JUDGMENT Krishna S.Dixit, J. - Petitioners who have been called upon by the official respondents to pay a larger sum of money by way of deficit stamp duty much subsequent to registration of their sale deeds on the ground of under-valuation of the flats comprised therein, are knocking at the doors of writ court for laying a challenge thereto inter alia on the ground of bar of limitation and inapplicability of the Guideline Value Norms on which the impugned orders are structured; after service of notice, the official respondents having entered appearance through the learned AAG, resist the Writ Petition by filing a Statement of Objections in justification of impugned action. 2. Brief factual background: (a) Prestige Tech Park inter alia developed in the lands contiguously spread over two villages namely Amane Bellandur Khane and Kaadubeesanahalli eventually fall within the jurisdictional limits of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike; Prestige Tech Park - III is a constituent unit thereof developed by erecting a cluster of commercial Apartments/Buildings in Sy.Nos.110/1, 110/2 & 110/3 of Amane Bellandur Khane village, Varthur hobli, Bengaluru East; all these petitioners have bought flats by virtue of registered sale deeds in question that comprise the building erected in Tech Park III. (b) The sale deeds in question were executed & registered during the period between 2015 and 2016; later, allegedly on the basis of audit objections recorded by the Accountant General for the State of Karnataka, the second respondent-District Registrar having suo moto examined the instruments, found the property comprised therein to be under-valued and therefore, directed the petitioners to make good the deficit stamp duty; the first respondent- Regional Commissioner having turned down their appeals, these Writ Petitions are presented. 3. Submissions at the Bar: (i) Learned Sr. 3. Submissions at the Bar: (i) Learned Sr. Advocate Mr.K.N.Phanindra appearing for the petitioners finds fault with the impugned orders arguing that: (i) in respect of Sale Deeds of April 2015 involved in nine writ petitions, the suo moto examination done by the District Registrar was beyond the limitation period prescribed under Sec.45-A(3) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 (hereafter "Stamp Act") and therefore, the same is legally unsustainable, (ii) both the impugned orders proceed on a wrong premise that the Apartments comprised in the Sale Deeds are in the buildings erected in Kadubeesanahalli land whereas the records establish that they are in Amane Bellandur Khane Village, and thus, there is error apparent on the face of the record, (iii) the Stamp Act being a fiscal legislation, its provisions need to be construed strictly and the lurking doubt, if any, shall enure to the benefit of duty payer, which aspect having been lost sight of by the official respondents, the impugned orders are infected with legal infirmities warranting indulgence of writ Court; he banks upon certain rulings in support of his submissions. (ii) Learned AAG Mr.Subramanya appearing for the official respondents vehemently contends that: (i) the limitation period of two years prescribed in Sec.45-A(3) applies not to the issuance of notice of under-valuation but to the initiation of intra-departmental proceedings such as calling for records from the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar and examination thereof; (ii) though Prestige Tech Park-III is arguably situate in Amane Bellandur Khane Village, it's other constituent units namely Tech Parks I & II are situate in Kaadubeesanahalli, all these three units together constitute one integral whole for the purpose of determining the market value of the properties comprised in the sale deeds and therefore, the Guideline Values specified in the Notification dated 27.10.2014 are applicable to the case of the petitioners, and, (iii) the official respondents working under the Stamp Act have the advantage of accumulated expertise in the matter and therefore, Writ Court should be slow in interfering with their decisions; learned AAG relying upon certain decisions in support of these contentions, seeks dismissal of writ petitions. 4. 4. Since all these petitions involve substantially similar questions of law & facts, the same having been grouped together, are taken up for final disposal by a common judgment, as consensually suggested by both the sides; having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the petition papers, and after adverting to the Rulings cited at the Bar, this Court grants relief to the litigant citizens for the following discussion: 5. As to limitation period prescribed u/s.45-A(3) of Stamp Act: (i) The Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 providing for levy of stamp duty on the documents/instruments is a law relating to fiscal liability and therefore, it's provisions and the delegated legislations made thereunder such as the Notifications specifying the Guideline Values need to be construed stricto sensu; if there is any reasonable doubt as to the liability, the same should yield to the benefit of the duty payer, subject to all just exceptions; the authority to impose a tax or levy a fee cannot be deduced from provisions of doubtful import, and when the words used in a fiscal Statute are capable of two interpretations, the one that favours the citizen, must hold the field vide Diwan Brothers Vs. Central Bank of India, (1976) 3 SCC 800 . (ii) With the above prelude, it is profitable to reproduce a relevant part of sub-section (3) of Sec.45-A which has the following text: "(3) The Deputy Commissioner may, suo motu within two years from the date of registration of any instrument specified in sub-section (1) not already referred to him under sub-section (1), call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property which is the