JUDGMENT 1. Petitioner-accused No.1 Dr.Badari Datta H.C., consultant, ENT Surgeon, petitioner-accused No.2 Dr.Jayashree, consultant Anesthesiologist, the learned Additional SPP are present. Mr.Srinath R.K. has filed Vakalath for respondent No.2. They have filed joint memo dated 5.4.2019. In the said joint memo it has been contended that the parties have reached out of Court settlement vide compromise deed dated 20.06.2018. Respondent No.2-complainant received an amount of Rs.15,00,000/- as compensation and it has been further submitted that he has no grievance whatsoever against the petitioners. It is further contended that the subject matter is of a civil nature and the instant complaint has been filed by respondent No.2 against the petitioners due to emotional outburst consequent upon the loss/death of son of respondent No.2 while he was under treatment of petitioners. The instant complaint was based on false, prejudicial and misconceived facts and grounds rather than on rational and realistic grounds. The complainant has now realized and appreciated the truth about the bonafide treatment rendered by the doctors and ready and willing to voluntarily withdraw the complaint filed against the petitioners. On these grounds they prayed to quash the criminal proceedings. 2. The said joint memo has been signed by petitioners-accused Nos.1 and 2 and respondent No.2- complainant and the same has been endorsed by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The joint memo and the affidavit has been placed on record. When the Court questioned respondent No.2-complainant he submits that the said facts which have been mentioned in the joint memo are true and correct and it is not under pressure or undue influence. The joint memo and the affidavit has been placed on record. When the Court questioned respondent No.2-complainant he submits that the said facts which have been mentioned in the joint memo are true and correct and it is not under pressure or undue influence. At this juncture, it is worth to mention here itself a decision of the Honble Apex Court in the case of J.Ramesh Kamath and Others v. Mohana Kurupt and Others, reported in (2016) 12 SCC 179 , wherein the Honble Apex Court has laid down certain principles as to under what circumstances the Court can quash the proceedings or compound the offences even in respect of a non-compoundable offences, wherein it has been held as under:- 'Held, power vested in High Court under S.482 is not limited to quashing proceedings within ambit and scope of S.320 of Cr.P.C., - In Gian Singh, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , it was clearly expounded that quashing of criminal proceedings under S.482 of Cr.P.C., could also be based on settlements between private parties, and could also be on a compromise between the offender and victim Only that, the above power did not extend to crimes against the society Further, jurisdiction vested in High Court under S.482 Cr.P.C., for quashing criminal proceedings was held to be exercisable in criminal cases having an overwhelming and pre-dominatingly civil flavour, particular offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership, or such like transactions, or even offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc., or family disputes where wrong is basically private or personal. In all such cases, parties should have resolved their entire dispute by themselves, mutually.' 3. The Honble Apex Court has reiterated the principles of law laid down in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 , wherein it has been observed that the Court can exercise the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and compound the offence. In the case of Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , it has been observed as under: '8. We find that there are cases where the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the proceedings in those offences which are uncompoundable has been recognized. In the case of Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , it has been observed as under: '8. We find that there are cases where the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the proceedings in those offences which are uncompoundable has been recognized. The only difference is that under Section 320(1) of the Code, no permission is required from the Court in those cases which are compoundable though the Court has discretionary power to refuse to compound the offence. However, compounding under Section 320(1) of the Code is permissible only in minor offences or in non-serious offences. Likewise, when the parties reach settlement in respect of offences enumerated in Section 320(2) of the Code, compounding is permissible but it requires the approval of the Court. Insofar as serious offences are concerned, quashing of criminal proceedings upon compromise is within the discretionary powers of the High Court. In such cases, the power is exercised under Section 482 of the Code and proceedings are quashed. Contours of these powers were described by this Court in B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana which has been followed and further explained/elaborated in so many cases thereafter, which are taken note of in the discussion that follows hereinafter. 9. At the same time, one has to keep in mind the subtle distinction between the power of compounding of offences given to the Court under Section 320 of the Code and quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 482 of the Code. Once it is found that compounding is permissible only if a particular offence is covered by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code and the Court in such cases is guided solitarily and squarely by the compromise between the parties, insofar as power of quashing under Section 482of the Code is concerned, it is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. Such a distinction is lucidly explained by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab . Such a distinction is lucidly explained by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab . Lodha, J. speaking for the Court, explained the difference between the two provisions in the following manner: (SCC pp.340-41, paras 57 & 59). '57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 59. B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.' 10. Apart from narrating the interplay of Section 320 and Section 482 of the Code in the manner aforesaid, the Court in Gian Singh case also described the extent of power under Section 482 of the Code in quashing the criminal proceedings in those cases where the parties had settled the matter although the offences are not compoundable. Apart from narrating the interplay of Section 320 and Section 482 of the Code in the manner aforesaid, the Court in Gian Singh case also described the extent of power under Section 482 of the Code in quashing the criminal proceedings in those cases where the parties had settled the matter although the offences are not compoundable. In the first instance it was emphasized that the power under Section 482 of the Code is not to be resorted to, if there is specific provision in the Code for redressal of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. The Court also highlighted that in different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non. 11. As to under what circumstances the criminal proceedings in a non- compoundable case be quashed when there is a settlement between the parties, the Court provided the following guidelines: (Gian Singh case, SCC pp.340-41. para 58) '58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the facts that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.' 12. Thereafter, the Court summed up the legal position in the following words: (Gian Singh case, SCC pp.342-43, para 61) '61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or a complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plentitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelines engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victims family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.' The Court in Gian Singh case was categorical that in respect of serious offences or other offences of mental depravity or offence of merely dacoity under special statute, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servant while working in that capacity. The mere settlement between the parties would not be a ground to quash the proceedings by the High Court and inasmuch as settlement of such heinous crime cannot have imprimatur of the Court.' 4. In yet another decision in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others reported in (2017) 5 SCC 350 it has been held that continuation of criminal proceedings after compromise arrived at between the parties which may amount to abuse of process of Court and futile exercise, in that light the Court can accept the compromise and compound the offence. 5. On going through the contents of the joint memo filed by the parties and on perusal of the records even though it has been alleged in the complaint and other material with regard to the negligence, when respondent No.2-complainant himself has come up with a case that it is a civil dispute and he has received the compensation of Rs.15,00,000/- and because of mistaken facts and due to emotional outburst the complaint has been filed as he has lost his son. Under such circumstances continuation of the proceedings is going to be a futile exercise and waste of judicial time. 6. The learned Additional SPP submitted that the medical reports and other things are also supporting the case of the prosecution. Under such circumstances continuation of the proceedings is going to be a futile exercise and waste of judicial time. 6. The learned Additional SPP submitted that the medical reports and other things are also supporting the case of the prosecution. But when the complainant himself has come up with a new version and has compounded the offence, then under such circumstances, in my opinion if the said compromise is allowed by keeping in view the said decisions endorsed, the parties can settle their dispute amicably. 7. In the case of Gian singh (quoted supra), it has been observed that the High Court is having power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to weigh the material on record and take an appropriate decision in accordance with law depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, keeping in view the said facts and circumstances, this Court can exercise the power and permit the parties to settle their disputes amicably as entered into. 8. With the above observations the joint memo and the affidavit are placed on record and the petition is allowed. 9. In view of compounding of the offence entered into by the parties, the proceedings initiated in C.C.No.690/2017 pending on the file of I Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, against the petitioners for the offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC is hereby quashed.