JUDGMENT : M. Venkata Ramana, J. 1. The plaintiffs are the appellants. The suit was laid for partition of the plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and to allot one such share to the plaintiffs 1 and 2, another such share to the plaintiffs 3 and 4 each, dividing by metes and bounds, taking into consideration good and bad qualities of the land and put them in separate possession of their respective shares as well as for costs. 2. During pendency of the suit, the first plaintiff died and the second plaintiff, being his L.R., then on record, continued with no other L.R., brought on record. The 1st defendant also died during pendency of the suit and his L.Rs., being the defendants 2 to 4 and the defendants 8 to 10, were brought on record during the suit proceedings. During pendency of this appeal, the 2nd plaintiff died and his L.Rs., being the appellants 5 to 7 were brought on record. Similarly, the 4th plaintiff died during pendency of this appeal and his L.Rs., being the appellants 8 and 9, were brought on record. The second defendant died, whose L.Rs. were brought on record being the respondents 12 to 16. The 3rd defendant also died and his L.R., being the respondent No. 11 was brought on record. 3. The appeal against the defendants 7 and 8 was dismissed for default by an order of this Court dated 30.3.2001. It was not restored. 4. The parties as arrayed in the suit are being referred to in this appeal, for convenience. 5. The suit was originally laid in OS No. 146 of 1983 on the file of the Court of learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Tirupati. It was transferred to the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, Puttur, where it was renumbered in OS No. 20 of 1990. The suit was dismissed by the decree and judgment dated 14.12.1994. Against it, the present appeal is preferred. 6. The relationship among the parties to this appeal is not in dispute. The pedigree (genealogy) among the original parties to the suit is as follows: (Material on record did not make available the names of both the wives of Sri China Gangaiah Son of Sri Kannaiah and also his two daughters. Sri Kannaiah's branch is not a party to the suit and to this appeal) 7. The pedigree (genealogy) among the original parties to the suit is as follows: (Material on record did not make available the names of both the wives of Sri China Gangaiah Son of Sri Kannaiah and also his two daughters. Sri Kannaiah's branch is not a party to the suit and to this appeal) 7. The plaint 'A and C' schedule properties are located in Taduku Village and the plaint 'B' schedule property is situated in Venugopalapuram Village of erstwhile Puttur Taluq of Chittoor District. 8. Before embarking upon the discussion of the evidence and material on record, it is desirable to consider the case of the parties in the available pleadings, set forth by them. 9. The case of the plaintiff in the plaint, in brief is, as follows: (i) That all the parties to the suit constituted an undivided joint Hindu family. The 1st defendant was the manager of this the joint family which remained undivided in status. Plaint 'A to C' schedule properties are ancestral joint family properties. Since members in this family grew in number, it became unmanageable and therefore, by a tentative arrangement, without any division by metes and bounds and for the sake of convenience, the 1st defendant and his branch, late Krishnaiah's branch, the 5th defendant and his branch and the 1st plaintiff and his branch, went on cultivating some portions of plaint A-schedule lands, paying land revenue separately for the extent, which was being cultivated by each branch. Large portions of the land of this the joint family remained uncultivated. The members of the joint family began to live in some portions of C-schedule house properties, according to their convenience, without there being division by metes and bounds. (ii) The plaint B-schedule property was covered with wild growth. Therefore, using the joint family funds and efforts of members of the joint family, it was cleared improving the profile of the land. But it remained uncultivated. It is in joint possession of all the parties. (iii) The patta in respect of plaint 'A and B' schedule properties always is in the name of the 1st defendant, being the manager of the joint family. (iv) However, the 1st defendant with fraudulent and malicious intent, filed declarations under Land Ceiling Act before the Land Reforms Tribunal, claiming plaint 'B' schedule property as his own and exclusive item, which the plaintiffs came to know. (iv) However, the 1st defendant with fraudulent and malicious intent, filed declarations under Land Ceiling Act before the Land Reforms Tribunal, claiming plaint 'B' schedule property as his own and exclusive item, which the plaintiffs came to know. They objected and filed the objections before the Land Reforms Tribunal. However, it was not enquired into, since there being no provision to investigate into the title of the parties under Land Ceiling Act. (v) The original plaintiffs got issued a legal notice to the defendants 1 to 4 dated 13.3.1983, demanding partition of plaint schedule properties, alongwith defendants 5 to 7. A reply was sent by defendants 1 to 4 with false allegations, setting up prior partition and claiming plaint B-schedule property as exclusive one belonging to the 1st defendant. The defendants 5 to 7 colluded later on with defendants 1 to 4, after issuing the notice. So, they are added as defendants. Thus, the plaint schedule properties have to be divided since it is no longer convenient to continue to be joint for the defendants and the plaintiffs. 10. A written statement and additional written statement were filed by the 2nd defendant, adopted by defendants 3 and 4. He contended therein denying the claim of the plaintiffs, as under: (i) The 1st defendant was not the manager of the erstwhile joint family. There was a partition of the family properties in the year 1959 and prior to it, upon death of Sri Kanakaiah, the 5th defendant was managing the joint family affairs. The partition was so entered in the year 1959 in view of some misunderstandings among the sons of Sri Kanakaiah, who felt that the properties be divided and to live separately. The division was effected in the presence of village elders Sri Karavati Bodi Mandadi, Pagadala Krishnaiah of Taduku Village and Sri D. Ramaraju as well as Sri G. Chengalraju of S.B.R. Puram and others. From the time of this partition and division, each branch of the sons of Sri Kanakaiah have been living separately cultivating their respective shares, paying land revenue separately without anything to do with another. This partition became final and therefore, the suit as filed could not be maintained. (ii) The 1st defendant was assisting one Sri Narasimha Raju, who was the proprietor of Venugopalapuram Village Estate. This partition became final and therefore, the suit as filed could not be maintained. (ii) The 1st defendant was assisting one Sri Narasimha Raju, who was the proprietor of Venugopalapuram Village Estate. Therefore, Sri Narasimha Raju, satisfied with the services of the 1st defendant out of generosity gave away plaint B-schedule property to him for cultivation. It was, after all these brothers got divided in the year 1959. This land was uneven and a major part of it was unfit for cultivation. However, the 1st defendant reclaimed, made it fit for cultivation, where he began to raise dry crops and was paying rents to the proprietor Sri Narasimha Raju. When the village was taken over by the Government and in the enquiry conducted by the Settlement Officer, a patta was granted for this land in favour of the 1st defendant in recognition of his title and possession, in the year 1962. When grant of such patta was challenged by some of the ryots of the village before various Tribunals, the 1st defendant resisted and ultimately, the patta in his favour for this land was confirmed. (iii) A separate pattadar passbook was also issued to the 1st defendant in respect of this land by Deputy Tahsildar, Puttur and these are all known to the plaintiffs. At no point of time, any other member of the joint family raised any objection in respect thereof. Possession of this land by the 1st defendant with right, title and interest was also recognized by the revenue authorities and a fertilizer card was also issued for this land in his favour. Thus, since the year 1959, the 1st defendant and his heirs continued to be in exclusive possession of plaint 'B' schedule land, raising dry crops, well over statutory period, perfecting their title by adverse possession also. Therefore, the plaintiffs are estopped by their conduct as well as by acquiescence from claiming any right to plaint B-schedule property. (iv) Subsequent to the partition in the year 1959, the 5th defendant and the 4th plaintiff purchased certain properties under registered sale deeds, while the plaintiffs 3 and 4 also sold certain extents, which were allotted to them to one Smt. Parameswaramma in S. No. 146/12 in an extent of Ac. 0-32 cents. She is a necessary party to the suit and her non-joinder is bad. 0-32 cents. She is a necessary party to the suit and her non-joinder is bad. The 1st plaintiff also mortgaged certain properties, which were allotted to his share to one Sri Chenchuraju under a registered mortgage deed dated 5.8.1966. Pattadar passbook was issued in respect of share allotted to the 1st defendant out of plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties and to all other members of the erstwhile the joint family. During his lifetime, the 1st defendant also divided all the properties among his sons viz., the defendants 2 to 4, who continued to enjoy their respective shares and live separately. (v) On account of factions in the village and at the instance of enemies of the 1st defendant's family, the plaintiffs in collusion with the defendants 5 to 7, filed the false suit, without any manner of right. The suit claim is also barred by time. 11. The defendants 5 and 7 did not file a separate written statement opposing the claim of the plaintiffs but adopted the written statement filed by the 6th defendant. It was the version of the 6th defendant in the written statement, while denying the claim of the plaintiffs, that the 5th defendant had spent 3/4th amount out of his personal earnings and 1/4th of the joint family funds to reclaim plaint B-schedule land, which remained as the joint family property. He further contended that the 5th defendant got the patta for plaint 'A' and 'B' schedule lands in the name of the 1st defendant, since he was the manager and the eldest member in the family. Thus, he asserted that all the plaint schedule properties remained joint and each branch is entitled for 1/4th share. He admitted issuance of the notice alongwith the plaintiffs to the defendants 1 to 4 calling upon them for partition and division of the plaint schedule properties, while asserting that there was only a tentative arrangement in the family, without actual division by metes and bounds for convenient enjoyment of these lands. Thus, a claim for 1/4th share in the plaint schedule properties was made by the 6th defendant including on behalf of defendants 5 and 7. 12. Basing on the above pleadings, the Trial Court settled the following issues and additional issues for trial: "(1) Whether there was partition in 1959 between the 2nd defendant and his uncles? Thus, a claim for 1/4th share in the plaint schedule properties was made by the 6th defendant including on behalf of defendants 5 and 7. 12. Basing on the above pleadings, the Trial Court settled the following issues and additional issues for trial: "(1) Whether there was partition in 1959 between the 2nd defendant and his uncles? (2) Whether the B-schedule property is the absolute property to 1st defendant? (3) Whether the 5th defendant purchased S. Nos. 144/1, 3/2A, 169/1 and 4th defendant purchased S. No. 144/1 and sold S. No. 146/12 to Parameswaramma? (4) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Parameswaramma? (5) Whether the suit is barred by time? (6) Whether the suit property is liable to be partitioned as claimed by the plaintiff? (7) To what relief? Additional issue: 1. Whether the family genealogy pleaded in Para 3-A of the plaint is true?" 13. At the trial, the 4th plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and the 2nd plaintiff as PW6, apart from examining P.Ws. 3 to 5, while relying on Ex. A1 to Ex. A6, including Ex. A5(a) & (b) and Ex. A6(a) & (b). The 2nd defendant examined himself and DW1. The 6th defendant examined himself as DW6. They relied on the evidence of DW2 to DW5. On behalf of the defendants 1 to 4, Ex. B1 to Ex. B20 were relied on, at the trial. 14. Considering the pleadings and evidence on record, learned Trial Judge considered issues 1 and 2 and additional issue together and held in favour of the defendants 1 to 4, accepting prior partition and that the plaint B-schedule property exclusively belonged to the 1st defendant. Issues 3 and 6, similarly were held against the plaintiffs and on Issue No. 5, it was held that the suit claim was not barred by limitation. Ultimately, basing on these findings, the suit was dismissed, accepting the contentions of the defendants 1 to 4. 15. It is an unfortunate case where a major part of the records considered by the Trial Court is not available for the purpose of this appeal. Huge correspondence was entered into between the registry of this Court and the District Court, Chittoor as well as the Trial Court at Puttur for securing the records of the Trial Court. Plaint, written statement filed by the second defendant, report of the learned Commissioner, Ex. B1 to Ex. Huge correspondence was entered into between the registry of this Court and the District Court, Chittoor as well as the Trial Court at Puttur for securing the records of the Trial Court. Plaint, written statement filed by the second defendant, report of the learned Commissioner, Ex. B1 to Ex. B20, judgment and decree of the Trial Court alone are made available from the Trial Court. 16. As per the report of the registry of this Court, the reason assigned by the Trial Court as well as District Court, Chittoor for not furnishing the entire record is that the concerned records were destroyed due to efflux of time. 17. In course of hearing, learned Counsel for the respondents made available photocopies of Certified copies of the depositions alongwith plaint and written statement of the 2nd defendant in a paper book. Learned Counsel for the appellants also filed in the course of hearing, a copy of Ex. A4 obtained under RTI Act for perusal and consideration of this Court alongwith certified copy of Ex. B5-declaration filed by the 1st defendant before Additional RDO-cum-LRT, Chittoor Division. 18. Basing on such material, Sri K. Ananda Rao, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs and Sri J. Ugranarasimha, learned Counsel for the respondents, submitted their arguments in this appeal. 19. In the course of hearing, Sri K. Ananda Rao, learned Counsel for the appellants, stated that the parties have settled this dispute in respect of plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties after disposal of the suit during the year 2011 and therefore, it is not necessary to go into the issues relating to these properties. However, the learned Counsel for the respondents questioned the same, stating that there was no such settlement or adjustment outside the Court. Considering the submissions made in this appeal, it is apparent that there was no such adjustment or settlement among these parties. Even otherwise, no application in terms of Order 23 Rules 1 and 2 has been filed in this appeal at any stage, to get such adjustment or settlement recorded. Hence, considering the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants as well as the respondents and basing on the material available, the findings are now recorded in this judgment. 20. Now, the following points arise for determination: (1) Whether prior partition of the year 1959 set up by defendants 1 to 4 and 8 to 10, is true? Hence, considering the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants as well as the respondents and basing on the material available, the findings are now recorded in this judgment. 20. Now, the following points arise for determination: (1) Whether prior partition of the year 1959 set up by defendants 1 to 4 and 8 to 10, is true? (2) Whether plaint B-schedule land was the exclusive property of the deceased 1st defendant and to which his legal heirs stood entitled to? (3) Whether the claim of the plaintiffs for partition and division of plaint 'A to C' schedule properties is proper? (4) Whether the defendants 1 to 4 are entitled to raise a plea of bar of limitation in this appeal, when findings on Issue No. 5 of the Trial Court ended against them? (5) To what relief, the parties are entitled to? Point No. 1: 21. The initial burden to prove that the plaint schedule properties are the joint family properties is on the plaintiffs. It does not in any manner get altered or shifted to the defendants. At the same time, there is presumption in favour of joint nature of the properties held by a Hindu Joint Family. 22. In Kesharbai @ Purhpabai Eknathrao Nalawade (D) by L.Rs. and another v. Tarabai Prabhakarrao Nalawade and others, AIR 2014 SC 1830 , relied on for respondents, in Para 19 it is stated thus: "19........Undoubtedly the joint and undivided family being the normal condition of a Hindu family, it is usually presumed, until the contrary is proved, the every Hindu family is joint and undivided and all its property is joint." 23. Hon'ble Supreme Court referred its earlier judgments in Bhagwati Prasad Sah and others v. Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer and another, AIR 1952 SC 72 and Addagada Raghavamma and another v. Addagada Chenchamma and another, AIR 1964 SC 136 , in this ruling. It is further observed that the burden would lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims the relief. 24. In the Trial Court, reliance was placed by the defendants in Pata Sahu and another v. Hint Sahu and others, AIR 1991 Pat. 276 , where in Para 31, it is observed in this context, as under: "31. 