JUDGMENT : M.Satyanarayana Murthy, J. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by one Chintapalli Pratap Kumar, practicing Advocate and Member of Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh vide Endrolment No.897/2007, claiming Writ of Certiorari against the notice dated 04.01.2020 issued by the second respondent in Complaint Case No.23 of 2019 (SR No.99 of 2017) lodged by the third respondent against this petitioner and quash the same, as the same is illegal, arbitrary and violative of procedure prescribed in Form E-1 as envisaged under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 (for short 'The Rules') and violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and also violative of principles of natural justice. 2. The petitioner is an Advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of State of Andhra Pradesh with Enrolment No.897/2007 and practicing in Prakasam District Courts at Ongole and also appearing in the Courts in and around Prakasam District, dealing with both civil and criminal cases. 3. In the year 2013, one Mr.Kotari Nageswara Rao/third respondent herein approached the petitioner for filing the cases arising under the provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner, being an Advocate, accepted the said briefs and have filed complaint cases, as required and the same were registered as C.C.No.610 of 2013 on the file of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ongole at Prakasam District, C.C.No.481 of 2014 on the file of II Additional Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class, Ongole, which was later transferred and re-numbered as 331/2016 and C.C.No.482 of 2014 on the file of II Additional Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class, Ongole. While the said complaint cases were pending, the accused in C.C.No.610 of 2013 and Kotari Nageswara Rao/third respondent herein have compromised the said case outside the court and requested the petitioner to file withdrawal petition under Section 257 of Cr.P.C. in view of the request of complainant, on his behalf, a petition was filed duly signed by Kotari Nageswara Rao before the II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ongole at Prakasam District. Said Kotari Nageswara Rao appeared before the Magistrate on 30.10.2014 and after considering the petition filed by Kotari Nageswara Rao, the Magistrate passed the order on 30.10.2014 in C.C no.610 of 2013 which reads as under: "The complainant having requested permission to withdraw his complaint and having satisfied this Court that there are sufficient grounds for granting permission is hereby permitted to withdraw the complaint. The accused is acquitted u/Sec.257 of Code of Criminal Procedure." 4. It is further contended that, C.C.No.481 of 2014 was originally filed before the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Ongole and in this case, the petitioner issued 'No Objection Vakalatnama' to the third respondent on 03.04.2015 under due acknowledgment, upon his request and the third respondent engaged another counsel by name G. Nagireddy in this case to represent the case on his behalf. Thereafter, the said case was transferred to Special Mobile Court, Ongole and re-numbered as C.C.No.331 of 2016. The third respondent compromised the said case with the accused in the said case and to that effect, he filed withdrawal petition, the same was recorded and closed on 13.10.2016 by the Judicial Magistrate. 5. Calendar Case No.482 of 2014 on the file of II Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Ongole was returned to the third respondent by the Court below on 30.10.2014 on the point of jurisdiction, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dasarath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.2287/2009. The third respondent resubmitted C.C.No.482 of 2014 before the Special Magistrate Court III, Kukatpally, Miyapur, Ranga Reddy district, by engaging another Advocate namely S. Vijaya Lakshmi on 26.11.2014 and the same was numbered as C.C.No.99 of 2015. Subsequently, the said C.C No.99 of 2015 was returned to the third respondent by the Court below in view of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, again the third respondent resubmitted the said complaint vide C.C.No.9 of 2015 by engaging G. Nagi Reddy, Advocate before the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Ongole. The petitioner also gave 'No objection Vakalatnama' to the third respondent upon the request of the third respondent and only consequent to such NOC, the third respondent was able to engage various other advocates for the same case. 6. Thus, the petitioner is not concerned with the disposal of calendar cases referred above, in view of the circumstances narrated supra. The petitioner also gave 'No objection Vakalatnama' to the third respondent upon the request of the third respondent and only consequent to such NOC, the third respondent was able to engage various other advocates for the same case. 6. Thus, the petitioner is not concerned with the disposal of calendar cases referred above, in view of the circumstances narrated supra. But, to the utter surprise and dismay, the third respondent started submitting false and frivolous complaints against the petitioner one after the other by making false, baseless and concocted allegation. All the complaints made against the petitioner were not proved and there is no proper evidence placed by the third respondent in support of his complaints made against the petitioner before the concerned authorities. 