ORDER : Dinesh Kumar Singh, J. 1. The present revision under Section 397/401 CrPC has been filed against the judgment and order of acquittal of accused-respondents passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, E.C. Act, Pratapgarh in Sessions Trial No. 291 of 2002, arising out of Case Crime No. 338 of 1997, Police Station Antu, District Pratapgarh under Sections 307 and 506 IPC. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, was that on 13.06.1997, the complaint/injured, Kamlesh Bahadur Singh was going to Pratapgarh from his residence at Village Shivrajpur; he stopped at Garhwara try-junction to have betel at Chaurasia Betal Shop; at that time, Anjani Singh present there exhorted that he should not go alive, and asked accused Shailendra alias Nate to kill him; accused, Anjani Singh fired at him from behind by country made pistol and accused, Shailendra alias Nate fired at him from front; the complainant raised alarm; at that time, Atibal Singh, Pradhan of Village Rampur and his brother Rakesh Bahadur Singh tried to catch-hold of the accused, however, the accused ran away, showing the country made pistols, towards east; since the accused had firearms in their hands, nobody dared to chase them; the shopkeepers, due to fear and terror, closed their shops. It was further alleged that the complainant had enmity with accused Anjani Singh. 3. The complaint was given by the complainant on 13.06.1997 to the Station House Officer, Antu, on the basis of which FIR No. 94 of 1997 dated 13.06.1997 was registered at 9.05 a.m. at Case Crime No. 338 of 1997, under Sections 307 and 506 IPC against accused Anjani Singh and Shailendra alias Nate. 4. Statements of the witnesses, under Section 161 CrPC, were recorded. The investigating officer prepared a site-map on 13.06.1997 itself. The complainant/injured was medically examined on the same day at the Health Center, Sandwa Chandrika. On 14.06.1997, his X-ray was conducted. 5. On the basis of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against Shailendra alias Nate. Accused, Anjani Singh was summoned an application under Section 319 CrPC. 6. The charge, under Section 307/506 IPC, was framed, which the accused denied, and claimed trial. 7. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined complainant, Kamlesh Bahadur Singh as PW-1. Dr. Julkar Nain, who was a formal witness as PW-2. He allegedly examined victim Kamlesh Bahadur Singh on 13.06.1997 at 9.45 a.m. at Primary Health Center, Sandwa Chandrika. 6. The charge, under Section 307/506 IPC, was framed, which the accused denied, and claimed trial. 7. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined complainant, Kamlesh Bahadur Singh as PW-1. Dr. Julkar Nain, who was a formal witness as PW-2. He allegedly examined victim Kamlesh Bahadur Singh on 13.06.1997 at 9.45 a.m. at Primary Health Center, Sandwa Chandrika. He proved the injury report, Exhibit Ka-2. Atibal Singh, alleged eye-witness, as PW-3. Dr. H.C. Mishra as PW-4. He was a formal witness and conducted X-ray on the body of the victim on 14.06.1997 at District Hospital, Pratapgarh, and he proved the X-ray report, Exhibit Ka-3 as well as the material, Exhibit M-1 to M-3 of X-ray Plate etc. Constable Murlidhar as PW-5, who said that he was posted at Police Post Garhwa on 13.06.1997, and he was posted with Lalai Singh and Sub-Inspector R.N. Singh. He witnessed them writing and reading. He proved the chik report etc, and the site-map etc. 8. The accused, in their statements under Section 313 CrPC, denied the allegations of causing injuries by firing at the complainant. It was said that the medical report was a fabricated document. The investigation was conducted wrongly, and in a biased manner. They had been falsely implicated for enmity. However, they did not produce any witness in their support. 9. The learned trial Court, after considering the criminal history of the complainant, who was involved in two murder cases, and the fact that there was no case lodged by him against the accused or by the accused against him, did not believe the assertion of the complainant that because of fear and terror of the accused, no independent witness from the market, which was open at the time of incident, including the betel shop owner Chaurasia, came to depose against them. The trial Court was of the opinion that if the independent witnesses were produced, the case would have been naturally established as the incident alleged to have taken place in front of Chaurasia Betal Shop in the busy market, and the true prosecution story would have emerged. 10. The trial Court also did not find sufficient evidence to believe that there was a serious enmity between the complainant and the accused. Accused, Anjani Singh, and he were the accused in murder case of Ram Lautan Singh. 10. The trial Court also did not find sufficient evidence to believe that there was a serious enmity between the complainant and the accused. Accused, Anjani Singh, and he were the accused in murder case of Ram Lautan Singh. It was also said that in murder case of Ram Lautan Singh, the complainant, his father and brother were accused, and accused, Anjani Singh was a pairokar. Accused, Anjani Singh opposed his selection of Block Development Committee. However, the trial Court was of the opinion that the enmity was not so much serious that the accused would have tried to kill the victim. The trial Court, after considering the statements of PW-1, concluded that the FIR was ante-timed. The trial Court further concluded that PW-1 was not reliable. PW-3 was an interested and a chance witness. Statement of PW-3 and the medical report, Exhibit Ka-3, were doubtful. No blood was found at the place of incident, though according to victim, he remained there for 5-6 minutes, and, thereafter, he went to his nearby house and remained there for 10-15 minutes, and thereafter he went to the police station, which is 12-13 kilometers away from Garhwara. The clothes, which could have been worn by the victim at the time of alleged incident, were not produced. The FIR was ante-timed. The writer of the FIR was not produced. The trial Court did not believe the enmity of the magnitude which could have been the reason for the accused to make an attempt on the life of the complainant, PW-1. In view thereof, the trial Court, after examining the evidence in detail, has acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 307/506 IPC vide the impugned judgment and order. 