JUDGMENT : Ravi Ranjan, J. This appeal has been preferred by the writ petitioner assailing the decision dated 21.08.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (C) No. 4281 of 2017 dismissing the writ petition. 2. The factual matrix necessary to be discussed for consideration of lis, stands enumerated as under: 3. The Respondent no. 4-Bank of India, Hazaribagh Branch, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Bank’ for sake of convenience) instituted Money Suit No. 9/1996 in the court of Sub-ordinate Judge-V, Hazaribagh for realization/recovery of a sum of Rs.6,89,380.08 along with interest @ 18.25% per annum to be calculated from the date of filing of suit till actual payment and also for realization of costs, charges and expenses etc. 4. The case of the plaintiff-Bank was that the defendant was the permanent employee of the plaintiff as “Special Assistant” posted in Hazaribagh Branch and was assigned the work relating to C.D. & T.D.R., S.B. payment relating to department including checking O.D., C.D., L.I.C., Supplementary Cash Books and other concerned Ledgers etc. However, the allegation of the Bank, which would be evident from the judgment of the Civil Court appended as Annexure-1, was that the defendant-appellant fraudulently misappropriated the money belonging to the plaintiff-Bank by forging and fabricating the records/books of the Branch. In order to misappropriate money for personal gains, he made several fraudulent entries in the Books of Account, papers and withdrew the amounts in a fictitious name from Hazaribagh Branch. In what manner it was done, has been detailed in the judgment of the Sub-ordinate Judge-V. The suit was filed in the year 1996. By that time, the Parliament had already enacted the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1993”) which came into force on 25th June, 1993. According to Section 1(4) of the Act, 1993, the provisions of the Act, 1993 were not applicable where the amount of debt due to any bank or financial institution or to a consortium of banks or financial institutions was less than Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh). Thus, obviously, money/recovery suit was not filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal rather the same was filed before the Civil Court for recovery of Rs.6,89,380.08 as it was less than Rs. Ten Lakh. Thus, obviously, money/recovery suit was not filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal rather the same was filed before the Civil Court for recovery of Rs.6,89,380.08 as it was less than Rs. Ten Lakh. At the time when the suit was filed the State of Jharkhand was the integral part of the State of Bihar which came into existence on 15.11.2000 under the Bihar Re-organization Act, 2000. 5. Debt Recovery Tribunal, Patna was constituted vide Notification GSR No. 325(E) dated 24.01.1997 having territorial jurisdiction over the State of Bihar. However, the matter was perhaps not transferred to it under Section 31 of the Act, 1993 as the suit was filed for recovery of Rs.6,89,380.08 along with interest. The suit was ultimately decided vide judgment dated 31.05.2007 by the Sub-ordinate Judge-V, Hazaribagh (Annexure-1) ex-parte in favour of the Bank. However, the decretal amount along with interest having raised to much higher than Rs. Ten Lakh, a petition was filed under Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 before the Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal at Hazaribagh with a prayer to issue recovery certificate to the tune of Rs.38,19,089.32 together with interest and costs. 6. In the proceeding before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, the defendant appeared and filed show cause disclosing the fact that in the criminal case bearing Case No. C-119S/1994 having already been lodged by the C.B.I. against the judgment-debtor and which is still pending in the Court of Special Judge, C.B.I. at Ranchi, the defendant was languishing in Jail from 19.04.1999 to 21.06.2001. A stand was taken by the defendant-writ petitioner that he was not aware of the institution of the money suit and due to lack of knowledge he could not appear and the suit was heard ex-parte in his absence and unfortunately no appeal could be filed against the judgment and the decree. 7. Be that as it may, Execution Case No. 1 of 2012 was decided in favour of the plaintiff-Bank and the recovery certificate to the tune of Rs.38,19,089.32 inclusive of decretal amount of Rs.6,89,380.08 with interest @ 18.25% per annum raised from 25.06.1996 to 31.10.2011 and a cost of Rs.14,060/-, was issued. Consequent thereof, demand notices were also issued. 8. 7. Be that as it may, Execution Case No. 1 of 2012 was decided in favour of the plaintiff-Bank and the recovery certificate to the tune of Rs.38,19,089.32 inclusive of decretal amount of Rs.6,89,380.08 with interest @ 18.25% per annum raised from 25.06.1996 to 31.10.2011 and a cost of Rs.14,060/-, was issued. Consequent thereof, demand notices were also issued. 8. The aforesaid order was put to challenge before the Single Bench of this court in W.P. (C) No. 4281 of 2017 chiefly on the ground that the case of the Bank was not covered under Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 and such proceeding was in teeth of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank, Dasuya Vs. Chajju Ram and others [ AIR 2000 (SC) 2671 : (2000) 6 SCC 655 ] and other few decisions of the other High Courts such as Bank of India Vs. Quest Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and others in Appeal No. R-38 of 2012 and a judgment passed by the Bombay High Court in Bank of India Vs. Shree Satya Corporation and others. 