JUDGMENT : P. Krishna Bhat, J. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 25.08.2014 in SC No.103/2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge at Yadgiri by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 2. JUDGMENT : P. Krishna Bhat, J. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 25.08.2014 in SC No.103/2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge at Yadgiri by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 2. The case of the prosecution is somewhat on the following lines viz.,; that deceased Shivamma (CW1) aged about 15 years was the daughter of one Ningamma; said Ningamma and PW.5 Marlingamma and the accused are siblings being the children of one Malappa Balichakra; said Malappa Balichakra had left behind one house property in Koliwada locality of Yadgiri city expressing his intention to give it to PW.6 who is the daughter of PW.5; the accused was unhappy about the same and he was suspecting that PW.5 was intending to give the said property to deceased CW.1 who was a destitute after losing her mother Ningamma, her father having already given up on Ningamma for another woman; accused had filed OS No.20/2011 in the Court of Civil Judge at Yadgiri against PW.5 and PW.6 for declaration, possession and injunction in respect of the said house property bearing City Municipality No.2-11-32 in Koliwada locality of Yadgiri city as evidenced by Ex.P.20; accused had decided to do away with deceased CW.1 in order to remove the hurdle for getting the property all for himself; on account of the threat of the accused, PW.5 had left the deceased CW.1 in the care of father of PW.12 and gone to Bengaluru for earning her livelihood; PW.5 had returned to the native place on 1.8.2012 and on coming to know about the same CW.1 had gone to the house on the same day for staying with PW.5; accused became enraged on account of the same and with the intention of committing her murder on 2.8.2012 at about 6.00 a.m. he went near the house of PW.5 and after abusing her entered inside the house, sprinkled kerosene oil on deceased CW.1 and lit her ablaze and before PW.5 who was outside the house and other neighbouring eyewitnesses PW.1 Mallayya, PW.2 Hanmanth, PW.3 Siddappa, PW.4 Ramesh, PW.13 Mareppa could do anything, he made good his escape; thereafter deceased was shifted to Yadgiri District Hospital by about 8.00 a.m.; on receiving telephonic information from the hospital PW.15, the PSI went to the hospital and also secured the presence of Taluka Executive Magistrate, YadgiriPW.14 and recorded the statement of CW.1 as per Ex.P.12; the Taluka Executive Magistrate-PW.14 himself recorded the statement of CW.1 deceased as per Ex.P.13 and later on the same day at 5.10 p.m., CW.1 breathed her last in the hospital; the case was investigated by PW.15 and PW.16 and accused was charge sheeted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The case having been committed to the Court of Sessions at Yadgiri, after affording reasonable opportunity, the charge was framed against the accused, trial was held during which PWs.1 to 17 were examined for the prosecution, Ex.P.1 to P.20 were marked and so also M.Os.1 to 3 were marked. After closure of the evidence for the prosecution, the learned Sessions Judge examined the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Accused did not choose to examine any witnesses on his behalf. Thereafter arguments were addressed on either side and on appreciation of the evidence before him, learned Sessions Judge at Yadgiri entered a finding of guilt for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced the accused accordingly by his judgment dated 25.08.2014. It is the said judgment which is called in question in this appeal. 3. Sri Nandakishore Boob, learned counsel appearing for the accused fervently submitted before us that the accused is innocent; deceased was having certain health issues on account of which she had committed suicide by self immolation; that taking advantage of the unfortunate death of deceased CW.1, PW.5 in collusion with the police and PW.14 had created a false case against the accused; even the eyewitnesses have turned hostile and only material against the accused based on which learned Sessions Judge has convicted the accused viz., the dying declaration as per Ex.P.13 recorded by PW.14 the Taluka Executive Magistrate and Ex.P.12 statement recorded by the PW.15 are shrouded with suspicious circumstances and therefore the accused is entitled to be acquitted. 4. Per contra, learned State Public Prosecutor Sri Prakash Yeli submitted that the accused in order to grab the house property has committed the murder of the deceased in a most gruesome manner resulting in snuffing out the life of a young girl aged about 15 years and further that on account of the threats by him even the witnesses were dissuaded from speaking the truth before the Court which is evidenced by close relatives like PW.5, PW.6 of the deceased and neighbouring witnesses like PWs.1 to 4 and PW.13 turning hostile and further that there is clinching evidence of the two statements given by deceased CW.1 before PSI-PW.15 and Taluka Executive Magistrate-PW.14 which are fully natural, blemishless and shown to be made by the deceased in a fit state of mind. It was his contention that there is absolutely no motive whatsoever alleged against PW.14, the Taluka Executive Magistrate who is a responsible officer for concocting a false statement of the deceased. He submitted that learned Sessions Judge has elaborately considered each and every relevant aspect of the materials duly placed before the Court and he having come to the correct conclusion based on unimpeachable materials, there is no warrant for interference with the same by this Court. 