act, the State Government may pending disposal of the proceedings before it under sub-section (1), by order, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from office. 19. The Division Bench of this Court in Tarini Tripathy (supra) while dealing with sub-section (1) of Section 115 held that if on the report of the Sub-divisional Officer the Collector is of the opinion that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or violates the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder or abuses the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama, he may, by order, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from office and report the matter to the State Government. It was held that Section 115 postulates the following as the three requirements: (a) a report from the concerned Sub-divisional Officer. (b) satisfaction of the Collector on the basis of the report that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or the Naib Sarpanch has wilfully omitted or refused to carry out or violated the provisions of the Act, or the rules or orders made thereunder, or abused the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama. (c) his further satisfaction that the further continuance of the elected representative in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama. 20. (c) his further satisfaction that the further continuance of the elected representative in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama. 20. The position of law according to Section 115(1) operating now is that if the State Government on the basis of the report of the Collector or the Project Director, District Rural Development Agency, or suo motu, is of the opinion that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat “wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or violates the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder or abuses the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama” it may after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, remove him/her from the office of Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be. sub-section (2) of Section 115 now provides that the State Government may, pending initiation of the proceeding on the basis of its opinion under Sub-section (1), by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from the office. Earlier, suspension was envisaged both in its Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) and removal in sub-section (2), but now in the scheme of the amended Section 115 after 2004, sub-section (1) deals with removal and sub-section (2) with suspension. The amendment of 2004 has thus brought two significant changes that (i) now only the State Government would be competent to pass the order of suspension and (ii) in doing so, it has been mandatorily required to record reasons. The object for which reasons are required to be recorded would be wholly defeated if it were held that the requirement was anything but mandatory. Obviously, reasons that are required to be recorded for suspending Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, should satisfy the parameters already enumerated in originally enacted sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Act which have now been retained in exactly the same form even after amendment in 2004 in sub-section (1) of Section 115 for removal. Obviously, reasons that are required to be recorded for suspending Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, should satisfy the parameters already enumerated in originally enacted sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Act which have now been retained in exactly the same form even after amendment in 2004 in sub-section (1) of Section 115 for removal. Sub-Section (2) of Section 115 of the Act now provides that the State Government may, pending initiation of the proceeding on the basis of its opinion under Sub-section (1), by order, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch. What therefore can be deduced from this is that parameters enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 115, both before and after amendment of 2004, were/are valid for both removal and suspension. While in the case of suspension, the competent authority is required to record only prima facie satisfaction on those very parameters reflecting gravity of allegations which may justify extreme step of suspension, in the case of removal, a categorical finding is required to be recorded on the charges against Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, on the basis of cogent and reliable evidence produced in the enquiry proceedings, with certain definiteness. Difference therefore is of only stage and degree but the parameters that are required to be taken into consideration both, either for arriving at prima facie satisfaction for the purpose of passing an order of suspension, or for recording a definite finding for removal of Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, remain the same. 21. In view of analysis of Section 115 from the perspective of legislative history, two significant changes brought in that provision after amendment, from what it was when Tarini Tripathy (supra) are that (i) while withdrawing the power from the Collector to suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, now that power has been conferred on the State Government which it can exercise on the basis of report of the Collector or Project Director, DRDA or suo motu and (ii) the State Government has been by sub-section (2) of Section 115 of the Act, ordained to record reasons in writing for the purpose of an order of suspension. Whether or not to place the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch under suspension is the discretion of the State Government, but once it decides to pass the order of suspension, it is mandatorily required to record reasons in writing on the basis of its opinion under sub-section (1). Sub-Section (2) of Section 115 thus makes those very parameters, which were culled out by Tarini Tripathy (supra), as relevant considerations for the State Government to record reasons in writing. The ratio of Tarini Tripathy (supra) thus continues to govern the field, there being no change in the basic parameters of law that are required to be adhered to, for placing a Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, under suspension. 