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2020 DIGILAW 1514 (KAR)

Jaidev Shroff v. State Of Karnataka

2020-07-28

S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR

body2020
JUDGMENT S.R. Krishna Kumar, J. - This petition is directed against the impugned order dated 29.08.2019 passed by the learned Civil Judge & JMFC, Byadagi in C.C. No. 332/2019 whereby the trial Court took cognizance against the petitioner for alleged offence punishable u/s 17(1)(a) and Section 29 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (for short 'Act') and issued summons to the petitioner and for consequent quashing of the entire aforesaid proceedings insofar as the petitioner is concerned and for other reliefs. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned HCGP for the respondent and perused the material on record. 3. Pursuant to a complaint filed by the Agricultural Officer & Insecticide Inspector, Byadagi (for short 'the complainant') for alleged offences punishable u/s 17(1)(a) and Section 29 of the Act, the trial Court took cognizance and directed issuance of summons as against the petitioner, Mr.Jaidev Sharoff, who was arraigned as accused No.2 in the said proceedings which were registered as C.C. No. 332/2019 before the trial Court. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred a revision petition in Crl. R.P. No. 147/2019 before the learned II Addl. Dist. & Sessions Judge, Haveri (sitting at Ranebennur). By order dated 21.12.2019, the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the revision petition as not maintainable. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is before this Court by way of the present petition filed u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to Sec.31 of the Act in order to contend that obtaining the written consent of the State Government or a person authorized by it, was a pre-condition for institution of any prosecution for an offence under the Act. It is contended that in view of the undisputed fact that no such written consent was obtained prior to presentation of the complaint by the complainant before the trial Court, the impugned order taking cognizance of the said offences against the petitioner and other accused was illegal and the same deserves to be quashed on this ground alone. 6. Secondly it was contended that a perusal of the complaint will indicate that the petitioner is arraigned as accused No.2 on the ground that he is the CEO of M/s UPL Ltd., which is engaged in the business of marketing insecticides. 6. Secondly it was contended that a perusal of the complaint will indicate that the petitioner is arraigned as accused No.2 on the ground that he is the CEO of M/s UPL Ltd., which is engaged in the business of marketing insecticides. The complaint indicates that the said Company is guilty of the alleged offences and since the petitioner is the CEO, he is arraigned as accused No.2. In this context, learned counsel points out that the Company, which has been duly incorporated under the Companies Act, is both a proper and necessary party to the criminal proceedings as mandatorily required u/s 33 of the Act. In the absence of arraigning the Company also as an accused, the proceedings only against the petitioner who was only a CEO was not maintainable and that the impugned order and the criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed on this ground also. 7. Thirdly it is submitted that a perusal of the complaint would also show that despite the alleged offences said to have been committed by the aforesaid Company, i.e., M/s UPL Ltd., there is no averment in the complaint that the petitioner was in-charge of or was responsible to the Company and for the conduct of the business of the Company as contemplated u/s 33 of the Act. It is therefore submitted that in the absence of necessary averments in the complaint with regard to the petitioner being in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company, the impugned order and the proceedings against the petitioner deserve to be quashed on this ground also. 8. Fourthly it is submitted that the complaint would also show that the address of the petitioner is given as Vapi, Gujarat State, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial Court and consequently, in the absence of following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the impugned order directing issuance of summons to the petitioner deserves to be quashed on this ground also. 9. Learned counsel also contended that the complaint would indicate that the laboratory report which is sought to be relied upon by the complainant was served upon only the retailer, accused No.3 and not upon the petitioner. 9. Learned counsel also contended that the complaint would indicate that the laboratory report which is sought to be relied upon by the complainant was served upon only the retailer, accused No.3 and not upon the petitioner. It is submitted that as held by various Courts, it is incumbent upon the complainant to serve a copy of the lab report upon all the accused persons including the petitioner so as to enable them to get the sample analyzed and obtain a second opinion and in the absence of the said exercise having been undertaken by the complainant prior to filing of the complaint, the entire proceedings as against the petitioner stand vitiated and deserve to be quashed on this ground also. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to Section 30 (3) of the Act in order to contend that the petitioner belonging to one of the categories of persons mentioned therein, no offence under the Act can be alleged against him. It is submitted that the material on record clearly indicates that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner is clearly an abuse of process of law and that the same deserves to be quashed by this Court. 11. Per contra, learned HCGP would support the impugned order and would contend that the various contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner can be taken up by him during trial before the trial Court and as such, this is not a fit case warranting interference by this Court u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following citations. (1) ( Salil Singhal V. State of Haryana, (1992) 1 RCR(Cri) 336) (Punjab and Haryana High Court; (2) State of NCT of Delhi V. Rajiv Khurana,2010 AIR SC 2966 ; (3) (Rajasthan High Court) M/s Rallis India Ltd. And Others V. State of Rajasthan and others, (1998) CriLJ 3593 ; (4) M/s Solar Syndicate, Dungri V. State of Punjab, (1994) 1 RCR(Cri) 140 ; (5) Aroon Purie V. Jayakumar Hiremath,2016 ALLSCR(Cri) 1754; (6) M/s Dashmesh Kheti Store and Others V. State of Punjab, (2013) 1 RCR(Cri) 150 (Punjab and Haryana High Court); (7) State of Jharkhand and Others V. Ambay Cements and another, (2004) 10 JT 93 ; - - - 13. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions and perused the material on record. 14. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions and perused the material on record. 14. A perusal of the material on record including the complaint filed by the complainant would indicate that prior written consent by the State Government or a person authorized by it not has been obtained by the complainant before presentation of the complaint before the trial Court. Sec. 31 of the Act mandates that obtaining of the written consent of the State Government or a person authorized by it is a pre-condition for institution of any prosecution for an offence under the Act. In view of the undisputed fact that no such written consent was obtained prior to presentation of the complaint by the complainant before the trial Court, the impugned order taking cognizance of the said offences against the petitioner and other accused deserves to be quashed. 15. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a perusal of the complaint will indicate that the petitioner is arraigned as accused No.2 on the ground that he is the CEO of M/s UPL Ltd., which is engaged in the business of marketing insecticides. The complaint indicates that the said Company is guilty of the alleged offences and since the petitioner is the CEO, he is arraigned as accused No.2. In this context, it can be seen that the said Company which has been duly incorporated under the Companies Act is both a proper and necessary party to the criminal proceedings as mandatorily required u/s 33 of the Act. In the absence of arraigning the Company also as an accused, the proceedings only against the petitioner who was a CEO is not maintainable and that the impugned order and the criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed on this ground also. 16. A perusal of the complaint would also show that despite the alleged offences said to have been committed by the aforesaid Company M/s UPL Ltd., there is no averment in the complaint that the petitioner was in-charge of or was responsible to the Company and for the conduct of the business of the Company as contemplated u/s 33 of the Act. In the absence of necessary averments in the complaint with regard to the petitioner being in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company, the impugned order and the proceedings against the petitioner deserve to be quashed on this ground also. 17. A perusal of the complaint would also show that the address of the petitioner is given as Vapi, Gujarat State, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the trial Court and consequently, in the absence of following the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the impugned order directing issuance of summons to the petitioner deserves to be quashed on this ground also. 18. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the trial Court in C.C. No. 332/2019 and the proceedings in the said case insofar as the petitioner is concerned, deserve to be quashed. In the result, I proceed to pass the following order. ORDER Criminal Petition is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 29.08.2019 passed by the learned Civil Judge & JMFC, Byadagi in C.C. No. 332/2019 are quashed insofar as the petitioner herein is concerned.