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2020 DIGILAW 165 (JHR)

Barin Murmu, son of Baneshwar Murmu v. State of Jharkhand

2020-01-27

RATNAKER BHENGRA, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

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ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The sole appellant has faced the trial on the charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for committing murder of Naresh Murmu. In Sessions Case No. 36 of 1996, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced to R.I for life under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The informant of this case is son of the deceased. On the basis of his fardbeyan which was recorded on 17.06.1995 at 7:00 a.m at village-Asangura, Bindapthar P.S. Case No. 97 of 1995 has been lodged against unknown. After the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted against the appellant and he has faced the trial on the above charge. During the trial the prosecution has examined nine witnesses; the informant is P.W.7. 3. In his fardbeyan the informant has stated that in the night of 16.06.1995 at about 10:00 p.m. he was sleeping in his courtyard. He woke-up on hearing sound of gurgling and when he came out he has seen head of his father severed and blood was oozing out from his neck. On his raising hulla his family members and villagers came there. The villagers were talking amongst themselves that they have seen few persons fleeing away towards southern side. He has raised an apprehension that due to a land dispute with some villagers his father has been killed. The informant has been examined as P.W.7. He has deposed in the court that when he came out from the courtyard he has seen three persons coming out from the room of his father, Barin Murmu was one amongst them. He has spoken about the villagers arriving there and their saying that they have seen Barin Murmu fleeing away. The wife of the informant has been examined as P.W.4. In her examination-in-Chief she has stated that in the night of 16.06.1995 she was sleeping in the courtyard. On hearing hulla she came out and saw that the appellant has severed neck of her father-in-law. However, in the same breathe she has stated that by the time she had gone inside the room the person who has killed her father-in-law had fled away. She has also admitted that in her statement before Daroga Ji she has not revealed that she has seen Barin Murmu. 4. P.W.1 and P.W.2 are the co-villagers. P.W. 5 is a relative of the informant and P.W.6 is the inquest witness. She has also admitted that in her statement before Daroga Ji she has not revealed that she has seen Barin Murmu. 4. P.W.1 and P.W.2 are the co-villagers. P.W. 5 is a relative of the informant and P.W.6 is the inquest witness. They are formal witnesses and they have not stated anything significant about the occurrence. P.W.3 is also a co-villager but he has been tendered by the prosecution for cross-examination. 5. Admittedly, the case set-up by the prosecution against the appellant is based on circumstantial evidence. All the material prosecution witnesses except the informant have stated that they have seen the appellant fleeing away outside the house of the informant; the informant has stated that he has seen three persons coming out from the room of his father and one amongst them was the appellant. 6. The prosecution has sought to prove the charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant through the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.4, P.W.6 and P.W.7 which according to the prosecution is corroborated by the medical evidence. 7. On 17.06.1995, Dr. Balram Prasad Gupta, who has conducted the post-mortem examination, has found one incised wound; size 5”x 3”x 3”, over left side of neck of Naresh Murmu. The major vessel of the left side of neck and 4th cervical vertebra and spinal cord were deeply cut and filled with blood. According to the doctor, the injury was ante-mortem in nature and caused by sharp heavy cutting weapon. 8. Now the question is whether on such evidence a charge of murder can be held proved against the appellant. 9. The circumstances that immediately after the occurrence the appellant has been found running outside the house of the appellant and it has also come in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that at that time he was carrying a tangi raise grave suspicion on complicity of the appellant in the crime and if these circumstances are corroborated by other incriminating circumstances which complete the chain of circumstances the appellant can be held guilty on the charge of murder. However, in the present case the only circumstance which has been brought against the appellant is that in the night of 16.06.1995 he has been found fleeing away outside the house of the appellant. 10. In a series of decisions – presently we will refer to “Padala Veera Reddy Vs. However, in the present case the only circumstance which has been brought against the appellant is that in the night of 16.06.1995 he has been found fleeing away outside the house of the appellant. 10. In a series of decisions – presently we will refer to “Padala Veera Reddy Vs. State of A.P.” reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 – the Supreme Court has held that when a case rests on circumstantial evidence it must satisfy the following tests : (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established, (ii) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused, (iii) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else, and (iv) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 11. In the court, P.W.1 has stated that in the night of 16.06.1995 he has seen the appellant fleeing away. At that time he was sleeping in kulhi (lane) and on hearing sound of gurgling he had gone there and seen the appellant. He has, however, admitted that he has no knowledge about the occurrence and he has not seen the appellant committing murder of Naresh Murmu. P.W.2 has stated that when he reached the house of the informant by that time several villagers had arrived there and they were talking that the appellant has killed Naresh Murmu. In his cross-examination he has admitted that about 20-30 villagers had assembled there, but none of the villagers has come forward to depose that he has seen the appellant committing the crime and, in fact, this is not the case of the prosecution also. P.W.5 has also stated that he has not seen the appellant committing the crime. In his cross-examination he has stated that he has seen the appellant from back side. He has also stated that regarding the appellant fleeing away he did not inform the villagers. P.W.5 has also stated that he has not seen the appellant committing the crime. In his cross-examination he has stated that he has seen the appellant from back side. He has also stated that regarding the appellant fleeing away he did not inform the villagers. During cross-examination the investigating officer has stated that the prosecution witnesses have revealed name of the appellant two days after registration of the First Information Report. The informant has sought to justify revealing name of the appellant after two days on the ground that at the time when his fardbeyan was recorded by the police he was in a state of shock, but, in respect of others in our opinion an inference cannot be drawn that all other prosecution witnesses were also in the state of shock. The defence set-up by the appellant is that the informant was nurturing a doubt that he had elicit relationship with his wife and that is the reason he has been falsely implicated in this case. In his examination-in-chief the informant has stated that the appellant had evil eyes on his wife and when he has objected to his misconduct the appellant had assaulted him. In his cross-examination he has admitted that the appellant and his wife were on talking terms and the appellant used to tease his wife in his house. Of course his wife has denied the suggestion that she had an affair with the appellant, but the investigating officer has deposed in the court that wife of the informant had stated before him that in past she had an affair with the appellant. The investigating officer has also stated that wife of the informant did not stated before him that she has seen the appellant fleeing away from her house. 12. In the above state of evidence, we find that the chain of circumstances is not complete and evidence of the prosecution witnesses wherein they have stated in the court that they have seen the appellant fleeing away from/outside the house of the informant in the night of 16.06.1995 would amount to major contradiction. 12. In the above state of evidence, we find that the chain of circumstances is not complete and evidence of the prosecution witnesses wherein they have stated in the court that they have seen the appellant fleeing away from/outside the house of the informant in the night of 16.06.1995 would amount to major contradiction. They have not revealed name of the appellant in their statement before the police at the first instance the effect of which would be that their evidence in the court would be considered as improvements which, however, cannot be reconciled or considered as explanation or elaboration of their previous statement and, therefore, that part of their testimony must be excluded from consideration and when it is done, we find that except suspicion there is nothing against the appellant on the basis of which he cannot be convicted for the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 13. Therefore, we hold that the prosecution has failed to establish the charge under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant. 14. The appellant is acquitted of the criminal charge framed against him in Sessions Case No. 36 of 1996. 15. Accordingly, the appellant, namely, Barin Murmu, who is on bail, shall stand discharged of liability of the bail-bonds furnished by him. 16. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 471 of 2001 is allowed. 17. Let a copy of the judgment be transmitted to the Court concerned through ‘FAX’. 18. Let lower-court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith.