JUDGMENT Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. - The present petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been maintained by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside the proceedings pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kinnaur Camp at Rampur, District Shimla, in Case No.158 of 2015, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, titled Ravinder Singh Thakur vs. Ranjeet Chauhan. 2. The key facts, giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant-respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'complainant') is an agriculturist and having his own orchard and the respondent-petitioner (hereinafter referred as 'respondent') is running a business of sale and purchase of fruit and vegetables. The respondent had time and again called the complainant in the year 2013-14, to send apple boxes in the market for sale. The complainant has exceeded the request and sent 400 apple boxes to the respondent in Narkanda, in the month of September, 2014 after assurance given by the respondent that the same may be sold out in a higher price and payment will be made promptly. The respondent has sold out the same, in a total amount of Rs.5,00,000/-, after deducting all the expenses and issued sale receipt to this effect. The complainant time and again requested the respondent that the amount lying with him may be given. In order to pay the legal liability, the respondent has issued cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- bearing No.146595, dated 22.9.2014, in favour of the complainant. The respondent at the time of issuance of aforesaid cheque assured the complainant that the same would be honored by his banker as and when presented by the complainant. The complainant presented the said cheque through his bank State Bank of India Branch at Rohru, within its validity in his own account and the same was returned with an endorsement "Insufficient fund" vide memo, dated 22.12.2014, issued by the Bank, which was received by the complainant later on. Thereafter, the complainant has issued a legal notice dated 24.12.2014 to the respondent through his counsel, which was sent by registered post with acknowledgment on the address of the respondent dated 24.12.2014. The notice was sent on correct address of the respondent through registered post on 24.12.2014. The registered letter and acknowledgment was issued on the address of the respondent, the same was returned unclaimed with the note "Not met left no address and returned to sender" on 30.12.2014. The notice was sent on correct address of the respondent through registered post on 24.12.2014. The registered letter and acknowledgment was issued on the address of the respondent, the same was returned unclaimed with the note "Not met left no address and returned to sender" on 30.12.2014. The respondent has failed to pay the aforesaid amount of cheque after receiving the notice as well as oral information given through mobile by the complainant after the cheque was dishonoured within a statutory period and thus, committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Hence, the present petition. 3. By way of the present petition, petitioner has come before this Court for quashing the complaint on the ground that the complaint was time barred, no notice was duly served upon the respondent and the complaint is premature and the learned Court at Rampur Bushehar, has no jurisdiction to try the case. 4. In support of his arguments, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court rendered in Criminal Appeal No.168 of 2008, titled Bimla Devi and others vs. Harish Rana, , decided on 20.6.2017. He has also relied upon the judgment in Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh, (2016) 2 SCC 75 , on his aspect and submitted that only the Learned Court at Rohru, District Shimla, has got jurisdiction. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has vehemently argued that address of the respondent has given in the present petition is the same, to which, notice was issued. He has further argued that as the presumption is taken with respect to the delivery of registered notice, the complaint is much prior to the expiry of time i.e. time was to expire on 8th March, 2015, but the complaint was presented on February, 2015 itself. He has further argued that after coming into operation of the notification of the Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative Department) New Delhi, the 22nd September, 2015/Bhadra 31, 1937 (Saka) i.e. The Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015, No.7 of 2015, the case can be filed where the cheque is presented by the drawee. 6. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the following judicial pronouncements : 1. K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and anr., (1999) AIR SC 3762 . 2. 6. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the following judicial pronouncements : 1. K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and anr., (1999) AIR SC 3762 . 2. D. Vinod Shivappa vs. Nanda Belliappa, in Case No. Appeal (crl.)1255-1261 of 2004, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, 2006. 3. C.C. Alavi Haji vs. Palapetty Muhammed and anr, (2007) 6 SCC 555 . 4. Subodh S. Salaskar vs. Jayaprakash M. Shah and anr., (2008) CriLJ 3953 . 5. M/s Ajeet Seeds Ltd. vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, (2014) 12 SCC 685 . 6. Sujatha Ramanathan vs. Ramya, Hon'ble Madras High Court, decided on 7th August, 2017. 7. Vijay Kumar Jain vs. Ramesh Chandra Jain, Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court, decided on 20th September, 2011. 7. In rebuttal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has argued that the complaint is hopelessly time barred, as report of the Post Office on 27th January, 2015 and taking the date, as the refusal date is time barred. 8. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, I have gone through the entire record in detail. 