Dhruvkumar Khimjibhai Badrakia v. State Of Gujarat
2020-01-29
N.V.ANJARIA
body2020
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Heard learned advocate Mr.Yogesh Ravani for the petitioners and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Rohan Shah for the respondent State, at length. 2. By presenting this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the two petitioners have prayed to direct the respondent to drop the departmental inquiry initiated against them pursuant to chargesheets dated 18th January, 2010 which was followed by preliminary inquiry dated 19th October, 2004. 3. The relevant facts in the background are that the two petitioners were posted as Deputy Executive Engineers in the Road & Building Department and had with them the charge of Panchayat Sub Division, Ahmedabad. At that time, which was the period between 1997 and 2000, certain construction works of road etc. were undertaken by the Panchayat Sub Division. The petitioners were served with the chargesheet in relation to the alleged irregularities in respect of the construction work supervised by them. 3.1 Petitioner No.1 was served with chargesheet dated 18th January, 2010 in which it was stated that when the petitioner was posted between 01st April, 1997 to 15th July, 2000 at District Panchayat, Ahmedabad in capacity of Deputy Executive Engineer, the irregularities were noticed in the development works of Naroda Gram Panchayat. Five charges were levelled which were with regard to expending more amount, accounting for double expenses, allegedly creating false records and so as to show the wrong measurement to claim further amount etc. 3.2 In the same way, petitioner No.2 was given the chargesheet of even date. The developmental work was supervised by him as Deputy Executive Engineer during the period from 15th July, 2000 to 14th March, 2006. The charges against this petitioner were of similar nature of incurring avoidable or double expenses and creating false record and measurement to inflate the amount to be recovered. 3.3 Both the petitioners were alleged the breach of the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 and sought to be proceeded with departmentally. They were called upon to submit their explanation. Both the petitioners, after service of chargesheets, made repeated request between 01st February, 2010 to 08th September, 2010 to the department to provide Rojkam and Panchnama. According to the petitioners, such relevant documents were not provided to them. 3.4 Petitioner No.1 retired from service on 31st March, 2011. Petitioner No.2 stood superannuated with effect from 31st October, 2012.
Both the petitioners, after service of chargesheets, made repeated request between 01st February, 2010 to 08th September, 2010 to the department to provide Rojkam and Panchnama. According to the petitioners, such relevant documents were not provided to them. 3.4 Petitioner No.1 retired from service on 31st March, 2011. Petitioner No.2 stood superannuated with effect from 31st October, 2012. It is the case that the petitioners requested that after their retirement, the departmental inquiry was not liable to be continued. It is stated that on 23rd June, 2014, they addressed letters asking to furnish the material which the respondents had been relying on, but nothing was provided, it was stated. It is stated by them that due to their insistence to provide documents, the respondents expressed to drop the inquiry in October, 2016, however it did not happen. Petitioner No.1 filed his defence statement on 02nd January, 2017. 4. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that respondent authority had proceeded to conduct the inquiries though there was total lack of evidence and that the inquiries against the petitioners were to be characterised with “no evidence”. In this regard it was submitted that when there was no Panchnama available, the whole charges about the irregularities in the construction work stood rendered factually foundationless. It was further submitted that in absence of any supportive material, charges could not have been levelled. The next was the submission about the inordinate delay of 13 years in holding the inquiries to submit that on this ground alone, the inquiries deserve to be quashed. 4.1 Detailed affidavit-in-reply came to be filed by the respondent, in which the charges against the petitioners were sought to be justified and it was stated that communication was received from Vigilance Commissioner in the year 2004 and the report of the Development Commissioner was given by the Panchayat Department in the year 2005. The proposed chargesheet, it was stated, was approved on 31st December, 2009 by the authority concerned and the same was received on 18th January, 2010. 5. When the facts of the case are noticed, what strikes conspicuous is that the departmental inquiry was initiated in the year 2010 in relation to the incident of work which took place between 01st April, 1997 to 15th July, 2000 when the petitioner No.1 was posted as Deputy Executive Engineer.