22. In Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra) the Division Bench of this Court further reiterated the aforesaid view by adding one more dimension by observing that legislature in its wisdom has in Section 115(1) deliberately used the word ‘wilful’ in Section 115(1). Therefore, the Collector must not only be of the opinion that the Sarpanch or the Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, has omitted or refused to carry out or violated the provisions of the Act, the Rules or the orders made thereunder and abused and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama Panchayat or the Grama, but he should also form an opinion that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch wilfully omitted, refused, violated the provisions of the Act or the Rules or wilfully abused the rights, and privileges vested in him or wilfully acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Gram Panchayat or the Grama unless it is found that he did so wilfully the provision would not be attracted. (Emphasis supplied) 23. In the case of Ch. Srinivas (supra) while discussing the aforementioned two judgments in Tarini Tripathy (supra) and Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra) this Court held that since existence of the circumstances enumerated in Section 115 is a condition fundamental for making of an opinion, the existence of the circumstances, if questioned, has to be proved at least prima facie. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the circumstances exist, giving no clue to what they are because the circumstances must be such as may lead to conclusions with certain definiteness. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the circumstances exist, giving no clue to what they are because the circumstances must be such as may lead to conclusions with certain definiteness. In Lingaraj Sahu vs. State of Orissa, 1990 (1) OLR 44 and Jagatram Patel vs. State of Orissa, (1995) 79 CLT 324 and also in Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra) this Court followed the ratio of Tarini Tripathy (supra). In a later judgment, Division Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Karji vs. Collector, Rayagada and Others, 1998 (2) OLR 348 , while relying on the decision of Tarini Tripathy (supra) and Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra), again reiterated that the circumstances for passing an order of suspension, contained in sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Act must not only be present, but the Collector should also be satisfied that the alleged delinquency is wilful and additionally held that the infraction by way of acts or omissions must be wilful and not accidental or negligent or involuntary but intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences following therefrom. 24. In Sukanta Bhoi vs. State of Orissa and Others, AIR 2000 Orissa 28 where the order of suspension of Sarpanch was challenged, the Collector did not record any finding nor did he come to the conclusion that the alleged delinquency was willful. The Division Bench in that case, while holding that although it was not necessary to provide opportunity of hearing before passing the order under sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Act, quashed the order of suspension. This Court in a recent Division Bench judgment in Sarat Chandra Mohanty (supra) revisited all its previous decisions dealing with Section 115 of the Act including Tarini Tripathy (supra) and Baikunthanath Mohanty (supra) and reiterated the same law as to the necessity of recording of requisite satisfaction as a condition for passing the order of suspension and held that not only the three essential requirements, as postulated by sub-section (1) of Section 115, must be present but the Collector should also be satisfied that the alleged delinquency was willful. It was held that the Collector has passed the impugned order of suspension without following the due procedure as envisaged in Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 115 of the OGP Act. Accordingly, the Court quashed and set aside the order of suspension. 25. It was held that the Collector has passed the impugned order of suspension without following the due procedure as envisaged in Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 115 of the OGP Act. Accordingly, the Court quashed and set aside the order of suspension. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and Others vs. Md. Illiyas (supra) while dealing with the case of suspension of a Sarpanch under Section 115(1) of the Act considered the true import of the word ‘wilful’ by holding that an Act is said to be ‘wilful’ if it is intentional, conscious and deliberate. The following excerpt from para-10 of the judgment is apt to quote:- “10. The expression ‘wilful’ excludes casual, accidental, bona-fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability. It is to be noted that a wilful act does not encompass accidental, involuntary, or negligent. It must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. The expression ‘wilful’ means an act done with a bad purpose, with an evil motive.” 26. We have to now in the light of the discussed case law examine as to whether the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the order of suspension. Perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that the learned Single Judge concluded that the impugned order of suspension was passed on the report of the Collector that the petitioner has wilfully violated the provision of Section 19 of the Act and acted in a manner which is prejudicial to the interest of the Grama and that her further continuation as Sarpanch of Kotsahi Grama Panchayat is detrimental to the interest of the inhabitants of the said Grama Panchayat. It was held that there is no such finding about any such opinion having been formed based upon the said report as to the existence of circumstances regarding wilful violation of the provision of Section 19 of the Act. Learned Single Judge held that such opinion has not been formed by the Government on the report of the Collector as to the existence of circumstances in the direction of wilful violation of the provision of Section 19 of the Act by the writ petitioner or that her actions were in any manner prejudicial to the interest of the Grama to say that continuation of the Sarpanch was detrimental to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama Panchayat. 