9. Learned counsel for the Bank submitted before the learned Single Judge that the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 is a complete code by itself which ousts the jurisdiction of civil Court and other Courts in respect of recovery of dues to the Bank and other Financial Institutions by referring Sections 2, 17, 18, 31 and 34 of the Act, 1993. Learned Single Judge formed an opinion that labeling of Sections would be immaterial in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in J Kumaradasan Nair Vs. Iric Sohan [ (2009) 12 SCC 175 ] holding therein that a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would not be sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court. Learned Single Judge came to a further conclusion that the trial court has got inherent power and jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted under Section 18 if the debt extent is more than Rs. Ten Lakh. Thus, even though wrong section was labeled as 31-A, the same did not make any difference. In the result, the writ petition was dismissed. 10. In the aforesaid background of the factual matrix, we have heard the parties and perused the records of this case. 11. Ten Lakh. Thus, even though wrong section was labeled as 31-A, the same did not make any difference. In the result, the writ petition was dismissed. 10. In the aforesaid background of the factual matrix, we have heard the parties and perused the records of this case. 11. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant, has chiefly raised two issues. First that Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 was not applicable; and second that the decretal amount is not the debt and, thus, the proceeding before the Debt Recovery Tribunal was not maintainable. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions rendered by Gujarat High Court in Bank of India Vs. Vijay Ramniklal Kapadia and others (AIR 1997 Gujarat 75) and Delhi High Court in State Bank of India Vs. Vijay Kr. Tayal [1996 (39) DRJ]. He has also placed reliance on the decision rendered in Punjab National Bank, Dasuya (supra) for that purpose. 12. Learned counsel for the Bank has vehemently argued that the applicability of Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 would not be of much importance for the reasons that once the debt crossed the amount of Rs. Ten Lakh, the Civil Court was not competent to execute the decree. Therefore, the Debt Recovery Tribunal has rightly assumed power. He has submitted that the Act being a complete code clearly stipulates under Section 31 that all the pending cases for recovery of amount of more than Rs. Ten Lakh has to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The Debt Recovery Tribunal has sufficient power under the Act whereas, Section 18 of the Act bars this jurisdiction to the Civil Courts. 13. On consideration of rival submissions made on behalf of the parties, in the opinion of this Court, following issues emerge for our consideration: I. Whether the proceeding which was initiated under Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 was erroneous as the case was not coming within the purview of the aforesaid provision and whether in such a situation, the entire proceeding has to be held to be fully without jurisdiction? II. Whether the claim of the Bank is covered within the definition of ‘debt’ as per Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993? If not, whether a proceeding could have been maintained before the Debt Recovery Tribunal? II. Whether the claim of the Bank is covered within the definition of ‘debt’ as per Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993? If not, whether a proceeding could have been maintained before the Debt Recovery Tribunal? Issue No. 1 – For better appreciation the relevant provision i.e. Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 is extracted and reproduced as under: “31-A. Power of Tribunal to issue certificate of recovery in case of decree or order. – (1) Where a decree or order was passed by any Court before the commencement of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act, 2000 and has not yet been executed, then, the decree-holder may apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of the amount. (2) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may issue a certificate for recovery to a Recovery Officer. (3) On receipt of a certificate under sub-section (2), the Recovery Officer shall proceed to recover the amount as if it was a certificate in respect of a debt recoverable under this Act.” From bare perusal of Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 it would appear that this provision is of inclusive and enabling nature to include the cases in which decree and order was passed by a Civil Court before commencement of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act, 2000 but the decree could not be executed. In such a situation, it has been provided that the decree holder can file an application before the Tribunal which may issue certificate for recovery to the Recovery Officer and that Recovery Officer shall proceed to recover the amount. This issue has already been delved upon by the learned Single Judge in the order impugned. Learned Single Judge has not held that the case was maintainable before the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 but has held that labeling of wrong section would not be a ground for declaring that the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is ousted. However, learned Single Judge has referred several Sections but has not referred as to under which Section actually the case could have been filed. While dealing with the identical situation, a learned Single Judge of Patna High Court in Shree Maha Laxmi General Store Vs. However, learned Single Judge has referred several Sections but has not referred as to under which Section actually the case could have been filed. While dealing with the identical situation, a learned Single Judge of Patna High Court in Shree Maha Laxmi General Store Vs. Union of India and others [2018 SCC Online Pat 2559 : (2019)196 AIC 361], after considering the provision of Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 as also other provisions, has come to the conclusion that a petition filed under identical circumstances under Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 was not maintainable and, as such, the entire proceedings stood vitiated. However, the Bank was granted liberty to pursue the case under Section 19 of the Act, 1993 by treating the writ petition itself to be an application under such provision. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Punjab National Bank, Dasuya (supra) while placing reliance on the literal meaning of Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 has held that the case considered by it in the aforesaid decision was within the ambit of the concerned provision. 15. We have given anxious consideration to the submissions made in this regard by rival sides and also to the materials available on record. Though we are in agreement with the opinion of learned Single Judge that Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 would not be applicable in the present case but at the same time we would disagree from that part of the decision of learned Single Judge of Patna High Court rendered in Shree Maha Laxmi General Store (supra) which says that the entire proceedings stand vitiated and, therefore, a fresh application should be made under Section 19 of the Act. 16. In the present case, learned Single Judge in the order impugned, has correctly held that it is well settled principle of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in J Kumaradasan Nair (supra) that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would not be sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law, however, learned Single Judge could not point out as to such application would be maintainable under which provision of the Act. Here, we will be in agreement with the decision of learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court rendered in Shree Maha Laxmi General Store (supra) that in the present scenario, petition under Section 19 of the Act, 1993 was the only recourse open to the Bank if the recoverable amount was more than Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh) as the jurisdiction of Civil Court would be ousted under Section 18 of the Act, 1993. However, even if the petition is filed under Section 31-A of the Act, 1993 the only requirement would be to consider the same under Section 19 of the Act, 1993 itself, as the power is referable to the actual power. Labeling of wrong section would be no reason for ousting the jurisdiction. At the same time, we would not agree with that part of the decision of the Patna High Court by which it had set aside the entire proceedings. In our considered view, even though petition for initiation of proceeding was filed under Section 31-A of the Act, 1993, that could well be considered and taken up under Section 19 where the actual power of the Tribunal lies and, thus, the certificate issued to the Recovery Officer could have to be protected. 17. Having reached to such conclusion, this issue is decided in favour of the Bank and against the writ petitioner-appellant. Issue No. 2 : So far as this issue is concerned, the first objection which has been raised by the respondent-Bank is that the issue having not raised either before the Tribunal or even before the Writ Court, now at the appellate stage it cannot be raised. Secondly, it is urged that even the writ petition was not maintainable as against the order of Tribunal, there is statutory provision of appeal. 18. In our considered view, both the aforesaid submissions raised on behalf of the respondent-Bank are noted only to be rejected for the reason that it is well settled proposition of law that so far exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India i.e. the issue of jurisdiction is concerned, even though there is alternative remedy there would be rule of discretion and not the rule of jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Balkrishna Ram Vs. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Balkrishna Ram Vs. Union of India and another (2020 SCC Online SC 21) has held that the principle that the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction when an efficacious alternative remedy is available, is a rule of prudence and not a rule of law. Since the issue raised before the Writ Court was touching the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Single Bench’s decision to entertain the writ petition cannot be faulted with. So far as the another question as to whether the suit which was instituted before the Civil Court with an allegation that the employee of Bank has misappropriated the money of Bank would be within the ambit of definition of “debt” as laid down under Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993 or not, would be pure question of law and would vitiate the entire proceedings if the issue is decided in favour of the appellant as it would take away the jurisdiction of the Debt Recovery Tribunal to deal with the concerned petition. As such, we are of the opinion that the concerned issue being the question of law can be raised at any stage. 19. Now coming to the issue concerned as raised, it would be apt to quote the relevant provision which is Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993 : “2(g). As such, we are of the opinion that the concerned issue being the question of law can be raised at any stage. 