7. The petitioner was elected as the General Secretary of the then existing Prakasam District Cricket association. In the capacity of the General Secretary of the Association, the petitioner was entrusted with the work of organizing the Inter-District and Inter-Zonal matches allotted by the Andhra Cricket Association and Inter-State and Ranji Trophy matches allotted by the Board of Control for Cricket in India. 8. The third respondent is not a Member of the said Prakasam District Cricket Association and is no way concerned with the transactions whatsoever done on behalf of the said Association. However, due to inadvertent mistake crept in the Income Tax transactions, the PAN Number of the third respondent was reflected in TDS to be paid in favour of the third party who had provided certain services to the Andhra Cricket Association, pursuant to which, he wrote complaint to the Association and the same was clarified by the Andhra Cricket Association. Dissatisfied with the clarification given by the Andhra Cricket Association through e-mail dated 15.03.2017, the third respondent submitted a complaint on 11.03.2017 to the Prakasam District Cricket Association making certain allegations against the petitioner and also sought for suspension/removal of the petitioner from the post of General Secretary, for which the President, Prakasam District Cricket Association had issued reply dated 17.03.2017, in which the act of the third respondent in filing a complaint instead of seeking a clarification in relation to the issue from the Andhra Cricket Association and Prakasam District Cricket Association was questioned/criticized and the third respondent was asked to refrain from making false, baseless and defamatory allegations against the petitioner. Further, the third respondent was directly warned of legal proceedings, if he fails to refrain from submitting inappropriate and illegal complaints against the petitioner and the Andhra Cricket Association and Prakasam District Cricket Association. 9. One Mr. N. Mohan Das, Advocate, who previously worked as President of Prakasam District Cricket Association committed various fraudulent deeds. Hence, the petitioner filed O.S.No.127 of 2015 and the Association also filed cases against him. Thereafter, he was banned for lifetime from 16.08.2015. Hence, the said N. Mohan Das became inimical towards the petitioner and he bore grudge against the petitioner. He hatched a plan to create trouble to the petitioner on one pretext or the other and he, in connivance with the third respondent started threatening the petitioner with dire consequences. Therefore, the petitioner lodged a complaint against the third respondent and also against the said N. Mohan Das and his followers to the Station House Officer, Ongole I Town Police Station. Since, the police did not take any action on the complaint of the petitioner, the petitioner submitted an online complaint to the Director General of Police, Andhra Pradesh. Since there is no professional relationship between the petitioner and the third respondent, who became tool in the hands of N. Mohan Das, upon his directions, filing complaints and cases against the petitioner one after the other, he also filed W.P.No.19420 of 2019 before this Court seeking a direction to the I Town Police Station, Ongole to register an F.I.R against the petitioner pursuant to his complaint, with the same allegations of the complaint now before the second respondent herein dated 11.11.2019 submitted in 'Spandana' programme and the said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on 03.12.2019. Thereafter, the third respondent approached the authorities against the petitioner and made false, baseless, frivolous and irrelevant allegations against the petitioner, which he had no competence whatsoever. Finally, the third respondent chose to file false complaint before the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh by making false and irrelevant allegations against the petitioner, despite the fact that there is no professional relationship between the petitioner and third respondent. 10. Upon receipt of the petition, the first respondent issued a Notice calling upon the comments of the petitioner on the said complaint, pursuant to which, the petitioner submitted his details explanation to the said complaint along with supporting documents. 10. Upon receipt of the petition, the first respondent issued a Notice calling upon the comments of the petitioner on the said complaint, pursuant to which, the petitioner submitted his details explanation to the said complaint along with supporting documents. A copy of the said comments is placed on record along with this petition and the said complaint was registered as SR No.99 of 2017. 11. The first respondent/State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh referred the said complaint to the second respondent/Disciplinary Committee for its disposal. The impugned notice suggests that the first respondent had considered the comments submitted by the petitioner and only thereafter, had referred the case to the second respondent. However, the fact that the resolution of the first respondent referring the compliant to the second respondent suffers from non-application of mind is evident from the fact that the complaint was referred to the second respondent despite categorical answers by way of comments. Therefore, the second respondent registered the said petition as Complaint Case No.23 of 2019 and issued the Impugned Notice dated 04.01.2020, directing the petitioner to submit his Statement of Defense together with any documents or affidavit in support of defense, if any, within five days from the date of receipt of the Notice. In the said Notice, it was stated that the meeting of the said Disciplinary Committee was fixed at 11- 00 A.M on 24.01.2020. But, the petitioner submitted a detailed statement with supporting documents which are placed on record for consideration. 