27. 27. In order to test the correctness of such finding, we have perused the finding recorded in the enquiry report by the District Panchayat Officer, which reads as follows:- “In view of the above it is found that the works have been completed but proper procedure as per Government guideline has not been followed. Hence, a show-cause may be issued to Sarpanch and PEO for not following due procedure and guidelines issued by the Government and the Executive Engineer, RWSS may kindly be requested to verify the ratio of population in no. of TWS project taken up in the GP with reference to the existing tube wells.” 28. The Collector served a notice on the respondent No. 7-writ petitioner on 6.2.2018 to which she submitted a reply under Annexure-3 to the writ appeal. The Collector thereafter again while considering the representation of the appellant herein pursuant to the order of this Court dated 27.11.2017 served a show-cause notice on the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner. The Collector then by order dated 5.5.2018 (Annexure-4 to the writ appeal) decided the said representation, in most part of which he has relied on the conclusion of the District Panchayat Officer in his report that every work was duly executed by the Gram Panchayat but referred to Rule 4 of the Rules to say that notice of 15 days was required to be given in the Grama for conducting meeting of Palli Sabha, but in the present case, the Sarpanch has violated the provisions as mentioned above. The Collector held that it was the duty of the PEO to apprise the Sarpanch regarding the provisions for issue of notice to conduct Palli Sabha. Since the PEO has committed irregularities, he is liable to be punished under Rule 15(4) of OCS (CC&A) Rules, 1962. In conclusion, the Collector in the aforesaid order has declined to interfere with the matter by observing that project works have already been completed. 29. Subsequently, the District Panchayat Officer on 14.5.2018 has issued another show-cause notice to the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner vide Annexure-5 to the writ appeal for violation of the provision of the Act and the Rule, 2014, for conducting Palli Sabha by not giving clear 15 days notice for selection of VLL and inclusion of previously executed works in annual action plan of 14th CFC and 4th SFC for the financial year 2017-18. 7-writ petitioner vide Annexure-5 to the writ appeal for violation of the provision of the Act and the Rule, 2014, for conducting Palli Sabha by not giving clear 15 days notice for selection of VLL and inclusion of previously executed works in annual action plan of 14th CFC and 4th SFC for the financial year 2017-18. But the show-cause notice does not allege that the petitioner has wilfully violated any of the aforementioned provisions or wilfully committed any illegalities in completing all the project. The Collector on that basis forwarded the matter to the Government vide letter dated 26.9.2019 under Annexure-5 to the writ petition and Annexure-7 to the writ appeal. In the last part of the letter, the Collector has stated thus:- “In view of the above facts, it shows that, the Sarpanch Kotsahi GP have wilfully violated the provision of the Act and Rules, abused the power, right and privileges vested in him and further continuance in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat. Therefore, in enclosing herewith the show-cause notice issued to the Sarpanch Kotsahi GP, it is requested to take action as OG Rule and the Acts.” 30. It would be evident from the aforequoted portion of the letter that it was here for the first time that the Collector used the word ‘wilfully’ by observing that the Sarpanch has wilfully violated the provision of the Act and Rules, abused the power, right and privileges vested in him and further that her continuance in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat. Undeniably, the Collector in doing so relied on the report of the District Panchayat Officer and the show-cause notice served on respondent no. 7-writ petitioner by the District Panchayat Officer. In the report, neither any such finding has been recorded by the District Panchayat Officer that the Sarpanch wilfully violated the provisions of the Act and the Rules or wilfully abused the power, right and privileges vested in her nor has it been stated that her further continuance in the office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat. This was not even so alleged in the show-cause served upon her. This was not even so alleged in the show-cause served upon her. In the facts like these, learned Single Judge was perfectly justified in concluding that there is no specific finding for any such opinion to be formed, based upon the said report as to the existence of circumstances in the direction of wilful violation of the provision of section 19 of the Act and about the action of the respondent no. 7-Sarpanch in any manner being prejudicial to the interest of the Grama in saying that the continuation of the respondent no. 7-writ petitioner as Sarpanch was detrimental to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama Panchayat. 31. The Supreme Court in Ajit Singh vs. Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government, (2009) 16 SCC 308 while dealing with the case of suspension of a Sarpanch under the provision of Section 51(1)(a) of Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 held that such provision requires as a precondition about the forming of an opinion that the charge made or proceeding taken against the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties or it involves moral turpitude or defect of character. The show-cause notice only required the appellants to explain why they should not be suspended. The order seems to proceed upon the basis that the show-cause notice, which had been served upon the appellants before the passing of the impugned order contained the likelihood of embarrassment in the discharge of duties because of the registration of the criminal case against them. The Supreme Court held that formation of that opinion was absent in the impugned order and that such an averment was made in the show-cause notice was not enough. The opinion that was contemplated in the relevant provision as a pre-condition of suspension not having been formed, the impugned order of suspension was quashed. 