JUDGMENT 1. The Court : The appeal is against a judgment and decree of December 20, 2001 in a suit instituted in 1964. 2. The matter pertains to a property at 30, Burtolla Street in Burrabazar. The case made out in the plaint, in short, is that one Awadh Behari Tiwari, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, was inducted as a monthly tenant in respect of the premises in question. Such induction was in or about the year 1955. It appears that in a mortgage suit previously brought against the original first defendant, the landlord, a receiver was appointed by this Court; but the owner of the property was given leave to induct any tenant as long as the rent earned went to the receiver towards discharge of the mortgage debt. Thus, the rent would be paid by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs and, upon the death of such predecessor, by the plaintiffs, to the receiver. According to the plaintiffs, shortly after their predecessor died in April, 1964 and the plaintiffs returned after completion of the religious rites in their native place in Bihar, the original first defendant approached the widow of Awadh Behari and his eldest son with a proposal that the existing tenancy be surrendered and a fresh tenancy be created so that the records before the receiver would carry the names of the new tenants upon the death of the original tenant. 3. Though the plaint claims that such representation was apparently made by the original first defendant to the widow and the eldest son of Awadh Behari on or about May 7, 1964, it appears that a document of surrender of tenancy was executed with the date attributed thereon to be April 27, 1964. It is the case of the plaintiff-appellants that on June 1, 1964, a brother of the original landlord carried a letter of such date evidencing the creation of a fresh tenancy in favour of the heirs of Awadh Behari and the letter of surrender was handed over to such brother of the original landlord simultaneously with the document pertaining to the creation of the new tenancy dated June 1, 1964 being obtained. 4. 4. According to the plaint, shortly thereafter the plaintiffs attempted to tender rent to the receiver, but on or about June 17, 1964, the receiver refused to accept rent on the ground that the plaintiffs had surrendered the tenancy by the document dated April 27, 1964 and such document was duly addressed to the receiver who was the de jure owner of the property. The receiver also informed the plaintiffs that following the plaintiffs surrender of their tenancy, a fresh tenancy had been created by the landlord in favour of his niece Gita Rani Khaitan. 5. The suit came to be instituted soon thereafter for a declaration that the plaintiffs continued to be tenants in respect of the property and for specific performance of the agreement to create a fresh tenancy as embodied in the document of June 1, 1964. The five sons and two daughters of the original tenant joined their mother as the plaintiffs. The landlord and the new tenant were the defendants. 6. The principal defence of the landlord was that there was no fresh tenancy which was created in favour of the plaintiffs. In short, it was the veracity of the document of tenancy of June 1, 1964 that was questioned. During the pendency of the suit the landlord sold the property to the added third defendant. 7. Upon appropriate issues being framed at the trial, evidence was received. The trial court noticed that the document of surrender of tenancy dated April 27, 1964 was disclosed by the plaintiffs as part of their documents along with the questioned document of creation of new tenancy dated June 1, 1964. The trial court found that the document of surrender of tenancy stood proved on the admission of the plaintiffs. The trial court held that the questioned document of June 1, 1964 was not proved. Though no handwriting expert was appointed to verify the signature attributed to the original first defendant, Raj Kumar, in the questioned document of June 1, 1964, on the basis of the admitted signature of Raj Kumar, the trial court came to a conclusion that the signature attributed to Raj Kumar in the questioned document was not of Raj Kumar. 8. In course of the present appeal, the dilapidated building at 30, Burtolla Street had to be brought down and a new construction made. 8. In course of the present appeal, the dilapidated building at 30, Burtolla Street had to be brought down and a new construction made. It was the appellants contention in this appeal that the appellants were in physical possession of a part of the premises and the appellants were in possession of the entirety of the premises through the sub-tenants that the appellants had inducted or the appellants had inherited from the previous tenant. 9. The appellants had sought to challenge the proposed demolition of the dilapidated building at the premises and upon having failed, applied before the appellate Court for preservation of the appellants rights qua the suit property during the pendency of the appeal. The only solace for the appellants was that the appellate Court observed that the demolition of the building and the virtual dispossession of the appellants from the suit premises would abide by the result of the appeal. 10. The appellants contend that since the appellants were admittedly in physical possession of a portion of the property and, upon the agreement between the appellants and the original first defendant being such that the appellants were not to surrender the tenancy in respect of the premises in question, the appellants should be found entitled to the entirety of the property as tenants thereat. In particular, the appellants say that there was nothing to detract from the document of June 1, 1964 and the trial court erred in not appointing a handwriting expert to verify the signature attributed to the original first defendant in such document. In such context, the appellants rely on a judgment reported at (2008) 4 SCC 530 (Thiruvengadam Pillai vs. Navaneethammal). The judgment instructs that it is risky for a Court to take upon the burden of verifying the questioned signatures in a document without seeking the assistance of handwriting experts. 