5. When the facts of the case are noticed, what strikes conspicuous is that the departmental inquiry was initiated in the year 2010 in relation to the incident of work which took place between 01st April, 1997 to 15th July, 2000 when the petitioner No.1 was posted as Deputy Executive Engineer. In case of petitioner No.2, the period was between 15th July, 2000 and 14th March, 2006. It was after gap of 10 years that the respondent proceeded to issue chargesheet to hold the inquiry. The preliminary inquiry was held in the year 2004. 5.1 In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh [1990 (supp) SCC 738] there was a delay of 12 years in initiating the disciplinary inquiry. The Supreme Court considered the effect of latches and delay on the departmental inquiry to ultimately hold that in absence of any satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay in issuing charge memo, it would be unfair to permit the departmental inquiry to proceed at the belated stage. 5.2 In Bani Singh (supra) it was observed, “The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1957-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 th4ere was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage.” (Para 4) 5.3 In M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [ (2006) 5 SCC 88 ], the delay in initiating the departmental inquiry was of six years and it was continued for a period of seven years. It was held that the aspect of delay in initiating inquiry by itself operated prejudicial to the delinquent officer.
It was held that the aspect of delay in initiating inquiry by itself operated prejudicial to the delinquent officer. 5.4 In P.V. Mahadevan v. State of Md, T.N. Housing Board [ (2005) 6 SCC 636 ] the facts before the Apex Court revealed inordinate delay of 10 years of initiating inquiry against the appellant which was not supported with any convincing explanation by the employer. The irregularities in question had taken place during the year 1990 for which disciplinary action was initiated in the year 2000. It was the case that it came into light of the audit report in the year 1995. The Apex Court however noted that explanation was least convincing since the audit was being carried out every year. 5.5 The test of prejudice was applied and it was held thus, “Under the circumstances, allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” (Para 11) 5.6 In Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y.P. Education Society [ (2013) 6 SCC 515 ] the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 14 with regard to belated conduct of inquiry that whether the court would be inclined to quash the departmental proceedings on the ground of delay would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. It was observed that though ordinarily the court should not set aside the departmental inquiry or quashed the charges on the ground of delay in initiation in the proceedings, the prejudice caused by delay may be a overriding consideration.
It was observed that though ordinarily the court should not set aside the departmental inquiry or quashed the charges on the ground of delay in initiation in the proceedings, the prejudice caused by delay may be a overriding consideration. The court must weigh all the facts to finally make up its mind. 6. Thus, it is well settled that inordinate delay is a consideration not to continue the departmental proceedings against government servant employee at the belated stage. The doctrine of prejudice is invoked in such circumstances. The courts have reasoned that the delay itself would result into sufferance and mental agony for the delinquent and it would amount to virtual punishment. When the departmental inquiry is initiated after long passage of time, delinquent would be deprived of raising proper and effective defence as he would not be expected to recollect the stale things after long time. For this reason, it is held by the Supreme Court that inordinate delay in commencement of the inquiry proceedings would have prejudicial effect on the employee. 6.1 Reverting to the facts of the present case, delay in initiating inquiry proceeding is more than 10 years. When the reply affidavit is seen, at every stage the authority has whiled away the time before taking a decision to start inquiry against the petitioners delinquents in respect of the decade old incident. The petitioners had already retired. The petitioners stand prejudiced by this very aspect. Therefore, only on the ground of delay in initiating inquiry proceedings which will indeed have the prejudicial effect, the petitioners are entitled to relief. No other aspect is required to be gone into, and hence not going into. 7. As a result of above discussion and reasons, petition deserves to be allowed. The inquiry proceedings initiated against the two petitioners pursuant to chargesheets dated 18th January, 2010 are hereby set aside. Petition stands allowed. Direct service is permitted.