JUDGMENT Debangsu Basak, J. - In a suit for recovery of price of goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff seeks an order of judgment on admission and order of attachment before judgment and injunction. 2. Learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff submits that, pursuant to the order placed by the defendant, the plaintiff from time to time sold and delivered raw jute to the defendant. The plaintiff raised invoices upon the defendant. A sum in excess of Rs. 24,41,932/- remains due and payable by the defendant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff demanded payment from the defendant. By letter dated March 12, 2011, the defendant acknowledged its liability to the plaintiff. However, despite such acknowledgement the defendant did not pay. He submits that, thereafter two notices for demand were issued. In response thereto, the defendant did not dispute the liability. The defendant never undertook the exercise of settlement of accounts which the defendant proposed by its letter dated March 12, 2011. Thereafter, according to him, the claim of the plaintiff stands admitted. 3. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, the plaintiff became aware that the defendant is trying to dispose of all properties belonging to the defendant. Consequently, the plaintiff seeks an order of attachment before judgment and order of injunction in order to protect the eventual decree that may be passed in the suit. In support of the contention that, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of attachment before judgment and injunction, learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff relies upon (2008) 2 SCC 724 ( Rajendran & Ors. Shankar Sundaram & Ors.), (2010) 2 CHN (Cal) 203 (Abheya Realtors Pvt. Ltd. vs. SSIPL Retail Ltd. & Anr.) and (2015) 4 CHN 509 (Sourav Ganguly vs. Mahuaa Media Pvt. Ltd.). Learned advocate appearing for the defendant submits that, the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The goods were allegedly sold and delivered in the year 2008-09. The so-called acknowledgement of liability dated March 12, 2011 was issued by a person who was no longer in the employment of defendant on such date. Therefore, the so called acknowledgement of liability by the defendant as on March 12, 2011 is no acknowledgement in the eye of law. Consequently, if the writing dated March 12, 2011 is discounted, then claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation since the suit was filed in 2014. 4. Therefore, the so called acknowledgement of liability by the defendant as on March 12, 2011 is no acknowledgement in the eye of law. Consequently, if the writing dated March 12, 2011 is discounted, then claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation since the suit was filed in 2014. 4. Referring to the letter dated March 12, 2011, learned advocate appearing for the defendant submits that, the same cannot be construed to be an unconditional acknowledgement of liability. He submits that, such letter was written by a person who was not in the employment of the defendant on the date of which such letter was issued. Assuming that the letter was issued at the behest of the defendant, then also, the same was in response to the letter dated September 22, 2010 of the plaintiff. The letter dated September 22, 2010 of the plaintiff contains an accounts statement prepared by the plaintiff. Such account statement itself establishes there were quality disputes if not anything else with regard to the goods claimed to be sold and delivered to the plaintiff. He refers to the mill receipts issued by the defendant. He submits that, there are quality and quantity disputes stated in the mill receipts on the basis of which the plaintiff is raising the present claim. Such disputes are endorsed on the mill receipts themselves. Therefore, without quantifying the value of the quality and quantity disputes as endorsed in the mill receipts, the claim of the plaintiff cannot be ascertained. The writing dated March 12, 2011 cannot be construed to mean an unconditional acknowledgement of liability on the part of the defendant. Moreover, the last sentence of such letter dated March 12, 2011 states that, the confirmation of liability was on the basis of mill receipts issued by our mills subject to deduction of any quality claim amount. 5. Relying upon AIR 1951 Cal 156 (Premraj Mundra vs. Md. Maneck Gazi & Ors.), AIR 2009 Cal 260 (Sunil Kakrania & Ors. vs. M/s. Saltee Infrastructure Ltd. & Anr.), (2008) 2 SCC 302 (Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. & Anr. Vs. Solanki Traders) and (2010) 3 Cal LT 268 (Kohinoor Steel Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pravesh Chandra Kapoor) learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff submits that, the plaintiff is not entitled to an order of attachment before judgment as well as an order of injunction as prayed for. & Process Engg. Co. & Anr. Vs. Solanki Traders) and (2010) 3 Cal LT 268 (Kohinoor Steel Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pravesh Chandra Kapoor) learned advocate appearing for the plaintiff submits that, the plaintiff is not entitled to an order of attachment before judgment as well as an order of injunction as prayed for. He submits that, the present application was made five years from the date of filing of the suit. The application contains only bald allegations that the defendant is trying to sell an immovable property. The application does not contain any instance of a creditor being defrauded by the defendant. On the basis of such bald statements he submits that, the reliefs as sought for by the plaintiff should not be granted. Moreover, there is unexplained delay on the part of the plaintiff in applying for the relief in the present application. 