11. However, it must be appreciated that a handwriting expert can only tender expert evidence. The opinion of the handwriting expert is but another piece of evidence for the trial court to consider. The opinion is not binding on the trial court and, upon giving cogent reasons, the opinion of an expert may be discarded by a Court with impunity. It is also well known that in matters pertaining to signatures, the Courts eyes are given a special status. The opinion is not binding on the trial court and, upon giving cogent reasons, the opinion of an expert may be discarded by a Court with impunity. It is also well known that in matters pertaining to signatures, the Courts eyes are given a special status. The trial court, in the present case, perceived the signature attributed to Raj Kumar in the questioned document of June 1, 1964 to not be of Raj Kumar on the basis of the signature of Raj Kumar in some of the admitted documents. 12. One of the pitfalls of the tragic delay in the conclusion of the present matter is that some of the original records have been misplaced. Despite the best efforts, the original records could not be traced out. The Court can only apologise to the parties for this tardiness on its part, particularly, since this is a Court of record. However, the misplacement of some of the originals has not impeded in the adjudication of the matter in the appeal. Quite fairly, copies of other admitted documents bearing the signature of Raj Kumar along with the two signatures of Raj Kumar appearing in the original written statement have been produced. Though the signature attributed to Raj Kumar in the questioned document of June 1, 1964 appears quite similar to the other admitted signatures of Raj Kumar, particularly, in how the first name 'Raj' is written; the manner of writing of 'Kumar' in the questioned document is grossly at variance with how Raj Kumar wrote his 'Kumar' in the admitted documents. Though the Court cannot claim to be a handwriting expert, one of the methods for assessing the veracity of a signature is to look at the characteristics. On a plain look at the second name 'Kumar' in the disputed signature, all the letters and characters appear to be well defined. In other words, all the letters appear to have been carefully and slowly constructed; though in the usual signature of Raj Kumar in the other admitted documents, the characters and the letters other than the first and last in the second name 'Kumar' appear to be lost in the apparent speed in which such word is written. 13. In other words, all the letters appear to have been carefully and slowly constructed; though in the usual signature of Raj Kumar in the other admitted documents, the characters and the letters other than the first and last in the second name 'Kumar' appear to be lost in the apparent speed in which such word is written. 13. The principle is that once the trial court has expressed a view, particularly when the trial court has had the benefit of the evidence unfolding before it, unless there is overwhelming material to the contrary, the appellate Court would scarcely disturb a factual finding. On the basis of the admitted signatures of Raj Kumar as made available in course of the appeal, there is insufficient evidence to overrule the view taken by the trial court in disbelieving the signature attributed to Raj Kumar in the questioned document of June 1, 1964. 14. Once the signature of Raj Kumar in the document is disbelieved, the document of June 1, 1964 can no longer be regarded as a document creating a fresh tenancy. 15. Since the letter of surrender of tenancy remains unquestioned and the document by which a fresh tenancy was allegedly created fails, the legal effect is that the tenancy has been surrendered unequivocally and unreservedly without the tenants possessing any further right in respect of the property in question. It is true that actual physical possession of the plaintiffs in some parts of the property has been claimed in the plaint and it also appears to be the admitted position that the original landlord allowed the heirs of the original tenant to continue in occupation of a part of the premises even after the surrender of tenancy. However, the status of the plaintiffs in such regard has to be of licensees. Such licensees could have held possession of the property or any part thereof only as per the wish of the landlord or the original first defendant. It does not appear that there was any intention of the licence being extended, particularly, at any point of time after the institution of the suit. 16. In fine, there appears to be no right that the appellants have in the property after surrendering the tenancy, notwithstanding the limited right to occupy a portion of the premises as licensees. It does not appear that there was any intention of the licence being extended, particularly, at any point of time after the institution of the suit. 16. In fine, there appears to be no right that the appellants have in the property after surrendering the tenancy, notwithstanding the limited right to occupy a portion of the premises as licensees. There does not appear to be any infirmity in the judgment in support of the decree or in the impugned decree itself. The subsequent demolition of the old building or the construction of the new building at the premises may be of no concern to the appellants any further once the appellants have been found to have surrendered the tenancy in 1964 without retaining any further rights in respect of the premises in question. Accordingly, APD No. 266 of 2003 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.