subject matter of any instrument specified in subsection (1) and the duty payable thereon] and if after such examination he has reason to believe that the market value of such property has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may determine by order the market value of such property and the duty payable thereon in accordance with the procedure provided for in sub-section (2) " The argument of learned Sr. Advocate Mr. Advocate Mr. Phanindra that the above provision employing the expression " within two years from the date of registration " needs to be construed in a meaningful way and beneficial to the duty payer, makes a lot of sense; a specific limitation period is prescribed by Caesar to relieve the citizens of the possible risk of being subjected to the suffering of belated recovery proceedings at the hands of indolent statutory authorities, coming to them as a bolt from the blue; the text of the provision generates a legitimate expectation in the mind of scrupulous citizens that after the efflux of two years from the registration of their conveyances, no demand shall be raised against them in relation to deficit duty otherwise payable. (iii) The laudable object of statute of limitation: T.M. Cooley a great American Judge in his magnum opus "A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS" of 1868, HINDUSTAN LAW BOOK COMPANY, CALCUTTA at Page 364 writes about larger benevolence of limitation statutes in a good governance, as under: "In this connection it may be proper to speak of limitation laws, which sometimes result in depriving a person altogether of his property, and yet are in strict conformity with the law of the land, and quite unobjectionable in principle. A limitation law fixes upon a reasonable time within which a party is allowed to bring suit to recover his rights, and, if he fails to do so, establishes a legal presumption against him that he has no rights in the premises. It is a statute of repose. A limitation law fixes upon a reasonable time within which a party is allowed to bring suit to recover his rights, and, if he fails to do so, establishes a legal presumption against him that he has no rights in the premises. It is a statute of repose. Every government is bound in good faith to furnish its citizens all needful legal remedies; but it is not bound to keep its courts open indefinitely for one who neglects or refuses to apply for redress until it may fairly be presumed that the means by which the other party might disprove the claim are lost in the lapse of time." What is stated more than a century & a half ago, by the said jurist, as being applicable to the private claims of citizens inter se, is equally invocable against a Welfare State and especially when the State has held out to the subjects at large that its actions of recovery of the kind, are restricted by the limitation period; Sec.45-A(3) has enacted a pragmatic norm that the Government, by the lapse of this prescribed time because of omission on its part, would loose the power to exact the duty from the citizen on the ground of deficient payment; it is more so when no provision is made either for condoning the delay or for extending the limitation period that would have otherwise enabled the Govt. to resort to recovery proceedings even after the lapse of limitation period. to resort to recovery proceedings even after the lapse of limitation period. (iv) The contention of learned AAG that the text & context of Sec.45-A(3) prescribe a limitation period of two years, is only for calling for the instrument & records from the office of the Sub-Registrar concerned for examination, and not for issuance of notice to the citizens, if countenanced, would defeat the very purpose for which the provision is enacted by the legislature in its wisdom pragmatic considerations; it is not possible to assume that a statute intended to relieve a citizen, by lapse of time would prescribe limitation only for the intradepartmental actions of the officials that are unilaterally accomplished indoor, keeping the citizen out in darkness; ordinarily, the statutes like this need to be given a purposive construction as distinguished from literal one; when so interpreted, the meaning of this provision expands the language of its text to the outer edge of its semantic limits; such an interpretation supplies the true meaning to the norm enacted therein; succour for this view can be had from the opinio juris; a renowned Israeli Judge of yester years MR.AHARON BARAK in "PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW", Universal Law Publishing Company, First Indian Reprint 2007 at Page xv of "Introduction" eruditely writes as under: "According to purposive interpretation, you cannot know how to interpret unless you know what the goal of interpreting is. In my opinion, the goal of interpreting is to achieve the purpose of law, in general, and of the individual legal text as part of it in particular. Law has a purpose. It is a social device. The goal of interpretation is to achieve the social goal of law. That is the theoretical basis for the centrality of purpose in purposive interpretation..." The other by-product of accepting the interpretation placed by the learned AAG is that once intradepartmental proceedings are on as an indoor exercise which they may resort as a Standard Operation Procedure, no time would ever run out for initiating the recovery action and eventually, the citizen may be subjected to the cruelty of uncertainty of a hanging sword falling on his head not only at any time, but arguably for any length of time; such an interpretation strikes at reason & justice; thus the purposive construction would make the said provision a living law of the people. (v) Mr. (v) Mr. Phanindra draws support from a Division Bench decision of this Court in M.C.ASSOCIATES vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA, (2008) AIR