6. Learned advocate appearing for the defendant on instructions submits that, the defendant will waive the service of the Writ of Summons. The defendant will file written statement within two weeks from date in the event the Court is pleased not to pass any decree in favour of the plaintiff. 7. The suit is for price of goods sold and delivered. The suit was filed in 2014. The present application was filed on September 5, 2019. There are three-fold prayers in the application. The first prayer relates to judgment on admission. The second prayer is for an order of attachment before judgment and the third prayer is for injunction. So far as the prayer for attachment on admission is concerned, the plaintiff relies upon the letter dated March 12, 2011 issued by the defendant in respect of the claim that the defendant acknowledged its liability unconditionally to the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to a decree on judgment on admission. 8. The letter dated March 12, 2011 is in response to a letter dated September 22, 2010 issued by the plaintiff to the defendant. In its letter dated September 22, 2010, the plaintiff claims that, a sum of Rs. 24,41,932.20 was due and payable by the defendant as on August 31, 2011 in terms of the books of account maintained by the plaintiff excluding the amount of delayed payment to be received by the plaintiff. Along with such letter, details of outstanding bill amount was enclosed. 24,41,932.20 was due and payable by the defendant as on August 31, 2011 in terms of the books of account maintained by the plaintiff excluding the amount of delayed payment to be received by the plaintiff. Along with such letter, details of outstanding bill amount was enclosed. The enclosed statement to the letter dated September 22, 2010 of the plaintiff, speaks of eight bills. The bills of the plaintiff are from December 10, 2008 to April 2, 2009. The suit being filed in 2014, an issue of limitation arises on the strength of the claim of the plaintiff as appearing in such statement. Apart from the issue of limitation such statement contains quantum which the plaintiff acknowledges that the defendant should received set off from the bill amount on account of short weight and claim. The mill receipts are disclosed in the affidavit in reply. The mill receipts contain endorsements with regard to quality and quantity claim. The quantum of quality and quantity claim are yet to be agreed to by the parties. In absence of such agreement such claims require adjudication by the Court. The statement enclosed to the letter dated September 22, 2010 quantifying the value of the quality and quantity disputes as appearing in the mill receipts are unilateral acts of the plaintiff. Moreover, all the eight mill receipts contains endorsement of some kind of dispute, either quality or quantity or both. Therefore, there is an issue as to the quantum that the defendant is entitled to set off on account of quality and quantity claim in respect of the goods claimed to be sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant. Such issue require adjudication on trial. Such issue cannot be settled on the affidavit evidence in this application. 9. The letter dated March 12, 2011 which the plaintiff claims to be an unconditional acknowledgement of liability of the defendant, in my view, cannot be construed to be so. The last sentence of such letter states that the liability of the plaintiff is acknowledged subject to deduction of any quality claim that the defendant has. As noted above, the parties are yet to agree as to the quality and quantity claim that the defendant is entitled to in respect of the subject bills of the plaintiff. Therefore, such an issue requires decision by the Court. 10. As noted above, the parties are yet to agree as to the quality and quantity claim that the defendant is entitled to in respect of the subject bills of the plaintiff. Therefore, such an issue requires decision by the Court. 10. There is another aspect to the claim of the plaintiff. As noted above, taking the dates of the bill and considering that the parties maintained running, current and continuous account in respect of the transaction had in between them, the last date of the bill is April 2, 2009. The suit was filed in 2014. Therefore, there is an issue of limitation which is required to be considered by the Court. This limitation is sought to be saved by the letter dated March 12, 2011. Apart from claiming that the letter dated March 12, 2011 does not contain an unconditional acknowledgement of liability, the defendant contends that, the author of such letter was no longer in the employment of the plaintiff on March 12, 2011. Such contention is an issue of fact. In the event, the defendant is successful in establishing such fact on trial, then the plaintiff will not be entitled to any relief in the suit as its claim would be barred by limitation. 11. In such circumstances, it would be inappropriate to pass a decree on judgment upon admission as prayed for by the plaintiff. 