32. On examination of records in the light of settled proposition of law, we have found that there is indeed no such material to justify formation of the opinion by the State Government as to the existence of the circumstances that respondent no. 32. On examination of records in the light of settled proposition of law, we have found that there is indeed no such material to justify formation of the opinion by the State Government as to the existence of the circumstances that respondent no. 7-writ petitioner wilfully violated the provision of Section 19 of the Act and therefore the conclusion arrived at by the State Government in the impugned order that her further continuation as Sarpanch of Kotsahi Gram Panchayat would be detrimental to the interest of the inhabitants of the Gram Panchayat, appears to be wholly unfounded. It must therefore be held that the impugned order passed by Government having been passed without the formation of the requisite opinion, suffers from the vice of non-application of mind, and amounts to colourable exercise of power. 33. On reading of Section 115(2) of the Act, we are inclined to hold that though the power to place an elected Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch under suspension is vested in the State Government, but this provision postulates the requirement of recording reasons in writing to suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from the office, pending initiation of the proceeding under sub-section (1) of Section 115. Clearly, first and foremost, a duty has been cast on the State Government to form an opinion that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, has wilfully (i) omitted or refused to carry out or has violated the provisions of the Act and the rules or orders made thereunder or (ii) has abused the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or (iii) has acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Gram. All these three requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 115 are qualified by the term ‘wilful’ namely: all or any of such three requirements of the sub-section (1) of Section 115 must be attributed to the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, as a wilful act on his/her part. In the event any one or more of the three circumstances being attracted, yet another important condition incorporated in sub-section (1) of Section 115 is that the State Government should also be of the opinion that further continuance of such Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch in the office would be detrimental to the interest of Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of Grama. All these requirements indicate the intention of the legislature that the power to place an elected representative of the Panchayati Raj Institution under suspension has to be used sparingly by the State Government, with utmost care and caution, only in appropriate cases, on the basis of the reliable and cogent material before it. In order to safeguard against abuse of such power, therefore, while conferring the discretionary power on the State Government, an additional condition has been incorporated in sub-section (2) of Section 115 of the Act by mandating it to record the reasons in writing for suspending a Sarpanch and Naib Sarpanch. Obviously, such reasons have to indicate that the State Government on objective consideration of material has satisfied itself about the existence of the above referred to pre-requisite conditions. 34. We may state at the cost of repetition observe that the Government at the stage of passing an order of suspension under sub-section (2) of Section 115 is only required to record its tentative or prima facie satisfaction on the parameters enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 115 of on the basis of allegations against the Sarpanch or the Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, although such allegations may even be disproved in the full-fledged enquiry proceeding. But the reasons given in the order of suspension should be specific and clear and not vague and cryptic. Requirement of recording reasons cannot be taken as satisfied by merely matching the language of the suspension order with the phraseology used in Section 115(1). This Court in exercise of power of judicial review, while examining the challenge to an order of suspension, can scrutinize the record to find out whether the reason given therein is an empty formality or is actually supported by material on record. The material taken into consideration to form the requisite opinion should support such satisfaction. 35. Constitutional status has been conferred on the Panchayati Raj Institution by amending the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) vide Act, 1992 w.e.f. 24.4.1993 Part IX has been thereby inserted in the Constitution of India. This is aimed at providing complete autonomy to Panchayati Raj Institutions as a basic democratic unit of a local self government at the grassroot level. Provisions contained in Part IX of the Constitution, more particularly Article 243G, confers various powers, authority and responsibilities on Panchayats. This is aimed at providing complete autonomy to Panchayati Raj Institutions as a basic democratic unit of a local self government at the grassroot level. Provisions contained in Part IX of the Constitution, more particularly Article 243G, confers various powers, authority and responsibilities on Panchayats. Therefore, the term of the representatives elected to such Panchayati Raj Institution cannot be allowed to be curtained without strict adherence to safeguards engrafted in the relevant statute i.e. Section 115 of the Act. The Constitution Bench in G. Sadanandan vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1925 held that if all the safeguards provided under the statute are not observed and an order having serious consequences is passed without proper application of mind, having a casual approach to the matter, the same can be characterized as having been passed mala-fide and thus, is liable to be quashed. 