JUDGMENT Sheel Nagu, J. - Present appeal preferred u/S. 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity the 1996 Act) seeks setting aside of the order dated 5/10/2019 vide A-1 passed u/S. 34 of the 1996 Act by which award dated 22/2/2017 passed by sole Arbitrator awarding compensation and interest to the respondent after finding it's claim to be justified, has been upheld. 2. Learned counsel for appellant-Insurance Company submits that claimant on 6/7/2005 purchased insurance policy titled as 'Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy' from appellant-Insurance Company for insurance cover of various items for which premium of Rs. 3,04,549/- was paid which led to issuance of insurance policy which was valid from 6/7/2005 to 5/7/2006. Thereafter, on 11/7/2005 another insurance policy for insurance of stock by paying premium of Rs. 1,45,416/- was purchased which was valid from 6/7/2005 to 15/7/2005. 2.1 Incidentally, the fire broke out in the night intervening 4 th & 5 th January, 2007 at the factory premises of respondent after the factory had commenced it's commercial production. FIR was lodged at the police station and claim under the insurance policy was preferred before the appellant for a sum of Rs. 9.89 crore to indemnify the respondent for the loss caused due to fire. The authorized Surveyor inspected the premises of respondent on 6 th & 7 th January, 2007 and submitted interim survey report on 12/1/2007 revealing loss of Rs. 7.30 crore suffered by respondent. The Surveyor however had not recommended 'on-account payment' to the respondent based on the interim survey report but asked the respondent to explore possibility of repairing plant and machinery by calling report from Korean manufacturer of the plant. The team of Korean manufacturer inspected the premises on 27/1/2007 and submitted report that out of 9 machines installed only 1 can be repaired and therefore the remaining 8 machines should be considered as total loss. Since repairing cost of the lone machine was more than the current price the 3 said machine was also declared to be total loss by the Surveyor. As per instructions of Surveyor, the respondent also appointed an Architect who visited the factory site and submitted report on 3/2/2007 estimating cost of repair of the building at Rs. 2,76,55,640=40. On 21/3/2007 the Surveyor submitted second report recommending therein on-account payment of Rs. As per instructions of Surveyor, the respondent also appointed an Architect who visited the factory site and submitted report on 3/2/2007 estimating cost of repair of the building at Rs. 2,76,55,640=40. On 21/3/2007 the Surveyor submitted second report recommending therein on-account payment of Rs. 2-50 crore to be released in favour of respondent, which was released after 1 months. After much deliberations between various stakeholders involved in the entire process, the appellant herein insisted that sum of Rs. 17259668/- against total claim of Rs. 9.89 crore made by the respondent be accepted as full and final claim in the insurance policy. Surveyor had recommended for payment of Rs. 42330735/- out of which on-account payment of Rs. 24934963/- had been made and the remaining i.e., 17259668/- was offered by the appellant-Insurance company after deducting amount towards reinstatement premium. The respondent did not agree to proposal and denied to sign the discharge voucher. This impelled the respondent to prefer complaint before National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for brevity the NCDRC) in shape of Original Petition No. 22/2008 claiming a sum of Rs. 9.89 crore under various heads. 2.2 Before the Commission the appellant-Insurance company raised objection that resolution of the dispute requires adducing of oral evidence and thus cannot be decided summarily. The Commission after hearing both the parties directed appellant Insurance Company to call upon the Surveyor and revise it's report in the light of various alleged glaring mistakes. In compliance the Surveyor submitted final survey report on 10/9/2007 and on 27/8/2009 before the Commissioner admitting certain glaring mistakes of reducing the sum insured while calculating the loss. On 20/5/2010 the Commission admitted the complaint of the respondent herein and directed both the parties to file their respective affidavits. The rival parties filed their affidavits and the claimant also filed various interrogatories which were responded to by the appellant- Insurance company. On 25/8/2015 when the matter came up before the Commission after completing of pleadings appellant-Insurance company submitted that since certain terms and conditions of the insurance policy which contained arbitration clause in case of liability being admitted by the other side, then the dispute only relates to the quantum of damages and thus matter should be adjudicated upon. On 25/8/2015 