12. So far as other reliefs of order of attachment before judgment and injunction are concerned, the parties rely upon several authorities. In Premraj Mundra (supra) , while considering an application under Order XXXVIII Rules 5 and 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , the Court laid down guiding principles governing such provision. Paragraph 18 thereof is as follows : 18. From a perusal of all the authorities, I think that the following guiding principles can be deduced: (1) That an order under O.38, Rr.5 & 6, can only be issued, if circumstances exist as are stated therein. (2) Whether such circumstances exist is a question of fact that must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. (3) That the Court would not be justified in issuing an order for attachment before judgment, or for security, merely because it thinks that no harm would be done thereby or that the defts. would not be prejudiced. (2) Whether such circumstances exist is a question of fact that must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. (3) That the Court would not be justified in issuing an order for attachment before judgment, or for security, merely because it thinks that no harm would be done thereby or that the defts. would not be prejudiced. (4) That the affidavits in support of the contentions of the applicant, must not be vague, & must be properly verified. Where it is affirmed true to knowledge or information or belief, it must be stated as to which portion is true to knowledge, the source of information should be disclosed & the grounds for belief should be stated. (5) That a mere allegation that the deft, was selling off & his properties is not sufficient. Particulars must be stated. (6) There is no rule that transactions before suit cannot be taken into consideration, but the object of attachment before judgment must be to prevent future transfer or alienation. (7) Where only a small portion of the property belonging to the deft, is being disposed of, no inference can be drawn in the absence of other circumstances that the alienation is necessarily to defraud or delay the pltfs. claim. (8) That the mere fact of transfer is not enough, since nobody can be prevented from dealing with his properties simply of cause a suit has been filed: There must be additional circumstances to show that the transfer is with an intention to delay or defeat the pltf.s claim. It is open to the Court to look to the conduct of the parties immediately before suit, & to examine the surrounding circumstances, to draw an inference as to whether the deft. is about to dispose of the property, & if so, with what intention. The Court is entitled to consider the nature of the claim & the defence put forward. (9) The fact that the deft, is in insolvent circumstances or in acute financial embarrassment, is a relevant circumstance, but not by itself Sufficient. (10) That in the case of running businesses, the strictest caution is necessary & the mere fact that a business has been closed, or that its turnover has diminished, is not enough. (9) The fact that the deft, is in insolvent circumstances or in acute financial embarrassment, is a relevant circumstance, but not by itself Sufficient. (10) That in the case of running businesses, the strictest caution is necessary & the mere fact that a business has been closed, or that its turnover has diminished, is not enough. (11) Where however the deft, starts disposing of his properties one by one, immediately upon getting a notice of the pltf.s claim, &/or where he has transferred the major portion of his properties shortly prior to the institution of the suit & was in an embarrassed financial condition, these was grounds from which an inference could be legitimately drawn that the object of the deft. was to delay and defeat the pltfs. claim. (12) Mere removal of properties outside jurisdiction, is not enough, but where the deft, with notice of the pltfs. claim, suddenly begins removal of his properties outside the jurisdiction of the appropriate Court, & without any other satisfactory reason, an adverse inference may be drawn against the deft. Where the removal is to a foreign country, the inference is greatly strengthened. (13) The deft, in a suit is under no liability to take any special care in administering his affairs, simply because, there is a claim pending against him. Mere neglect, or suffering execution by other creditors, is not a sufficient reason for an order under O. 38 or the Code. (14) The sale of properties at a gross undervalue, or benami transfers, are always good indications of an intention to defeat the pltfs. claim. The Court must however be very cautious about the evidence on these points & not rely on vague allegations. Premraj Mundra was considered by the Division Bench in Kohinoor Steel Pvt. Ltd. (supra) . In the facts of that case the Division Bench refused to grant the relief of attachment before judgment as also injunction. The Supreme Court in Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. (supra) while considering the provisions of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is of the following view : 5. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is a drastic and extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking. It should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. The power under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is a drastic and extraordinary power. Such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for the asking. It should be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with the Rule. The purpose of Order 38 Rule 5 is not to convert an unsecured debt into a secured debt. Any attempt by a plaintiff to utilise the provisions of Order 38 Rule 5 as a leverage for coercing the defendant to settle the suit claim should be discouraged. Instances are not wanting where bloated and doubtful claims are realised by unscruplous plaintiffs by obtaining orders of attachment before judgement and forcing the defendants for out-of-court settlements under threat of attachment. 