36. Panchayati Raj system is the base of the pyramid of democracy. Faith in and commitment to democracy gets strengthened or eroded from what people perceive. Allowing such elected representatives to be placed under suspension in an arbitrary and whimsical manner would certainly erode the democracy at the grass-root level through the Panchayati Raj system. Suspension of an elected Sarpanch, though by itself is not a penalty, but it is drastic action which certainly causes hardship to the person concerned. It has serious effect on the public life of the elected representative as it lowers down his/her status in the society. The Legislature has consciously provided for adherence to all the aforestated conditions to guard against the abuse of such power, for it was conscious of the fact that it was dealing with an elected representative to a democratically elected Panchayati Raj Institution which could have the effect of curtailing the prescribed period for which he or she was elected by popular vote. As the word ‘may’ has been used in the sub-section, a discretion has been given to the State Government and such discretion has to be exercised as per the safeguards lend in Section 115(1) and (2). We are therefore inclined to observe that even if the power of suspension has been conferred on the State Government, such power should not be exercised in a routine or mechanical manner. This Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that, as in the present case, complaints in many such cases are filed due to political rivalry. We are therefore inclined to observe that even if the power of suspension has been conferred on the State Government, such power should not be exercised in a routine or mechanical manner. This Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that, as in the present case, complaints in many such cases are filed due to political rivalry. Mere initiation of proceedings under Section 115(1) of the Act, without anything more, does not justify invocation of such extreme power, for charges may be disproved also. It is therefore not necessary that in every case where proceedings of removal of Sarpanch or the Naib Sarpanch are initiated under sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Act, order of suspension should invariably be passed. Unless the allegations are grave and serious enough to attract the parameters envisages in Section 115(1) of the Act, suspension should be avoided. 37. We may at this juncture usually refer to following observations from an old judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Kulamani Mallick vs. The Collector, Puri and Others, 2004 (1) OLR 46 : “Suspension of an elected representative is indeed a drastic action and should not be taken recourse to cursorily and in a mechanical manner. Having vested the power with the Executive to suspend an elected representative, the Legislature has provided safeguards against arbitrary exercise of the same. Therefore, while bringing the tenure of an elected representative to an end either temporarily or prematurely, utmost care and circumspection should be exercised. Right of an elected representative to continue in his office for the full tenure, should not be lightly tinkered with by the Collector. On perusal of the order of suspension, vide Annexure-4, it clearly reveals that the reasons given are vague, cryptic and do not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 115 of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act. While alleging that the Sarpanch violated the provisions of Orissa Grama Panchayat Act and the Rules thereunder, it is not specified as to which provision of the Act or Rules he violated. Similarly, specific allegations with regard to wilful abuse of powers, right and privileges vested in him have not been specified. While alleging that the Sarpanch violated the provisions of Orissa Grama Panchayat Act and the Rules thereunder, it is not specified as to which provision of the Act or Rules he violated. Similarly, specific allegations with regard to wilful abuse of powers, right and privileges vested in him have not been specified. Without stating the specific instances with regard to the violation of the provisions of the Act and Rules or without nomenclaturing the specific actions or omissions as wilful abuse of powers and/or rights or privileges, we feel, an elected Sarpanch cannot be suspended on vague assertions. Though there is no dispute in the legal proposition that a Sarapanch can be suspended in exercise of power under Section 115 of Grama Panchayat Act, Law is well settled that if the Collector intends to ascribe any imputation, the same should be specific, clear and not vague.” 38. In Raghuwar Dayal vs. State of Haryana, C.W.P. No. 5409 of 1999 decided on 28.5.1999, the Punjab and Hariyana High Court, speaking through Hon’ble Mr. Justice G.S. Singhvi (as His Lordship then was) observed that the power of suspending an elected representative should not be exercised casually by the administrative authorities. Some of the observations made in that decision are apt to quote:- “Before concluding, we wish to emphasise that the executive authorities who are entrusted with the power to suspend or remove the elected representatives of the local bodies like Municipalities and Gram Panchayats must bear in mind that those who win the confidence and trust of the people through the process of elections and occupy public positions are often made targets of vilification campaign by the opposite groups. In a majority of cases, the allegations of commission of irregularities are made. If the power of suspension and/or removal of the elected representatives is exercised liberally in such cases, then the mandate of the people will be indirectly frustrated, a situation which will not be good for the health of the democracy at the grass root level. It will be doing greater harm than good to