5. The factum of death of CW.1 Shivamma who was aged about 15 years due to burn injuries on 2.8.2012 at about 5.10 p.m. in Yadgiri District Hospital has not been disputed before us. 6. It is true that all the eyewitnesses have turned hostile. The eyewitnesses examined are PWs.1 to 4 and 13 who are the neighbours of PW.5 in whose house the incident had taken place and PW.5 herself is the maternal aunt of the deceased. Careful perusal of the evidence of PW.5 and PW.6, both of whom are close relatives of the deceased, show that they were determined to suppress the truth before the Court. 7. Motive suggested by the prosecution for the commission of the offence is that there was a civil litigation between the accused on the one side and PW.5 on the other with regard to a house property left behind by their father Malappa Balichakra. The further allegation is that CW.1 the deceased is the daughter of a pre-deceased sister by name Ningamma of both the accused and PW.5 and therefore accused was apprehending that she was a hurdle to him for getting the property all for himself. 8. In order to establish the said motive the prosecution has produced Ex.P.20 which is a summons in OS No.20/2011 pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Yadgiri communicating the order of exparte temporary injunction passed by the said Court to PW.5 and PW.6. Ex.P.20 bears the seal of the said Court and accused is the plaintiff in the said suit and PWs.5 and 6 are the defendants. Subject matter of the suit is house bearing City Municipality No.2-11-32 situated in Koliwada locality of Yadgiri city. When examined before the Court PW.5 Marlingamma has totally denied that there was any civil litigation between her and the accused. Subject matter of the suit is house bearing City Municipality No.2-11-32 situated in Koliwada locality of Yadgiri city. When examined before the Court PW.5 Marlingamma has totally denied that there was any civil litigation between her and the accused. She was treated as hostile and was crossexamined by the learned Public Prosecutor and it was suggested again during the same that there was a civil litigation before the Court regarding sharing the house property between her and the accused which has been promptly denied by her. In view of Ex.P.20 which is a Court authenticated document, there is no reason to disbelieve the fact that there was civil suit in OS No.20/2011 before the Court of learned Civil Judge, Yadgiri instituted by the accused against PWs.5 and 6 in respect of the house property. Case of the prosecution is also that accused was threatening PW.5 and consequently she had left the village for Bengaluru for earning her livelihood. Conspectus of facts surrounding the circumstances of PW.5 denying the very fact of civil litigation strongly suggests that she was under the threat of accused to deny anything and everything before Court. In fact, such denial is beneficial to him at the trial. 9. The evidence of PW.15, the PSI shows that he had prepared the spot panchanama Ex.P.8 in the presence of panchas, one of whom has been examined as PW.10 who has turned hostile. It is the case of prosecution that PW.5 had shown the spot where the incident had taken place to PW.15 and the panchas. Though PW.5 has turned hostile on this aspect, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW.15 on this aspect. Ex.P.8 shows that the incident had taken place inside the house of PW.5 situated in Koliwada locality which is the house property in dispute. 10. The evidence of PW.11 the medical officer shows that on 2.8.2012 at about 7.45 p.m. the dead body of deceased Shivamma was brought to him for post-mortem examination and he conducted the same between 8.00 p.m. and 10.45 p.m. His evidence shows that he had issued post-mortem examination report as per Ex.P.9 and he had noted the following in Ex.P.9:- "PME conducted on a female aged around 15-18 years, moderately built, scalp hair singed out, eyes burnt out, mouth opened and swollen tongue, height measuring 5' 3" in length. Superficial to deep burns present all over the body with complete absence of skin." He had noted that all internal organs were intact and congested. He had further observed superficial to deep burns were present all over the neck, chest, abdomen, upper limbs, lower limbs, both anteriorly and posteriarly. His opinion regarding cause of death was due to shock as a result of burns (cardio respiratory failure). During the crossexamination of this medical witness PW.11, it was elicited that since the tongue of the deceased was swollen and it was ante mortem in nature, she would not have been in a position to speak. 11. Relying on the said observation of the medical officer-PW.11 who conducted the post-mortem examination, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that when even according to the medical witness deceased could not have spoken when she was alive, there was no possibility of her giving statement as per Ex.P.12 and P.13 and if that was so, the entire case of the prosecution falls to the ground and accused is entitled to be acquitted. 