9. At the very outset, the documents on record, which show that the cheque was presented in the Bank, which was dishonoured and then the stipulated time, as required under law on 22.12.2014 with the endorsement "Insufficient funds" thereafter, notice was issued to the respondent within two days through Bank, which is Ex.CW1/D, in the learned Court below, on the address of the respondent, which is the same address and now in the present petition, endorsement on the same was unclaimed and before that intimation was left by the addressee by the postal authority. In these circumstances, the presumption is that it was received by the respondent and the same was returned to the addressee by the Post Office on 24.12.2014 and it could have been taken three days to reach back to the sender. 10. In these circumstances, the presumption is that it was received by the respondent and the same was returned to the addressee by the Post Office on 24.12.2014 and it could have been taken three days to reach back to the sender. 10. Now in the instant case, the presumption has to be taken that it is received by the addressee, when it was on the known address, which is the same address in the present petition and after thirty days, the time comes 24th January, 2015 i.e. the presumption period and fifteen days thereafter, 8th January, 2015, i.e. the time to make the payment and thereafter, the complaint was required to be filed within one month by 5th March, 2015, but the complaint was filed in the month of February, 2015, which is within limitation. 11. Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Bimla Devi and others vs. Harish Rana, in Cr. Appeal No.168 of 2008, a coordinate Bench of this Court has held as under : "9. Be that as it may, with evidently the apposite statutory mandatory presumption embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinabove being foisted upon service concerted through RAD cover upon the addressee/accused, thereupon the service upon the addressee/accused "through" UPC borne in Ext.PC hence with its not standing explicitly encompassed within the relevant statutory domain, corollary whereof "is" that the vigour of the mandate of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act is unattractable vis--vis service concerted "through" Ext.PC upon the accused/addressee. 10. Consequently, when within the ambit of the preemptory mandate of clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act, provisions whereof stands extracted hereinabove, the prima donna condition of the accused peremptorily standing served with a mandatory notice also when the aforesaid statutory condition warranted its preemptory evident satiation, for hence empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance upon the complainant, "whereas" the relevant aforesaid indispensable statutory condition not evidently begetting satiation, hence barred the magistrate concerned to take cognizance upon the complainant. Consequently, in the Magistrate ordering refusal to take cognizance upon the compliant does not render his order to suffer from any legal error. Consequently, in the Magistrate ordering refusal to take cognizance upon the compliant does not render his order to suffer from any legal error. [12] However, any reliance by him upon the aforesaid verdict is grossly misplaced, as the relevant paragraph thereof, does not make any explicit pronouncement that even with respect to a receipt issued by the postal authorities concerned with respect to a letter sent under UPC, the presumption embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act rendering the relevant statutory presumption being attractable thereupon, contrarily there is a vivid echoing therein that since the presumption embodied in Section 27 of the General Clauses Act "on evident satiation" of the ingredients spelt therein standing begotten also thereupon renders hence insignificant any want of any communication in respect thereof in the complaint besides rendering insignificant any want of the witnesses concerned not testifying in respect thereof, conspicuously, when evidence in respect of ingredients thereof standing proven alone enjoy creditworthiness. Be that as it may, with the preemptory mandate of the apposite clause of Section 138 of the Act not begetting any satiation, thereupon it is befitting to conclude that hence with the complainant not begetting any compliance therewith, thereupon the magistrate concerned stood barred to take cognizance upon the complaint. Hence, I find no merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed. The impugned judgment of the learned trial Court is maintained and affirmed." 12. Now coming to the second aspect of the case, as address was the same of which, the present petition was filed by the petitioner, the judgment as cited in Bimla Devi and others case (supra), is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. The amendment by way of Notification No.7 of 2015, by the Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative Department), New Delhi, 22nd September, 2015/Bhadra 31, 1937 (Saka), Section 3 reads as under : "3. 13. The amendment by way of Notification No.7 of 2015, by the Ministry of Law and Justice (Legislative Department), New Delhi, 22nd September, 2015/Bhadra 31, 1937 (Saka), Section 3 reads as under : "3. In the principal Act, section 142 shall be numbered as sub-section (1) thereof and after sub-section (1) as so numbered, the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely :- (2) The offence under section 138 shall be inquired into and tried only by a court within whose local jurisdiction- (a) if the cheque is delivered for collection through an account, the branch of the bank where the payee or holder in due course, as the case may be maintains the account, is situated; or (b) if the cheque is presented for payment by the payee or holder in due course otherwise through an account, the branch of the drawee bank where the drawer maintains the account, is situated. Explanation-For the purposes of clause (a), where a cheque is delivered for collection at any branch of the bank of the payee or holder in due course, then, the cheque shall be deemed to have been delivered to the branch of the bank in which the payee of holder in due course, as the case may be, maintains the account." 