24. In the Trial Court, reliance was placed by the defendants in Pata Sahu and another v. Hint Sahu and others, AIR 1991 Pat. 276 , where in Para 31, it is observed in this context, as under: "31. There cannot be any doubt that there is a presumption of a joint family continuing to be joint. It is also well known that the person who sets up the plea of partition must prove the same." 25. The character and nature of the joint family property will not change with the severance of the status of the joint family. As to nature of the property held by the joint family in such circumstances, it is observed in Bhagwant P. Sulakhe v. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe, AIR 1986 SC 79 , (relied for the appellants) in Para 14 thus: "14......The character of any the joint family property does not change with the severance of the status of the joint family and a joint family property continues to retain its the joint family character so long as the joint family property is in existence and is not partitioned amongst the co-sharers. By an unilateral act it is not open to any member of the joint family to convert any the joint family property into his personal property." 26. Bearing in mind the legal position as enunciated in the above rulings, the material on record in this appeal, has to be considered. 27. There is no dispute that plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties belonged to the joint family constituted by the parties to this case. 28. According to the plaintiffs, all the plaint schedule properties were being enjoyed as their joint family properties with commonality of interest by the date of the suit. Their contention is also that there was a rough and tentative arrangement regarding enjoyment of a part of plaint 'A' schedule property viz., the agricultural lands and the house sites in plaint 'C' schedule property, raising different kinds of structures. According to them, it was so arranged on account of the disputes among women in the family. The averments in the plaint are also to that effect. 29. The plaintiffs are supported by the defendants 5 to 7 in this respect. 30. According to them, it was so arranged on account of the disputes among women in the family. The averments in the plaint are also to that effect. 29. The plaintiffs are supported by the defendants 5 to 7 in this respect. 30. The defendants 1 to 4 or their legal representatives now in this appeal are disputing the same, contending that there was already a partition in the family in the year 1959 and that the parties did not remain in joint status either in relationship or with reference to the properties. A schedule is appended to the written statement, which according to the defendants, is reflecting the properties allotted to the 1st defendant in the family partition of the year 1959. Thus, they denied that there was a rough and tentative arrangement in enjoyment of plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties, calling it as an out and out partition. The disputes among women in the family was the reason for this partition, even according to them. Severance in status of the properties of the erstwhile joint family is thus disputed by them and contending that it was a partition by metes and bounds, whereupon the respective sharers began to enjoy those properties allotted to each sharer. Separate mess and residence on account of such partition, is also their case. 31. In the above circumstances, the burden being on the plaintiffs to prove and establish subsistence and continuance of the joint family, necessary evidence has to be let in by them. 32. PW1 who is the 4th plaintiff, deposed in this context. The second plaintiff examined himself as PW6. The evidence of DW6, who is the 6th defendant, supports their version. 33. In his deposition, PW1 has set out that the entire suit properties belonged to their joint family and that the 1st defendant was its manager. He claimed that out of the plaint A-schedule properties, 14 to 16 acres are cultivable and whereas, an extent of Acs. 6-50 cents out of plaint A-schedule remained barren, without any crops being raised. Extent of the land, which was under cultivation, is differently deposed by PW6 being Acs. 8-00 at Taduku. According to DW6, Acs. 12-00 out. of the plaint A-schedule lands remained barren with an extent of 8 or 9 acres under cultivation. DW6 also claimed that plaint A-schedule consisted of an extent of Acs. 21-00 and odd. 34. Extent of the land, which was under cultivation, is differently deposed by PW6 being Acs. 8-00 at Taduku. According to DW6, Acs. 12-00 out. of the plaint A-schedule lands remained barren with an extent of 8 or 9 acres under cultivation. DW6 also claimed that plaint A-schedule consisted of an extent of Acs. 21-00 and odd. 34. DW1, who is the second defendant, deposed that their joint family had about Acs. 30-00 in Taduku Village. However, he could not give the extent under cultivation by everyone of the sharers, admitting that there is some extent out of these lands at Taduku Village, which is not under cultivation. 35. With reference to the alleged rough and tentative enjoyment of the lands at Taduku as well as the house sites (plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties), the evidence of PW1, PW6 and DW6 is in tandem. 36. According to PW1, each branch has about Acs. 2-00 as cultivable extent, which they have been cultivating and enjoying since the year 1963. He further deposed that they have been enjoying income from their respective extents separately and pattadar passbooks were issued in respect of some of the lands. His version in respect of enjoying portions of the plaint 'C' schedule property also reflects that since the year 1963, they have been enjoying respective portions raising structures either in nature of thatched dwellings or otherwise. Though in the cross-examination for the defendants 5 to 7, this witness stated that they were so cultivating the land separately for sake of convenience, the fact remained established that since the year 1963 such enjoyment among all the sharers continued. 37. Relevant in this context is also the testimony of PW6. He deposed that all the sharers lived in the plaint 'C' schedule property in different dwelling units of unequal extents from his childhood suggesting that it has been so, for more than 30 years. He also deposed as to cultivating different extents individually and enjoying the usufruct there from separately. His deposition further is that every year they were contributing their respective shares to the first defendant and he used to pay lumpsum amount towards land revenue. 38. He also deposed as to cultivating different extents individually and enjoying the usufruct there from separately. His deposition further is that every year they were contributing their respective shares to the first defendant and he used to pay lumpsum amount towards land revenue. 38. DW6 also deposed in this context corroborating the versions of PW1 and PW6 to the effect that under a tentative arrangement entered into in the year 1963, all the sharers have been enjoying the properties as per their convenience, while asserting that all the plaint schedule properties have been in joint possession and enjoyment of all the sharers. He further stated in the cross-examination for the defendants 2 to 4, 8 to 10 that they have been attending to cultivation of these extents separately and enjoying income separately. He further stated that they have been living separately without having anything to do with other sharers. He also stated that separate pattadar passbooks were issued as per revenue records, irrespective of enjoyment and that they have been paying land revenue for the lands shown in their respective pattadar passbooks. 39. DW6 is the son of the 5th defendant, who was a gang maistri working in Railways. His evidence reflects that the 5th defendant was working at Taduku, Pudi and Puttur Railway Stations during his service of about 30 years. According to DW6, bis father was living with the plaintiffs and the defendants 1 to 4 together till the year 1963 and was spending his entire salary for the purpose of this joint family. However, according to him, his father stopped extending such assistance to the joint family since the year 1963 and thereafter, began to spend on his family alone. The 5th defendant retired from Railway service in or about the year 1967, as per the version of DW6. 40. The lands under cultivation at Taduku are irrigated by well water and all the sharers have been making use of this irrigation facility for their benefit. The evidence on record, particularly from PW6, DW1 and DW6 gives out the same. This well has got a motor with an electricity connection in the name of the 1st defendant and all the sharers were contributing to meet the expenses in operating this electric motor for their purpose. 41. The evidence on record, particularly from PW6, DW1 and DW6 gives out the same. This well has got a motor with an electricity connection in the name of the 1st defendant and all the sharers were contributing to meet the expenses in operating this electric motor for their purpose. 41. Oral evidence brought out from the neighbouring land owners or other villagers viz., PW2 to PW5 is in the nature of supporting the version of the plaintiffs as to enjoyment of separate extents of all the sharers particularly in the 'A' schedule properties, for their convenience. PW4-Sri Munuswamy, who claimed to be the waterman at Taduku regulating water supplies, also deposed use of this electric motor together by the sharers. 