Karnataka 207 for the proposition that the limitation of two years begins to run from the registration of the instrument in question and therefore, its suo moto examination for ascertaining the arguable escapement of revenue by way of stamp duty, becomes impermissible unless the recovery proceedings are initiated by issuing a notice to the citizen within the said period; the Bench after reproducing Sec.45-A(3) at paragraph 6, in the said judgment has observed at paragraph 7 as under: "7. The above statutory provision empowers the Deputy Commissioner to call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property which is a subject matter of any instrument and the duty payable thereon within two years from the date of registration of the instrument. In this case the 2nd respondent issued the 1st notice under Section 45-A(3) to the petitioners on 22- 1-1999 i.e., within the period of two years from the date of registration of the Annexure- B sale deed. The delay in serving the notice on the party concerned cannot be taken into consideration for determining whether the action under Section 45-A(3) was initiated within the period of two years stipulated by the statute. If the file discloses that action under Section 45-A(3) was initiated by issuing notice to the party within two years from the date of registration of the instrument, the action taken by the Deputy Commissioner is well within time. There are different ways of parties defeating the service of notice issued to them by the statutory authorities. If such delay is taken into account for determining the period of limitation, it will defeat the object of the statute. There are different ways of parties defeating the service of notice issued to them by the statutory authorities. If such delay is taken into account for determining the period of limitation, it will defeat the object of the statute. Hence we are of the view that, in the absence of any stipulation in Section 45-A(3) that the action under Section 45-A(3) can be considered to have been initiated only when the notice is served on the parties, the initiation of action by issuing notice to the party to the address shown in the instrument within two years from the date of registration of the instrument is sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 45-A(3) " These observations support the case of nine of the petitioners whose sale deeds having been registered in April 2015, have been issued notices more than two years thereafter, of course, the dates of the actual service of notices being irrelevant. 6. Db decision in MC Associates on Sec.45-A(3) and subsequent legislative amendments to other provisions of the Act: (i) There is one more reason as to why the contention of the learned AAG that the period of two years prescribed under the provision in question is only for initiating intradepartmental action and not for issuing of notice to the citizen, does not gain acceptance. As already mentioned above, a Division Bench of this Court in M.C. Associates supra had placed a particular construction on the said provision, way back in October 2007. It can be presumed that the Lawmaker takes note of the law declared by way of interpretation or otherwise, by the Constitutional Courts; the Stamp Act has been amended more than a dozen times since the decision in M.C. Associates; it is one of the essential requirements of the administration of justice that the long standing decisions should not be frequently changed by way of interpretation, so as to unsettle the settled positions; the fact that the State Legislature has not thought it necessary to amend the law for setting at naught the ratio in the said decision is a clear indicative of the position that the said ratio continues to be the true view of the law-maker. (ii) The contention of the learned AAG that the petitioners have not taken up the question as to invokability of Section 45-A(3) and therefore they should not be permitted to agitate the same, does not much come to the rescue of the State; true it is, ordinarily the matter of limitation is a mixed question of law & facts and therefore they should be a plea concerning the same in the pleadings of the parties; however, when the factual aspect of the matter emerges from the record of the case, the factual aspect ceases to be questionable and eventually what remains is a pure question of law and its invokability; the dates of registration of sale deeds are not in dispute and so also the dates when the petitioners have been issued with the notices; that being the position, it is open to the parties to take up plea of Limitation Law; after all, it does not befit a welfare State to defeat an otherwise legitimate claim of its citizens on the quick sands of a technical ground. 7. As to "per incuriam" & "obiter dicta" arguments of the State: (i) The contention of learned AAG Mr.Subramanya that the observations of the Division Bench in M.C.ASSOCIATES supra are only an obiter dicta if not per incuriam and therefore, the same lack the binding force of a precedent, cannot be acceded to; the very provision namely Sec.45-A(3) is quoted at para 6 of the decision and the same is interpreted at para 7 with due advertence; apart from this provision, no other is mentioned; it is a settled position of law that a smaller Bench of a Constitutional Court has no discretion to disobey a binding dicta of a larger Bench by simply branding the decision cited, as "per incuriam" or "obiter dicta" when apparently it is a considered opinion; the matter could have been more elaborately discussed, is beside the point; after all, one can not forget what Oscar Wilde an English writer of great repute had wittily stated "There is scope for improvement even in heaven"; (ii) when once, the Bench decided upon the relevant Rule, its scope and the facts, the validity of its conclusions in terms