JUDGMENT M.I.Arun, J. - Heard. 2. Aggrieved by the show cause notice dated 06.06.2020 bearing No.L.N.D (POO) CR/104/2019-20 issued by respondent no.2 and the consequent suo motu proceedings initiated by respondent no.2 against the petitioners, the instant writ petition is filed. 3. One late George Thangaiah, who was the husband of petitioner no.1 and father of petitioner nos.2 and 3, was granted a total of 16 guntas of lands in Survey Nos.2/2, 7/1A and 7/1B of Binnamangala Manavarthe Kaval Village, K.R.Puram Hobli, Bengaluru East Taluk vide order dated 26.12.1975 for non-agricultural purpose. It was granted at an upset price of Rs.12,000/- per acre. After the death of George Thangaiah, the petitioners have inherited the same and are in peaceful possession of the same. The said George Thangaiah was also the owner of certain adjoining lands to the property granted to him. The Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the BDA') thereafter has sanctioned development plan in respect of the property in question way back in the year 1977 and the said property has been developed. The fact that the property was allotted for non-agricultural purpose and the BDA sanctioning a development plan indicates that the property in question is no longer a kharab land. 4. Late George Thangaiah and the petitioners have been in enjoyment of the property since the date of its allotment in the year 1975. However, the respondents with an ulterior motive have been issuing certain show cause notices and initiating certain proceedings since 2016. The petitioners have duly replied to those notices and are defending themselves in the proceedings initiated against them. The present impugned notice has been issued as late as 06.06.2020 under Rule 25(1) of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The said notice is issued on the ground that the lands in question are "B" kharab lands and the same were not allotted to the petitioners in accordance with law. On the said ground, the petitioners have been asked to show cause as to why the allotment should not be cancelled and the lands be appropriated by the Government. 5. The petitioners have participated in the proceedings pursuant to the said notice. When the proceedings were going on, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petition. On the said ground, the petitioners have been asked to show cause as to why the allotment should not be cancelled and the lands be appropriated by the Government. 5. The petitioners have participated in the proceedings pursuant to the said notice. When the proceedings were going on, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition, respondent no.2 has passed an order cancelling the allotment of 16 guntas of phut kharab lands in Survey Nos.2/2, 7/1A and 7/1B of Binnamangala Manavarthe Kaval village. The petitioners in the instant writ petition, as mentioned above, have sought for quashing of the show cause notice and the consequential proceedings. 6. The petitioners have sought for quashing the show cause notice on the ground that the proceedings for cancellation are being issued under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 while the allotment was made under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'); the issuance of notice is in violation of the principles of natural justice and it is barred by time; the act of the BDA and other authorities sanctioning development plan amounts to an estoppel on respondents from issuing such notice; and the notice issued is not in accordance with law. 7. The respondents have filed their objections statement and have raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition is premature and what has been issued is only a show cause notice. The petitioners have participated in the same and they cannot prefer a writ petition. Section 49 of the Act provides for an appeal from the original orders and it is an alternative and efficacious remedy. In the light of the same, the petitioners cannot maintain the writ petition. All the grounds raised by the petitioners in the writ petition have been considered by respondent no.2 in his order dated 19.08.2020. The finding is that the predecessor in title of the petitioners has obtained the grant by playing fraud and on the said ground, the grant has been cancelled and if the petitioners are aggrieved by the same, they have to prefer an appeal. 8. The finding is that the predecessor in title of the petitioners has obtained the grant by playing fraud and on the said ground, the grant has been cancelled and if the petitioners are aggrieved by the same, they have to prefer an appeal. 8. It is true that Section 49 of the Act provides for an appeal from original orders such as the order passed by respondent no.2 in respect of the property in question pursuant to the show cause notice dated 06.06.2020 issued by him. However, apart from other grounds, the petitioners have raised the ground of limitation i.e., whether respondent no.2 could have issued the impugned show cause notice dated 06.06.2020 to cancel the grant made way back in the year 1975. Limitation is a question of jurisdiction. 