42. Thus, the oral evidence of the plaintiffs is proving the manner of enjoyment of plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties by all the sharers by metes and bounds indicating that there was partition of these properties. 43. On behalf of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10, documentary evidence has been let in at the trial to characterise the nature of enjoyment of these lands and to prove that they did reflect that there was an out-and-out partition by metes and bounds among these sharers. 44. A reference to an electric motor referred to above used for irrigating the respective extents being enjoyed by the sharers, is seen from the contents of Ex. B2-registration extract of mortgage deed dated 5.8.1966. The 1st plaintiff also representing the 2nd plaintiff, when he was a minor, had borrowed Rs. 500/- under the original of Ex. B2 from one Sri Chenchuraju, Son of Sri Muppalla Subbaraju. Security offered for this purpose was an extent of Ac. 0-35 cents out of Acs. 9-78 cents in S. No. 168/1 of Taduku Village (item No. 3 of plaint A-schedule). The purpose of borrowing as per the contents of Ex. B2, was to pay his share of the expenses for the electric motor. Another notable feature as per the contents of Ex. B2 is location of the land of the 5th defendant being the northern boundary. The 2nd defendant as DW1 also deposed in this respect. Thus, by the year 1966, the contents of Ex. B2, was to pay his share of the expenses for the electric motor. Another notable feature as per the contents of Ex. B2 is location of the land of the 5th defendant being the northern boundary. The 2nd defendant as DW1 also deposed in this respect. Thus, by the year 1966, the contents of Ex. B2 disclose, that separate and exclusive extents were being enjoyed by the sharers, providing a common irrigation facility by means of a well to serve their lands under cultivation at Taduku. PW6 admitted this fact. None of the defendants 1 to 7 according to him, did raise any objection in respect of this transaction under Ex. B2. 45. The statements of PW1, PW6 and DW6 are admissions in terms of Section 17 to Section 21 of the Evidence Act. The effect of such admissions is referred in Edla Venkata Raj Reddy v. Edla Linga Reddy (died) and others, 2000 (5) ALD 654 : 2000 (5) ALT 299 , relied on for the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10. 46. Ex. B1 is a registration extract of sale deed dated 17.2.1983. The plaintiffs 3 and 4 (PW1) sold under original of Ex. B1, Ac. 0-32 cents out of Ac. 0-64 cents of wet land in Item No. 9 of plaint A-schedule (S. No. 146/12) for Rs. 5,300/- in favour of Smt. Parameswaramma, Wife of Sri Anjaneyulu, a resident of Thimmaraju Kandrika. The western boundary of this land is described as the land belonging to the 1st defendant, whose name is referred in it as Peda Gangaiah. DW1 stated that the 1st defendant is also known as Peda Gangaiah Setty. 47. Ex. B20 is a registration extract of the sale deed dated 20.9.1989 (post institution of the suit) under which Ac. 0-15 cents in the very same S. No. 146/12 was sold in favour of Smt. Amaravathi by the plaintiffs 3 and 4, including on behalf of Lakshmipathi-son of the 4th plaintiff, who was then a minor. These two transactions reflect the independent manner of enjoyment of item No. 9 of plaint 'A' schedule property by the plaintiffs 3 and 4, either prior to the suit or after institution of the suit. These two transactions reflect the independent manner of enjoyment of item No. 9 of plaint 'A' schedule property by the plaintiffs 3 and 4, either prior to the suit or after institution of the suit. It is yet another circumstance relied on for the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 to prove the manner of exclusive enjoyment of the shares, out of plaint 'A' schedule lands being enjoyed by the sharers. 48. Ex. B18 and Ex. B19 are the registration extracts of the sale deeds dated 5.7.1971 and 22.5.1967, under which the 5th defendant had purchased Ac. 0-28 cents out of Ac. 0-68 cents in S. No. 144/1 and Ac. 0-37 cents out of Acs. 4-97 cents in S. No. 169/1 respectively (Item No. 4 of plaint A-schedule is Ac. 0-48 cents of dry land in S. No. 169/1). These two extents are independent acquisitions by the 5th defendant and admittedly they are not part of any of the plaint schedules nor subject matter of this lis. It is yet an another circumstance relied on by the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 to prove the method and manner by which these sharers began to enjoy the property as acquisitions or disposing them off, in apparent exercise of exclusive dominion and ownership. DW1 has deposed at the trial in respect of these instances in support of their contention as to partition of these properties by metes and bounds in the year 1959. DW1 was not specifically cross-examined in respect of these instances. 49. DW1 further deposed the manner of enjoyment of shares allotted to the first defendant out of the plaint 'A' schedule properties. Reliance is placed by DW1 in this context on Ex. B3, a bunch of land revenue receipts, either in favour of his father or himself, Ex. B4-Pattadar passbook issued in the name of the 1st defendant regarding 1/4th share as is depicted in the schedule appended to the written statement out of plaint 'A' schedule lands. This fact was also elicited from DW1 in the cross-examination for the defendants 5 to 7 at the trial. Ex. B4 bears the signature of the concerned Revenue Inspector with date 24.10.1974. Ex. B8-bunch of land revenue receipts are ranging from the year 1976 to 1984 for faslies 1382, 1383, 1385,1386 to 1389, 1392 and 1393. Ex. This fact was also elicited from DW1 in the cross-examination for the defendants 5 to 7 at the trial. Ex. B4 bears the signature of the concerned Revenue Inspector with date 24.10.1974. Ex. B8-bunch of land revenue receipts are ranging from the year 1976 to 1984 for faslies 1382, 1383, 1385,1386 to 1389, 1392 and 1393. Ex. B11-Fertilizer supply card was issued in the name of 1st defendant, depicting that Groundnut, Ragi and Paddy were raised in different extents out of these lands. They further relied on Ex. B14 to Ex. B16-land revenue receipts dated 17.5.1984 in favour of the defendants 2 to 4, which are subsequent to the institution of the suit. Ex. B17 is of similar nature dated 27.11.1988 in favour of 2nd defendant. 50. The defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 also relied on Ex. B5 to Ex. B7 stating that the deceased 1st defendant had filed his declaration under Land Ceiling Laws not only on his behalf but also on behalf of the defendants 2 to 4 and other family members. By Ex. B7-order dated 25.11.1975 of Land Reforms Tribunal, the declaration so filed was considered and the family unit was held to have had less than the standard holding in 0.5843 units comprised of 0.1275 units of ancestral lands and 0.4570 units of self acquired land. This is another instance of enjoyment of his share of land by the deceased 1st defendant. As seen from Ex. B5, the entire holding including plaint 'B' schedule property is shown, being an extent of Acs. 48-58. His individual holding is shown at Acs. 11-23. 51. Apart from the above instances in respect of mode and nature of enjoyment of respective extents, the version of PW1 that they were issued pattadar passbooks in respect of lands in their enjoyment and that they too have filed individual declarations under Land Reforms Laws, needs to be considered. It is the categorical version of PW1 in cross-examination for the defendants 2 to 4 as well as 8 to 10 that he and other plaintiffs filed declaration before the Land Ceiling Tribunal. 52. The averments in the plaint are that, with reference to Exs. B4 to B7, the plaintiffs raised an objection filing a petition before Land Reforms Tribunal, which is reiterated by PW1 at the trial. PW6 and DW6 also refer to this fact. 52. The averments in the plaint are that, with reference to Exs. B4 to B7, the plaintiffs raised an objection filing a petition before Land Reforms Tribunal, which is reiterated by PW1 at the trial. PW6 and DW6 also refer to this fact. They claimed that no enquiry took place therein since it was not contemplated under Land Ceiling Laws. 53. In support of these versions, neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants 5 to 7 filed copies of such objections or any documentary proof. Failure to produce copies of their respective declarations filed under Land Ceiling Laws is a fatal omission for the plaintiffs and the defendants 5 to 7, in pursuing their claim in this matter. In presence of Ex. B5, where the deceased 1st defendant had clearly mentioned land holding out of the joint family property, apart from the plaint B-schedule property, it would have been appropriate if the plaintiffs and the defendants 5 to 7 had produced these declarations. Such effort would have definitely supported their contention if they had shown joint nature of all the plaint schedule properties and as a fact, to prove nature of their enjoyment. 