when the matter came up before the Commission after completing of pleadings appellant-Insurance company submitted that since certain terms and conditions of the insurance policy which contained arbitration clause in case of liability being admitted by the other side, then the dispute only relates to the quantum of damages and thus matter should be adjudicated upon. It appears from the record that rival parties thereafter deliberated over the issue as to whether dispute can be referred to the Arbitrator or not especially on the anvil of Clause 13 of the insurance policy which is to the following effect:- '13. If any dispute or difference shall arise as to the quantum to be paid under this policy (liability being otherwise admitted) such difference shall independently or all other questions be referred to the decision of a sole arbitrator to be appoited in writing by the parties to or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator within 30 days of any party invoking arbitration, the same shall be referred to a panel of three arbitrators, comprising of two arbitrators, one to be appointed by each of the parties to the dispute/difference and the third arbitrator to be appointed by such two arbitrators and arbitrator to be appointed by such two arbitrators accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is clearly agreed and understood that no difference or dispute shall be referable to arbitration as herein before provided, if the Company has disputed or not accepted liability, under or in respect of this policy. It is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or suit upon this policy that the award by such arbitrator/arbitrators of the amount of the loss or damage shall be first obtained." 2.3 Finally the Commission by order dated 6/11/2015 vide A/11 impelled by the prayer made by respondent herein passed the following order:- Dated: 06.11.2015 ORDER The learned counsel for the complainant, on instructions, seeks to withdraw the complaint with liberty to either invoke the arbitration clause or to approach the Civil Court for the redressal of the grievances of the complainant, including interest on the amount paid by the opposite parties to the complainant during pendency of this complaint. In view of the aforesaid statement, the complaint is dismissed as withdrawn. Liberty as sought is granted. In view of the aforesaid statement, the complaint is dismissed as withdrawn. Liberty as sought is granted. In case the issue of limitation is involved, the complainant shall be entitled to seek benefit of the provisions contained in Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act and/or the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act, if such a benefit is otherwise admissible to it in law. 'Dasti' in addition." 2.4 Thereafter the matter was placed before the sole Arbitrator who passed the award in favour of respondent herein on 22/2/2017 after accepting the claim of respondent herein and rejecting the counter claim of appellant-Insurance company to the following extent:- AWARD Accordingly, following Award is passed in favour of the Claimant and against the Respondent: 1. The Claimant shall be entitled for following compensation from the Respondent: a. For Building Rs.12612353.00 b. For Plant & Machineries Imported Rs.14163754.00 c. Stock on all heads Rs. 6320969.00 d. Machineries Indigenous Rs.334000.00 e. Electrical Fittings & Installations Rs.640000.00 f. Furniture, Fixtures & fittings Rs.384141.00 g. Computers, UPS, Printers Rs.34000. On delay payment of (i) Rs.17259660.00 from 06.02.2007 to 10.07.2008 Rs.4409016/- and (ii) On Rs.5380825.00 from 06.02.2007 to 22.10.2009 Rs.2619061 total Rs.7028077.00 On the awarded amount, the Claimant shall be entitled interest at the rate of 16% per annum from 06.02.2007 to 16.02.2006. But in respect of item no. h (i) & (ii), the interest shall be payable from 11.07.08 and 23.10.09 respectively. i. The claimant shall be entitled for interest pendente lite, (from 16.02.2016) and till recovery of the awarded amount, on the awarded amount, at the rate of 14% per annum. j. The Claimant shall be entitled for the cost of litigation Rs.25 Lakh, Arbitrator's fee Rs.736300/- and Counsel Fee Rs.3 Lakh. k. The Claimant shall also be entitled to recover the amount of stamp duty, payable on the Award, after its payment, from the Respondent. Accordingly, this Award is passed on 22.02.2017." 3. Dissatisfied with the award of the sole Arbitrator provision of Sec. 34 of Arbitration Act were invoked before the Court which passed the impugned order on 5/10/2019 rejecting application of the appellant herein and in the process confirming the award of sole Arbitrator. 4. In the background of aforesaid factual matrix learned counsel for the rival parties are heard. 