12. Pw.15 the PSI has stated that he had received MLC from the hospital to the effect that CW.1 Shivamma had died at 5.10 p.m. on 2.8.2012 while undergoing treatment in the hospital itself. During the cross-examination the time of death of the deceased as stated by PW.10 has not been challenged at all. The accused is none other than the maternal uncle of the deceased and the reason why he has not chosen to question PW.15 regarding the time of death could only be attributed to the fact that it was so viz., the deceased had died at about 5.10 p.m. 13. Pw.15 has stated that he recorded the statement of the deceased between 8.00 a.m. and 9.00 a.m. and the Taluka Executive Magistrate was also present and he had taken his signature on the said statement as per Ex.P.12. PW.14 Taluka Executive Magistrate has stated that he had recorded the statement of deceased between 9.50 a.m. and 10.00 a.m. on 2.8.2012 which is as per Ex.P.13. The case of the prosecution is that incident had taken place at about 6.00 a.m. on 2.8.2012. Both PW.15 and PW.14 have emphatically stated that CW.1 at that point of time was in a condition to give statement and accordingly they had recorded statement. The case of the prosecution is that incident had taken place at about 6.00 a.m. on 2.8.2012. Both PW.15 and PW.14 have emphatically stated that CW.1 at that point of time was in a condition to give statement and accordingly they had recorded statement. PW.14 in particular who was the Taluka Executive Magistrate of Yadgiri at material point of time has stated that he had spoken to the medical officer who was in attendance by his side when he recorded the statement of the deceased and the said medical officer who has attested on Ex.P.13 was examined as PW.17 before the Court. PW.17 is very clear in his evidence that before PW.14 recorded the statement of the deceased, he had told PW.14 that CW.1 Shivamma was in a fit state of mind to give statement and he could record her statement. During his cross-examination a suggestion was put to him to the effect that if a person had suffered 100% burn injury, such a person would not have been in a position to give his statement which was denied by him. This witness has stated that deceased had died at 5.10 p.m. in the hospital and that has not been disputed during the cross-examination. It is relevant to notice at this stage that PW.17 had examined the deceased CW.1 at about 9.50 a.m. on 2.8.2012 and there is no cross- examination to the effect that at that time there was a swelling of the tongue of the deceased. The medical officer PW.11 who had conducted the PME would not have been able to ascertain decisively regarding the condition of CW.1 to give statement at 9.50 a.m. on 2.8.2012, at any rate, better than PW.17 who had examined CW.1 proximate to the time or almost contemporaneously as her statement was recorded by PW.14. Nothing was elicited in the cross-examination of PW.17 so as to disbelieve the version of PW.17 that CW.1 was in a condition to give statement when PW.14 had recorded Ex.P.13. It is rather improbable on the material available on record to believe that senior officials like PW.17 and PW.14 would be in cahoots to falsely implicate the accused in this case. 14. The statement as per Ex.P.13 recorded by PW.14 from the deceased CW.1 is very short and brief. It is in a question and answer manner. It is rather improbable on the material available on record to believe that senior officials like PW.17 and PW.14 would be in cahoots to falsely implicate the accused in this case. 14. The statement as per Ex.P.13 recorded by PW.14 from the deceased CW.1 is very short and brief. It is in a question and answer manner. In the said statement CW.1 Shivamma has stated that accused had caused burn injuries to her in the house and motive for the same was property dispute. As already noticed, PW.17 was very clear that at the point of time when PW.14 recorded Ex.P.13 statement from CW.1, she was in a position to give statement. There is no serious challenge to the evidence of PW.17 on this aspect. PW.14 has no doubt was extensively cross-examined on behalf of the accused. PW.14 has stated during his cross-examination that there was no peeling of skin of the lips of the deceased. He has further stated that he had taken the thumb mark from CW.1 from the portion of the thumb which was not affected by burn injuries. The evidence of PW.14 is very natural and there is absolutely no reason to disbelieve him from what was elicited during the cross-examination. There is nothing to show that CW.1 had not given the statement as per Ex.P.13 before PW.14 and on the contrary the statement seems to be a very natural one and there is nothing on record to suggest that she was tutored by any one. On the other hand, evidence of PW.5 shows that she was under some pressure not to speak the truth before the Court when she spoke the most blatant lie about civil litigation in the face of Ex.P.20. 15. In sum, the contention of the learned counsel as stated above overlooks the fact that Ex.P.13 was recorded between 9.50 and 10.00 a.m. on 02.08.2012 and at that time she was examined by PW.17 and PW.14 was also satisfied about the condition of CW.1 to give statement. 15. In sum, the contention of the learned counsel as stated above overlooks the fact that Ex.P.13 was recorded between 9.50 and 10.00 a.m. on 02.08.2012 and at that time she was examined by PW.17 and PW.14 was also satisfied about the condition of CW.1 to give statement. PW.17 was not at all cross-examined regarding the condition of her tongue, and with the condition of the girl fast deteriorating which is evidenced by her death at 5.10 p.m. on the same day, swollen tongue noticed at the time of death by PW.11 could only be attributed to the later development - all of these show that there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for appellant. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has further contended that since Ex.P.13 does not carry certification from PW.17 regarding the fitness of CW.1 to give the statement, Ex.P.13 is liable to be disbelieved. There is no statutory requirement that the dying declaration need to be in any particular format and further that it should carry certification by a medical officer that the deponent was in a fit state of mind to give statement. A Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in (Laxman Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 ) has observed as follows : "3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of crossexamination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of crossexamination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however has to always be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. (Emphasis supplied) 17. Similarly the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in (Poonam Bai Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2019 6 SCC 145 ) has observed as follows : "10. There cannot be any dispute that a dying declaration can be the sole basis for convicting the accused. However, such a dying declaration should be trustworthy, voluntary, blemishless and reliable. In case the person recording the dying declaration is satisfied that the declarant is in a fit medical condition to make the statement and if there are no suspicious circumstances, the dying declaration may not be invalid solely on the ground that it was not certified by the doctor. Insistence for certification by the doctor is only a rule of prudence, to be applied based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The real test is as to whether the dying declaration is truthful and voluntary. It is often said that man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. However, since the declarant who makes a dying declaration cannot be subjected to cross-examination, in order for the dying declaration to be the sole basis for conviction, it should be of such a nature that it inspires the full confidence of the court. In the matter on hand, since Exh. P2, the dying declaration is the only circumstance relied upon by the prosecution, in order to satisfy our conscience, we have considered the material on record keeping in mind the well established principles regarding the acceptability of dying declarations." (Emphasis supplied) 18. Further, in a case (Kamalavva and Another Vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 13 SCC 614 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed as follows : "23. Further, in a case (Kamalavva and Another Vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 13 SCC 614 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed as follows : "23. The Constitution Bench in Laxman case also referred to an earlier decision of this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat, wherein it was held that the ultimate test with regard to the admissibility of a dying declaration is whether the dying declaration can be held to be a truthful one and voluntarily given. In the said decision it was also held that before recording the declaration, the officer concerned must find that the declarant was in a fit condition to make the statement. The aforesaid ratio of Koli Chunilal Savji case was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Laxman case. 24. In Vikas V. State of Maharashtra this Court elaborately discussed the previous relevant decision governing the legality of dying declaration and observed in para 45 as follows : (SCC pp.529-30) "45. The Court, referring to earlier case law, summed up principles governing dying declaration as under: (Paniben case, SCC pp. 480-81, para 18) (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon." 25. After referring to the decision of this Court in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, this Court in Vikas reiterated the legal position that where a dying declaration is recorded by a competent Magistrate, it would stand on a much higher footing inasmuch as a competent Magistrate has no axe to grind against the person named in the dying declaration of the victim and in absence of circumstances showing anything to the contrary, he should not be disbelieved by the court. 26. In Nallapati Sivaiah Vs. SDO, in para 22 it was stated thus: (SCC p.474) "22. It is equally well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction. But at the same time due care and caution must be exercised in considering weight to be given to dying declaration in as much as there could be any number of circumstances which may affect the truth. This Court in more than one decision cautioned that the courts have always to be on guard to see that the dying declaration was not the result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is the duty of the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for the medical opinion." 32. It is the duty of the courts to find that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the dying declaration. In order to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, the courts have to look for the medical opinion." 