9. It is true that any grant made as in the instant case can be suo motu enquired into by respondent no.2 and the said grant can be cancelled, if it is found that the same is obtained by making false or fraudulent representation or if it is contrary to the Rules. There is no period of limitation prescribed under any statute as to the time within which respondent no.2 has to exercise his powers under Rule 25 of the Rules and cancel the grant. It is a well settled proposition of law that when such limitation is not prescribed the same has to be exercised within a reasonable period. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in JOINT COLLECTOR RANGA REDDY DISTRICT AND ANOTHER V. D. NARSING RAO AND OTHERS, (2015) 3 SCC 695 . Paragraphs 25 and 31 of the said judgment read as under: "25. The legal position is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court which have laid down that even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of any power, revisional or otherwise, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. This is so even in cases where allegations of fraud have necessitated the exercise of any corrective power. We may briefly refer to some of the decisions only to bring home the point that the absence of a stipulated period of limitation makes little or no difference insofar as the exercise of the power is concerned which ought to be permissible only when the power is invoked within a reasonable period. 31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority." 10. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in N. RAGHAVENDRA MURTHY V. STATE OF KARNATAKA,2020 SCCONLINE(KAR) 860 has held as under: "(vi) It is settled position in law that power conferred on an Authority or by a statute must be exercised within a reasonable period of time. The Apex Court in Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale33 was considering the case of exercise of revisional power under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Admittedly, there was no time limit prescribed for exercise of such power under the law and when such power was sought to be exercised after 17 years, it was held as follows:- "11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the Legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein." In the present case, the exercise of power asserting the State's claim in the year 2011-2012 having the consequence of canceling mutations effected several decades ago as reflected in Column No.3 of the Table extracted hereinabove is clearly an effort to exercise power conferred beyond a reasonable period of time and hence impermissible. Accordingly, in such of the cases where mutation has been effected pursuant to the transfer by the Maharaja of Mysore at the first instance as indicated in Column No.3, exercise of power in the year 2010, 2011-2012 many decades subsequent to the effecting of such mutations is bad in law, as power is not only sought to be exercised after a reasonable period of time, but beyond the period of limitation prescribed in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (e) Alternative remedy: (i) It is the contention of the State that as against the impugned order passed by the Deputy commissioner under Section 67(2) of the K.L.R. Act, there are alternative remedies available as provided under Section 67(3) of the K.L.R. Act which includes filing of a civil suit against the order passed under Section 67(2) of the K.L.R. Act or as against an order passed in revision or appeal. (ii) On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that the impugned order is passed without jurisdiction and if that were to be so, the writ petitions challenging the validity of such orders would be maintainable. (ii) On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners have contended that the impugned order is passed without jurisdiction and if that were to be so, the writ petitions challenging the validity of such orders would be maintainable. (iii) It is settled legal position that relegating the petitioners to avail the alternative remedy to challenge the impugned orders as provided for under the statute instead of entertaining the writ petitions directly is a matter left to the discretion of the Court to be exercised keeping in mind the settled principle that a writ petition can be entertained directly against an order passed without jurisdiction. In fact, in the case of M. Sankaranarayanan34 in the context of a broadly similar factual matrix and legal controversy where the jurisdiction of the revenue authority under Section 67 of the K.L.R. Act to initiate proceedings in respect of time barred claims was being considered, the Apex Court has held that the challenge to a notice without jurisdiction could be directly entertained under Article 227 of the Constitution of India." 11. Further, when a notice is issued, the notice should be clear and precise as to on what grounds action is proposed to be taken. It cannot be vague and ambigious. 12. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.No.46547/2011 (DD 14.12.2011) at paragraph 4 has held as under: "4. The question that requires to be determined in this writ petition is whether the impugned notice is valid in law? When a notice can be said to be valid in law? The term 'Notice' originated from the Latin word 'Notitia' which means 'being known'. It is equivalent to information, intelligence or knowledge. Notice is the starting point of any hearing. The right to fair hearing covers every stage through which an administrative adjudication passes, starting from notice to final determination. Notice embodies rule of fairness and must precede an adverse order. It should clearly state the reason as to why a party is required to appear and/or his reply is required. The party concerned should be apprised of the evidence on which the case against him is based and be given an opportunity to rebut the said evidence. A notice, to be valid in law, should be clear and precise so as to give the party concerned adequate information of the case he has to meet. The party concerned should be apprised of the evidence on which the case against him is based and be given an opportunity to rebut the said evidence. A notice, to be valid in law, should be clear and precise so as to give the party concerned adequate information of the case he has to meet. The adequacy of notice is a relative term and must be decided with reference to each case. The test of adequacy of notice will be whether it gives sufficient information so as to enable the person concerned to put up an effective defence. If a notice is vague or it contains unspecified or unintelligible allegations, it would imply a denial of proper opportunity of being heard. Natural justice is not only a requirement of proper legal procedure but also a vital element of good administration." 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in BIECCO LAWRIE LIMITED AND ANOTHER V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER, (2009) 10 SCC 32 at paragraphs 24 and 25 has held as under: "24. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard-audi alteram partem i.e. hear the other side and it is often considered that it is broad enough to include the rule against bias since a fair hearing must be an unbiased hearing. One of the essential ingredients of fair hearing is that a person should be served with a proper notice i.e. a person has a right to notice. Notice should be clear and precise so as to give the other party adequate information of the case he has to meet and make an effective defence. Denial of notice and opportunity to respond result in making the administrative decision as vitiated. 25. The adequacy of notice is a relative term and must be decided with reference to each case. But generally a notice to be adequate must contain the following: (a) time, place and nature of hearing; (b) legal authority under which the hearing is to be held; (c) statement of specific charges which a person has to meet." 14. In the instant case, the lands were granted to the predecessor in title of the petitioners way back in the year 1975. The said grant is sought to be cancelled in the year 2020, after a lapse of nearly 45 years. The delay in issuance of show cause notice cannot be considered reasonable. In the instant case, the lands were granted to the predecessor in title of the petitioners way back in the year 1975. The said grant is sought to be cancelled in the year 2020, after a lapse of nearly 45 years. The delay in issuance of show cause notice cannot be considered reasonable. As per Article 112 of the Limitation Act, even for a suit by or on behalf of Central Government or State Government, the limitation prescribed is 30 years. Though fraud vitiates everything, the impugned show cause notice does not indicate as to what action of the grantee amounted to fraud nor does it indicate as to the facts based on which the respondents have concluded that the grant was not in accordance with law. The show cause notice is bad for being issued after a lapse of nearly 45 years which is beyond reasonable time and also for not specifying the reasons on which it is sought to be cancelled. The order which is passed subsequent to the impugned notice during the pendency of the writ petition though states that the allotment is vitiated by fraud, it does not specify the facts which constitute the fraud. 15. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned notice dated 06.06.2020 issued by respondent no.2 and subsequent proceedings pursuant to the notice are liable to be set aside. Hence, the following: ORDER (i) The writ petition is allowed. (ii) The show cause notice dated 06.06.2020 bearing No.L.N.D (POO) CR/104/2019-20 issued by respondent no.2 in respect of 13 guntas of land in Survey No.2/2, 1 gunta of land in Survey No.7/1A and 2 guntas of land in Survey No.7/1B of Binnamangala Manavarthe Kaval Village, K.R.Puram Hobli, Bengaluru East Taluk under Rule 25(1) of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969 is hereby set aside. (iii) All proceedings and the subsequent order dated 19.08.2020 passed in No.LND(E) CR 104/2019-20 pursuant to the aforementioned notice dated 06.06.2020 are held to be null and void. In view of disposal of the writ petition, pending interlocutory applications do not survive for consideration and are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.