5. Dissatisfied with the award of the sole Arbitrator provision of Sec. 34 of Arbitration Act were invoked before the Court which passed the impugned order on 5/10/2019 rejecting application of the appellant herein and in the process confirming the award of sole Arbitrator. 4. In the background of aforesaid factual matrix learned counsel for the rival parties are heard. 5. Learned counsel for appellant-Insurance company primarily raises the following grounds:- (1) The court-below u/S. 34 of the Arbitration Act and as well as the sole Arbitrator acted unlawfully and against the settled principles of law while invoking the provision of Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act in favour of the respondent herein. (2) The sole Arbitrator dealt with issues apart from the issue of building and machinery within which the dispute was confined. (3) The interest awarded by the Arbitrator was beyond the permissible limits set by law. (4) The Arbitrator exceeded it's brief as it travelled beyond the purview of dispute referred to it while extending relief to the respondent. 5.1 As such it is submitted that the impugned award and the impugned order of the Court are not in conformity with public policy of India and are contrary to the fundamentals of justice. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon various judicial pronouncements on various different aspects i.e. relevance of surveyor's report, the liability of insurer to establish loss before claiming indemnity, award of excessive interest, the limitation aspect of the case, absence of waiver of the terms and conditions of policy and the last but not the least, the conduct of Arbitrator and the scope and sweep of Sec. 34 of Act 1996. The citations referred to above are reproduced below for ready reference and convenience:- (1) Jurisdiction of NCDRC: S. No. Case Citation Para No Page No. 1. Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. N.K. Modi. III (1996) CPJ 1 (SC) Para 13 and Para 14. 1-7 2. Skypak Couriers Ltd. vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd. IV (2000) SLT 404 Para 2 8-13 3. CCI Chambers Co-Op. HSG Society vs. Development Credit Bank Ltd. V (2003) SLT 185 Para 6, 7 and 8 14-18 4. Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. 1 (2004) SLT 200 Para 11 and 19 19-27 5. National Seeds Corporation vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. CCI Chambers Co-Op. HSG Society vs. Development Credit Bank Ltd. V (2003) SLT 185 Para 6, 7 and 8 14-18 4. Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society vs. M. Lalitha (Dead) Through LRs. & Ors. 1 (2004) SLT 200 Para 11 and 19 19-27 5. National Seeds Corporation vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. II (2012) SLT 51 Para 6.6, 22,27 to 32. 28-53 6. LT. Col. Anil Raj & Anr. vs. M/s Unitech Limited Consumer Case No.346 of 2013 Para 11. 54-61 7. Aftab Singh vs. Emmar MGF Land Limited & Anr. Consumer Case No.701 of 2015 Para 25 to 28 and Para 36. 62-97 8. M/s Emmar MGF Land Limited & Anr. vs. Aftab Singh. Civil Appeal No. 23512- 23513 of 2017 98-107 (2) Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 : 1. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd (2003) 5 SCC 705 1-41 2. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. vs. Friends Coal Carbonisation (2006) 4 SC 445 42-53 3. ONGC vs.. Garware Shipping Corpn. Ltd (2007) 13 SCC 434 54-61 4. Delhi Development Authority vs. R S Sharma & Co., New Delhi (2008) 13 SCC 80 62-76 5. M/s MSK Projects JV Ltd vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 2011 SC 2979 7-95 6. M/s M.B. Patel & Co. vs. ONGC AIR (2008) SC (Supp) 280 96-97 7. ONGC vs. Western Geo International Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 263 98-115 8. Harsha Construction vs.. Union of India and others (2014) 9 SCC 246 116-122 9. Associated Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49 123-166 10. M.P. Power Generation Co. Ltd. & Anr. Versus Ansaldo Energia Spa & Anr. 2018 (5) SCALE 731 167-183 (3) Award of Excessive Interest. 1. Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. Versus G. Harichandra Reddy. (2007) 2 SCC 720 1-6 2. MSK Prjects (I) JV Ltd. Versus State of Rajasthan. (2011) 10 SCC 573 7-25 3. State of Rajasthan versus Ferro Concrete Construction (P) Ltd. (2009) 12 SCC 1 26-51 4. DDA & Ors. Versus Joginder S. Monga (2004) 2 SCC 297 52-75 5. M/s National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Deepak & Anr. Civil Appeal No. (s)2587/2012 76-79 (4) Section 14. Limitation Act, 1963 : 1. Mohinder Prakash vs. DLF Commercial Developers Ltd. 195 (2012) DLT 357 2. Zafar Khan and Others vs. Board Of Revenue, U.P. And Others AIR 1985 SC 39 3. Versus Joginder S. Monga (2004) 2 SCC 297 52-75 5. M/s National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Deepak & Anr. Civil Appeal No. (s)2587/2012 76-79 (4) Section 14. Limitation Act, 1963 : 1. Mohinder Prakash vs. DLF Commercial Developers Ltd. 195 (2012) DLT 357 2. Zafar Khan and Others vs. Board Of Revenue, U.P. And Others AIR 1985 SC 39 3. Bakhtawar Singh vs. Sada Kaur (1996) 11 SCC 167 4. Karan Singh and Other vs. Union of India (1996) 11 SCC 170 5. Deena (dead) through LRS vs. Bharat Singh (dead) through LRS and Others (2002) 6 SCC 336 6. Neeraj Jhanji vs. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (2015) 12 SCC 695 7. Ketan. V. Parekh vs. Special Director, Director of Enforcement and another (2011) 15 SCC 30 8. Madhavarao Narayanrao Patwardhan, State of Bombay vs. Ram Krishna Govind Bhanu and Others 1959 SCR 564 : AIR 1958 SC 767 9. Siraj-UI-Haq Khan and Others vs. The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P. And others 1959 SCR 1287 : AIR 1959 SC 198 10. M.P Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of central Excise (2015) 7 SCC 58 11. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others (2008) 7 SCC 169 12. Venkatappa, K.T vs. The Group Village Panchayat Krishnarajapuram, Banglore Dated: 22 nd October,1982 ILR (Karnataka). 13. MP Steel Housing Board vs. Mohan Lal and Company (2016) 14 SCC 199 6.1 It is contended that Consumer Forums are well-equipped to even deal with matters which involve disputed questions of fact and therefore withdrawal of the claim before the Consumer Forum which had jurisdiction to decide the disputed questions of fact cannot be raised in support of the plea for condonation of delay u/S.14 of the Limitation Act. 6.2 Per contra , learned counsel for the respondent emphasizing the limited scope of interference u/S.34 of Act 1996 especially on the aspect of limitation and as well as merits, submits by referring to page 194 of the compilation of this appeal that the withdrawal order rendered by the Commission was never assailed by the appellant and thus the same became final and binding on the appellant. It is further submitted that the question of want of jurisdiction of Commission is vivid by the fact of involvement of disputed questions of fact for adjudication of which the Commission was an inappropriate forum. It is further submitted that the question of want of jurisdiction of Commission is vivid by the fact of involvement of disputed questions of fact for adjudication of which the Commission was an inappropriate forum. More so, by referring to Clause 13 of the agreement it is submitted that the policy itself provides for referring of dispute to Arbitrator and therefore the jurisdiction of the Commission to deal with the matter gets ousted. Learned counsel for the respondent referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh Vs. Kalsi Construction Company (2019) 8 SCC 726 ], submits that in the absence of agreement to the contrary agreed, the Arbitral Tribunal is conferred with wide powers to award interest wherever considered reasonable for the whole or any part of the period between the date on which cause of action arose and the date of making of the award. In regard to appellant's contention that Arbitral Tribunal travelled beyond its brief by adjudicating issues apart from issues pertaining to building, plant and machines, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that other issues 'were never abandoned by respondent' and thus were open for the Arbitrator to dwell upon. 6.3 It is further contended by respondent that since the order dated 06.11.2015 reserved liberty to raise all claims, occasion of any abandonment of any claim does not arise. The decision of Apex Court in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd Vs. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) [2019 SCC Online 677] is pressed into service. Further decision of Apex Court in Pam Developments Private Limited Vs. State of West Bengal [ (2019) 8 SCC 112 ] is relied upon to contend that money decree ought not to be stayed. 7. The present appeal has been filed u/S.37(1)(c) of the Act 1996 against the order of the Court passed u/S.34 of the Act declining to set aside the Arbitral Award. 7.1 Accordingly, this Court has to see as to whether jurisdiction exercised by the Court u/S.34 of the Act was within the four- corners of law or not? 7. The present appeal has been filed u/S.37(1)(c) of the Act 1996 against the order of the Court passed u/S.34 of the Act declining to set aside the Arbitral Award. 7.1 Accordingly, this Court has to see as to whether jurisdiction exercised by the Court u/S.34 of the Act was within the four- corners of law or not? 7.2 At the outset, dealing with the aspect of limitation, it is seen that the sole Arbitrator found the claim to be within limitation by holding that the claimant was pursuing his dispute before the Commission with due diligence and after withdrawal of the dispute promptly filed the claim before the Arbitral Tribunal and therefore the Arbitrator ignored the delay between 25.02.2008 and 06.11.2015 and while doing so it noticed that Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 providing for procedure for dealing with complaint filed before the forum did not bestow any power upon the Commission which is otherwise available to the civil courts in Order XXIII Rule (1) CPC. 8. This Court after due consideration of the rival contentions does not see any reason to take a different view than the one taken by the Court while rendering the impugned order. The view so taken is in line with law and the time tested principle of fundamental policy of Indian Law that no-one should be left without a remedy. 