JUDGMENT : Ravindra V. Ghuge, J. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the parties. 2. Considering that the learned Advocates for the respective sides were prepared to address the Court on the petition itself, the civil application seeking an out of turn for final hearing the petition stands disposed off. 3. The petitioner Municipal Corporation is aggrieved by the judgment and award dated 14.09.2015 delivered by the Industrial Tribunal, Amravati in Reference (IDA) No.2/2008 by which the Industrial Tribunal has answered the reference in the affirmative and has delivered the following award: AWARD 1. The reference is answered in the affirmative. 2. The Party no.2(ii) is entitled for the monetary benefits of suspension period from 17.8.1989 to 18.6.2007 as duty period and also entitled for the wages of above suspension period and arrears of wages. The party no.2 is also entitled for the time bound promotion and higher wages. 3. The party no.1 is directed to pay to party no.2 all monetary benefits of suspension period from 17.8.1989 to 18.6.2007 as duty period and also pay wages of above suspension period and arrears of wages and further directed to give him time bound promotion and higher wages. 4. There shall be no order as to costs. 5. The Award be sent to the Additional Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur. 6. The conciliation proceedings be sent to the Additional Commissioner of Labour, Nagpur. 4. Though the learned Advocates for the respective sides have strenuously supported their pleadings, I find that the issue that needs to be considered in this petition is as to whether respondent no.2 workman was entitled for all monetary benefits even during the period of his suspension. 5. Respondent no.2, the workman herein, was undisputedly an employee of the Amravati Municipal Corporation. He was arrested on account of an offence having been registered against him under Section 302 of the IPC. He was arrested and was admittedly in jail from 27.08.1989 till 19.12.1989. 6. The record reveals that after he was released on bail, he approached the petitioner for being reinstated in service as the petitioner placed him under suspension w.e.f. 27.08.1989 as he was detained in police custody remand for more than 48 hours. He was arrested and was admittedly in jail from 27.08.1989 till 19.12.1989. 6. The record reveals that after he was released on bail, he approached the petitioner for being reinstated in service as the petitioner placed him under suspension w.e.f. 27.08.1989 as he was detained in police custody remand for more than 48 hours. Admittedly, the petitioner Corporation did not allow him to report for duties on the pretext that his case was before the Court of Criminal jurisdiction and until the criminal trial with regard to the offence alleged to have been committed by him is not completed, he would not be permitted to report for duties. It is undisputed that the employee was acquitted by judgment dated 13.12.2006 delivered in Sessions Trial Case No.16/1997. 7. The learned Advocate for the Corporation places reliance upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others, (2019) 5 SCC 809 . Contention is that the employee can blame himself for the misfortune that has befallen him. The employer never initiated any disciplinary proceeding against him and the suspension of the employee was not on account of any legal action initiated by the petitioner Corporation. He was placed under suspension since he was kept in police custody remand beyond 48 hours and hence, the Corporation relied upon the Rule 72 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Joining Time, Foreign Service and Payment during suspension, dismissal and Removal) Rules, 1981. It is also canvassed that the acquittal of the concerned employee was on account of benefit of doubt and not by way of an honourable acquittal. 8. With the assistance of the learned Advocate for the petitioner Corporation, I have gone through the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Narain supra. I find that paragraph nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 are relevant and which read as under: 6. The decision of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore was followed by this Court in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh to refuse back wages to an employee who was initially convicted for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and later acquitted by the High Court in a criminal appeal. While refusing to grant relief to the petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. While refusing to grant relief to the petitioner therein, this Court held that subsequent acquittal would not entitle an employee to seek back wages. However, this Court was of the opinion that if the prosecution is launched at the behest of the department and the employee is acquitted, different considerations may arise. The learned counsel for the appellant endeavored to distinguish the prosecution launched by the police for involvement of an employee in a criminal case and the criminal proceedings initiated at the behest of the employer. The observation made in the judgment in Union of India v. Jaipal Singh has to be understood in a manner in which the department would become liable for back wages in the event of a finding that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was mala fide or with vexatious intent. In all other cases, we do not see any difference between initiation of the criminal proceedings by the department vis-a-vis a criminal case lodged by the police. For example, if an employee is involved in embezzlement of funds or is found indulging in demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, the employer cannot be mulcted with full back wages on the acquittal of the person by a criminal Court, unless it is found that the prosecution is malicious. 7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23.10.1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21.10.1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21.03.1983. It is clear from the record that the appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental inquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental inquiry. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23.10.1979 came to an end on 21.03.1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23.10.1979 came to an end on 21.03.1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21.10.1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the IA, we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the appellant is entitled for full wages from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance. 8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31.08.2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20.01.2003. Further, the appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23.10.1979 to 21.10.1987. 9. In the case in hand, the record reveals that though the employee was released on bail on 19.12.1989 and has approached the management for seeking resumption of his duties, he was disallowed from joining the duties on the ground that his case was pending before the court of criminal jurisdiction. It is settled law that a person is innocent until proven guilty. The employee concerned has never been convicted by any court unlike the case of Raj Narain (supra) wherein he was convicted by the court of criminal jurisdiction and subsequently was acquitted by the higher court. 10. In my view, the Municipal Corporation was not justified in disallowing the employee to report for duties after he was released on bail. The petitioner could not have referred to his pending criminal case as a ground for refusing him resumption of duties which was eventually permitted on 18.06.2007. It is, therefore, obvious that from 22.12.1989 till 17.06.2007, for a period of almost 18 years, the employee was deprived of his employment and salary earnings. 11. The petitioner could not have referred to his pending criminal case as a ground for refusing him resumption of duties which was eventually permitted on 18.06.2007. It is, therefore, obvious that from 22.12.1989 till 17.06.2007, for a period of almost 18 years, the employee was deprived of his employment and salary earnings. 11. The learned Advocate for the Corporation takes exception to the observations made by the Industrial Tribunal in the impugned award that the employee was honourably acquitted. I find that though the said contention is correct, the fact that the employee was acquitted for the offences alleged to have been committed by him on account of lack of evidence, would not change the situation. His acquittal would remain an acquittal until the petitioner can point out any provision of law that a person who is acquitted on account of benefit of doubt, would be disentitled from service benefits or reinstatement in service. 12. Considering the above, the Industrial Court has rightly concluded that the suspension period of the employee deserves to be converted into regular employment. 13. The learned Advocate for the said employee makes a statement on instructions that as he has spent some time in jail till 19.12.1989, obviously he could not have reported for duties and he would not be entitled for wages for that period. 14. Considering the above, this petition is partly allowed. The direction of the Industrial Tribunal to grant monetary benefits to the employee even for the period spent in jail, stands modified. The said employee would be entitled for monetary benefits from 20.12.1989. His suspension allowance paid to him for the period 20.12.1989 till the date of his reinstatement, would be adjusted against the legal dues payable to him. Needless to state, there shall be no break in service and he shall be deemed to be in continuous service. 15. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.