19. Now coming to the issue concerned as raised, it would be apt to quote the relevant provision which is Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993 : “2(g). “debt” means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any civil Court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the application and includes any liability towards debt securities which remains unpaid in full or part after notice of ninety days served upon the borrower by the debenture trustee or any other authority in whose favour securing interest is created for the benefit of holders of debt securities or.” (Emphasis is ours) From bare perusal of the aforesaid provision, it would be apparent that, for considering the liability as “debt” due to a bank or any financial institution or by consortium of banks etc., there has to be a business activity undertaken by the bank or such financial institution along with such person who would be liable to pay back the debt, i.e., there should be a business activity between such person and the Bank under which such person becomes liable to pay back the Bank a sum along with interest. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in United Bank of India Vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal and others ( AIR 1999 SC 1381 ) in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the expression ‘debt’ has to be given the widest amplitude to mean any liability which is alleged as due from any person by a bank during the course of any “business activity” undertaken by the bank. Debts Recovery Tribunal and others ( AIR 1999 SC 1381 ) in which the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the expression ‘debt’ has to be given the widest amplitude to mean any liability which is alleged as due from any person by a bank during the course of any “business activity” undertaken by the bank. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that for ascertaining the question whether the claim of any other bank or financial institution would come within the purview of the Tribunal created under the Act, it would be imperative that the entire averments made by the plaintiff in the plaint have to be looked into. In the present case, though the plaint is not available but the same has been dealt with by the Sub-ordinate Judge-V, Hazaribagh in his judgment dated 31.05.2007 rendered in Money Suit No 9 of 1996 filed by the Bank (Annexure-1). Relevant passage from the aforesaid judgment is extracted and quoted as under for better appreciation: “2. The case of the plaintiff in short is that the plaintiff is a Body Corporate constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act V of 1970, having its Head Office at Express Towers, Nariman point, Bombay-400 021 and a Branch Office amongst other places at Hazaribag, Post Office Hazaribag-825301 Police-station Hazaribag, District-Hazaribag. The defendant was in permanent employment of the plaintiff as “Special Assistant” posted in Hazaribag Branch from 18.10.1984 to 20.12.1994 and as Special Assistant, his duty was to perform all day to day work relating to C.D. & T.D.R., S.B. payment relating to Department including checking O.D., C.D., L.I.C., Supplementary Cash Books and concerned Ledgers etc. and other alike works as part of his duty and/or entrusted from time to time by the Branch in terms of Bipartite settlement held between workmen Union and Indian Bank Association from time to time. The defendant being a Senior and old employee of the plaintiff was fully conversant with day to day working of different tables of the Bank’s Branch and had also approach to all the accounts books and papers of the Hazaribag Branch of the plaintiff. It is further case of the plaintiff that in course of his work, the defendant fraudulently misappropriated money belonging to the plaintiff by forging and fabricating in the record/books, pages of the Branch. It is further case of the plaintiff that in course of his work, the defendant fraudulently misappropriated money belonging to the plaintiff by forging and fabricating in the record/books, pages of the Branch. In order to misappropriate the money for personal gains, he made several fraudulent entries in the books of account, papers and withdrew the amounts in fictitious name from Hazaribag Branch viz:- xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” From perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite clear that the Bank has tried to recover the sum which was misappropriated by its employee in a fraudulent manner. 21. While dealing with such a situation, Gujarat High Court in a decision rendered in Bank of India Vs. Vijay Ramniklal Kapadia and others (supra) has held that misappropriation of amount of the bank by its employee can never be construed as “debt” in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993. The relevant passage i.e. paragraph-5 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: “5. On the plain reading of the above definition, it is clear that any liability which is alleged and due from any person by a bank during the course of any business activity undertaken by it in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or whether payable under a decree or an order of any civil Court or otherwise, and subsisting on and legally recoverable on the date of the application is “debt”. Thus any liability due from any person by a bank during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank will constitute a “debt”. Therefore, a fraud committed by an employee of the Bank cannot or should not be construed a “debt”. In the instant case, it is the allegation of the appellant bank in the plaint that respondent No. 1 being an employee of