of precedential value cannot be pushed into oblivion, howsoever innovative the arguments be; the Apex Court in Mahadeo Lal Kanodia Vs. The Administrator General of West Bengal, (1960) AIR SC 936 , observed: "...we have noticed with some regret that when the earlier decision of two Judges of the same High Court in Deorajin's case was cited before the learned Judges who heard the present appeal, they took on themselves to say that the previous decision was wrong, instead of following the usual procedure in case of difference of opinion with an earlier decision of referring no less than legal propriety form the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law than any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. The quality would totally disappear if Judges of coordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decision..." (iii) The vehement contention of learned AAG Mr.Subramanya that an earlier Division Bench of this Court in G. Vitobha Vs. State of Karnataka, (1991) ILR(Kar) 888 had placed a different interpretation on a pari materia provision enacted in Karnataka Sales Tax, 1957 and that the same having not been adverted to by the later Bench of same strength in M.C.ASSOCIATES supra, the provision in question needs a fresh look independently, is bit difficult to nod to; the two Benches decided the cases arising not only under two different statutes i.e., Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 and Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 but also on the texts of their provisions that were in variance with each other; therefore, the decision in the former cannot be said to be rendered under a pari materia legal regime; similarly, the decision in N.Ranga Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 9 SCC 691 too does not come to the rescue of the State inasmuch as the Apex Court there, was examining the provisions of Sections 15 & 15B of the Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 which again had a different terminology; this apart, when two decisions which discuss the same provision of law are cited, the one more closer to the facts of the case at hands, has to be followed, unless their precedential force is otherwise robbed off by each other. 8. 8. As to invokability of the Guide Line Values prescribed for Kaadubeesanahalli to the structures in other village: (i) In all these cases, regardless of the years of registration of the conveyances in question, one fact which stares at the State is that all these registered instruments comprise the Apartments in the buildings of Prestige Tech Park - III, developed in Sy.Nos.110/1, 110/2 & 110/3 of Amane Bellandur Khane village, Varthur Hobli, Bangalore East; the contention that Prestige Tech Parks I, II & III constitute one single Block which is developed on two different but contiguous villages namely Amane Bellandur Khane and Kaadubeesanahalli, does not make difference to the case of the petitioners as long as their buildings are erected in the former, as is forthcoming from the specific texts of the subject sale deeds; much milk cannot be derived by the State by banking upon the Notification dated 27.10.2014 at Annexure-R4 which at its internal Page No.208 i.e., at Item No.412 mentions "Prestige Tech Park (Commercial)" when it is under the heading "XXIII Kaadubeesanahalli"; by the very text & context of the said Notification, the structures erected in other villages logically stand excluded in ascertaining the market value for the purpose of levying stamp duty, as rightly contended by Mr.Phanindra. (ii) There is yet other reason which Mr.Phanindra points out for discounting the version of the learned AAG Mr.Subramanya that the aforesaid Notification of 27.10.2014 at Annexure-R4 applies to structures in Prestige Tech Park III too; a land developer may take up construction in one single project comprising multiple villages and of calling it with one single nomenclature; that per se does not disentitle the duty payer from invoking the beneficial Guideline Values that may be otherwise applicable to each of the constituent villages independently; this view is strengthened by another Notification dated 27.10.2014 which specifically stipulates in it's Appendix that where there is no Guideline Value prescribed for the commercial flats, their market value shall be determined with the addition of 30% to the Guideline Value prescribed for residential flats; the same is reiterated in clause 7 of the Notification dated 28.03.2016 as well; the fact that the petitioners apparently have valued their properties with this addition, cannot be disputed. 9. 9. Lastly, Mr.Phanindra submits and this Court agrees that whatever excess amount that is paid or deposited pursuant to the impugned orders, needs to be refunded should the petitioners succeed in their legal battle; ordinarily, the usufructs of victory in a court case cannot be denied to a successful litigant; no exception such as one of unjust enrichment or the like is made out by the State to this general proposition; even otherwise, there is no authority or justification for the State to retain the money of the citizens, which they were made to pay coercively sans legal duty; an argument to the contrary amounts to acquisition of property of a private citizen without authority of law and thus, violates Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. In the above circumstances, these Writ Petitions succeed; a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned orders; a Writ of Mandamus issues to the respondents to refund to the petitioners all and whatever amount collected from them pursuant to the impugned orders which are now set at naught, within a period of eight weeks. This Court places on record its deep appreciation for the able assistance rendered by learned Sr. Advocate Mr. Phanindra and learned AAG Mr. Subramanya. Costs made easy.