32. The technical objection raised by the counsel for the appellant regarding the unavailability of doctor's certification and endorsement as to mental fitness of the deceased is liable to be rejected inasmuch as the same has been held by this Court in numerous decisions as a mere rule of prudence and not the ultimate test as to whether or not the said dying declaration was truthful or voluntary." 19. As observed in the above decisions there is nothing on record to show that PW.14 who is a competent Taluka Executive Magistrate had any axe to grind against the accused. Evidence of PW.14 further shows that he himself had spoken to the victim CW.1 and he had satisfied himself about the condition of CW.1 Shivamma to give the statement and further there is nothing on record to show that CW.1 was tutored or her statement was not voluntary. The effect of her statement under Ex.P.13 is very clear and pointed viz., that accused had set her ablaze and the motive was the property dispute. PW.17 who had examined CW.1 and was present when the statement was recorded was clear that she was in a position to make the said statement at that time. In the event we are fully satisfied that the absence of certification by PW.17 does not in any way detract from the probative value of Ex.P.13. The burn injuries as could be seen from the evidence of PW.11 was superficial to deep and therefore it was entirely probable that the swelling of the tongue at the time of death of the deceased which occurred indisputably at 5.10 p.m. i.e., about seven hours after the statement was recorded as noticed by PW.11 was on account of fast deterioration of the condition of the victim girl. 20. Ex.P.13 then partakes the character of what in law is known as "dying declaration". What is a dying declaration? 20. Ex.P.13 then partakes the character of what in law is known as "dying declaration". What is a dying declaration? It is vain on our part to attempt to define the term, for, it ought to remain undefined and the exercise of characterizing it as such and investing it with probative sanctity, to some extent, must essentially remain an exercise particular to each case. It has, paradoxically, an undying quality about it. It is not a declaration when made; but it has all the solemnity attached to a declaration once the maker dies subject to what is stated in Section 32 (1) of Evidence Act; and the construction put on it in Laxman's case (supra) and various other authorities. Why is this solemnity attached when the maker is not available to be cross-examined? Does it not seem illogical? Probably, yes. Experience acquired over centuries due to eternal conflict between human nature - his proclivities, and the law has apparently made the law makers to hew this principle to bring about a balance, as it were. Sagacious and revered Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it pithily when he said "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." Literature tells us, Sohrab, the son, had apparently retorted to Rustom, the father, "Man who are thou who dost deny my words? Truth sits upon the lips of dying men, and falsehood, while lived, was far from mine." (Mathew Arnold - Sohrab and Rustum). We said - it has an undying quality about it, for, it is made at a time when the undying hope of life inhering in the chest of every human, starts ebbing away and when the stark portents of death waiting at the door steps gives a unique serenity to the mind compelling the maker to state nothing but the truth. 21. The circumstances noted by us surrounding recording of Ex.P.13 has persuaded us to hold that CW.1 has indeed made the statement; that she had made the statement that sounds natural and she made it without external pressure. PW.14 has stood the test of cross-examination. It, then partakes the character of dyeing declaration. It is completely acceptable. 21. The circumstances noted by us surrounding recording of Ex.P.13 has persuaded us to hold that CW.1 has indeed made the statement; that she had made the statement that sounds natural and she made it without external pressure. PW.14 has stood the test of cross-examination. It, then partakes the character of dyeing declaration. It is completely acceptable. There is nothing in the cross-examination of PW.14, PW.15 and PW.17 to suggest even remotely that mind of CW.1 was ever likely at her dying moments to have been a mere conduit to the schemes and machinations of an external agency who, alas, has not been identified by the defence. As we have noted, PW.5 denying even the undeniable OS No.20/2011 (Ex.P.20) between accused and her hints at the dark probability of the accused trying to influence the course of trial. However, we are not placing reliance on this aspect alone. The girl CW.1 was aged about 15 years and she lived in a realm, on account of her tender age, where " .. and falsehood, while lived, was far from mine." 22. It is too well settled to require restatement of the legal position that conviction can be based solely on dying declaration if it inspires confidence of the Court and satisfies the parameters expounded in "Laxman", "Poonam Bai", "Kamalavva and another" cases referred to supra. On the records as presented during trial on Ex.P.13, we must say it does. 23. The learned Sessions Judge has appreciated the evidence in its proper perspective and has come to the conclusion that accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and on re-appreciation of the evidence, we find no reason whatsoever to disagree with him and therefore, this appeal must fail and accordingly, we proceed to pass the following : ORDER The above appeal is dismissed.