the appellant-Bank has committed fraud with the Bank to the extent of Rs. 13,86,000/- and the suit is filed to recover the said amount. In the instant case, it is the allegation of the appellant bank in the plaint that respondent No. 1 being an employee of the appellant-Bank has committed fraud with the Bank to the extent of Rs. 13,86,000/- and the suit is filed to recover the said amount. By no stretch of imagination the said misappropriation of the amount of the Bank by its employee can be construed as a “debt”, the learned trial Judge, in the instant case, unfortunately has referred to and reproduced only a limited part of the definition of the word “debt” and has committed an error in holding that the debt is a liability which is alleged as due from any person by a Bank. The later part of the definition of the word “debt” is clear which states that it is the liability due from any person during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank which can be said to be a “debt”, meaning thereby that any transaction between a Bank and its customer with respect to the business activity undertaken by the Bank, i.e. granting of loan etc. Misappropriation of the amount of the Bank by its employee and recovery thereof by way of suit can never be construed as a “debt”. In view of this, the appeal is required to be allowed.” 22. Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in State Bank of India Vs. Vijay Kr. Tayal (supra) has also dealt with such situation in paragraph-9 which reads as under: “9. As regards suits instituted by the Banks and Financial Institutions against employees for amount misappropriated or embezzled, reference may be invited to OA 7/95 in Suit No. 550/94 titled Oriental Bank of Commerce Vs. Sh. Mohan Gupta. I have held that suit for recovery of misappropriated or embezzled amounts by the Banks or Financial Institutions against the employee, would not be one which would come within the definition of a “debt arising during the course of business” as contemplated under the Act. Sh. Mohan Gupta. I have held that suit for recovery of misappropriated or embezzled amounts by the Banks or Financial Institutions against the employee, would not be one which would come within the definition of a “debt arising during the course of business” as contemplated under the Act. Hence the said suits would not be liable to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal.” From perusal of the above, it appears that the learned Single Judge in clear terms has held that the suit for recovery of embezzled amount by the Banks or Financial Institutions against the employee, would not be one which would come within the ambit of “debt arising during the course of business” as contemplated under the Act. 23. A Division Bench of Delhi High Court in M/s J.U. Mansukhani and Co. and another Vs. Presiding Officer and others (AIR 2000 Delhi 103) has of course held that in case in which drafts were allegedly and fraudulently obtained in direct or indirect collusion with the bank officials, it is clearly a business activity of a Bank and, therefore, taking help of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in AIR 1999 SC 1381 , it has been held that it would come within the jurisdiction of Tribunal. However, the said case is clearly distinguishable on facts as in the aforesaid case a customer had fraudulently obtained the amount by tendering fraudulent draft, may be in direct or indirect collusion with the Bank officials, but the suit for recovery was not initiated against the employee of the Bank rather the same was instituted against M/s J.U. Mansukhani and Co. and another who, being customers, were of course in business activity with the Bank whereas in the case in hand, allegation is against a bank employee who had misappropriated the amount of the Bank in fraudulent manner, thus, he cannot be said to be in “business activity” with the Bank. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has also placed reliance on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. M/s Ballabh Das and Co. and others ( AIR 1999 SC 3408 ) but the said case is on the issue of transfer of cases from the Civil Court to the Tribunal after the Debt Recovery Tribunal having been established. 25. M/s Ballabh Das and Co. and others ( AIR 1999 SC 3408 ) but the said case is on the issue of transfer of cases from the Civil Court to the Tribunal after the Debt Recovery Tribunal having been established. 25. After giving careful consideration to the submissions raised on behalf of the parties and the materials available on record, we are in full agreement with the views expressed by the Gujarat High Court in Bank of India Vs. Vijay Ramniklal Kapadia and others (supra) and Delhi High Court in State Bank of India Vs. Vijay Kr. Tayal (supra) so far as the present issue is concerned and we have no hesitation in holding that the money suit, which was filed for recovery of the amount, fraudulently misappropriated by an employee of the Bank, who was not in the business activity with the Bank, would not come within the definition of “debt” as envisaged under Section 2(g) of the Act, 1993 and, as such, we are of the opinion that the execution proceeding before the Tribunal was wholly without jurisdiction. 26. In the result, the writ petition and the appeal are allowed. The impugned order as well as the consequential demand notices are hereby quashed and set aside. However, the Bank would be at liberty to file execution case before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction which would take up the matter on its own merit and in accordance with law as the Bank is decree-holder and admittedly no appeal against such decree has been preferred by the writ petitioner-appellant.