JUDGMENT M.I.Arun, J. - Aggrieved by the order dated 12.08.2014 in Small Causes No.1435/2011 passed by the Court of Small Causes (SCCH-09), Bengaluru, this revision petition is filed by the plaintiff therein. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a partnership firm carrying on the business in wholesale and retail dealer for tiles, plumbing materials and hardware fittings. It is a registered partnership firm. The petitioner supplied the materials to the defendant on credit basis from 07.04.2010 to 14.05.2010. The defendant made the last part payment on 21.09.2010. Still, he is liable to pay an amount of Rs.12,082/- and interest of Rs.2,916/-. In spite of several demands and request, he failed to repay the amount. Hence, the petitioner got issued a legal notice and thereafter, has filed a small causes suit for recovery of the amount. 3. The respondent denied the transactions with the petitioner. The trial Court, based on the pleadings and evidence, has come to the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to prove the transactions with the defendant as alleged. 4. It is seen from the records that the petitioner initially filed a suit against one Mr. Raghu by showing him as Proprietor for M/s Mathru Builders. However, subsequently, he has substituted the said Mr.Raghu with one Mr.B.S.Kumar as the owner of M/s Mathru Builders. To prove his case, the petitioner has produced certain tax invoices and statement of accounts. However, the said tax invoices and the statement of accounts are denied by the respondent. Nothing is elicited in the cross-examination of DW.1. The tax invoices and the statement of accounts are the documents of the petitioner. There is nothing on record to show apart from the allegation made by the petitioner and the said tax invoices and the statement of accounts that the respondent is due any money to the petitioner. The respondent categorically denied that he has put his signature on the said tax invoices or statement of accounts. The petitioner has not been able to prove otherwise. 5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CHANDRADHAR GOSWAMI AND OTHERS VS. The respondent categorically denied that he has put his signature on the said tax invoices or statement of accounts. The petitioner has not been able to prove otherwise. 5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CHANDRADHAR GOSWAMI AND OTHERS VS. GAUHATI BANK LIMITED, (1967) AIR SC 1058 in para 6 has held as under: "(6) The main question urged before us is that there is no evidence besides the certified copy of the account to prove that a sum of Rs.10,000 was advanced to the appellants and, therefore, in view of S.34 of the Evidence Act the appellants cannot be saddled with liability for that amount. Section 34 is in these terms:- "Entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability." It is clear from a bare perusal of the section that no person can be charged with liability merely on the basis of entries in books of account, even were such books of account are kept in the regular course of business. There has to be further evidence to prove payment of the money which may appear in the books of account in order that a person may be charged with liability thereunder, except where the person to be charged accepts the correctness of the books of account and does not challenge them. In the present case, however, the appellants did not accept the correctness of the books of account. We have already indicated that they went to the length of saying that the accounts were not correctly kept, and were fraudulent. They also said that no money had been taken by them after March 1, 1947. This being their pleading, the trial Court rightly framed the third issue relating to the total amount due from the appellants to the bank. But unfortunately it over looked to go into that issue specifically and we have already indicated how it made a mistake in arriving at the amount due when considering the issue relating to relief. This being their pleading, the trial Court rightly framed the third issue relating to the total amount due from the appellants to the bank. But unfortunately it over looked to go into that issue specifically and we have already indicated how it made a mistake in arriving at the amount due when considering the issue relating to relief. In any case as the appellants had not admitted the correctness of the accounts filed by the bank, particularly after March 1, 1947, the bank had to prove payment of Rs.10,000 on March 19, 1947 if it wanted to charge the appellants with liability for that amount. But all that the bank did was to produce a certified copy of account under S.4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, No.XVIII of 1891. Section 4 of that Act reads thus- "Subject to the provisions of this Act, a certified copy of any entry in a banker's book shall in all legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of the existence of such entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of the matters, transactions and accounts therein recorded in every case where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself is not by law admissible, but not further or otherwise." It will be clear that S.4 gives a special privilege to banks and allows certified copies of their accounts to be produced by them and those certified copies become prima facie evidence of the existence of the original entries in the accounts and are admitted as evidence of matters, transactions and accounts therein, but such admission is only where, and to the same extent as, the original entry itself would be admissible by law and not further or otherwise. Original entries alone under S.34 of the Evidence Act would not be sufficient to charge any person with liability and as such copies produced under S. 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act obviously cannot charge any person with liability. Therefore, where the entries are not admitted it is the duty of the bank if it relies on such entries to charge any person with liability, to produce evidence in support of the entries to show that the money was advanced as indicated therein and thereafter the entries would be of use as corroborative evidence. Therefore, where the entries are not admitted it is the duty of the bank if it relies on such entries to charge any person with liability, to produce evidence in support of the entries to show that the money was advanced as indicated therein and thereafter the entries would be of use as corroborative evidence. But no person can be charged with liability on the basis of mere entries whether the entries produced are the original entries or copies under S. 4 of the Bankers' Books Evidence Act. We cannot agree with the High Court that the mere fact that the appellants did not specifically mention the sum of Rupees 10,000 as not having been advanced to them in their written statement would make any difference on the facts of the present case. We have already pointed out that the appellants produced specially after March 1, 1947. We have also pointed out that it was stated on their behalf that nothing was borrowed after March 1, 1947. The main appellant in whose name the account was, appeared as a witness and stated that so far as he remembered he only borrowed Rs.8,000 from the bank and nothing there-after. He also stated that he did not remember to have borrowed any sum from the bank after the execution of the mortgage-deed. In the face of this pleading of the appellants and the statement of one of them, the bank had to prove that the sum of Rs.10,000 was in fact advanced on March 19, 1947 and could not rely on mere entries in the books of account for that purpose. This is clear from the provision in S.34 of the evidence Act. No attempt was made on behalf of the bank to prove by any evidence whatsoever that a sum of Rupees 10,000 was advanced on March 19, 1947. The entry in the account books in that connection is to the effect: "To amount paid to Gauhati branch as per D/advice, dated 6th March 1947". If this amount of Rs.10,000 was paid by the bank on the order of the appellants or any one of them that order should have been produced in support of the entry, and then the entry would have been helpful to the bank as a corroborative piece of evidence. But the bank did nothing of the kind. If this amount of Rs.10,000 was paid by the bank on the order of the appellants or any one of them that order should have been produced in support of the entry, and then the entry would have been helpful to the bank as a corroborative piece of evidence. But the bank did nothing of the kind. The only witness produced on behalf of the bank was an officer who had nothing to do with the Tezpur branch where the transactions were entered into. We are, therefore, of opinion that in view of S.34 of the Evidence Act the appellants cannot be saddled with liability for the sum of Rs.10,000 said to have been advanced on March 19, 1947 on the basis of a mere entry in the account. Section 34 says that such entry alone shall not be sufficient evidence, and so some independent evidence had to be given by the bank to show that this sum was advanced. What would be the nature of such independent evidence would certainly depend upon the facts of each case; but there can be no doubt that some independent evidence to show that advance had been made has to be given. Further, as in this case the dispute was with respect to one entry of Rs.10,000, it should not have been difficult for the bank to produce evidence with respect thereto. We cannot, therefore, agree with the High Court that the advance of Rs.10,000 on March 19, 1947 has been proved in this case." 6. Thus, in any way, production of statement of accounts and tax invoices does not amount to proving his case. Accordingly, the trial Court has rightly dismissed the small causes suit. 7. Further it is noticed, the legal notice is issued by the petitioner against one Mr. Raghu, Proprietor of M/s Mathru Builders. The small causes suit is also initially filed against Mr. Raghu, Proprietor of M/s Mathru Builders. Subsequently, the petitioner substituted one Mr.B.S.Kumar as Proprietor of M/s Mathru Builders. When the suit is being instituted against proprietary concern, the same has to be instituted against the proprietor because the name given to the proprietary concern is not a person in the eye of law. It is the proprietor who is a person in the eye of law. Subsequently, the petitioner substituted one Mr.B.S.Kumar as Proprietor of M/s Mathru Builders. When the suit is being instituted against proprietary concern, the same has to be instituted against the proprietor because the name given to the proprietary concern is not a person in the eye of law. It is the proprietor who is a person in the eye of law. It is found from the records, the petitioner themselves are not aware as to whether they had transaction with Mr.Raghu or Mr.B.S.Kumar. The notice is issued to Mr.Raghu and thereafter, the suit is filed against Mr.Raghu. Subsequently, one Mr.B.S.Kumar is substituted as the defendant in the original suit. For the aforementioned reasons, the trial Court has held that the petitioner has failed to establish the fact, the respondent owed money to it. Hence, it has dismissed the suit. 8. The trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction as vested in law. There is no exercise of jurisdiction illegally and there is no material irregularity committed by the trial Court. 9. For the aforementioned reasons, the revision petition is hereby dismissed . No order as to cost.