11. Heard Mr. Sushil Kumar Sinch, learned counsel representing the revisionist, Mr. Shailendra Tripathi, learned Additional Government Advocate, representing respondent no. 1-State as well as Mr. Ishan Baghel, learned counsel representing respondent nos. 2 & 3. 12. Mr. Sushil Kumar Singh, counsel for the revisionist, has submitted that the trial Court has erred in disbelieving the testimony of the injured witness. He has argued that injuries caused to the victim could not have been self-inflicted. He has further argued that whole approach of the trial Court, in disbelieving the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3, is incorrect. 12. Mr. Sushil Kumar Singh, counsel for the revisionist, has submitted that the trial Court has erred in disbelieving the testimony of the injured witness. He has argued that injuries caused to the victim could not have been self-inflicted. He has further argued that whole approach of the trial Court, in disbelieving the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3, is incorrect. The impugned judgment and order suffers from gross illegality, which has resulted in miscarriage of justice and, therefore, this Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397/401 CrPC, should set-aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial Court, and remit the matter back to the trial Court for trial afresh. 13. Per contra, Mr. Ishan Baghel, counsel for accused-respondent nos. 2 and 3 has submitted that the trial Court has correctly analyzed the evidence, and has come to correct conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. He has further submitted that the impugned judgment and order has been passed by the trial Court after analyzing the evidence in detail, which is not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397/401 CrPC. He has further submitted that the view taken by the trial Court is not an impossible view and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal, and he has prayed for dismissal of the revision. 14. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, including the learned Additional Government Advocate, representing respondent-State, and perused the lower court record, including the evidence led by the prosecution in support of its case. 15. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 13.06.1997 at 8.00 a.m. at Chaurasia Betal shop situated at Garhwara tri-junction. The owner of the shop was not examined, who, according to PW-1, was present. No independent witness from market was examined, though the complainant had specifically said that the market got opened at that time, and many persons were present there when the incident took place. No evidence was brought-forth to establish the previous enmity between the complainant and the accused. The incident was alleged to have taken place at 8.00 a.m., however, the FIR was registered at 9.05 a.m. at the police Station, which is around 12-13 kilometers away. No evidence was brought-forth to establish the previous enmity between the complainant and the accused. The incident was alleged to have taken place at 8.00 a.m., however, the FIR was registered at 9.05 a.m. at the police Station, which is around 12-13 kilometers away. The FIR was scribed by Lalai singh, but he was not examined. The trial Court has correctly come to the conclusion that the FIR was ante-timed inasmuch as from the statement of PW-1 himself, it would have been impossible for him to travel and lodge FIR at 9.05 a.m. According to him, he remained at the place of incident for 5-6 minutes, and, thereafter, he want to nearby house and remained there for 10-15 minutes, and, thereafter, he went to the Police Station Antu to lodge the FIR. PW-1 alleged that both the accused fired at him, but he did not mention specifically, which fire hit him or both fires, caused by the accused, hit him. 16. Medical examination of the victim was conducted on the same day at 9.45 a.m. at Primary Health Center, Sandwa Chandrika. Injury report, Exhibit Ka-2, does not mention crime number or G.D. number. In the injury report, the following injuries were noticed:- i) Firearm wound (multiple) in an area of 9cm x 8.5cm on the right side of face of sizes in. 2cm x. 2cm. Advised X-ray; ii) Multiple firearm wounds in an area of 15cm x 14cm on the right back, 2cm below shoulder in sizes. 3cm x. 2cm. Depth cannot be ascertained. Advised X-ray; iii) Multiple firearm wounds in an area of 6cm x 4cm on the back of right hand. Depth cannot be ascertained. Advised X-ray; iv) Multiple firearm wounds in an area of 6cm x 5cm on the upper part of the back just below cervical prominence. Depth cannot be ascertained. Advised X-ray; v) Multiple firearm wounds in an area of 8cm x 4.5 cm on the posterior part of head and right ear. Advised X-ray. Depth cannot be ascertained; and vi) Firearm wound. 2cm x. 2cm on the on the left scapula, 4.5cm below the cervical prominence. Depth cannot be ascertained. Advised X-ray. 17. It is relevant to mention here that the injury report does not mention the FIR number. Even, the letter, which was sent along with the victim for his medical examination, did not mention the FIR number. 2cm x. 2cm on the on the left scapula, 4.5cm below the cervical prominence. Depth cannot be ascertained. Advised X-ray. 17. It is relevant to mention here that the injury report does not mention the FIR number. Even, the letter, which was sent along with the victim for his medical examination, did not mention the FIR number. The trial Court, therefore, found that the injury report was suspicious. The trial Court did not believe the statement of PW-3, who was alleged eye-witness. There were glaring contradictions in statement of PW-1, therefore, the trial Court concluded that the medical/injury report prepared of PW-1 was suspicious as it did not explain point of entry of bullet, abrasion or point of exit. The trial Court has further held that the injury report does not mention that the injuries could have been caused by some firearm. 