12. The third respondent submitted the same complaint that was submitted before the first respondent before Andhra Cricket Association, Prakasam District Cricket Association, Anti Corruption Bureau, complaint before Spandana programme followed by a writ petition before this Court and before the first respondent and no action was taken by any of the authorities, as there is no material in support of the allegations made in the compliant and the writ petition was dismissed. The petitioner also stated the facts narrated in the statement of defense in the representation. 13. The petitioner also stated the facts narrated in the statement of defense in the representation. 13. While narrating the facts, the following are the specific grounds urged in the petition: (a) The second respondent while issuing notice dated 04.01.2020 arrived at a conclusion that "had reason to believe that there is a prima facie case that the respondent - Advocate had been guilty of professional misconduct" without conducting enquiry by the second respondent Committee is illegal, arbitrary and not in conformity with the procedure prescribed in Form E-1, as envisaged under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules and thereby the Notice is liable to be quashed. (b) Recording such finding that the petitioner is prima facie guilty of misconduct without conducting an enquiry is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and also against the principles of natural justice. On this ground also, the notice is liable to be struck down. (c) The specific contention is that, the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh has no power or jurisdiction or authority to give a finding against the petitioner on the complaint filed by the third respondent without conducting full-fledged enquiry by the Disciplinary Committee on the allegations made in the complaint. Therefore, the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh has taken away the powers vested with the Disciplinary Committee alone to conduct enquiry on the compliant. Consequently, the impugned Notice which is not issued in the prescribed Form E-1 as envisaged under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules is not legal and liable to be quashed. (d) To constitute professional misconduct, there must be intention on the part of the Advocate concerned to cause loss to his client or to gain something for him through his acts and omissions. Since there is no professional relationship between the petitioner and the third respondent, even much before filing of the complaint before the Bar Council, continuation of the proceedings before the second respondent is nothing but abuse of process of law. (e) Finally, it is contended that, the first respondent failed to consider the blatant fact that the complaint submitted by the third respondent suffers from material suppression of facts on the ground that one of the cases claimed to have been filed through the petitioner herein stands to have been disposed while the complainant claims the same to be pending. (e) Finally, it is contended that, the first respondent failed to consider the blatant fact that the complaint submitted by the third respondent suffers from material suppression of facts on the ground that one of the cases claimed to have been filed through the petitioner herein stands to have been disposed while the complainant claims the same to be pending. Therefore, issue of Notice in Form No.E-1 under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules in Complaint Case No.23 of 209 (SR No.99 of 2017) on the file of first respondent on the basis of the complaint by the third respondent is not in conformity with Form No. E-1, as envisaged under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules and violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India and requested to issue a Writ of Certiorari, by quashing the impugned Notice dated 04.01.2020 in Complaint Case No.23 of 209 (SR No.99 of 2017). 14. During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Anup Koushik Karavadi mainly contended that, the impugned Notice dated 04.01.2020 is not in conformity with Form E-1 issued under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules and thereby, the Notice itself is illegal. Apart from the above infirmity, arriving at such conclusion that the respondent had reason to believe that there is a prima facie case that the respondent - Advocate had been guilty of professional misconduct without conducting any enquiry is a pre- determination and thereby, arriving at such conclusion without conducting any such enquiry at the stage of issuing notice is a serious illegality. The petitioner also contended that voluminous material produced before the authorities was not considered, including the statement of defense and remarks/comments submitted by the petitioner before the first respondent and referred the matter to the second respondent for initiating disciplinary proceedings against this petitioner and it amounts to non-application of mind and requested to set-aside the same. 15. Sri Dasari S.V.V. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 contended that the Notice in Form E-1 is always subject to modification and the heading of the notice itself would disclose that the Bar Council can modify the Notice, even Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules permits the Bar Council to modify the proforma. 