6. A defendant is not debarred from dealing with his property merely because a suit is filed or about to be filed against him. Shifting of business from one premises to another premises or removal of machinery to another premises by itself is not a ground for granting attachment before judgment. A plaintiff should show, prima facie, that his claim is bona fide and valid and also satisfy the court that the defendant is about to remove or dispose of the whole or part of his property, with the intention of obstructing or delaying the execution of any decree that may be passed against him, before power is exercised under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. Courts should also keep in view the principles relating to grant of attachment before judgment. 13. In Sunil Kakrania & Ors. (supra), the Division Bench refused to grant an order of attachment before judgment as also injunction after noticing Premraj Mundra (supra) and Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. (supra). 14. In Abheya Realtors Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Court allowed the first defendant to furnish a bank guarantee to secure claim of the plaintiff. In the facts of that case, the Court found that the agreement between the parties in the suit was not in dispute. The Court found that, the first defendant was liable to pay liquidated damages and the same was quantified in the agreement. The Court also found that the defendant failed to establish that the relevant clause in the agreement provided for liquidated damages is a penalty that would fall foul of the Contract Act. The Court found that, the first defendant was liable to pay liquidated damages and the same was quantified in the agreement. The Court also found that the defendant failed to establish that the relevant clause in the agreement provided for liquidated damages is a penalty that would fall foul of the Contract Act. The Court found that it was equitable in the facts and circumstances of that case to require the first defendant to furnish a bank guarantee to secure the claim, without prejudice to its rights and contentions. 15. In Sourav Ganguly (supra) the Court considered an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 . On the facts of the case, the Court found that, there was a justifiable apprehension on the part of the petitioner before the Court that, the petitioner will be entitled to realize the money upon the arbitral reference to be concluded and that, the respondent was involved circumstances. In the facts of that case, the Court directed continuance of the subsisting order of injunction till the respondent therein was able to deposit a sum of Rs. 20 crore in aid of the claim of the petitioner. 16. In Rejendran And Others (supra) the Supreme Court, while considering an application under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, found in the facts of that case that, the direction for furnishing security passed by the High Court was correct. The Supreme Court found in that of the case that, a cheque was issued in the name of the firm, the appellants before the Supreme Court were partners of such firm. A pronote was executed by a partner of the firm. Under the Partnership Act, 1932, prima facie, the plaintiff could enforce his claim not only as against the firm but also as against its partners. In such circumstances, the claim of the plaintiff being more or less admitted, the order of attachment before judgment was passed. 17. In the three authorities as noted above where the Court granted relief to the plaintiff in the nature of Order XXXVIII Rules 5 and 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the claims were assessed at the prima facie level and upon the Court finding that, there was overwhelming chances of success of the plaintiff, proceeded to grant such relief to the plaintiff. Apart from the chance of success of the plaintiff, the Court took into account the conduct of the defendant and the likelihood of the eventual decree being not satisfied by the defendant. An element of certainty of success of the claims of the plaintiff is required for the Court to exercise its discretion in granting a relief under Order XXXVIII Rules 5 and 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in favour of the plaintiff. 18. In the facts of the present case, the claim for judgment on admission failed. There is a likelihood of the entire claim of the plaintiff failing in the event the defendant is able to substantiate that, the author of the letter dated March 12, 2011 was no longer in the employment of the defendant when such letter was written. The present application was filed five years after the filing of the suit. There is nothing on record to suggest that, the defendant subsequent to the suit being filed embarked upon a course of conduct which tantamount to defrauding the creditors. 19. In the facts of the present case, therefore, in my view, relief of attachment before judgment need not be passed. 20. So far the prayer for injunction is concerned, I do not find the balance of convenience and inconvenience to be in favour of the plaintiff for a grant of such order, in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Such prayer is also refused. 21. The defendant volunteers and waives the service of the writ of summons in the suit. The defendant volunteers to file written statement within two weeks from date. 22. In such circumstances, it is placed on record that, the writ of summons of suit stands waived by the defendant. The defendant will file written statement within two weeks from date. There will be cross order for discovery of documents within a fortnight thereafter. Affidavit as to documents be filed within that period. Inspection forthwith thereafter. The plaintiff is at liberty to prepare the Judges Brief of Documents. Old GA No. 2080 of 2019 newly numbered as GA No. 2 of 2019 in CS No. 61 of 2014 is disposed of without any order as to costs.