the institution of local bodies. If the power of suspension and/or removal of the elected representatives is exercised liberally in such cases, then the mandate of the people will be indirectly frustrated, a situation which will not be good for the health of the democracy at the grass root level. It will be doing greater harm than good to the institution of local bodies. Therefore, unless the allegations of financial irregularities or gross misconduct are found proved, the authorities concerned must exercise restraint and as and even in those cases in which it becomes imperative to exercise the power of suspension or removal, cogent reasons must not only be recorded but must be communicated to the affected person. In our considered view, the elected representatives cannot be treated worst than the government employees in whose cases the requirement of passing a reasoned order has been consistently insisted by the Courts in the last 40 years.” 39. Apart from the merits of the case, there is another reason why the appeal in the present case merits dismissal. The writ petition was filed by respondent No. 7-writ petitioner. Even though the State Government was a party-respondent to the writ petition, they chose not to file counter affidavit. Thereafter, when the order of suspension was quashed, the State Government has decided not to challenge the impugned judgment by filing writ appeal. Under sub-section (3) of Section 115 of the Act, the State Government has been conferred with the power of revoking the order of suspension of Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch at any time during the pendency of the proceeding under sub-section (1). The State Government having taken a conscious decision not to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge, can be taken to have accepted its correctness. The State Government, which has the power to revoke the order of suspension as per sub-section (3) of Section 115 of the Act, having taken a conscious decision not to assail the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the appeal filed at the instance of the complainant challenging the impugned judgment, even otherwise, should not be entertained. 40. The Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Garg and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2005 (1) RLW Raj. 478 was dealing with the similar argument where allegation against the elected lady Sarpanch was that she indulged in forgery and preparation of forged documents. 40. The Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Surendra Kumar Garg and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2005 (1) RLW Raj. 478 was dealing with the similar argument where allegation against the elected lady Sarpanch was that she indulged in forgery and preparation of forged documents. Considering the question of locus-standi of the complainant, the Division Bench in para-6 of the judgment held as under:- “6. So far as the ground of locus-standi is concerned, it may be mentioned that once the complaint is made, the business of the complainant is over. He is no more person to make any interference as the complaint is the subject matter of enquiry between the party concerned and the Government and no one has a right to make an interference. The complainant is only an informer and the business has been completed by the appellants, while making complaint against the respondent no. 3 and they have no interest left in the matter to get acquaintance with the further development of the proceedings. Apart from that, the State Government has always inherent jurisdiction to revoke its earlier order in view of the subsequent events taking place in the matter. In this connection, reference of Bharat Kumar vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2000 (2) WLC (Raj.) 270 and Mahadev Prasad Yadav vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 1990 (1) RLR 157 may be made.” 41. We may in this connection usefully refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. Collector, (2012) 4 SCC 407 . In paragraphs 58 and 59 of the report of that judgment; their Lordships observed thus:- “58. Shri Chintaman Raghunath Gharat, Ex-President was the complainant, thus, at the most, he could lead evidence as a witness. He could not claim the status of an adversarial litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. The complainant cannot be the party to the lis. A legal right is an averment of entitlement arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. Thus, a person who suffers from legal injury can only challenge the act or omission. There may be some harm or loss that may not be wrongful in the eye of law because if may not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest of the complainant but juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. 59. The complainant has to establish that he has been deprived of or denied of a legal right and he has sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In case he has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to confer a locus-standi to sue upon the individual. There must be injuria or a legal grievance which can be appreciated and not a statpro ratione voluntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of reasons.” 42. In view of afore discussed position of law, it must be held that role of the appellant is merely that of an informer or relator, who brought the act of commission or omission of the respondent-Sarpanch to the notice of the State Government or its authorities. Even if the Government, acting on the complaint of the appellant, has initiated proceedings against the respondent-Sarpanch for her removal and placed her under suspension, he can have no further role to play in the matter except perhaps as a witness in enquiry proceedings. Once the enquiry proceedings begin, it is a matter between the Government and the respondent- Sarpanch. But the appellant cannot be considered as a necessary party in a legal proceeding where such Sarpanch would challenge the order of her suspension nor would he have any locus-standi to challenge the decision of the State Government to revoke the order of suspension. 43. In the light of foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.