1 & 2 contended that the Notice in Form E-1 is always subject to modification and the heading of the notice itself would disclose that the Bar Council can modify the Notice, even Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules permits the Bar Council to modify the proforma. Therefore, the Notice issued to the petitioner in Form E-1 is with modification but not a ground to quash the same, as such, modification is permissible by Rule itself. Therefore, on the ground of modification of proforma of Notice in Form E-1, the Notice cannot be quashed. 16. Yet, another contention raised before this Court is that, to conduct an enquiry by the Disciplinary Committee on the complaint, a Notice in Form E-1 is required to be issued under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules, subject to certain modifications and expressing its opinion that there is prima facie material against this petitioner to conduct enquiry does not amount to pre-determination of the complaint and it is a mandatory requirement to frame appropriate charges, subject to the defense set-up by this petitioner. Mere expressing prima facie opinion does not vitiate the notice and therefore, the grounds urged by the petitioner in the writ petition are baseless. 17. It is further contended that the substance of the allegation made in the complaint lodged with the first respondent by the third respondent discloses prima facie material against this petitioner and therefore, Respondent No. 1 expressed its prima facie opinion, which led Respondent No.2 to proceed further by issuing Notice in From E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules. Hence, the Notice cannot be set-aside or quashed by issuing Writ of Certiorari. 18. Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the points that arise for consideration are as follows: "(1) Whether issuance of Notice in Form E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules with modification of proforma is a ground to quash the Notice dated 04.01.2020 issued by the second respondent. 18. Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the points that arise for consideration are as follows: "(1) Whether issuance of Notice in Form E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules with modification of proforma is a ground to quash the Notice dated 04.01.2020 issued by the second respondent. (2) Whether expressing prima facie opinion while issuing notice in Form E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules, without conducting any enquiry is a ground to set-aside or quash the notice and whether it is violative of Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. If so, whether Notice in Form E-1 dated 04.01.2020 is liable to be set-aside?" POINT No.1: 19. Admittedly, the petitioner is a practicing Advocate and the third respondent engaged his professional services to file complaint cases for the offences punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. Giving up vakalatnama etc, as alleged in the writ petition is not relevant for deciding the issue before this Court, since the petitioner questioned the Notice issued in Form E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules, mainly on two grounds. It is also unnecessary to deal with the statement of defense and the comments submitted by the petitioner to the notice issued by Bar Council of India before initiation of disciplinary proceedings against this petitioner and statement of defense submitted by this petitioner in pursuance of the Notice impugned in this writ petition are not relevant for the limited purpose of deciding the issue. If, for any reason, the statement of defense and other material is considered at this stage, while deciding the legality of the notice issued in Form E-1, it amounts to determination of the disciplinary enquiry pending before the second respondent. Therefore, I am not inclined to advert to the material produced before this Court, except the notice issued by the second respondent in Form E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules. 20. Therefore, I am not inclined to advert to the material produced before this Court, except the notice issued by the second respondent in Form E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules. 20. In the Notice in Form E-1, the petitioner was called upon to submit his statement of defense, while informing that the case is referred to Disciplinary Committee No.VI of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh for disposal under Section 35(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961 and that the meeting of the said Disciplinary Committee was fixed at 11.00 A.M on 24.01.2020, while expressing its opinion that the petitioner is prima facie guilty of misconduct. 21. The main contention of the petitioner is that, the Notice impugned in the writ petition is not in conformity with the Notice in Form E-1 prescribed under the Rules. For better appreciation of the facts, the Notice issued to the petitioner and the Notice in Form E-1 r/w Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules are extracted hereunder: NOTICE ISSUED TO THIS PETITIONER BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE NO.VI OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH COMPLAITN CASE NO.23 OF 2019 (S.R.No.99 of 2017) Between: Sri Kotari Nageswara Rao s/o Ramulu, Occ: Tobacco Trade H.No.39-8-19, 1st lane, Gopal Nagar, Ongole, Prakasam District Complainant Vs. Sri Chintapalli Pratap Kumar, Advocate, S/o Koteswara Rao R/o B-13, Nyayavadasadan, Dist. Court Premises, Flat No.103, N.S. Towers, Santhapet, Ongole, Prakasam Dist. Respondent 9849129970 WHEREAS a complaint dated 22-07-2017 against the Respondent, a copy of which was already sent, had been considered by the Bar Council on 23.11.2019 along with the comments of the respondent and "had reason