8.1 In regard to merits of the matter, this Court has extremely limited jurisdiction which is circumscribed by the provision of Section 34 of the Act which is couched in language revealing the mind of the maker that except as enumerated in Section 34(2) & (2A) of the Act, the Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of Act 1996 cannot take recourse to any other ground for setting aside the award passed by lawfully constituted Arbitral Tribunal as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. 8.2 Once the appellant failed to challenge the order of the Commission of withdrawal of the case by the respondent herein, the same became binding upon the appellant. The respondent had withdrawn the case before it's adjudication on merits by the Commission and therefore the said withdrawal cannot come in way of the respondent to approach the Arbitral Tribunal. 8.2 Once the appellant failed to challenge the order of the Commission of withdrawal of the case by the respondent herein, the same became binding upon the appellant. The respondent had withdrawn the case before it's adjudication on merits by the Commission and therefore the said withdrawal cannot come in way of the respondent to approach the Arbitral Tribunal. 8.3 More so, it was also open to respondent to raise all disputes pertaining to the dispute between the rival parties arising out of the policy before the Arbitral Tribunal. Thus, it is clear that the Arbitral Tribunal was free to dwell upon all the aspects which constituted the cause of action behind the dispute between the rival parties arising out of the policy which not only provided for building, plant, machines but also other aspects. 9. After hearing learned counsel for the rival parties and perusing the record which is made available, this Court is of the considered view that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the orders of Tribunal and as well as the Court were against the public policy of India as enumerated in Clause (i) & (ii) of Explanation 1 to Section 34(2)(b) of Act 1996. The Award and as well as the impugned order of the civil court also do not appear to come in conflict with the basic notion of morality or justice especially when as the element of injustice could not be demonstrated by the appellant. More so, appellant has also failed to demonstrate any illegality or impropriety in the Award and the impugned order of the Court. 10. The limited jurisdiction of the Court u/S.34 does not empower the Court to set aside the Award merely on the ground of erroneous application of law or wrong appreciation of evidence. 11. The ground of violation of any principle of natural justice is also not made out in the present case. 12. It is trite law that the awards passed by lawfully constituted Arbitral Tribunal in a lawful manner which are immune from the trappings of Section 34 of the Act ought not to be interfered with by judicial forums. The Act 1996 is an Act to govern the relationship between the parties arising out of agreement. 12. It is trite law that the awards passed by lawfully constituted Arbitral Tribunal in a lawful manner which are immune from the trappings of Section 34 of the Act ought not to be interfered with by judicial forums. The Act 1996 is an Act to govern the relationship between the parties arising out of agreement. Since the very foundation of the Act 1996 is based on the consent of the parties which is manifested in the agreement, the law mandates the courts to remain aloof and interfere only when the limited grounds expressly provided in Act 1996 are made out. This object behind Act 1996 is manifested by Sections 4, 5, 19, 20 and 34 etc. which reveal wide and free playing field made available to the rival parties not only to enter into agreement but also in regard to adjudication of disputes. Thus, going by the very object of Act 1996, the will of the rival parties which is predominant ought to be allowed to prevail even at the cost of ignoring a few technicalities of civil law provided such ignoring does not offend the object of the 1996 Act. 13. In view of above factual scenario and legal position, this Court does not deem it appropriate to interfere in the matter and upholds the order of the Court impugned herein by finding no manifest illegality, impropriety or perversity. 14. Consequently, the appeal fails and is dismissed, sans cost.