54. When all these circumstances are cumulatively considered, they lead to an impression that the plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties were divided long ago among all the sharers specifying respective extents with clear identity. Therefore, some of the sharers were in a position to either sell away their respective extents or encumber them by creating mortgages. They also invited revenue records in nature of pattadar passbooks of their respective extents. Thus, these circumstances are inconsistent with joint nature of these properties. Thus, they do indicate that there was a partition among all the sharers long ago, by metes and bounds. The evidence on record is proving that this partition took place in or about the year 1963. In respect of the version of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 that this partition took place in the year 1959, except the testimony of DW1, there is no other evidence on record. The material, though slender in nature of Ex. B2-the oldest document on record of the year 1966, supports the version of PW1, PW6 and DW6. 55. The material, though slender in nature of Ex. B2-the oldest document on record of the year 1966, supports the version of PW1, PW6 and DW6. 55. The evidence on record makes out that, the deceased 1st defendant, being eldest in the family, was its manager, attending to the affairs of this family in all respects, including cultivation and management of the joint family lands and other assets. Contention of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 that it was the 5th defendant, who was the manager of this family attending to all subject affairs, is not based on evidence on record. 56. It is rather difficult to have evidence to prove an ancient partition of the nature sought to be projected by the parties in this case. It was so observed in C. Bommul Reddy (died) and others v. C.R. Bommul Reddy and others, 1990 (1) APLJ 13 . 57. It was cautioned in this ruling that the Courts should remember that strict proof of old transactions cannot be expected and course of natural human conduct should be taken into consideration for this purpose. In this ruling, Bhagwan Dyal v. Reoti Devi, AIR 1962 SC 287 , a leading authority on law relating to proof of ancient transactions is discussed. It is desirable to extract the contents of Para 23 of this ruling in this context for benefit, hereunder: "The Trial Court did not judge the evidence in the light of the principles applicable to the ancient transactions which are normally proved by presumptions and proper inferences drawn from the conduct and evidence. The decision in Bhagwan Dyal v. Reoti Devi (supra), is a leading authority and this decision lays down that "the general principle is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course of conduct. The decision in Bhagwan Dyal v. Reoti Devi (supra), is a leading authority and this decision lays down that "the general principle is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved but this presumption can be rebutted by direct evidence or by course of conduct. In the case of old transactions when no contemporaneous documents are maintained and when most of the active participants in the transactions have passed away, though the burden still remains on the person who asserts that there was a partition, it is permissible to fill up gaps more readily by reasonable inferences that in a case where the evidence is not obliterated by passage of time." Dealing with the facts in Paragraph No. 20 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed at Page 295 as follows: The evidence of this witness is not very helpful as regards the particulars of the partition but it discloses that the brothers were living separately and earning their livelihood. This evidence is further reinforced by the fact that in regard to the ancestral property the names of the different members of the family, including Reoti Devi, are entered in the Government accounts against different portions of said property. Lastly, there was never any dispute between Kashi Ham and the sons of Jwala Prasad, or between the four brothers in respect of the income from the ancestral land. That could be explained only on the hypothesis that the said property was divided and the members of the family were getting their share of the income therefrom. This conduct of the parties for about 50 years was consistent with their partition rather than their joint status." The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the decision aptly applies to the facts of our present case and long separate residence and enjoyment of the properties is explainable, only on the hypothesis of a prior partition. The long course of conduct of the parties stretching for over sixty years is inconsistent with the theory of the family continuing as a joint family. The long course of conduct of the parties stretching for over sixty years is inconsistent with the theory of the family continuing as a joint family. The decision in Musammut Parbati v. Chaudhrinaunihal Singh, Volume 36 Indian Appeals 71, is a decision of the Privy Council wherein the Court observed that in cases of this type which deal with the ancient transactions and ancient partition it is not proper to consider each document by itself to see whether they rebut the presumption but the proper course is to take into account the cumulative effect of these documents and then decide whether the cumulative effect of the documents indicates the joint status of the family or the fact that the family was divided. The presumption that Hindu the joint family continues to be joint can be rebutted by the cumulative effect of the documents and the conduct of the parties. The Privy Council reversed the finding of the High Court to the effect that the family continued to be a joint family and came to the conclusion that the agreement of 1861 specified the shares into which the title was divided and the shares had been separately recorded in the names of the allottees and they had since been separately enjoyed and the subsequent course of dealing and settlement of accounts between them had been on the footing of each being separately entitled. The decision in Girja Bhai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj and others, Volume 43 Indian Appeals 151, lays down as follows at Pages 162 and 163. "The intention to separate may be evidenced in different ways, either by explicit declaration or by conduct. If it is an inference derivable from conduct, it will be for the Court to determine whether it was unequivocal and explicit, in Joy Narain Giri v. Grish Chunder Myti, (1878) L.R. 5 Ind. "The intention to separate may be evidenced in different ways, either by explicit declaration or by conduct. If it is an inference derivable from conduct, it will be for the Court to determine whether it was unequivocal and explicit, in Joy Narain Giri v. Grish Chunder Myti, (1878) L.R. 5 Ind. A.P. 228, their Lordships regarded the conduct of one of the two co-sharers who constituted the joint family "when he left the joint residence and withdrew himself from commensality as indicating a fixed determination henceforward to live separately from his cousin, and treated "the fact of his borrowing money for his maintenance, as well as making a Will, as indicating at all events, that he himself considered that a separation had taken place" The conclusion was based on the inference of intention derivable from the acts and declarations of the member who it was alleged had separated himself, and not from the conduct or attitude of any other party." 58. It is also useful to consider the effect of observations of Privy Council in Gaganbai v. Fakirgowda, AIR 1930 PC 93 , in this case (referred to in the above ruling of C. Bommul Reddy's case (supra), in Para 25). "25........."Separation in food and residence for a long time between two brothers of a Hindu family, independent transactions of property such as mortgage and leases and appropriation of the proceeds thereof to personal uses, description of one of the brothers as being separated in the Record of Rights prepared under the Bombay Land Records of Rights, enjoying of the properties by the widow of one of the brothers after his death and the entry in the mutation register prepared under Bombay Land Revenue Amendment Act, of the name of widow as the owner of the properties, all these facts clearly show that there had been a partition between the two brothers during their life time." 59. Yet another ruling relied on for the appellants in this respect is, in The C.I.T., Kanpur v. M/s. Kalloomal Tapeswari Prasad (HUF), Kanpur, AIR 1982 SC 760 , where the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as to the effect of partition under Hindu Law in Para 16 as under: "16. Under Hindu Law partition may be either total or partial. A partial partition may be as regards person who are members of the family or as regards properties which belong to it. Under Hindu Law partition may be either total or partial. A partial partition may be as regards person who are members of the family or as regards properties which belong to it. Where there has been a partition, it is presumed that it was a total one both as to the parties and property but when there is a partition between brothers, there is no presumption that there has been partition between one of them and his