to believe that there is a prima facie case that the Respondent-Advocate has been guilty of professional misconduct" and resolved to register the same as Complaint Case No.23 of 2019 (S.R.No.99/2017) and this case is referred to Disciplinary Committee No.VI of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh for disposal under Section 35(1) of the Advocates Act, 1961. The meeting of the said Disciplinary Committee has fixed at 11-00 A.M on 24.01.2020 (Friday) for hearing of the case at the office of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh, A.P. High Court Building, Nelapadu, Amaravati, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the relevant rules of the Council. The meeting of the said Disciplinary Committee has fixed at 11-00 A.M on 24.01.2020 (Friday) for hearing of the case at the office of the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh, A.P. High Court Building, Nelapadu, Amaravati, in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the relevant rules of the Council. The respondent may submit statement of defence together with any documents or affidavits in support of defence if any in five copies within 5 days from the date of receipt of this notice in addition to the comments already filed. The Respondent shall sent one copy of statement of defence to the Complainant and one copy to the Advocate-General, High Court of Judicature at Amaravati direct under Registered A.D cove. The complainant may be entitled to file a reply to the statement of defence together with such documents on which they proposes to rely in support thereof within 5 days thereafter. The parties above named are required to appear in person or through Advocate before the said Committee on the said date, time and place or any other date or dates and place to which the matter may be adjourned. It shall be open to the parties to examine the witnesses that may be permitted before Disciplinary Committee. If, on any date of hearing any party is absent, the hearing will proceed exparte against him. The parties are required to file four copies of all the papers to the Registrar, Disciplinary Committee, Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Dated this the 4th January, 2020. I/c Registrar, Disciplinary Committee No.VI & I/c Registrar, Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh Enclosures: Nil Notice in Form E-1 FORM E-1 (Under Rule 5 in Chapter I, Part VII) NOTICE OF HEARING OF COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION 35/36 OF THE ADVOCATES ACT, 1961 AND RULE 5, CHAPTER I, PART VII OF THE RULES OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF......................... D.C. ENQUIRY NO................. ....................................................................................................Complainant/s (with Address) Versus ....................................................................................................Respondent/s (with Address) WHEREAS a complaint date ........... against respondent/s, a copy of which is already sent herewith has been referred for disposal to the above Committee of the Bar Council ...................... under Section 35/36 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Disciplinary Committee has fixed ........... (time) on ........... (date) for the hearings of the case at ........... against respondent/s, a copy of which is already sent herewith has been referred for disposal to the above Committee of the Bar Council ...................... under Section 35/36 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Disciplinary Committee has fixed ........... (time) on ........... (date) for the hearings of the case at ........... (place) in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the relevant rules of the Council. The Respondent may submit his statement of defence together with any documents or affidavits in support of his defence within ........... days from the date of this notice. The respondent shall send one copy of his statement of defence to the complainant and one copy to the Advocate-General direct under Registered A.D cover. The complainant may be entitled to file a reply to the statement of defence together with such documents on which he proposes to rely in support thereof within ........... days. The parties above named are required to appear in person or through Advocate before the said Committee on the said date, time and place or any other date or dates and place to which the matter may be adjourned. It shall be open to the parties to examine the witnesses that may be permitted before Disciplinary Committee. If, on any date of hearing any party is absent, the hearing will proceed ex-parte against him. ........... is required to file ........... copies of ........... to the Registrar, Disciplinary Committee, Bar Council of ........... on or before ........... Dated this the ........... day of ...........20 By Order Registrar Disciplinary Committee Bar Council of ........... 22. On close comparison of the notice prescribed in Form E-1 prescribed under the Rules and the Notice impugned in the writ petition, there is a little variation and the second respondent expressed its view that there is a reason to believe that prima facie the respondent/advocate has been guilty of professional misconduct. 23. Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules deals with issue of notice. According to it, the notices referred in this Chapter "shall subject to necessary modification", be in Form Nos. E-1 and E-2, be sent to the Advocates appearing for the parties, Notice to a party not appearing by the Advocates shall be sent to the address as furnished in the complaint or in the grounds of appeal. According to it, the notices referred in this Chapter "shall subject to necessary modification", be in Form Nos. E-1 and E-2, be sent to the Advocates appearing for the parties, Notice to a party not appearing by the Advocates shall be sent to the address as furnished in the complaint or in the grounds of appeal. The cost of the notices shall be borne by the complainant unless the Disciplinary Committee otherwise directs. When the Rule itself permits necessary modifications to Form Nos. E-1 and E-2 issued under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules, the alleged modification in the notice cannot be faulted. On the other hand, the intention of the Legislature is to proceed with the matter calling upon the statement of defense, unless the second respondent comes to a prima facie opinion that there is prima facie material to proceed against this petitioner, the Disciplinary Committee cannot proceed with the matter and it is nothing but taking cognizance as in criminal cases. Therefore, the alleged modification of notice in Form Nos. E-1 or E-2 is not a ground to set-aside or quash the Notice issued in Form E-1, which is impugned in this writ petition, since the Rule itself permits such modification. Hence, I hold that the alleged modification that Notice in Form E-1 issued under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules is not illegal and it is permissible under law. Hence, on this ground, the notice impugned in this writ petition cannot be set-aside. Accordingly, the point is held against this petitioner and in favour of the respondents. POINT No.2 24. The second ground raised in the writ petition is that, the second respondent ought not to have expressed its prima facie opinion that the petitioner-Advocate is guilty of professional misconduct, while issuing Notice in form E-1 under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules. No doubt, in the Notice dated 04.01.2020, the second respondent expressed its opinion as follows: "had reason to believe that there is a prima facie case that the respondent - Advocate had been guilty of professional misconduct" 25. Therefore, the expression of prima facie opinion that the petitioner/Advocate has been guilty of misconduct without conducting any enquiry and without even before calling for statement of defense is not an illegality. Therefore, the expression of prima facie opinion that the petitioner/Advocate has been guilty of misconduct without conducting any enquiry and without even before calling for statement of defense is not an illegality. The procedure being followed by the Andhra Pradesh Bar Council is almost identical to the procedure being followed for conducting formal enquiries, but not on par with an enquiry or trial in a criminal complaint. However, when the Bar Council found that there is prima facie material to proceed against this petitioner/Advocate, the second respondent can issue a notice in Form E-1. Hearing of the petitioner or Respondent No.3 at the time of issuing notice is not a ground, as it was not contemplated. If, the complaint does not disclose any ground to proceed against this petitioner/Advocate, the first respondent even without referring the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee, registering the same as a complaint can reject it on the ground that the allegations are groundless. Groundless would mean the absence of reasonable ground to expect the finding guilty. Groundless is equivalent to saying that there is no ground for framing charge which depends on the facts and circumstances of different cases. Therefore, only when the State Bar Council comes to a conclusion that there are no grounds to proceed further for the specific allegation of misconduct of the Advocate, the first respondent can close the complaint before registration of the same as a complaint case. Therefore, at the stage of referring the complaint case to second respondent, the first respondent has to examine whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed against this petitioner/Advocate for the alleged misconduct. Whether the material placed before the State Bar Council is sufficient and whether the enquiry will end in finding guilty or not guilty are irrelevant for consideration at the stage of issuing Notice in Form E-1. Therefore, the first respondent is required to examine whether the material produced by the third respondent and the allegations made in the complaint are sufficient to proceed further, finding prima facie ground. 26. No doubt, the second respondent expressed its opinion that there is prima facie material to conclude that the petitioner/Advocate has been guilty of professional misconduct. The action initiated against this petitioner is only by exercising power that conferred by Section 35 of The Advocates Act, 1961. Section 35 of the Advocates Act deals with punishment of advocates for misconduct. 26. No doubt, the second respondent expressed its opinion that there is prima facie material to conclude that the petitioner/Advocate has been guilty of professional misconduct. The action initiated against this petitioner is only by exercising power that conferred by Section 35 of The Advocates Act, 1961. Section 35 of the Advocates Act deals with punishment of advocates for misconduct. According to Section 35(1), where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council "has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct", it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. Therefore, the first respondent strictly adhering to Subsection (1) of Section 35 of the Advocates Act, expressed its prima facie opinion on its own that the petitioner/Advocate is guilty of professional misconduct. The expression "has reason to believe" is explained by the Supreme Court in Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dhabholkar, 1976 2 SCR 48 wherein the Apex Court observed that, when the Bar Council in its wider scope of supervision has observed that if the conduct of the advocates in their professional duties comes appealable, any instance of such misconduct, it is the duty of the Bar Council concerned to refer the matter to Disciplinary Committee. The expression "reason to believe" is mentioned in Section 35 of the Advocates Act only for limited purpose of using it as a filter for excluding complaint against the advocate. 