ORDER : 1. This writ petition is filed seeking to set aside the Award, dated 04.04.2012, passed in I.D. No. 42 of 2011, by virtue of which the labour court dismissed the claim petition, which was filed by the petitioner questioning the removal order passed by the respondent therein vide proceedings No. M1/2(3)/2007-PLMR, dated 08.06.2007. 2. The petitioner was appointed as Driver in the respondent-Corporation in the year 1997. On 26.01.2007, the bus on which the petitioner was going as a Driver met with an accident, departmental action was initiated by framing two charges, which reads as follows: “Charges: (1) For having driven the Hi-Tech vehicle bearing No. AP11Z-3354 on 26.01.2007 with lack of anticipation and rash and negligent manner on route Hyderabad-Palamaner near Sugalimitta resulting which the Service Bus hit an auto rickshaw bearing No. AP7X0874 and one occupant of the above auto rickshaw by name Sri M. Narasimhulu was got severe injuries and died besides damages caused to a tune of Rs.2390/- to our Hi Tech vehicle as well as to the Auto Rickshaw which constitutes misconduct under Reg.28(ix)(a) of APSRTC Employees (conduct) Reg.1963. (2) For having failed to inform about the fatal accident caused by you on 26.01.2007 to vehicle No. AP 11Z 3354 either to the depot authorities or to the concerned police authorities and given scope for detention of our Hi-tech vehicle by the police authorities Punganur from 29.01.2007 by 07:00 hours, upto 14:00 hours., of 31.01.2007 and caused loss of revenues to the Corporation which constitutes misconduct under Reg.28(xxii) of APSRTC Employees (Conduct) Reg.1963.” 3. After due enquiry, the order of removal was passed against the petitioner. Questioning the same, the petitioner approached the labour court and the labour court dismissed the claim petition upholding the enquiry officer’s report. The present writ petition is filed assailing the said award on the ground that the criminal case booked against the petitioner in respect of the said accident has recorded an honourable acquittal. Hence, the disciplinary action taken in pursuance of the enquiry report in respect of the charges based on the same set of facts cannot be sustained. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. Hence, the disciplinary action taken in pursuance of the enquiry report in respect of the charges based on the same set of facts cannot be sustained. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. The charges framed against the petitioner are not only for causing the accident due to which one M. Narsimhulu sustained severe injuries and died, but also for the damages caused to the Hitech vehicle as well as the Auto rickshaw. The 2nd charge is for not informing about the fatal accident caused by the petitioner either to the depot authorities or to the concerned police authorities for giving scope for the detention of hi-tech vehicles to the police authorities and thereby causing loss of revenue to the Corporation. 6. The questions that fall for consideration are: (A) Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts. (B) Whether the acquittal in the criminal case would automatically entitle the petitioner for discharge from the departmental proceedings or for setting aside the findings of the enquiry officer. (C) Whether the punishment imposed by the enquiry officer, which was confirmed by the labour court, is shakingly disproportionate. 7. The first charge to some extent overlaps the charges in the criminal case. The charge in the criminal case is under Section 304-A IPC, which is for causing the death of a person by doing any rash and negligent act, whereas the charges in the departmental proceedings, as already observed, are not alone for causing of the death of a person. By the date of the judgment in the criminal case, the departmental proceedings against the petitioner have concluded and the punishment of removal from service was imposed. The criminal court has to record the acquittal as no evidence came forth with regard to the rash and negligent act of the petitioner. But the judgment reflects that PW1, who was the son of the deceased, though did not speak about the rash and negligent act of the petitioner, in unmistakable terms deposed about the APSRTC Bus being involved in the accident and hitting the auto for which his father sustained injuries. A mere hit by the bus may not by itself be considered as a rash and negligent act unless the other circumstances under which the hit happened are brought forth. A mere hit by the bus may not by itself be considered as a rash and negligent act unless the other circumstances under which the hit happened are brought forth. Due to the failure of PW1 to bring forth the said circumstances and due to the other witnesses not stating anything with regard to the rash and negligent driving of the petitioner, the criminal court recorded the acquittal of the petitioner. But the fact, which stands to be proved beyond doubt, is the involvement of the vehicle on which the petitioner was going as a driver in the accident. The damages, as assessed, also occurred to the vehicle. Hence, the 2nd part of the first charge framed for disciplinary proceedings, as rightly observed, stood proved. 8. The 2nd charge is that the petitioner did not inform the depot authorities about the involvement of the vehicle in the accident was also proved by the enquiry. There is no argument aimed at the propriety of the enquiry. 9. Hence, on the basis of the above facts, it can be said that the departmental enquiry and the criminal case are not based on totally the same set of facts. 10. The first ruling relied upon by the petitioner’s counsel reported in G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 deals with a situation where departmental enquiry and criminal proceedings are based on same set of facts. Hence, it cannot be applied to the facts of this case. The second ruling reported in S. Bhaskar Reddy vs. Supt. of Police, (2015) 2 SCC 365 is also to the same effect. The third ruling is rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, reported in Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. V. Yellaiah, 2013 SCC Online AP 532 which is also rendered on the facts that the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal case are based on the same set of facts. 11. Hence, the above rulings do not help the petitioner in drawing support to his contention that the acquittal in the criminal case would entitle him for discharge in the departmental proceedings. 12. However, this court has ample powers to interfere with the punishment if it is found to be shakingly disproportionate to the charges. 11. Hence, the above rulings do not help the petitioner in drawing support to his contention that the acquittal in the criminal case would entitle him for discharge in the departmental proceedings. 12. However, this court has ample powers to interfere with the punishment if it is found to be shakingly disproportionate to the charges. Since the criminal case ended in acquittal, the first part of the first charge, can be held as not proved and hence, the findings of the enquiry officer to that extent can be set aside. Then the facts, with the help of which punishment can be awarded would be the damage to the vehicle and the suppression of the involvement of the vehicle in the accident by the petitioner. 13. In G.M. Tank’s ruling (supra), the Supreme Court, by considering the acquittal in the criminal case, has thought it fit to order reinstatement of the petitioner with effect from the date of the judgment in the criminal case, but since the petitioner therein retired, the court set aside the order of dismissal but without backwages and held that the petitioner would be entitled for pension. In S. Bhaskar Reddy’s ruling (supra), while setting aside the order of dismissal, the court held that the respondents need not reinstate the petitioners into service, but in its place an order to compulsorily retire the petitioners from services and pay the pensionary benefits including the arrears treating them as compulsorily retired form their service with effect from the date of judgment and order passed in the criminal case, was passed. 14. In the light of the punishments imposed that were awarded by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid rulings, the punishment of removal of the petitioner in this case can be considered as shakingly disproportionate. This court is of the opinion that ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is directed to be reinstated into service with continuity of service and other attendant benefits, but without back wages. 15. With the above observations, the writ petition is allowed and the Award, dated 04.04.2012, passed in I.D. No. 42 of 2011, by the 1st respondent is hereby set aside. 16. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.