18. It is well settled that the scope of revision under Section 401 CrPC, against the judgment of acquittal, is not to reappreciate the evidence on record, and come to a different conclusion than arrived at by the trial Court on a revision preferred by the informant. The High Court should not interfere with the order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction against the order of acquittal, at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction, and it does not exercise the appellate jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction has wider scope to consider the question of fact and law and to convert an order of acquittal into order of conviction. 19. It is relevant to mention here that the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad alias B.P. Singh and others Vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another, (2002) 6 SCC 650 has specified the scope of the revision under Section 401 CrPC against the judgment of acquittal. Paragraphs, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Bindeshwari Prasad alias B.P. Singh and others Vs. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another's case (supra) are extracted herein below:- 12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the informant under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional court, prohibiting it from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a retrial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 : 1951 Cri. LJ 510], K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963) 1 Cri. LJ 8], Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 : 1973 SCC (Cri.) 903],Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu, (1975) 4 SCC 477 : 1975 SCC (Cri.) 543: AIR 1975 SC 1854 ] and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 : 1968 Cri. LJ 665].) 13. LJ 8], Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, (1973) 2 SCC 583 : 1973 SCC (Cri.) 903],Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu, (1975) 4 SCC 477 : 1975 SCC (Cri.) 543: AIR 1975 SC 1854 ] and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 : 1968 Cri. LJ 665].) 13. The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. 14. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial court took the opposite view. This Court has repeatedly observed that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a retrial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the court exercising revisional jurisdiction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a retrial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the court exercising revisional jurisdiction. We, therefore, find no justification for the impugned order of the High Court ordering retrial of the appellants. 15. The High Court has noticed the fact that the State had preferred an appeal against the acquittal of the appellants. That appeal was dismissed by the High Court on the ground of limitation. In principle that makes no difference, because the dismissal of the appeal even on the ground of limitation is a dismissal for all purposes. As observed earlier, the jurisdiction of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is much wider than the jurisdiction of the revisional court exercising jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party. All grounds that may be urged in support of the revision petition may be urged in the appeal, but not vice versa. The dismissal of an appeal preferred by the State against the order of acquittal puts a seal of finality on the judgment of the trial court. In such a case it may not be a proper exercise of discretion to exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the order of acquittal at the instance of a private party. Exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such a case may give rise to an incongruous situation where an accused tried and acquitted of an offence, and the order of acquittal upheld in appeal by its dismissal, may have to face a second trial for the same offence of which he was acquitted. 16. For these reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. 20. It is well established that the scope of revision, against an order of acquittal, is limited only to where the material evidence has been overlooked by the trial Court, and the judgment of acquittal has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court in Suryakant Dadasaheb Bitale Vs. Dilip Bajrang Kale and another (2014) 13 SCC 496 in paras 11 and 12 has held as under:- 11. The Supreme Court in Suryakant Dadasaheb Bitale Vs. Dilip Bajrang Kale and another (2014) 13 SCC 496 in paras 11 and 12 has held as under:- 11. The scope of revisional jurisdiction was considered by this Court in K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR 1962 SC 1788 : (1963) 1 Cri. LJ 8] and held as follows: (AIR p. 1789) "Where the appeal court wrongly ruled out evidence which was admissible, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in revision, so that the evidence may be reappraised after taking into account the evidence which was wrongly ruled out as inadmissible. But the High Court should confine itself only to the admissibility of the evidence and should not go further and appraise the evidence also…." 12. In Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram (1973) 2 SCC 583 : 1973 SCC (Cri.) 903: AIR 1973 SC 2145 ], this Court held that where the material evidence have been overlooked by the trial court or Sessions Court, the High Court in revisional jurisdiction can interfere with the finding of acquittal." 21. If the trial Court, on evaluation of evidence of eye-witnesses, has found the statement of victim improbable and unreliable and the view taken by the trial Court is not an impossible view, this Court is not required to interfere with the order of acquittal. 22. Considering the evidence on record, I am of the view that the view of the trial Court is not perverse or against the law or against the evidence on record. In view thereof, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the order of acquittal, in exercise of original jurisdiction under Section 397/401 CrPC. Hence, this revision is dismissed.