35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct.- 1. Where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. 1[(1A) The State Bar Council may, either of its own motion or on application made to it by any person interested, withdraw a proceeding pending before its disciplinary committee and direct the inquiry to be made by any other disciplinary committee of that State Bar Council. 2. The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State. 3. 2. The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council shall fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State. 3. The disciplinary committee of a State Bar Council after giving the advocate concerned and the Advocate-General an opportunity of being heard, may make any of the following orders, namely:- (a) dismiss the complaint or, where the proceedings were initiated at the instance of the State Bar Council, direct that the proceedings be filed; (b) reprimand the advocate; (c) suspend the advocate from practice for such period as it may deem fit; (d) remove the name of the advocate from the State roll of advocates. 4. Where an advocate is suspended from practice under clause (c) of sub-section (3), he shall, during the period of suspension, be debarred from practising in any court or before any authority or person in India. 5. Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-General under sub-section (2), the Advocate-General may appear before the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council either in person or through any advocate appearing on his behalf. Explanation.-In this section, 4[section 37 and section 38], the expressions "Advocate-General" and Advocate-General of the State" shall, in relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the Additional Solicitor General of India.] 27. Hence, expressing its opinion by the first respondent that "had reason to believe that there is a prima facie case against the petitioner/advocate has been guilty of professional misconduct" is only a statutory requirement under Section 35 of the Advocates Act and not a empty formality. Therefore, the second respondent issued notice in Form E-1 stating that the first respondent expressed its opinion prima facie, strictly in compliance of Section 35 of the Advocates Act and it does not amount to pre-determination of the guilt of this petitioner. In any view of the matter, expressing its opinion that the petitioner/advocate is prima facie guilty of professional misconduct is not a ground to set-aside the notice issued in Form E-1 and Expressing such opinion by the Bar Council while referring the complaint to the second respondent and issuing notice in Form E-1 is within the permissible modification under Rule 5(1) of Part VII Chapter I of the Rules. 28. 28. The word "prima facie case" is not explained anywhere, but, in general parlance, it is described as arguable case at the enquiry or trial of the proceedings or a case which has to go for enquiry or trial. Therefore, using the words "prima facie" by the second respondent is only expressing its opinion that the complaint against this petitioner lodged by the third respondent is to go for enquiry to decide the complexity of the petitioner regarding his professional misconduct during enquiry and on the other hand, it is only in strict compliance of the mandatory requirement under Section 35 of the Advocates Act. 29. In fact, the opinion has not been expressed by the Disciplinary Committee, but, it is an opinion expressed by the Bar Council of the State while referring the complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. Notice issued in Form E-1 by the second respondent, on reference of the complaint to it, expressing opinion that it had reason to believe that the petitioner/advocate had been guilty of professional misconduct is only a statutory requirement by the first respondent, but not otherwise. Hence, on this ground, the notice impugned cannot be quashed or set-aside by exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, issuing any Writ of Certiorari, since the jurisdiction of Certiorari is purely discretionary and cannot be exercised as a matter of course, by following the law declared by the Supreme Court in Yashwant Sinha v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2019 16 Scale 1 and General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa v. Sri Giridhari Sahu, Civil Appeal No.8071 of 2010 dated 14.09.2019. Moreover, the merits of the defense of this petitioner cannot be adverted to, in view of the limited challenge to the notice impugned in this writ petition and that the merits of the case is within the jurisdiction of Bar Council of the State. 30. In view of my foregoing discussion, I find no illegality to quash or set-aside the notice impugned in the writ petition, exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 31. In the result, writ petition is dismissed, but without any costs in the circumstances of the case. 32. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.