14. In Bridgestone India Private Limited vs. Inderpal Singh, (2016) 2 SCC 75 , wherein it has been held as under : "The appellant issued a legal notice on 26.08.2006, which was served on the respondent - Inderpal Singh on 06.09.2006, demanding the amount depicted in the cheque. The appellant informed the respondent, that he would be compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, if payment was not made by the respondent within 15 days from the date of receipt of the legal notice. The accused-respondent- Inderpal Singh, preferred an application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, under Section 177 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 contesting the territorial jurisdiction with respect to the above cheque drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh. The prayer made by the respondent, that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings initiated by the appellant - M/s Bridgestone Indian Pvt.Ltd. was declined on 02.06.2009. The prayer made by the respondent, that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings initiated by the appellant - M/s Bridgestone Indian Pvt.Ltd. was declined on 02.06.2009. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, relied on the judgment rendered by this Court in K.Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, (1999) AIR SC 3762 , to record a finding in favour of the appellant. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, dated 02.06.2009, the respondent-Inderpal Singh preferred a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh before its Indore Bench. Having examined the controversy in hand and keeping in mind the fact, that a number of documents were presented by the respondent - Inderpal Singh during the course of hearing before the High Court, by an order dated 03.12.2009, the petition filed by the accusedrespondent was disposed of, by remitting the case to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, requiring him to pass a fresh order after taking into consideration the additional documents relied upon, and the judgments cited before the High Court. The Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, yet again, by an order dated 11.01.2010 held, that he had the territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the controversy raised by the appellant - M/s Bridgestone India Pvt.Ltd. under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The decision rendered by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, was again assailed by the accused-respondent in yet another petition filed by him under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh before its Indore Bench. The High Court accepted the prayer made by the accused-respondent - Inderpal Singh by holding, that the jurisdiction lay only before the Court wherein the original drawee bank was located, namely, at Chandigarh, wherefrom the accused-respondent had issued the concerned cheque bearing No.1950, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh. The High Court accepted the prayer made by the accused-respondent - Inderpal Singh by holding, that the jurisdiction lay only before the Court wherein the original drawee bank was located, namely, at Chandigarh, wherefrom the accused-respondent had issued the concerned cheque bearing No.1950, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh. Since cheque No.1950, in the sum of Rs.26,958/-, drawn on the Union Bank of India, Chandigarh, dated 02.05.2006, was presented for encashment at the IDBI Bank, Indore, which intimated its dishonor to the appellant on 04.08.2006, we are of the view that the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, would have the territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceedings initiated by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, after the promulgation of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Second Ordinance, 2015. The words "...as if that sub-section had been in force at all material times..." used with reference to Section 142(2), in Section 142A(1) gives retrospectivity to the provision. In the above view of the matter, the instant appeal is allowed, and the impugned order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, by its Indore Bench, dated 05.05.2011, is set aside. The parties are directed to appear before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, on 15.01.2016. In case the complaint filed by the appellant has been returned, it shall be re-presented before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, on the date of appearance indicated hereinabove. " 15. From the above, it is clear that the complaint was filed within time and the learned Court at Rampur Bushehar, has got territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. Notice was duly served upon the respondent, as it was the same address, of which, the present petition is filed. In these circumstances, jurisdiction of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not required to be exercised and complaint cannot be quashed. 16. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the present petition sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned Court below on 20th January, 2020. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. 17. 16. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, the present petition sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned Court below on 20th January, 2020. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of. 17. Needless to say that the observations made hereinabove shall not be construed as an opinion expressed on the merits of the main case, which shall be adjudicated on its own by the learned Court below and the decision rendered in this petition shall have no bearing on the same.