descendants. It is, however, open to a party who alleges that the partition has been partial either as to persons or as to property to establish it. The decision on that question depends on proof of what the parties intended-whether they intended the partition to be partial either as to property, the family ceases to be undivided so far as properties in respect of which such partition has taken place but continues to be undivided with regard to the remaining family property. After such partial partition, the rights of inheritance and alienation differ accordingly as the property in question belongs to the members in their divided or undivided capacity. Partition can be brought about (1) by a father during his lifetime between himself and his sons by dividing properties equally amongst them, (2) by agreement or (3) by a suit or arbitration. A declaration of intention of a coparcener to become divided brings about severance of status. As observed by the Privy Council in Appovier v. Rama Subha Aiyan, (1866) 11 Moo Ind. App. 75: "when the members of an undivided family agree among themselves with regard to particular property, that it shall thenceforth be the subject of ownership, in certain defined shares, then the character of undivided property and joint enjoyment is taken away from the subject-matter so agreed to be dealt with; and in the estate each members has thenceforth a definite and certain share, which he may claim the right to receive and to enjoy in severalty, although the property itself has not been actually severed and divided". A physical division of the property which is the subject-matter of partition is not necessary to complete the process of partition insofar as that item of property is concerned under Hindu law. The parties to the partition may enjoy the property in question as tenants-in-common. A physical division of the property which is the subject-matter of partition is not necessary to complete the process of partition insofar as that item of property is concerned under Hindu law. The parties to the partition may enjoy the property in question as tenants-in-common. In Appovier's case (supra), the Privy Council further laid down that "if there be a conversion of the joint tenancy of an undivided family into a tenancy in common of the members of that undivided family, the undivided family becomes a divided family with reference to the property that is the subject of that agreement, and that is a separation in interest and in right, although not immediately followed by a de facto actual division of the subject-matter. This may at anytime, be claimed by virtue of the separate right." 60. The circumstances as reflected from the evidence and material on record, discussed above, as rightly contended for the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10, do make out an out-and-out partition among all the sharers of all the joint family properties then available. It cannot be stated that the enjoyment of these properties likewise by the sharers is only an indication of severance in status, whereby the nature of the family properties as joint extents was not lost. Therefore, reliance placed by the plaintiffs in this context to support their contention in M/s. Kalloomal Tapeswari Prasad (HUF), Kanpur, cannot be made applicable, in given facts and circumstances of the case. 61. Similarly, reliance placed by the plaintiffs in Bhagwant P. Sulakhe v. Digambar Gopal Sulakhe and others (supra), cannot assist their contention. 62. A vain attempt is made on behalf of the plaintiffs basing on the versions presented by PW1 and PW6 as well as DW6 that their claim is rested on the properties, which were not part of tentative arrangement and that the properties which were left out of it, are the subject matter of their claim for partition. This contention is not supported by the pleadings in the plaint. It was never the case of the plaintiffs that there was a partial partition of the joint family properties among all the sharers and the suit claim is only with reference to left over properties of the joint family. This contention is not supported by the pleadings in the plaint. It was never the case of the plaintiffs that there was a partial partition of the joint family properties among all the sharers and the suit claim is only with reference to left over properties of the joint family. This alleged circumstance also cannot be relied on for the plaintiffs to support their version that there was only severance in status of members of the alleged the joint family and not of the family properties. 63. Thus, on careful examination and analysis of the evidence and the material on record, the inference drawn is that by the date of the suit, there was already partition of the plaint 'A' and 'C' schedule properties among all the sharers by metes and bounds, who began to enjoy their respective shares independently exercising complete dominion. The shares allotted were in their exclusive possession and enjoyment. It was the situation obtaining, by or about the year 1963. 64. Thus, this point is answered. Point No. 2: 65. Plaint 'B' schedule land is, an extent of Acs. 27-16 cents in S. No. 236 of Venugopalapuram Village, Puttur Taluq, Chittoor District, locally known as 'Mokala Cheruvu'. It is in the cultivation accounts for revenue, of Kasimkuppam Group of Villages, undisputedly. 66. This land is not an ancestral property of this family. Nor it was ever held by Sri Rayadurgam Kanakaiah or his father Sri Gangaiah. 67. Admittedly, this land belonged to Sri Narasimharaju, proprietor and Inani holder of Venugopalapuram Village. Thus, it was a part of estate land of Sri Narasimha Raju. Acquisition of this land from the erstwhile estate of Sri Narasimha Raju of Venugopalapuram Village, in the name of the 1st defendant is admitted by the parties in this case. Issuance of patta in favour of the 1st defendant there for in the year 1962 is also admitted. It is nobody's case that plaint 'B' schedule land was acquired by making use of the profits from other properties of this joint family or out of its nucleus. 68. It is the contention of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 that it was given away to the deceased 1st defendant by Sri Narasimharaju out of generosity and admiring the assistance offered to him by the 1st defendant. 68. It is the contention of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 that it was given away to the deceased 1st defendant by Sri Narasimharaju out of generosity and admiring the assistance offered to him by the 1st defendant. The second defendant as DW1 deposed in this respect, claiming that the plaint 'B' schedule land was a self acquisition of his father from Sri Narasimha Raju. 69. In the written statement of the 2nd defendant, it is stated that the 1st defendant had reclaimed this land, which was otherwise uneven with major part of it being unfit for cultivation, paying rents to Sri Narasimha Raju. The evidence of DW1 is also that after reclaiming this land, his father had raised dry crops like horse gram, red gram etc. 70. The defendants 5 to 7, however claimed that the 5th defendant had contributed for improving this land to make it cultivable, which, DW6 deposed. According to DW6, his father spent for reclaiming the plaint 'B' schedule land and that this land was being used jointly for grazing cattle and for collecting firewood on account of the wild growth then available in this land. According to PW1 the Patta was granted in the name of the 1st defendant during survey and settlement operations, since he was the eldest member in the family. 71. PW1 further deposed that there was litigation regarding this land, which was defended by the deceased 1st defendant. He also claimed that he gave a copy of the judgment therein to his Advocate which, however, was not produced on their behalf at the trial. 72. Ex. A3-Certified Copy of SLR covering S. No. 236 was exhibited at the trial through PW6. Photocopy of this document made available by the learned Counsel for the appellants stated to have been obtained under RTI Act refers to this land covering an extent of Acs. 27-16 cents. It stood in the name of Sri Rayadurgam Gangaiah, Son of Sri Kannaiah. Learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that these entries were made in this SLR register (Fair adangal) on 30.4.1958, referring to an entry relating to S. No. 237 found in the same page, where an entry relating to S. No. 236 is seen with an initial of concerned who made it with this date. DW1 was not subjected to cross-examination basing on the entries in Ex. DW1 was not subjected to cross-examination basing on the entries in Ex. A3 questioning identity of the deceased 1st defendant as the pattadar referred to therein. On behalf of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10, it was suggested to PW6 at the trial that Ex. A3 was created by him using his influence, alongwith Ex. A4. He also stated that the survey was conducted in the years 1956 and 1957 of the suit lands. 