JUDGMENT Suraj Govindaraj, J. - The appellant is before this Court in second appeal being aggrieved by the Judgment and decree passed by the Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Ranebennur in R.A.No.51/2013 dated 14.03.2016 confirming the Judgment and Decree passed by the Principal Civil Judge and I Addl. JMFC Court, Ranebennur in O.S.No.404/2010 dated 01.04.2013. 2. The suit in O.S.No.404/2010 had been filed for partition and separate possession by respondent Nos.1 to 9, against respondent Nos.10 to 21 and the appellant. In the said suit, it was claimed that the suit schedule properties are ancestral joint family properties of the plaintiffs and defendants. 3. One Fakkirayya was the propositus of the family who expired in the year 1937 leaving behind his wife Iramma who died in the year 1968. They had three children namely Gudlayya, Shivayya and Veerayya who had several children. Gudlayya had a wife by name Savitramma and they had children by name Shashidarayya and Vishalakshi. The genealogy as regards Shivayya and Veerayya as also Gudlayya is not in dispute. 4. After the death of the propositus, the properties stood in the name of the elder son Gudlayya, but it was in joint possession and enjoyment of all the parties to the suit. It was alleged that, Shivayya who was working with the Police Department had given a loan to Shashidarayya and on 16.04.1971, he fraudulently got executed a sale deed in respect of item No.1 property of the Schedule B properties. He is also stated to have given a loan to his other brother Veerayya and on 11.11.1974, he got executed a fraudulent sale deed from the said Veerayya. In pursuance of the said sale deeds, the name of Shivayya was entered in the revenue records of item No.1 properly of Schedule B and thereafter his children and the children of his son Shashidarayya were residing in the said property. Subsequent to Shivayya's death, the name of Shashidarayya was entered into the revenue records as the owner of the item No.1 of schedule B property. It was alleged that despite the same, the property continued to be common property of the family and every one had a right, title and interest therein. 5. Subsequent to Shivayya's death, the name of Shashidarayya was entered into the revenue records as the owner of the item No.1 of schedule B property. It was alleged that despite the same, the property continued to be common property of the family and every one had a right, title and interest therein. 5. Shivayya had filed a suit in O.S.No.70/1978, challenging the aforesaid two sale deeds and sought for a declaration that the Schedule B item No.1 property is his absolute property and claimed to be in exclusive possession thereof. The said suit came to be dismissed on the ground that the said sale deed of the year 1971 and 1974 relied upon by the Shivayya had not been proved. As against this, Shivayya preferred R.A.No.45/1989 which came to be dismissed on 07.07.2005 and subsequent regular second appeal in RSA No.1959/2005 also came to be dismissed on 15.02.2008. The same has attained finality. 6. On the suit in O.S.No.404/2010 being filed, the defendant No.6 filed a written statement contending that the property covered under item No.1 of Schedule B property namely CTS No.2115-A of Ranebennur had been purchased by his father Shivayya from his brothers thereby Shivayya had become the absolute owner of the entire item No1 property. Hence, it was contended that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants had any right, title or interest in the said property. The other defendants had filed their separate written statements taking up various other contentions. 7. Insofar as the defendant No.6, who is the present appellant herein is concerned, specific issues were raised at Issue Nos.4 and 5 i.e. as regards whether his father had purchased the property from his brothers and had become the absolute owner and as also whether his father had executed a will bequeathing his 1/3rd share in favour of the defendant No.6. The Trial Court answered both issues in negative and while doing so, it has held that, the suit in O.S.No.70/1978 which had been filed by the defendant No.6's father Shivayya had been dismissed, the regular appeal had also dismissed, so also the second appeal. Hence, neither Shivayya nor defendant No.6 claiming under Shivayya could claim any right, title or interest exclusively in item No.1 of Schedule B property. Hence, neither Shivayya nor defendant No.6 claiming under Shivayya could claim any right, title or interest exclusively in item No.1 of Schedule B property. As regards the Will, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that no such document has been produced and in the absence thereof, the claim of defendant No.6 was unsustainable and rejected. 8. Aggrieved by the same, defendant No.6 filed an first appeal in R.A.No.51/2013 which also came to be dismissed by the Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Ranebennur by way of Judgment dated 14.03.2016. In the said appeal, the first appellate Court again answered the issues as regards the acquisition of the property by defendant No.6's father to be in the negative, so also held that no Will has been produced, the claim of the defendant No.6 that he had been bequeathed the property was not sustainable. 9. It is aggrieved by the said Judgments, that the present second appeal has been filed. While the matter is pending, I.A.No.2/2017 has been filed to bring on record the alleged Will stated to have been executed by the father of the defendant No.6 to contend that the appellant has been bequeathed 1/3rd right of Shivayya in item No.1 of Schedule B property. 10. Sri. V.K.Kalasurmath, learned counsel for the appellant would submit that, there being a Will in existence, the appellant was not in a position to produce the same before the Trial Court, in the sense that the same had been furnished to the Advocate, but the Advocate has failed to produce it. He therefore submits that, the Will ought to be taken in to consideration or in the alternative, the matter may be remanded to the Trial Court for fresh consideration. 11. Sri. Dinesh M. Kulkarni, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1, 3, 4, 5, 8 & 9 would submit that, even if the Will were to be taken to be genuine and in existence, the Will could not confer any title on the appellant for the reason that the appellant's father Shivayya did not have any right, title or interest over the entire property bequeathed to the appellant. Inasmuch as the suit in O.S.No.70/1978 had attained finality and the claim for declaration by Shivayya the father father of the appellant herein had been rejected. Inasmuch as the suit in O.S.No.70/1978 had attained finality and the claim for declaration by Shivayya the father father of the appellant herein had been rejected. Such being the position, when the appellant's father did not have ownership of Item No.1 of Schedule B property, he could not by claiming to be the owner of the said property bequeath his allotted share or part of his share to anybody else. 12. Having heard both the counsels and having gone through the Judgment of the Trial Court and that of the first appellate Court, I am of the considered opinion that, there is no infirmity in the said two Judgments, the father of the appellant having failed to establish his ownership as regards Item No.1 of Schedule B property and his claim having been rejected, he had no authority to execute a Will bequeathing the property to defendant No.6, even if the said Will were to be presumed to be genuine at this Stage. Such being the case, Item No.1 of Schedule B property would continue to be the joint family properties of all the parties and each of them would be entitled to the share as determined by the Trail Court. 13. Sri. V.S.Kalasurmath at this point would submit that, there are two sets of properties i.e. residential properties and agricultural properties and it would not be possible to divide residential properties amongst all the parties and therefore, residential property may be allotted to the share of the appellant. This however cannot be done in these proceedings, the same would have to be worked out in the Final Decree Proceedings. 14. Hence, there being no grounds made out in the second appeal, no substantial questions are required to be framed in the appeal and therefore, the appeal is dismissed at the admission stage itself. 15. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, I.As. if any pending for consideration do not survive.