73. DW1 deposed referring the litigation between his father and Sri M. Chenchuraju in respect of this land in plaint 'B' schedule. It was suggested to DW1 on behalf of the defendants 5 to 7 that in that suit, the deceased 1st defendant contended that the plaint 'B' schedule land belonged to their joint family. If it was so, the defendants 5 to 7 or the plaintiffs could have produced the record relating to the suit between the deceased 1st defendant and Sri M. Chenchuraju, at the trial in support of their contention. Failure to produce this record including the judgment, which PW1 claimed that he had handed over to his Advocate relating to the litigation, goes a long way to discredit the version of either the plaintiffs or the defendants 5 to 7 in this respect. 74. It is further to be noted, that the defendants 5 to 7 joined the plaintiffs in issuing Ex. A1-legal notice, to the 1st defendant during his lifetime and before institution of the suit. Ex. A2 is stated to have been a reply issued on his behalf to Ex. A1 setting out similar defence as is found on their behalf in the suit. The plaintiffs chose to make the defendants 5 to 7 as their adversaries on the premise that they colluded with defendants 1 to 4. Whereas, the version of the defendants 1 to 4 at the trial was that the defendants 5 to 7 colluded with the plaintiffs. Be it noted that the defendants 5 to 7 filed a written statement conceding the claim of the plaintiffs, demanding partition of the plaint 'A to C' schedule properties claiming 1/4th share therein. Evidence was also let in on then-behalf through DW6, which supported the stand of the plaintiffs at the trial. Be it noted that the defendants 5 to 7 filed a written statement conceding the claim of the plaintiffs, demanding partition of the plaint 'A to C' schedule properties claiming 1/4th share therein. Evidence was also let in on then-behalf through DW6, which supported the stand of the plaintiffs at the trial. Therefore, these circumstances prove that the defendants 5 to 7 are in league with the plaintiffs than the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10. 75. In this context, one singular circumstance to be reckoned and which is impressive insofar as the stand of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 concerned is that the alleged tentative arrangement among these parties did not include plaint 'B' schedule properties. DW6 clearly admitted this fact in cross-examination. Reason for leaving aside this extent of property for their common and beneficial enjoyment and in failing to include in the alleged tentative arrangement set up by the plaintiffs among all the sharers, is of utmost importance, particularly having regard to the defence of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10. 76. Conscious of this fact, apparently, the plaintiffs as well as the defendants 5 to 7 have set up a plea that this land always remained barren without cultivation with wild growth and pits. If really the plaint 'B' schedule property was treated as an acquisition by the deceased 1st defendant for the purpose of entire family, it would not have been left over in the process of tentative and rough arrangement in enjoyment of the lands. Oral evidence let in on behalf of the plaintiffs, through P.Ws. 2 to 5, in this respect, cannot bear any consequences. 77. The defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 made an attempt to examine Sri Narasimha Raju as DW2 and DW3-Sri M. Narayana Swamy. They were examined-in-chief in the Trial Court on 25.4.1990 and 19.6.1990 respectively. However, cross-examination of these witnesses was deferred at the request of the plaintiffs, as seen from the depositions of these two witnesses. The defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 could not produce these two witnesses for cross-examination and therefore, their evidence was eschewed on 9.7.1990 by the Trial Court 78. DW4 supported the version of these defendants not only with reference to the past partition but also in respect of possession and enjoyment of plaint 'B' schedule land. The defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 could not produce these two witnesses for cross-examination and therefore, their evidence was eschewed on 9.7.1990 by the Trial Court 78. DW4 supported the version of these defendants not only with reference to the past partition but also in respect of possession and enjoyment of plaint 'B' schedule land. His version at the trial was that the deceased 1st defendant and his sons improved this land and were raising horse gram and other dry crops. He claimed that he was assisting them in cultivation of this land and also as an agricultural labourer. His deposition makes out that he is aware of the affairs in this family. He denied the suggestion on behalf of the plaintiffs that the land at Venugopalapuram viz., plaint 'B' schedule being a the joint family property and further contended that it was not self-acquisition of the 1st defendant. 79. Evidence of DW5, who claimed to be the Sarpanch of their village Gram Panchayat, is not of much importance in this case to consider, though he deposed, supporting the version of defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10. He seems to be living with his daughter at Gajulamandyam and his version that he was attending to irrigating the agricultural lands in their village as a waterman, did not have any support from any other material. In fact, his cross-examination by the plaintiffs reflects that he was not appointed by the Government for such purpose, for any of these villages. 80. Apart from relying on the evidence of DW1 in this context, on behalf of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10, strong reliance is placed in Ex. B9-Pattadar passbook, which was issued in favour of the deceased 1st defendant in October 1974, for S. No. 236/1 covering Acs. 22-60 cents. Entries in this pattadar passbook described that this extent belonged to the deceased 1st defendant, as owner. DW1 Asserted that this land is to an extent of Acs. 22-60 only and not, to the extent described in the plaint B schedule. 81. Ex. B5 to Ex. B7 already referred to supra while considering point No. 1, relate to the claim of the deceased 1st defendant in respect of this land as his self acquisition. Fertilizer Supply card was also issued to the deceased 1st defendant in Ex. 22-60 only and not, to the extent described in the plaint B schedule. 81. Ex. B5 to Ex. B7 already referred to supra while considering point No. 1, relate to the claim of the deceased 1st defendant in respect of this land as his self acquisition. Fertilizer Supply card was also issued to the deceased 1st defendant in Ex. B12 covering the years 1973 to 1975 in respect of this land. It also bears the signatures of Revenue Officers like Tahsildar, Puttur and was issued by VDO, Taduku. 82. Most important among the documents produced in this context by the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 is Ex. B10, which is an extract of adangal issued on 21.9.1983 by the Taluq Office, Puttur. It covers faslies 1369, 1374 to 1376 and 1384 to 1388. The name of Sri R. Gangaiah (the deceased 1st defendant), son of Kannaiah, is shown as the person in possession of Acs. 27-60 cents in S. No. 236. It is described as a fallow land. Similar description of the deceased 1st defendant as well as Sri M. Chenchuraju stood recorded for the faslies 1374 to 1376 in it, in respect of this land. However, Sri Gangaiah and Sri Chenchuraju are shown in the relevant column relating to persons in enjoyment of this land, during the faslies 1382 to 1384. Crops like horse gram and another (Arika in Telugu) is shown to have been raised in Acs. 5-00 and Acs. 7-50 during the year 1974 while Acs. 20-10 was left over as fallow. During faslies 1385 to 1388, contents of Ex. B10 reflect the name of the deceased 1st defendant as son of Sri Kanakaiah and in enjoyment of Acs. 22-60 cents and whereas Sri Muppalla Chenchuraju is described to hold different extents in the same survey number. 83. On behalf of the plaintiffs, with reference to entries in Ex. A3 showing that patta was granted in favour of the 1st defendant in or about 1958, an attempt is made to draw assistance from the entries in Ex. B10 reflecting barren nature of this land during the year 1959 and upto 1966 or later upto the year 1972. 83. On behalf of the plaintiffs, with reference to entries in Ex. A3 showing that patta was granted in favour of the 1st defendant in or about 1958, an attempt is made to draw assistance from the entries in Ex. B10 reflecting barren nature of this land during the year 1959 and upto 1966 or later upto the year 1972. According to the plaintiffs, since the family remained joint without any specific partition or division of the properties by metes and bounds, when the 1st defendant was admittedly the manager of this family attending and managing affairs of all properties, whatever acquisition made by and in the name of the 1st defendant during such period, shall be construed and remained properties of the joint family. Support is drawn on their behalf in this context relying in N. Padmamma and others v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy and others, (2015) 1 SCC 417 , in Para 11 referring to nature of possession of a co-heir of a the joint family property as under: "11. It is fairly well settled principle of law that the possession of a co-heir is in law treated as possession of all the co-heirs. If one co-heir has come in possession of the properties, it is presumed to be on the basis of a joint title." 84. In Subraya M.N. v. Vittala M.N. and others, 2016 (5) ALD 10 (SC) : (2016) 8 SCC 705 , relied on for the appellant in similar situation in grant of patta in favour of the deceased 1st defendant to enure to the benefit of the joint family, when it was being enjoyed by the entire the joint family as a part of its holding. 85. In these two rulings of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in given facts and circumstances, it is so observed, that the acquisitions by a manager of a joint family during his tenure in such capacity, shall enure to the benefit of the entire the joint family and which are open for partition among all the sharers. Thus, the effect of these observations is that any acquisition by manager in his individual name and capacity when the family remained joint shall be deemed to be the property of the joint family. 86. Thus, the effect of these observations is that any acquisition by manager in his individual name and capacity when the family remained joint shall be deemed to be the property of the joint family. 86. On behalf of the appellants, reference is also made to the judgment of erstwhile High Court of A.P. in Kakumani Subbarao v. Kakumani Vennkateswarlu (died) and others, 2012 (5) ALD 161 : 2012 (6) ALT 113 , as to presumption of a property belonging to the Hindu joint family, when it is in the name of a coparcener to remain as a part of the joint family estate. 87. The contents of Ex. B10 are that this land was in possession of the deceased 1st defendant by the year 1959. The material on record as per findings recorded on Point No. 1 supra are that, by or about the year 1963, there was a partition and division of the joint family properties in the plaint 'A' and 'C' schedules by metes and bounds. Due consideration is given in keeping this plaint 'B' schedule land aside without bringing within the fold and purview of this partition and division in the year 1963. When all these factors are considered cumulatively, holding this land since the year 1959 by the deceased 1st defendant shall be deemed as his own acquisition which was admittedly acquired from Sri Narasimha Raju, the erstwhile estate holder of Venugopalapuram, and not otherwise. This land remained beyond the ken of the joint family and not as a pari of its holding. 88. The burden of proof is on the party, who alleges that this excluded property from partition is a joint family property. Reliance is placed on behalf of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10, in Kesharbai @ Purhpabai Eknathrao Nalawade (D) by L.Rs. and another v. Tarabai Prabhakar Rao Nalawade and others (supra), in this respect. It is so observed in this ruling and further holding that once a partition in the sense of division of right and title or status is proved or admitted, presumption is that the joint property was partitioned or divided. 89. and another v. Tarabai Prabhakar Rao Nalawade and others (supra), in this respect. It is so observed in this ruling and further holding that once a partition in the sense of division of right and title or status is proved or admitted, presumption is that the joint property was partitioned or divided. 89. In the light of the observations in this ruling of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances proved and established in this case, the burden is on the plaintiffs to prove that plaint 'B' schedule properties belonged to the joint family. The evidence placed by the plaintiffs did not have the effect of discharging such burden effectively and satisfactorily. 90. It is not the case of the plaintiffs at any stage in this matter including in the pleadings in the plaint as well as at the trial that there was blending of plaint 'B' schedule property at the instance of the deceased 1st defendant and other properties belonging to the joint family nor that it was brought into common hotch potch. When it is the burden of the plaintiffs upon proved facts in this case, they cannot contend that when the deceased 1st defendant being the manager of the joint family, acquired such land from the estate holder Sri Narasimha Raju, it became a property of the joint family. It is not necessary for the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 to claim ouster of other sharers in respect of this property, since the evidence on record unerringly proved that this land was a self acquisition of the deceased 1st defendant. 91. Absence of proof of their alleged protest in including this property as part of his holding by the 1st defendant and of his branch before the Land Reforms Tribunal covered by Ex. B4 to Ex. B7 and failure to produce copies of their own declarations filed before Land Reforms Tribunal are open for the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 to rely on to support their version. 92. The plaintiffs did not choose to examine the 1st plaintiff at the trial nor the 5th plaintiff. They were alive and available then, who had known the affairs in the family. 92. The plaintiffs did not choose to examine the 1st plaintiff at the trial nor the 5th plaintiff. They were alive and available then, who had known the affairs in the family. They would have been the best persons to speak of either the rough and tentative arrangement or out and out partition of the family properties as well as acquisition of plaint B schedule property, including manner of its enjoyment. Their old age or other reason stated by the plaintiffs or the defendants 5 to 7, is not sufficient to accept, to explain away their non-examination at the trial. They being the surviving sharers amongst all these four brothers, their testimony would be pivotal in resolving the entire controversy. Their non-examination is fatal to these parties and necessary consequences shall follow. This fatal circumstance drives the last nail into the case of the plaintiffs and that of the defendants 5 to 7. 93. Rightly as contended for the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the plaintiffs holding that they suppressed the best evidence possible and the material as well as relevant record in this case, under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. In support of such contention they relied on Pandurang Jivaji Apte v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar (dead) by LRs. and another, AIR 1981 SC 2235 . 94. Both the learned Counsel addressed arguments as to application and effect of provisions of Inams Abolition Act. Such questions were not pleaded nor any evidence was let-in or any arguments were submitted in the Trial Court. Therefore they cannot be permitted to be urged now. 95. Thus, on a careful examination and analysis of the entire material, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge in this respect, holding that plaint 'B' schedule property was acquired by the deceased 1st defendant on his own, should be affirmed. Thus this point is answered. Point No. 3: 96. In view of the findings on Points 1 and 2, the irresistible conclusion is that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of partition as sought. Thus this point is held. Point No. 4: 97. A vain attempt is made on behalf the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 that the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by time under Article-110 of the Limitation Act. Thus this point is held. Point No. 4: 97. A vain attempt is made on behalf the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 that the claim of the plaintiffs is barred by time under Article-110 of the Limitation Act. This contention is opposed on behalf of the plaintiffs on the ground that the Trial Court answered the issue relating to limitation against the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10. 98. This objection on behalf of the plaintiffs is correct. Further, it was never an objection of these defendants, either in the written statement or at the trial pointing out application of Article 110 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is not open for them to reject the ground of limitation on this score. 99. Want of pleadings cannot be an obstacle in this situation, according to the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 and contending that substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds of procedural irregularity relying on Union of India v. Naresh Kumar and others, (1996) 6 SCC 660 . 100. Thus, for the reasons stated above, this point is held in favour of the defendants 2 to 4 and 8 to 10 and against the plaintiffs. Point No. 5: 101. In view of the findings on Points 1 and 2, on reappraisal of the material and evidence, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Judge in the judgment under appeal have to be affirmed. The decree and judgment so passed do not call for any interference. 102. In the result, this appeal is dismissed confirming the decree and judgment in OS No. 20 of 1990 dated 14.12.1994 on the file of the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur. Having regard to the close relationship among these parties, they are directed to bear their own costs throughout. 103. As sequel thereto, all miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Interim Order, if any, shall stand vacated.